
John Dewey Revisited in an Age of Educational Decline

Democracy and Education. By John Dewey. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916). Cited in the text as *DE*.

Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction To Social Psychology. By John Dewey. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922) Cited in the text as *HNC*.

Schools of Tomorrow. By John Dewey. (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1915) Cited in the text as *ST*.

Experience and Education. By John Dewey. (New York: The Macmillan Publishing Company, 1938) Cited in the text as *EE*.

In this period of crisis in American schools, a sound understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of American education is impossible without a clear grasp of John Dewey's contribution. Although the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Dr. Benjamin Rush and others of the Founding Generation still enjoy a modicum of influence here and there in U.S. schools and universities, Dewey's thought has long superseded the influence of the Founding Generation.¹ As many educational philosophers agree, including Plato, Rousseau, the Founders, and Dewey himself, the educational enterprise may be the preeminent public concern within a political regime. It is at least as critical as economics, the environment, and foreign policy-if not more so.

Revivals of Dewey's thought appear at regular intervals, the latest signaled by the completion in 1991 of the 37 volumes of Dewey's complete works by the University of Southern Illinois Press.² This commendable endeavor makes Dewey's prolific but disparate body of writings more accessible than ever before. Addi-

tional evidence of recent interest in Dewey's relevance includes the re-publication of Sidney Hook's 1939 paean to Dewey, *John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait* (1995)³, Alan Ryan's *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (1997)⁴, Welchman's *Dewey's Ethical Thought* (1995)⁵, Campbell's *Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence* (1995)⁶, and Westbrook's *John Dewey and American Democracy* (1991)⁷. Appeals to Dewey's authority continue apace both in psychology journals and in the many educational journals that populate the academic landscape and numerous and sundry educational conferences. Sometimes these appeals are implicit, sometimes explicit; at times they have a tone of outright reverence. The title of a recent article on moral education is illustrative: "The Crux of Our Inspiration."⁸

Yet Dewey is rarely seriously read or adequately understood in schools of education; instead future teachers often learn a little bit "about" Dewey but never have the opportunity to assess critically the Deweyan ideas that underlie their classes and permeate their professional organizations. Political scientists who might, by training and objective distance, furnish a better assessment of Dewey's educational thought, usually concentrate upon Dewey's political and social philosophy found in such Deweyan writings as *Democracy and Education*, *The Public and Its Problems*, *Liberalism and Social Action*,¹⁰ and *Freedom and Culture*.¹¹ As a political and social philosopher, Dewey is famous for his modern liberalism.¹² He writes in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922):

Find a man who believes that all men need is freedom *from* oppressive legal and political measures, and you have found a man who, unless he is merely obstinately maintaining his own private privilege, carries at the back of his head some heritage of the metaphysical doctrine of free-will, plus an optimistic confidence in natural harmony. He needs a philosophy that recognizes the objective character of freedom and its dependence upon a congruity of environment with human wants, an agreement which can be obtained only by profound thought and unremitting application. For freedom as a fact depends

upon conditions of work which are socially and scientifically buttressed (HNC,305-6).

But by focusing upon his political philosophy-or his psychology-only one dimension of Dewey's work is in view. Neglected is Dewey's own clue, that in order to appreciate fully his philosophy, it should be read as a complete system. Given the breadth of Dewey's work, this is admittedly difficult to do. Nonetheless, Dewey argued that all philosophy-like life in general-should be considered as a whole. In focusing upon artificially categorized dimensions of his thought, the larger picture can be difficult to appreciate.

For the educator and the political scientist alike, studying Dewey's educational philosophy offers a unique advantage, for in his educational thought all the dimensions of his philosophical thought intersect. Education was his passion and is the field in which his political aspirations, his moral philosophy, and his psychological innovations all find their purpose. Indeed, Dewey's instrumentalism teaches that without a purpose and application, philosophy is so much wasted time and effort. Dewey may have hoped to change intellectual life through other dimensions of his thought, but he expected to change the country and the world through his educational philosophy. He explains in *Democracy and Education* that he must:

contend not only with the inertia of existing educational traditions, but also with the opposition of those who are entrenched in command of the industrial machinery, and who realize that such an educational system if made general would threaten their ability to use others for their own ends... But this very fact is the presage of a more equitable and enlightened social order, for it gives evidence of the dependence of social reorganization upon educational reconstruction (DE, 319).

Such reconstruction is essential, in Dewey's view, to preserve the American democratic experience-indeed, to save it from destruction as he warns in *The School and Society*.¹³ This experience must be transformed by a revolution in education, followed by social and

economic revolution. One cannot occur without the other, but education must first change since it is "the process through which the needed transformation may be accomplished..." (DE, 332):¹⁴

Dewey's philosophy is best known as pragmatism, a designation he enjoyed with two other American philosophers, William James and Charles Pierce. As he acknowledged in the closing pages of *Democracy and Education*, "The theory of the method of knowing which is advanced in these pages may be termed pragmatic. Its essential feature is to maintain the continuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment" (DE, 344). Education, for Dewey, even more than politics, provides the link between the abstract and the practical. Whereas change in politics could be frustratingly slow, the educational process is far more efficient. By manipulating the educational process, one may more efficiently change the political and the social realities.

Dewey's philosophy, then, must always be interpreted in light of his preoccupation with social change. In some places, Dewey chooses the more militant term "instrumentalism" over "pragmatism" because the former signaled a stance decidedly contrary to the metaphysical and the transcendent, abstract distractions that, in his view, retard progress. Traditional notions of human nature, of the structure and the process of democracy, and of the nature of truth must be reworked. Dewey argued that

The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand. If there is especial need of education at the present time, if this makes urgent a reconsideration of the basic ideas of traditional philosophic systems, it is because of the thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of democracy (DE, 331).

Later in his career Dewey characterized his work as empirical or "experimental," and it is this final term that maybe most appropriate because of the anti-utilitarianism sometimes evident in his thought. There are times when Dewey's dogmatic obsession with discrediting and demolishing all that is traditional compromises his pragma-

tism to the point that his philosophy takes on features of nihilism, so intent was he on razing the traditional landscape as a prerequisite to building anew.

Several observations about his style of writing and argumentation are helpful in reading Dewey. Dewey's widely conceded but easily forgiven carelessness in argumentation occasionally mars his philosophical discourse and frustrates the reader. He tends to be redundant, both within a given work, and from one book or article to the next. Possibly, Dewey adopted this style for rhetorical purposes, employing repetition to make his argument clear to as wide an audience as possible. Since the intent of this review is to allow Dewey to speak for himself, a degree of his redundancy surfaces even in review. To filter out this characteristic of Dewey's writing is not only quite difficult, but ill-advised in this project. The ideas and arguments that the reader finds most superfluous are usually Dewey's most important ideas. Where he feared his argumentation was inadequate, he supplied the balance by repetition.

Dewey's arguments by analogy were sometimes strained; they can even prove the contrary point. More frustrating is the ambiguity and vagueness that characterizes discussion of even his most important concepts. Perhaps, though, it is this very vagueness that has given his work a certain elusiveness, yet resilience, and has even conferred a kind of mystique which has led to its perennial attraction. Successive generations of philosophers of education can argue, as Dewey himself did late in his career in *Experience and Education*, that misapplications and abuses of his educational philosophy are the result of a failure to grasp his ideas correctly, or result from an outright distortion of his philosophy. The way then is always clear for a renewal of interest in Dewey's thought, so as to "truly" explain and "accurately" apply his ideas. Despite withering attacks on his ideas that might have annihilated others, Dewey reappears at regular intervals, Phoenix-like, as the hero of educational reform. One can argue though, that philosophers and educators often look to Dewey for solutions to problems that he himself created. If this is true, a clear recognition of his influence is imperative before American education has degenerated past the point of recovery.

What persuasion Dewey was not able to muster by the cogency of his arguments he was able to supply by the sheer volume of his writing. Thus, the corpus of his writings take on a kind of "appeal to force"¹⁵ as often they have overwhelmed both his academic and popular audience alike by their sheer bulk alone. For this review, I have chosen four of Dewey's works. The first, *Democracy and Education*, is his best known work. *Democracy and Education* offers an almost seamless weave of his political and educational philosophy. The second, *Human Nature and Conduct*, is his self-described study of "social conduct" but is perhaps best described as a study of moral philosophy with critical implications for moral education. The third work, *Schools of Tomorrow*, is a blend of Dewey's theory and his showcase of progressive educational practices. *Democracy and Education* and *Schools of Tomorrow* elevated Dewey as the principal leader and spokesman for the progressive movement in education. (Dewey relied upon his disciple, W.H. Kilpatrick to implement many of his ideas through Teachers College, Columbia, where Kilpatrick taught for 28 years.) Finally, in *Experience and Education*, written very late in his career, Dewey was required to confront the many criticisms provoked by his life-long career of educational reconstruction.

DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916)

Introduction: School, Society, and the Moral Aim of Education

Democracy and Education is Dewey's best known work. It is well organized, clear, and comprehensive, containing all of Dewey's important concepts. Since it is comprehensive but of only moderate length, many of these concepts are discussed only superficially. For that reason, *Democracy and Education* may be Dewey's least objectionable work because no subject is treated in great depth before the reader is introduced to another topic. Thus, the work is less vulnerable than others of Dewey because no concept is treated extensively enough for careful analysis. All of these concepts are woven together in a philosophical system that appears at once coherent and plausible. The unity of the thesis also immunizes it

from serious criticism because even if the critic is troubled by the tone of what he reads, it is difficult to identify a strategic point of attack. Finally, the combination of educational reconstruction and democratic progress is brilliant and bestows a kind of universal appeal and philosophical orthodoxy on this work.

The title itself reflects Dewey's grand theme that the future of American democracy is dependent on the reform of American education. This is the book most likely chosen in a school of education or a department of political science as an introduction to Dewey's thought. It is fast moving, and in the first few chapters, Dewey establishes several important themes. In the first chapter of *Democracy and Education*, he introduces one of his most important themes; namely, that the educational experience should be, as much as possible, a microcosm of social life. If then, the schoolhouse is society on a small scale, the socialization of the pupil becomes the primary task of the educator.

Beings who are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap (DE, 3).

Since this socialization is the preeminent objective of education, the academic dimension of schooling may suffer.

In achieving this goal, however, we must leave behind an "unduly scholastic" and "formal notion" of education (DE, 4).

This is an important premise for Dewey to establish, because in so doing, he erases the boundaries that separate school as a unique institution. By merging school and society, the school can be saved from the inertia of rigid and irrelevant scholasticism and reconstructed so as to both resemble and produce a better society.

Formal instruction...easily becomes remote and dead-abstract and bookish, to use the ordinary words of depreciation...There is the standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of the schools, isolated from

the subject matter of life-experience (DE, 8).

Dewey denigrates the school's traditional obligation of forming moral and intellectual virtue. For in such formation, the pupil "is trained like an animal rather than educated like a human being" (DE, 13). Although Dewey notes the concern of "keeping a proper balance between "informal" and "formal" pedagogy, an important thrust of this work is to elevate informal "learning" over formal, progressively rendering traditional education obsolete. His avowed aim is to overcome an "undesirable split between the experience gained in" ordinary life experiences and "what is acquired in school." Yet, his effect will be to undermine the importance and prestige of formal education. Even so, for Dewey, a radical shift in the purpose of schooling is an urgent task. Although Dewey denigrates traditional moral education, he maintains that education has a definite moral obligation, namely, the socialization of students as a preparation for their role as social reformers.

This task is formidable because socialization in the school is not simply adaptation to the status quo. To be sure, conventional social and political formation as an "unconscious influence of the environment...is so subtle and pervasive that it affects every fiber of character and mind" (DE, 17). If students need appropriate socialization, it is so that they can reconstruct the society in which they find themselves. Dewey's self-appointed task, then, is challenging: he must socialize, but he must do so in such a way that students reject the prevailing social mores in the interest of creating new ones. By what method does Dewey propose to achieve this goal?

Although he eschews direct formal instruction, Dewey teaches that we educate, "indirectly by means of the environment" (DE, 19). This is to say that to the extent that we must exercise control, it is not over the student, but the educational process (DE 39). This is a critical point, because any other method would not satisfy Dewey's anti-authoritarianism. The process consists not so much in "books and conversation," because "these agencies have been relied upon too exclusively." Also important, if Dewey is to overcome tradition, is to avoid a didactic methodology in which educators arrogantly and

presumptuously tell students what they *ought* to learn and what they *ought* to do.

Our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack, and growth as something which fills up the gap between the immature and the mature is due to regarding childhood *comparatively*, instead of intrinsically. We treat it simply as a privation because we are measuring it by adulthood as a fixed standard. This fixes attention upon what the child has not, and will not have till he becomes a man (DE, 42).

If educators act as if they, rather than the child's interests and activities, should determine the content and methods of education, they are "guilty of an overweening presumption" (DE, 42).

In order for the school to operate efficiently, Dewey recommends "conjoint activities" which allow the child to assist in organizing his own education (DE, 40). If children could express themselves, "articulately and sincerely," Dewey notes, "they would tell a different tale..." Using a biblical allusion, he adds "there is excellent adult authority for the conviction that for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become as little children" (DE, 42).

In this regard, Dewey then underlines his chief complaint of the French philosopher Rousseau in Rousseau's educational treatise, *Emile*. Dewey argues that Rousseau's thought is too individualistic, with insufficient attention paid to the social dimension of a child's life (DE, 60). He also criticizes Rousseau for making the "natural" opposed to the "social," and for making "Nature" itself the goal of education. Dewey faults Rousseau for believing that education can occur spontaneously if only unnatural impediments are removed from the pupil.

Dewey's social goal, then, is intimately tied to his educational goals in that, if educated students are to labor for a more democratic life, their education itself must be thoroughly democratic. Stated conversely, if education is not a thoroughly democratic activity, it is inappropriate preparation for democratic life.

A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible

readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder (DE, 99).

Ideals, Goals, and Aims

Dewey is militantly opposed to "ideals" in education. He misses no opportunity to condemn them. He is slow to define what he means by this term, but the operative definition that gradually emerges has to do with pre-established goals or standards in education, whether those have to do with moral or academic achievement. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey becomes so agitated in discussion of these ideals that he introduces more objections than he can adequately explain.

In place of educational ideals, he substitutes his conception of educational "growth." "Growth" means "(i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and (ii) that the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming" (DE,50). Conventional education is misguided in that it is "connected with a false idea of growth or development; that it is a movement toward a fixed goal." Dewey asserts, "Growth is regarded as *having* an end, instead of *being* an end" (DE, 50).

In Dewey's view, the traditional dependence upon ideals of learning and behavior has produced a veritable litany of errors in education practice. In general, these consequences involve a neglect of pragmatic teaching concerns in the classroom. More specifically, education has forced students to fit preconceived goals instead of adapting the school to the student. The problems of conventional education include

first, failure to take account of the instinctive or native powers of the young; secondly, failure to develop initiative in coping

with novel situations; thirdly, an undue emphasis upon drill and other devices which secure automatic skill at the expense of personal perception (DE, 50).

All of this reinforces the tyranny that "the adult environment is accepted as a standard for the child" (DE 50). To Dewey, "goals" are no more than adult preferences. All that is produced in the pupil are "habits of dependence" upon the initiative of others. Moreover, fixed goals steal away motivation producing "loss of impetus." They induce "shillyshallying and procrastination" they force individuals to conform to general standards thus stifling individual creativity. They require teachers to use the primitive concepts of the "carrot" and the "stick," or as Dewey puts it, "adventitious motives of pleasure and pain" (DE 55).

To reiterate, in place of abstract educational goals Dewey offers his (equally abstract) conception of growth. He avers, "Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education" (DE 51). Growth is an end in itself. To the extent that we can accept this, we have matured in a kind of intellectual evolutionary step. Dewey explains,

The conception that growth and progress are just approximations to a final unchanging goal is the last infirmity of the mind in its transition from a static to a dynamic understanding of life (DE 56-57).

When Dewey cannot avoid speaking of measurements of school-house progress, He prefers to speak of "aims" in education, rather than ideals or goals. Accepting his terminology, we must ask that if ideals are prohibited, at what does education aim? Dewey stipulates that whatever it is, it can be decided only within the educational process; it cannot be imposed from without.

In our search for aims in education, we are not concerned, therefore, with finding an end outside of the educative process to which education is subordinate. Our whole conception

forbids (DE, 100).

The teacher, therefore, cannot impose his goals upon the pupil, for to do so would be "fatal" to real progress.

To talk about an educational aim when approximately each act of a pupil is dictated by the teacher, when the only order in the sequence of his acts is that which comes from the assignment of lessons and the giving of directions by another, is to talk nonsense (DE, 101-102).

Aims must be an "outgrowth of existing conditions." They cannot "issue from some outside source." Aims must also be tentative, "flexible," and subject to change just as a farmer alters his methods based upon changes in soil, climate, and weather conditions (DE, 104-5). Applied to education, this means that "it is as absurd for the [teacher] to set up his 'own' aims as the proper objects of the growth of the children as it would be for the farmer to set up an ideal of farming irrespective of conditions." It seems that for Dewey, aims really mean methods, or something less. He later qualifies this discussion by explaining that aims might be considered "suggestions" to educators (DE, 107). He then adds, "Educators have to be on their guard against ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate," because "'general' also means 'abstract,'" and "such abstractness means remoteness, and throws us back, once more..." (DE, 109). "[E]xternally imposed aims" are "responsible for the emphasis put upon the notion of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish" (DE, 110).

By attending to the child's "interest," we avoid "certain conceptions of mind and of subject matter which have had great vogue in philosophic thought in the past, and which exercise a serious hampering influence upon the conduct of instruction and discipline" (DE, 130). Traditional "subject matter" is "indifferent" to "the habit and preferences of the individual." If subject matter is not uniquely tailored to the individual student, the student must waste "effort to bring the mind to bear upon it..." This in turn requires

"discipline of the will" which for Dewey is a fruitless and unreasonable demand (DE, 133). Dewey complains that a "peculiar artificiality attaches to much of what is learned in schools" because formal learning "does not possess for them the kind of reality which the subject matter of their vital experiences possesses." Even in matters of aesthetics, Dewey enjoins the teacher not to recommend particular works of art as having intrinsic worth. Students must be free to make this discovery, and this way we may avoid "the division between laboring classes and leisure classes" that the appreciation of the fine arts often fosters (DE, 136).

Work, Play, and Organization of Subject Matter

All of this, however, does not mean that the student does not work. On the contrary, Dewey advocates "[i]ntellectual *thoroughness*" which includes

straightforwardness, flexible intellectual interest or open minded will to learn, integrity of purpose, and acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of one's activity including thought (DE, 179).

The student undertakes this pursuit as the teacher furnishes an "environment" rather than subject matter. This saves the student from becoming victim to "the formulated, the crystallized, and systematized subject matter of the adult; the material as found in books and in works of art, etc" (DE, 182). Realizing that the student cannot learn in a vacuum, Dewey acknowledges that some amount of authoritative subject matter may inadvertently filter into the student experience despite the educators best efforts to prevent it. In that case, the learning material must be scrutinized for its instrumental value (DE, 183). Stated again, all subject matter is "tentative and provisional until its worth is tested experimentally..." (DE, 189).

In revamping-if not rejecting-the standard curriculum, Dewey will now turn himself to erasing the line distinguishing work and play. This quickly leads to his undermining the traditional categories distinguishing academic disciplines. He does all of this in the

interest of making learning more relevant to the student by tying learning to his or her daily experience. Dewey argues that play is often a more conducive environment to learning than work, as "[e]xperience has shown that when children have a chance at physical activities which bring their natural impulses into play, going to school is a joy, management is less of a burden, and learning is easier" (DE, 194). Gone is the Aristotelian-Thomistic distinction between work, play, and leisure. Such distinctions are not intrinsic; they are cultural. Gone also is the presumption that a sound education is built around books:

In pioneer times, for example, outside occupations gave a definite and valuable intellectual and moral training. Books and everything concerned with them were, on the other hand, rare and difficult of access; they were the only means of outlet from a narrow and crude environment. Wherever such conditions obtain, much maybe said in favor of concentrating school activity upon books. The situation is very different, however, in most communities to-day (DE, 196).

Dewey argues that just as gardening can be used as an informal environment to teach botany and chemistry, so also can all meaningful subject matter be taught through informal "hands-on" activity (DE, 200). History, in Dewey's view, is useful only insofar as it can be made immediately relevant to the present. Dewey argues for the use of history for cultivating a socialized intelligence..." This use "constitutes its moral significance." But,

[i]t is possible to employ it as a kind of reservoir of anecdotes to be drawn on to inculcate special moral lessons on this virtue or that vice. But such teaching is not so much an ethical use of history as it is an effort to create moral impressions by means of more or less authentic material (DE, 196).

Dewey explains that this traditional use of history only "produces a temporary emotional glow; at worst, callous indifference to moralizing" (DE, 217).

It does not seem to be Dewey's purpose to depreciate corn-

pletely the study of history and geography. He says, "Geography and history are the two great school resources for bringing about the enlargement of the significance of a direct personal experience" (DE, 218). He puts considerable restraints, however, upon its study. For example history cannot be used for didactic moral lessons and it must be immediately relevant to be of value. For that reason, Dewey may make the meaningful study of history impossibly difficult (DE, 218).

The Scientific Method

Dewey's random and empirical approach to subject matter is more consistent, in his view, with scientific methodology. This discussion of the scientific method, in turn, introduces Dewey's closely related concept of "intelligence":

Science represents the office of intelligence...pursued systematically, intentionally, and on a scale due to freedom from limitations of habit. It is the sole instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from accidental, progress (DE, 228).

Dewey dismisses arguments against his promotion of the scientific method. He asserts that the reluctance or "[d]islike to employ scientific knowledge as it functions in men's occupations is itself a survival of an aristocratic culture," and is more fitting in a society of "slaves and serfs..." (DE, 229). If "humanistic studies are set in opposition to study of nature" they eventually "shrink" to a study of "the classics, to languages no longer spoken" (DE, 229). The scientific method is the only "organ of general social progress" (DE, 231). The school should be a kind of "laboratory" in which the student should, in some fashion, assign "values" to all things by means of the scientific methodology, whether the subject matter is literary, musical, or moral. All subjects are equally amenable to this process, but short of such a method, the student only learns to "recite" the values of others.

Nevertheless, the student is not free to make entirely independent valuations for Dewey imposes his particular criteria of utility on all normative judgments. If, for example, poetry cannot be made into

"a resource in the business of life," it is "artificial poetry"(DE, 231-241). It appears, moreover, than those valuations that the student does complete are subject to constant reevaluation by the teacher to ensure their instrumental value and to weed out the inevitable but dangerous accumulation of purely traditional matter.

Since the curriculum is always getting loaded down with purely inherited matter and with subjects which represent mainly the energy of some influential person or group of persons in behalf of something dear to them, it requires constant inspection, criticism, and revision to make sure it is accomplishing its purpose (DE, 241).

If this kind of circumspection is relaxed, "there is always the probability that it represents the values of adults...or of pupils a generation ago rather than those of the present day (DE, 241). Dewey concedes that the usefulness of subject matter is sometimes difficult to project. One measure, then, of instrumental value, is the student's response: "When pupils are genuinely concerned in learning Latin, that is of itself proof that it possesses value" (DE, 242).

Only the full integration of the scientific method into education can address otherwise intractable social problems. For Dewey, the universal utility of such methodology has already been proven in the social sciences-although he offers no illustrations for his sweeping assertion (DE, 285). It only remains to apply scientific thinking to especially "perplexing problems as insanity, intemperance, poverty, public sanitation, city planning, [and]the conservation of natural resources..." (DE, 285). In his condemnation of "non-scientific" learning, Dewey reaches for the most pejorative term he can find.

So far as schools still teach from textbooks and rely upon the principle of authority and acquisition rather than upon that of discovery and inquiry, their methods are *Scholastic* (DE, 280) (emphasis added).

Although Dewey in later years would distance himself from radical Progressive experimentation, he should not have been surprised that his authority would be cited to justify both the

denigration of textbook learning and the outright exclusion of textbooks from the classroom.

"Learning by Doing" and Utility

Progressive education has become famous-or notorious as the case may be-for insisting that learning take place by *doing*. This means that whether the subject is history, arithmetic, literature, or science, if it cannot be learned through an activity, then it immediately falls under suspicion. So, it is no surprise that Dewey regularly denigrates "formal education" "mere bookishness" and "what is popularly termed the academic." He rejects out of hand the values that adults typically impose upon their children and pupils. These include, for example, "honesty, amiability, perseverance, loyalty," as well as the endorsement of "classics of literature, painting, music...." Dewey argues that if these values are taught-rather than experienced-they "will be *merely* symbolic"(Dewey, 1916:234-5).¹⁷ Dewey automatically disallows "inherited values":

Since the curriculum is always getting loaded down with purely inherited traditional matter and with subjects which represent mainly the energy of some influential person or group of persons in behalf of something dear to them, it requires constant inspection, criticism, and revision to make sure it is accomplishing its purpose. Then there is always the probability that it represents the values of adults rather than those of children and youth, or those of pupils a generation ago rather than those of the present day (DE, 241).

What seems to motivate Dewey is a visceral abhorrence that anything might be transmitted to students, based on the experience of previous generations, that students do not experience themselves. This, however, is hardly a pragmatic position to take. Here and elsewhere, Dewey stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the obvious inefficiency of requiring elementary or high school students to discover everything anew.

As we have noted, Dewey also eschews the traditional categorization of subject material, i.e., the segregation of subjects into

sciences, literature, history, etc. Our division of courses is a historical artifact with no intrinsic or instrumental value to compel its acceptance. While most all educators recognize that, at times, interdisciplinary study is useful and appropriate, Dewey would have us discard all categorical designations so that learning might occur in a completely spontaneous and random fashion as each child is guided by his own interest and impulse. In taking such a position, he again ignores the impracticality of abandoning all distinct courses of study in favor of the unknown. His interest here is not so much utility as it is anti-authoritarianism. Revealing is his choice of terms, especially the subtle but pejorative use of the word "institution" to denote an area of study. By designating academic disciplines institutions, he associates them with a kind of reactionary pedagogical *ancien regime*. We will later see in *Human Nature and Conduct* that he identifies American education with pre-revolutionary France.

Each interest is acknowledged as a kind of fixed *institution* to which something in the course of study must correspond...The variety of interest which should mark any rich and balanced experience have been torn asunder and deposited in separate *institutions* with diverse and independent purposes and methods (DE, 246-7) (emphasis added).

For Dewey, there is no distinction between education for leisure and education for work because these distinctions rest upon preordained value assignments. The traditional idea, then, of a "liberal education," finds no home in Dewey's thought.

Certain studies and methods are retained on the supposition that they have the sanction of peculiar liberality, the chief content of the term liberal being uselessness for practical ends (DE, 257).

Dewey agrees there is a difference between "living" and "living worthily," but such a life is not attained by denoting arbitrarily some subject matter as suitable for liberal studies and some as suitable for practical training. Dewey's apparent goal is unfettered pedagogical freedom for the student. No other mode of education is consistent

with democratic life.

But the essence of the demand for freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an individual to make his own special contribution to a group interest, and to partake of its activities in such ways that social guidance shall be a matter of his own mental attitude, and not a mere authoritative dictation of his acts (DE, 301).

Freedom from authority, freedom from the curriculum, freedom from convention—all such liberation is essential for "democratic" schooling and true intellectual independence.

Freedom means essentially the part played by thinking—which is personal—in learning: it means intellectual initiative, independence in observation, judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of adaptation to them (DE, 302).

Such freedom must be reflective of every facet of the educational process itself. For example, individual freedom "cannot be separated from opportunity for free play of physical movements," because "[e]nforced physical quietude may be unfavorable to realization of a problem. Dewey's ultimate goal is a liberated "mental attitude." "True individualism" cannot be attained in education until there is a "relaxation of the grip of the authority of custom and traditions..." (DE, 305).

We must also note that just as school should not be scholastic, neither should it be vocational. It is true that to "find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness." Dewey concedes that "the failure to discover one's true business in life" is tragic. It would seem, then, that vocational education would be an easy fit with Dewey's philosophy. But since the school cannot assume a "goal-oriented" posture, the activity of the school must be the important thing. Dewey, accordingly, warns against too closely defined vocational education:

To predetermine some future occupation for which education is to be a strict preparation is to injure the possibilities of

present development and thereby to reduce the adequacy of preparation for a future right employment (DE, 310).

So, despite the utility of vocational tracks, Dewey must prohibit them for reasons of ideology. He thus stipulates that vocational education be "indirect" rather than "direct" so that, as before, "the needs and interests of the pupil" are given free play. By so doing, "vocational guidance" will not lead up to a "definitive, irretrievable, and complete choice" which is likely to be "rigid, hampering further growth" (DE, 311).

Summary

In the final chapters of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey cannot resist one more attack upon traditional moral philosophy, religion, and educational practice. In this instance he does so by an attack upon "dualisms," meaning "basic divisions, separations, or antitheses." Such divisions prevent "fluent and free intercourse," which ultimately means a loss of "continuity." Dualisms, for example, "end in a division between things of this world as mere appearances and an inaccessible essence of reality." A dualistic approach also divides-artificially-the "particular and universal" and separates "activity and passivity in knowing." A dualistic cleavage between the "intellect and the emotions" somehow induces teachers to rely too heavily upon conventional grading because by segregating and suppressing the emotional component of the child in favor of the intellectual, students lose interest and initiative in learning (DE, 333-335). Dewey notes that biology and the discovery of evolution show that life is a movement of "simpler and more complex organic forms until we reach man." Further proof is furnished by the practice of carpentry that does not involve discrete disconnected acts but one continuous process in the interest of construction (DE, 337). Dewey's talk, then of dualisms, while presented as a philosophical proposition, grants Dewey the rhetorical advantage of demonizing his opponents, who would resist his erasing the boundaries between the school and society, between what is moral and intellectual and, between what is academic and vocational.

Dewey reiterates the role of the scientific method, without which we have "no right to call anything knowledge"(DE, 338). He notes that it "will doubtless take a long time" to accept that the scientific method is valid "in social and moral matters," and to relinquish "the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority..." (DE, 339). If we are to achieve the moral aims of education, we must refrain from "building castles in the air"and avoid the "evils"¹⁸ of established, but fallacious thinking, about education and philosophy, fallacies that render moral education in school "practically hopeless" (DE, 348, 350, 354).

The hopelessness of traditional moral education is the delusion of identifying morals with character, a delusion fraught with false premises, including false notions about the psychological make-up of the child.

Thus in education we have that systematic depreciation of interest which has been noted, plus the necessity in practice, with most pupils, of recourse to extraneous and irrelevant rewards and penalties.... Thus we have the spectacle of professional educators decrying appeal to interest while they uphold with great dignity the need of reliance upon examinations, marks, promotions and emotions, prizes and the time-honored paraphernalia of rewards and punishments (DE, 336).

Dewey also reiterates that since all aspects of education are moral, education should not be narrowly concerned with the development of character. He insists that "the moral and the social...are, in the last analysis, identical with each other" (DE, 358). Therefore, Dewey summarizes, the "school must itself be a community life in all which that implies" and learning in school should be continuous with that out of school" (DE, 358). "To maintain capacity for such education is the essence of morals" (DE, 360).

Even in as careful a work as *Democracy and Education*, the reader cannot fail to note the destructive nature of Dewey's educational philosophy. While he offers a great deal that is novel in educational theory, he cannot do so without aggressively dismantling what exists. At times, this destructive impulse is quite explicit

as with his attacks against religion. Other times his deprecation of the conventional is more subtle. Whatever the mode of attack, this is an indispensable Deweyan strategy that characterizes all of his educational work.

***HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT:
An Introduction to Social Psychology (1922)***

Overview

Although Dewey characterizes this work as a study in social psychology, it might also be called a study in moral philosophy. It is perhaps Dewey's most comprehensive treatment of the subject, and his most revealing. He includes enough psychology so as to explain his conception of moral growth, so psychology does figure significantly in the work. Since for Dewey "all morality is social," his inclusion of the word "social" in the sub-title of this work is significant. *Human Nature and Conduct* began as series of lectures Dewey delivered at Stanford University in the spring of 1918. Dewey did not write this book with only education in mind; his purpose was broader. He wanted to supply a psychology for democratic practice, one that would provide the theoretical foundation for progressive democratic change in the post World War I period. He wanted to show how the social dynamics between the members of a participatory democracy might, and should, take place. The work is indispensable though, for providing a fuller picture of Dewey's moral philosophy as he felt it should appear in education. More to the point, for Dewey, a true democratic psychology can be discovered only by means of the scientific method as it is exercised in the schoolhouse. Once discovered, this psychology can be applied to society at large in the interest of democratic progress.

This work is significant in that it shows Dewey's forceful rejection of the Aristotelian-Thomistic system of virtue, although it suits his purposes to retain much of the classical vocabulary of moral philosophy. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey is less restrained and subtle with his many intellectual prejudices than in

other works. Although his arguments at times may remain vague, his predispositions in *Human Nature and Conduct* are quite transparent. A major thrust of this work consists of a systematic dismantling of traditional moral philosophy. His criticism of traditional ideas reaches the point of ridicule. For example, in attacking the "simplistic" view that virtue is an individually possessed trait, and the concomitant idea that human beings are capable of praiseworthy conduct by the exercise of virtue apart from a revolution in social conditions, he says,

We are all natural Jack Homers. If the plum comes when we put in and pull out our thumb we attribute the satisfactory result to personal virtue (HNC, 253).

He makes little attempt to veil his hostility to Christianity: "For Christendom as a whole, morality has been connected with supernatural commands, rewards and penalties." Those who no longer hold these beliefs have "escaped this delusion"(HNC, 294). Natural law is equally invalid as we erroneously "have insisted that natural laws are themselves moral laws," and have frantically substituted nature for failed religion.

When mythology is dying in its open forms, and when social life is so disturbed that custom and tradition fail to supply their wonted control, men resort to Nature as a norm. They apply to Nature all the eulogistic predicates previously associated with divine law; or natural law is conceived of as the only true divine law. This happened in one form in Stoicism. It happened in another form in the deism of the eighteenth century with its notion of a benevolent, harmonious, wholly rational order of Nature (HNC, 297).

In light of so many delusions, Dewey warns, as if from the pulpit, "The path of truth is narrow and straitened" and [ijt is only too easy to wander beyond the course from this side to that." Religion "has made morals fanatic or fantastic, sentimental or authoritative by severing them from actual facts and forces..." (HNC, 296).

Fundamental to Dewey's moral philosophy is a radically new

conception of human nature. His conception, though, is predictably vague. One thing is clear: human nature is not fixed. It is malleable, a premise that grants the contemporary liberal optimism to the possibility of progress. The following represents Dewey at his most concrete in discussing human nature.

Human nature exists and operates in an environment. And it is not "in" that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil. It is of them, continuous with their energies, dependent upon their support, capable of an increase only as it utilizes them, and as it gradually rebuilds from their crude indifference an environment genially civilized (HNC, 296).

With a casual style that characterizes the book, Dewey recalls the saying, "Give a dog a bad name and hang him" By quoting this proverb, Dewey means to expose those moralists who, through their unjustified prejudice, stamp human nature with "suspicion, with fear," and with "sour looks" (HNC, 1). He acknowledges that theologians deserve much of the blame, but for Dewey, the blame also lies with the working assumptions of moral philosophy in general because, as he notes, "Morality is largely concerned with controlling human nature" (HNC, 1). Dewey will argue, in this work and elsewhere, that it is those very impulses of human nature that should be the point of departure for educators, and not the demon to be exorcized. Dewey will argue time and again that the impulses and interests of children should be the leading and organizing factor in the school day in place of preconceived courses of study imposed from without.

Conceptions of human nature have also been the pretext of social control:

Control has been vested in an oligarchy. Parents, priests, chiefs, social censors have supplied aims, aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed, to the young, laymen, ordinary folk; a few have given and administered rule, and the mass have in a passable fashion and with reluctance

obeyed. Everybody knows that good children are those who make as little trouble as possible for their elders, and since most of them cause a good deal of annoyance they must be naughty by nature. Generally speaking, good people have been those who did what they were told to do, and lack of eager compliance is a sign of something wrong in their nature (HNC, 2-3).

Dewey concedes that such perverse social mechanisms and relationships may not exist by deliberate design because "no matter how much men in authority have turned moral rules into an agency of class supremacy, any theory which attributes to the origin of rule deliberate design is false"(HNC, 3).

Whatever the cause, our dysfunctional moral philosophy flows from our dismal understanding of human nature. We have failed to use the tools of modern psychology and physiology to achieve a better view. Reaping the whirlwind, we have permitted "the evils which have resulted from severing morals from the actualities of human physiology and psychology"(HNC, 3).

So, it is Dewey's task to encourage the discovery of a more sound view of human nature and morals since "Our science of human nature in comparison with physical sciences is rudimentary." Thus, our science of "morals which are concerned with the health, efficiency and happiness of a development of human nature are correspondingly elementary" (HNC, 3). Dewey is careful to separate himself, at least rhetorically, from the Rousseauistic "romantic glorification of natural impulse as something superior to all moral claims" (HNC, 6). His rhetoric, however, cannot obscure the fact that, on balance, Dewey's view of human nature is much closer to Rousseau's than he cares to admit, at least in this book."

In case any doubt remains of Dewey's disdain for religion and the role it has played in the obfuscation of morals, he adds additional comment. He is contemptuous of religious moralists for it is they who separate morals from everyday life.

Some become engrossed in spiritual egotism. They are preoccupied with the state of their character, concerned for the

purity of their motives and the goodness of their souls (HNC, 7).

This preoccupation is nothing more than self-interested "conceit" and it is the "exaltation" of this conceit that degenerates into a self-absorption. This self-absorption produces "a corrosive inhumanity which exceeds the possibilities of any other known form of selfishness." In other instances "persistent preoccupation with the thought of an ideal realm breeds morbid discontent with surroundings, or induces a futile withdrawal into an inner world..." (HNC, 7).

Dewey seeks a middle road to social improvement, equidistant between two extreme and simplistic paths. One side argues that social reform comes about only when individuals first "purify their own hearts." The other asserts that institutional reform must precede individual improvement. Dewey declines to acknowledge the third route, namely that both institutional reform and individual moral improvement may be essential. Instead, he creates a middle ground that concentrates upon the "interaction" of the individual and the social. This interaction he will call "habit," and habit is the exclusive possession of neither the individual nor his environment.

Two observations of Dewey's position on this issue are pertinent. One, this conception of "habit" as the interaction of the individual and the social will always remain vague. This flaw is acknowledged by Dewey's supporters and critics alike. The second important point is that Dewey's attempt to steer this middle course is untenable; he consistently finds himself on the modern liberal side of a predominant emphasis on social reform.

In conclusion to this introduction, Dewey advocates "a morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it..." (HNC, 12). Dewey attempts this by dividing *Human Nature and Conduct* into three major concepts, titled "The Place of Habit in Conduct," "The Place of Impulse in Conduct," and "The Place of Intelligence In Conduct." I find no better way to understand and assess this important book than to follow Dewey's own organization.

Part I: The Place of Habit in Conduct

Although Dewey retains the Aristotelian-Thomistic term "habit", his definition of the same is novel. The earlier individualistic notion of habit was a "fatuity" because "moral dispositions are thought of belonging exclusively to self." Consequently, "the self is...isolated from natural and social surrounds." Thus,

A whole school of morals flourished upon capital drawn from restricting morals to character and then separating character from conduct, motives from actual deeds (HNC, 15-16).

Consequently, morals have become "subjective" and "individualistic"(HNC, 15-16). To be sure, "[h]onesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility" are not private possessions of a person. They are "working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces."

Dewey's position here immediately raises a problem of accountability as an important questions surfaces: "To whom, or to what is one responsible for one's behavior?" This question of accountability is one that plagues Dewey's philosophy, and it is conspicuous here. Dewey notes that only if an individual were totally "alone in the world" would his "habits...belong to him alone." In that instance "responsibility and virtue would be his alone.... But habits involve the support of "environing conditions" such as "a society or some specific group of fellow-men." Therefore,

Conduct is always shared.... It is not an ethical "ought" that conduct *should* be social. It is social, whether bad or good (HNC, 16-17).

So as not to leave his reader in any doubt, Dewey, by way of illustration, applies this principle to criminal justice noting,

Our entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends to prevent recognition of social partnership in producing crime; it falls in with a belief in metaphysical free-will.... Society excuses itself by laying the blame on the criminal (HNC, 18).

The previous passage confirms that despite Dewey's attempt to occupy a unique position between individual and societal moral responsibility, when he makes the practical application, the onus of responsibility for reform falls upon the side of social change. The following passage supports the same observation.

Until we know the conditions which have helped for the characters we approve and disapprove, our efforts to create the one and do away with the other will be blind and halting.... To change the worldng character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits...(HNC, 19).

Dewey acknowledges his departure from conventional terminology as he says, "The word habit may seem twisted somewhat from its customary use when employed as we have been using it" (HNC, 40).

Having redefined the concept of habit, Dewey now turns his attention to the concept of "will." Not surprisingly, he denies the importance of the will since there is no virtue upon which it might be exercised. Although we have tended to "think of habits as means, waiting, like tools in a box, to be used by conscious resolve," such a view is misguided because of reliance upon the operation of the will. Dewey reveals that the idea of voluntary virtue and vice is a belief in a kind of simplistic "magic" because the "man who feels that *his* virtues are his own personal accomplishments is likely to be also the one who thinks that by passing laws he can throw the fear of God into others and make them virtuous by edict and prohibitory mandate" (HNC, 27). As if Dewey's meaning of habit and will were not elusive enough, Dewey offers the enigmatic assertion that habit and will are, in fact, synonymous.

Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will (HNC, 42).

Anticipating the reader's frustration in seeking more precise definitions of these important moral concepts, Dewey warns that "we are inclined to take the notions of goodness in character and goodness in results in too fixed a way" (HNC, 48).

It stands to reason that if virtue and vice cannot be individualized, then character cannot be personalized. Neither is there any place for conventional notions of "motive." In the absence of better "methods of scientific analysis and continuous registration and reporting," our ability to judge "motive" is "rudimentary."

We are inclined to wholesale judgments of character, dividing men into goats and sheep, instead of recognizing that all character is speckled, and that the problem of moral judgment is one of discriminating the complex of acts and habits..." (HNC, 48).

In the absence of better psychological means of analysis based upon scientific observation, we can at best recognize "*tendency*." To take the analysis of moral philosophy one step further, Dewey notes that an expectation of confidence, even certainty, in moral judgment of character is a "conceit," a conceit that has been fostered most notably by religion which offers the very assurance of moral belief and behavior that Dewey scorns. The effect of religion has been "to cherish this attitude by making men think that the universe invariably conspires to support the good and bring the evil to naught." The consequence is "'idealistic' utopias [and also]...all wholesale pessimism and distrust of life" (HNC, 49-50).

Dewey, then, deliberately leaves us in uncertainty until we have better means by which to analyze and judge moral behavior. He warns that we must "never assume that a moral judgment which reaches certainty is possible," until better means of analysis are possible (HNC, 51).

Any observed form or object is but a challenge. The case is not otherwise with ideals of justice or peace or human brotherhood, or equality, or order. They too are not things self-enclosed to be known by introspection as objects were once supposed to be known by rational insight. Like thunderbolts and tubercular disease and the rainbow they can be known only by extensive and minute observation of consequences incurred in action (HNC, 6-7).

To hope for more is to embrace "a false psychology of an isolated self and a subjective morality" that "shuts out from morals the things important to it, [namely] acts and habits in their objective consequences." By doing so, we will miss the opportunity of "breaking down old rigidities of habit and preparing the way for acts that recreate an environment" (HNC, 6). The traditional must be discarded before we can apprehend the true nature of morality.

Part II: The Place of Impulse in Conduct

Part II provides a better idea of Dewey's direction. Here the influence of Rousseau is strong though not acknowledged. Dewey is optimistic that by focusing upon the child we may find a better understanding of human conduct. His optimism, however, lures him into a heavily romanticized view of the nature of childhood.

And yet the intimation never wholly deserts us that there is in the unformed activities of childhood and youth the possibilities of a better life for the community as well as for individuals here and there. This dim sense is the ground of our abiding idealization of childhood. For with all its extravagancies and uncertainties, its effusions and reticence, it remains a standing proof of a life wherein growth is normal not an anomaly, activity a delight not a task, and where habit forming is an expansion of power not its shrinkage (HNC, 99).

To follow this more enlightened path, we must discard our conventional disapproval of childishness. This disapproval has justified the imposition of adult standards upon juvenile behavior: "Habit and impulse may war with each other, but it is a combat between the habits of adults and the impulses of the young, and not, as with the adult, a civil warfare whereby personality is rent asunder." Dewey argues, "Our usual measure for the 'goodness' of children is the amount of trouble they make for grownups, which means of course the amount they deviate from adult habits and expectations" (HNC, 99). Dewey is so convinced of the ingenuousness of juvenile impulse that, in a curious way, he accuses adults of pursuing religion to regain what they have condemned in the young:

We compensate for the harshness and monotony of our present insistence upon formed habits imagining a future heaven in which we too shall respond freshly and generously to each incident of life (HNC, 99-100).

It seems that what Dewey calls "impulse," earlier moral philosophers called "passion". For Dewey however, impulse is not to be harnessed to do the work of virtue as we might discipline passion. Impulse is to be set free and studied to see where it goes, followed and observed by the social scientist after it has been freed for creative activity. Dewey must assert again his refusal to accept the unalterability of human nature. "Custom" has fostered entrenched attitudes and habits and created only an appearance of a fixed nature.

Those who argue that social and moral reform is impossible on the ground that the Old Adam of human nature remains forever the same, attribute however to native activities the permanence and inertia that in truth belong only to acquired customs (HNC, 109).

Stated differently, we have employed faulty logic by starting with the result-fixed customs and social mores-and assumed they were the consequence of unalterable traits.

We thus take the same social custom twice over: once as an existing fact and then as an original force which produced the fact, and utter sage platitudes about the unalterable workings of human nature or of race (HNC, 111).

For example, belligerence between nations is not inevitable. On the contrary, the individual and social conditions that lead to war can be re-channeled.

Social conditions rather than an old unchangeable Adam have generated wars: the ineradicable impulses that are utilized in them are capable of being drafted into many other channels (HNC, 113).

The solution to such hostility Dewey argues, is a "general social

re-organization" that will "redistribute forces, immunize, divert and nullify" (HNC, 115). He describes a kind of vicious circle in which customs create habits. Habits then reflect back upon customs to perpetuate them until the process repeats itself. Once formed, "[h]abits perpetuate themselves, by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities."

They stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select, concentrate and organize the latter into their own likeness. They create out of the formless void of impulses a world made in their own image. Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct (HNC, 125).

Although "Recognition of the correct psychology locates the problem," it does not however "guarantee its solution"(HNC, 125).

Existing institutions impose their stamp, their superscription, upon impulse and instinct...How then can we get leverage for changing institutions...? Shall we not have to depend in the future as in the past upon upheaval and accident to dislocate customs so as to release impulses to serve as points of departure for new habits? (HNC,126).

Dewey asks, "Is there any [non-violent] way out of the vicious circle?" (HNC, 127). The answer, already proposed in *Democracy and Education*, is the school. Dewey explains that there are "possibilities resident in the education of the young which have never yet been taken advantage of." The "young are not as yet as subject to the full impact of established customs. Their life of impulsive activity is vivid, flexible, experimenting, curious" (HNC,127).

At this point in *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey cautiously introduces his idea of "intelligence" as that which should guide the educational process. Although here he offers a slightly different explication of intelligence than he had supplied in *Democracy and Education*, this important Deweyan concept still remains shrouded in ambiguity. He first notes that, "in order for the education of the young [to be] efficacious in inducing an improved society, " adults should not design it. If they do, they will simply substitute one

"rigidity" for another.

What is necessary is that habits be formed which are more *intelligent*, more sensitively percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current. Then they will meet their own problems and propose their own improvements (HNC, 128) (emphasis added).

As vague as this proposition might be, it is the only solution because if "we had to wait upon exhortations and unembodied 'ideals' to effect social alterations, we should indeed wait long." Better is "*intelligent* direction," even if we do not know exactly what that means at the present time (HNC, 129). We do know that intelligence is to be uncovered by scientific analysis and psychological study. The best environment in which to undertake this study is in situations of play, because in Dewey's view, they are the social settings least constrained by malformed "habit." Hence the immense strategic importance of "play" and of "art" which Dewey defines as "make-believe" activity (HNC, 160). As we learn by studying children at play, "we may set hopefully at work upon a course of social invention and experimental engineering" (HNC, 148). The success of all of this depends upon our "escape from the clutch of custom" so that impulses might be released to be used by "the work of intelligence" (HNC, 170). Dewey accordingly writes, "To the study of intelligence in action we now turn our attention" (HNC, 171).

Part III: The Place of Intelligence in Conduct

In this section Dewey will explain that "intelligence" should guide moral deliberation and progress. As a prelude to this discussion, Dewey must first address himself to that which should not guide either our deliberations or our progress. It must not be Aristotle's goal of excellence, nor can it be the oriental concept of "Nirvana." The medieval ideal of "heavenly bliss" must be rejected as must also be rejected Herbert Spencer's goal of social evolution. Finally, the

concept of "conscience" must be renounced as it is a fiction and no real faculty at all (HNC, 184-5).

Moral deliberation, he notes, is nothing but experimentation and moral choice is the random step involved in such experimentation: Moral choice is no more than "simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action"(HNC, 190,193). Moral acts do not demand the control and channeling of passions and desires for that would imply that passion is bad. At this point, Dewey finds it convenient to mischaracterize Aristotelian/Thomistic moral philosophy as Stoicism by ridiculing the attempt to eliminate the "emotional, passionate phase of action...in behalf of a bloodless reason" (HNC, 195-6).

Instead he suggests that morality will involve the "attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires"(HNC, 196). Reason is not the governing faculty in moral deliberation, it is instead an outcome of successful experimentation: "For reason...is an outcome...not a primitive force" (HNC, 247). Dewey seems to say here that reason will be a component of intelligence once intelligence is discovered.

For Dewey there is no objective truth. He castigates the pernicious "false notion of antecedent truths" (HNC, 243). "Principles are no more than "hypotheses with which to experiment" (HNC, 239). We tend to cling to "[f]ixed ends" because of a juvenile "love of certainty" that demands "guarantees in advance of action." Dewey harshly charges, as he has before, that traditional moral philosophy has somehow been foisted upon one class for the advantage of another:

The great trouble with what passes for moral ends and ideals is that they do not get beyond the stage of fancy of something agreeable and desirable based upon an emotional wish; very often, at that, not even an original wish, but the wish of some leader which has been conventionalized and transmitted through channels of authority (HNC, 255).

The "Good" is not fixed; it is not an elusive goal. "In quality, the good is never twice alike. It never copies itself. it is new every morning,

fresh every evening. It is unique in its every presentation (HNC, 211). Teleological morals have misled us all.

Over and over again, one point has recurred for criticism—the subordination of activity to a result outside itself. Whether that goal be thought of as pleasure, as virtue, as perfection, as final enjoyment of salvation, is secondary to the fact that the moralists who have asserted fixed ends have in all their differences from one another agreed in the basic idea that present activity is but a means. We have insisted that happiness, reasonableness, virtue, perfecting, are on the contrary, parts of the significance of present action (HNC, 265).

So the choice "is between the development of a technique by which intelligence will become an intervening partner and a continuation of a regime of accident, waste and distress" (HNC, 277). The reader must still wonder at this juncture, what is the definition of intelligence, as Dewey has spent far more time attacking what intelligence must replace instead of explaining the meaning of intelligence.

Summary

Dewey acknowledged, writing in the late 1930s, that the memory of the First World War had tended to invite pessimism in regard to human progress. However, for Dewey, such pessimism does not invalidate the idea of progress; instead, it questions the moral ideals that arise from the traditional concept of a rational universe. He is even hopeful that "The bankruptcy of the notion of fixed goods to be attained and stably possessed may possibly be the means of turning the mind of man to a tenable theory of progress—to attention to present troubles and possibilities" (HNC, 287). That more "tenable theory of progress" rests upon intelligence.

While not defining intelligence, he describes its operation. Certain critics of Dewey have equated intelligence with the scientific method, but they are not quite the same. Dewey's "intelligence" means not only the use of the scientific method, but also that which is to be attained by the scientific method. At times for Dewey,

"intelligence" seems to acquire an almost spiritual dimension. Regarding intelligence, he explains, "'It thinks' is a truer psychological statement than 'I think'" (HNC, 314). He further notes that although we cannot depend upon a rational universe, intelligence takes advantage of circumstances so as to win whatever fortune may yield:

The gratuitous help of unforeseen circumstance we cannot afford to despise. Luck...has a way of favoring the intelligent and showing its back to the stupid. And the gifts of fortune when they come are fleeting except when they are made taut by intelligent adaptation of conditions (HNC, 305).

In the unlikely case that the reader has failed to understand, Dewey asserts that cooperating with intelligence is difficult if not impossible until we can shed the encumbrance of a moral philosophy based upon ideas of "Right" and of misleading notions of individual responsibility. We must accept that "moral judgment and moral responsibility are the work wrought in us by the social environment" since "all morality is social..." (HNC, 316).

Judgment in which the emphasis falls upon blame and approbation has more heat than light. It is more emotional than intellectual (HNC, 320).

So-called "moral" persons get so occupied with defending their conduct from real and imagined criticism that they have little time left to see what their acts really amount to and the habit of self-blame inevitably extends to include others since it is a habit (HNC, 321). The chief obstacle judging by the venom of his attack-is traditional religion, by which he is continually offended, and which he always regards with hostility:

Religion has lost itself in cults, dogmas and myths....it has been perverted into something uniform and immutable.... [It has been petrified into a slavery of thought and sentiment, an intolerant superiority on the part of the few and an intolerable burden on the part of the many (HNC, 330-1).

Instead of traditional morals and ideals, Dewey offers intelli-

gence the purpose of which is to produce growth. But what is growth? He can only answer tautologically: that which is guided by intelligence. Although "[M]orals is not conduct" it is the "growth of conduct... It is all one with growing...." Progress is defined as "present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning, and retrogression is a present slipping away of significance, determinations, grasp" (HNC, 281). But to what does progress lead except to more progress?

If it is better to travel than to arrive, it is because traveling is a constant arriving, while arrival that precludes further traveling is most easily attained by going to sleep or dying (HNC, 282).

Exactly what Dewey means by intelligence seems unclear by the conclusion of this work. For the reader expecting a clear account of moral development and intelligence, *Human Nature and Conduct* is both anticlimactic and disappointing. Intelligence is never explicitly defined. We do know what intelligence is not: it is not everything previously relied upon in Western civilization to guide moral growth, social progress, and education. The best that we can say is that intelligence will not be fully operative until all that has gone before is swept away.

Although his conception of intelligence is never defined, Dewey leaves important clues for the reader in an earlier discussion of "impulse" found in Part II of this work. He begins this discussion by complaining, in now familiar fashion, that because of classical philosophy and all its descendant philosophies, especially Christianity, we occupy ourselves by suppressing "impulse." (HNC, 129). But instead of repressing impulse we need the "development of a new morale which can be attained only as released impulses are intelligently employed to form harmonious habits adapted to one another in a new situation." Those who resist Dewey's new morality are guilty of "personal feebleness, of inability to cope with change" (HNC, 130).

Our means of controlling impulse, of labeling instincts, of ascribing to human nature certain predilections like self-love or self-interest, stifle Dewey's conception of human flourishing, because

we refuse to recognize that "selfhood...is in process of making" (HNC, 137). "What makes the difference in each of these cases is the difference between a self taken as something already made and a self still making through action" (HNC, 139). For readers familiar with the nihilistic philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, Dewey then makes a startling statement:

If we can remove artificial labels and means of control from human nature then each impulse or habit is thus a will to its own power (HNC, 140).

He continues:

To say this is to clothe a truism in a figure. It says that anger or fear or love or hate is successful when it effects some change outside the organism which measures its force and registers its efficiency.... Each impulse is a demand for an object which will enable it to function (HNC, 140).

At the present time, however, "we have no generalized will to power, but only the inherent pressure of every activity for an adequate manifestation"(HNC, 141).

It is not so much a demand for power as search for an opportunity to use a power already existing. If opportunities corresponded to the need, a desire *for power* would hardly arise: power would be used and satisfaction would accrue (HNC, 141).

He then immediately ties this to the school in noting that "educative growth" cannot occur if impulses are "snubbed" thus making impulse "'sublimated." These impulses, though, are so primeval, that "frustration dams activity up, and intensifies it," and engenders a "longing for satisfaction at any cost." Ultimately, "the will to power bursts into flower" (HNC, 141). The result, more often than not, is pathological.

Explosive irritations, naggings, the obstinacy, of weak persons, dreams of grandeur, the violence of those usually submissive

are the ordinary marks of a will to power (HNC, 142).

Dewey's point here is that we all possess this Nietzschean "will to power" but it is generally contained by social conditions and misguided educational processes in all but the most aggressive personalities such as a "Napoleon" (HNC, 142). That point established, Dewey immediately turns to the act of "creating," as he argues that "[a]ctivity is creative, in so far as it moves to its own enrichment as activity, that is, bringing along with itself a release of further activities" (HNC, 143). This assertion triggers more extensive discussion of Dewey's conception of individual creativity. He concludes by noting the task ahead. "Having [this] knowledge, we may set hopefully at work upon a course of social invention and experimental engineering." This process must include a study of the "educative effect" Dewey says, which is "prerequisite to effective reform" (HNC, 148).

To summarize this important passage, we see that Dewey identifies as the driving force of educational and social change the uninhibited, even forceful, emergence of impulse. We have understood that impulse is roughly equivalent to the traditional conception of passion. Here it becomes even more animated, a primeval yet purposeful energy not unlike Nietzsche's will to power that demands creative expression. Following Dewey's argument, we see that if the educator denies the opportunity for expression to this classroom will to power, it is likely to turn aggressive, if not violent. In that case, culpability for such student misbehavior will rest squarely on the school and educator, not the pupil. It is no wonder that traditional pedagogical discipline and restraints must be eradicated with all due speed.

SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW (1915)

Introduction

In *Schools of Tomorrow*, Dewey argues that, "the growth of democratic ideals...demands a change in education" (ST, 306). Toward

this end, this book offers many recommendations to reform if not to revolutionize teaching and learning. The impulse behind *Schools*, though, is more than a desire for better pedagogy. *Schools of Tomorrow* is motivated by that which motivates all of Dewey's work: his desire for social transformation. Schools must be pried loose from their "inertia" so that they can be the tools of reform instead of instruments that perpetuate retardation:

The chief effort of all educational reforms is to bring about a readjustment of existing scholastic institutions and methods so that they shall respond to changes in general social and intellectual conditions (ST, 229).

The ideas and practices featured in this volume represent the educational trends that created educational revolution in the early part of this century and which have left an indelible mark upon American education even today. This revolt against tradition was justified as the only type of truly democratic education. Such a revolution, it was argued, was needed to transform schools from elitist institutions that preserved privilege to those that truly promoted the growth of democracy. To meet this challenge was a "vital necessity" (ST, 289). Dewey writes in his concluding chapter:

The schools we have been discussing are all working away from a curriculum adapted to a small and specialized class towards one which shall be truly representative of the needs and conditions of a democratic society (ST, 288).

This reconstruction of education brings implications for changes, not only in classroom theory and practice, but for democratic and moral philosophy. Behind the scenes, so to speak, and animating much of this pedagogical and philosophical reconstruction is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Dewey notes approvingly that the 18th century French philosopher "is...very recently beginning to enjoy respect" (ST, 290).

The organization of *Schools of Tomorrow* is haphazard as Dewey alternates between descriptions of progressive schools and discussions of the theory underlying those school practices. Dewey

notes that, with only one exception, the schools he highlights were visited not by him but by "Miss [Evelyn] Dewey," his daughter. Dewey admits this is not a serious theoretical work saying, "There has been no attempt in this book to develop a complete theory of education nor yet review any "systems" or discuss the views of prominent educators." Nor, Dewey points out, is this "a text book of prominent education, nor yet an exposition of a new method of school teaching, aimed to show the weary teacher or the discontented parent how education should be carried on." Instead, Dewey explains, "We have tried to show what actually happens when schools start out to put into practice, each in its own way, some of the theories that have been pointed to as the soundest and best ever since Plato..."(ST, preface). He quickly notes that these elements of progressivism are not "fads and caprices," nor are these practices "lacking in any far reaching aim or guiding principle" (ST, preface).

Indeed, *Schools* offers the reader an opportunity to distinguish between theory and practice in Progressive education. Without a doubt, the book demonstrates the effectiveness of brilliant teaching when teachers can act with initiative and creativity. Some of these turn-of-the-century teachers provide an inspiring legacy for the teaching profession. As Dewey explains, "The schools we have used for purposes of illustration are all of them directed by sincere teachers trying earnestly to give their children the best they have by working out concretely what they consider the fundamental principles of education" (ST, preface).

Those innovative techniques, though, are tied to underlying philosophical ideas that are sometimes quite radical. These supporting principles are at least as important-perhaps more important-to Dewey as the classroom innovations. He continues, "It is the function of this book to point out how the applications arise from their theories and the direction that education in this country seems to be taking at the present time (ST, preface). The philosophical principles are significant in what they reveal about Dewey's progressivism. For example, Dewey and the progressives are well known for a "child-centered" classroom free from the arbitrary ideas of adults. This is promoted as the best way for the child to learn, but Dewey

clearly has another motive: his virulent anti-authoritarianism.

Dewey intends for this volume to show progressive education at its best, creative and energetic. For example, Dewey provides admirable examples of the progressive principle of "learning by doing." He notes that several progressive schools had implemented the principle of "learning by doing" in teaching English and spelling by acquiring a school printing press and producing juvenile publications (ST, 83-4). Another innovative method of teaching grammar was illustrated in the Phoebe Thorn Experimental School of Bryn Mawr College where grammar was taught by allowing the students, by trial and error, to write their own rules of grammar, just as civics might be taught by inviting students to visit local civic authorities, institutions, and community artisans. Later the students would write their own city charter.

Another model of studying history is by dramatic historical enactments. Dewey explains that this pedagogical activity involves the student both physically and mentally which enhances and multiplies the learning experience.

The historical facts which are presented must be true, and whether the pupils are writing a play based on them or are building a Viking boat, the details of the work as well as the main idea must conform to the known facts. When a pupil learns by doing he is reliving both mentally and physical some experience which has proved important to the human race; he goes through the same mental processes as those who originally did these things (ST, 292-3).

In spite of Dewey's interest in promoting his progressive theory, the clearest lesson of *Schools of Tomorrow* maybe no more than an illustration of the effectiveness of dynamic and motivated teachers who are free to do their best. If that is the case, *Schools* may ironically refute Dewey's premise, so important in *Democracy and Education*, that the educational *process-and* not the authority of the curriculum and the teacher, is the key element in education. Dewey may inadvertently concede this point, for example, when he says, "We have hoped to suggest to the reader the practical meaning of some

of the more widely recognized and accepted views of educational reformers by showing what happens *when a teacher applies these views*" (ST, preface) (my emphasis).

Here also, as in a few earlier works of Dewey (e.g., *My Pedagogical Creed*²¹), one finds a fleeting reference to the family as a model of public education. This, however, may be done at the family's expense because it later opens the door for public education, not only to import techniques from the family, but to usurp the tasks and authority of the family. This usurpation is done all the more easily as Dewey consistently works to erase the "artificial" lines separating social institutions, just as he tries to blur the lines between the school and society in general.

This book is written on the assumption that 1) the method of elementary education should resemble a child's first few years of learning; and, 2) middle and high school education should follow the same method. That is to say, methods that work in elementary school will also work on the middle and secondary level. Unfortunately, although progressive education was able to furnish some proof that supported the former thesis, the latter thesis was almost purely hypothetical and constituted a particularly dangerous and eventually disruptive influence in the progressive classrooms of Dewey's day. It has fomented similar disorder since that time.

Rousseau in Theory and Practice

Schools of Tomorrow is valuable in that it demonstrates the powerful influence that Rousseau's *Emile* exerted upon progressive education in general, and upon Dewey in particular. Although Dewey concedes that "Rousseau said, as well as did, many foolish things," Dewey believes he also provides sound guidance for education, judging by the prominence the French philosopher enjoys in *Schools of Tomorrow* (ST, 1). Dewey notes Rousseau's "insistence that education be based upon the native capacities of those to be taught and upon the need of studying children in order to discover what these native powers are..." (ST, 1). For Dewey, this "sounded the key-note of all modern efforts for educational progress."

It meant that education is not something to be forced upon children and youth from without, but is the growth of capacities with which human beings are endowed at birth" (ST, 2).

"Rousseau's teaching that education is a process of natural growth has influenced most theorizing upon education since his time" (ST, 17). The idea of "natural growth" is central to Rousseau as it is for Dewey. As noted in *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey departs from Rousseau in believing that natural growth includes social integration, that is, the natural is found in the social. Rousseau taught that natural growth requires freedom from social norms. Dewey notes Rousseau's apparent need to denigrate the social dimension of life in his emphasis upon "natural development" and "nature" as a guide to education. By way of correction to Rousseau's views, Dewey reports that the Swiss education reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, in his experimentation and work on early education, "had a firm grasp on a truth which Rousseau never perceived." Pestalozzi,²² Dewey reports, "realized that natural development for a man means social development, since the individual's vital connections are with others even more than with nature" (ST, 62). In Pestalozzi's words, Nature educated man for social relations, and by means of social relations. Things are important in the education of man in proportion to the intimacies of social relations into which man enters (as quoted in ST, 62).

This seems to be Rousseau's only theoretical flaw. Both he and Dewey believe that natural development requires a forceful rejection of the past and of tradition. Dewey acknowledges that Rousseau abdicated the moral responsibility of educating his own children. He notes, "Rousseau, while he was writing his *Emile*, was allowing his own children to grow up entirely neglected by their parents, abandoned in a foundling asylum" (ST, 60). But for Dewey this does not discredit Rousseau's thought and Dewey assumes the task of illustrating Rousseau's theory in the schoolhouse.

A strong element of Rousseau's attraction for Dewey is Rousseau's focus upon education from the child's point of view. The educator must adopt this perspective initially to avoid the errors of tradition-

alism. Dewey quotes from Rousseau's *Emile*:

We know nothing of childhood, and with our mistaken notions of it the further we go in education the more we go astray. The wisest writers devote themselves to what a man ought to know without asking what a child is capable of learning (as quoted in ST, 1).

He further notes that Rousseau "insists that existing education is bad." This is so "because parents and teachers are always thinking of the accomplishment of adults." True reform must center attention on both "the powers and weaknesses of children" (ST, 1).

Dewey also complains that "professional educators are always forgetting" that what "is learned in school is at the best only a small part of education, a relatively superficial part; and yet what is learned in school makes artificial distinctions in society and marks persons off from one another" (ST, 2). In making this complaint, Dewey at once denigrates conventional schooling and strips away that which makes school a separate institution. He notes that, "we exaggerate school learning compared with what is gained in the ordinary course of living."

Dewey then picks up a theme familiar in *Democracy and Education*, namely, that all of schooling should be patterned after the learning that takes place in the first few years of life because it is at that stage that learning takes place "naturally," without artificial constructs. Early learning is guided by the child's own interests and motivations as he explores the world around him.

If we want, then, to find out how education takes place most successfully, let us go to the experiences of children where learning is necessity, and not to the practices of the schools where it is largely an adornment, a superfluity and even an unwelcome imposition (ST, 3).

To follow that direction will be challenging, though, because "schools are always proceeding in a direction opposed to this principle," as adults "try to force" learning on children. But "[w]e are of little faith and slow to believe;" consequently, we insist that our preconceived

curriculum must be "drilled" into the student before "he has any intellectual or practical use" for that information. We force feed the student "a premature diet of adult nutriment" until it "has deadened" his "desire to learn." (ST, 5). Such a method is "cruel, for it consists in sacrificing the present to the remote and uncertain future" (ST, 5). It is "suicidal" to focus upon future goals instead of simply focusing upon the process of "growing"(ST, 6).

"Teaching which guides natural growth" is superior to "teaching which imposes adult accomplishments." Critical to good teaching is physical freedom for students, a lack of restraint of bodily movements. Dewey cites Rousseau again who offers a playground illustration and a feline analogy, both intended to depreciate the use of books in the classroom. Presumably, Dewey is equally comfortable with both analogies.

The lessons the scholars give one another on the playground are worth a hundredfold more than what they learn in the classroom. Watch a cat when she first comes into a room. She goes from place to place; she sniffs about and examines everything. She is not still for a moment. It is the same with a child when he begins to walk and enters, as it were, the room of the world about him. Both use sight, and the child uses his hands as the cat her nose.... Our first teachers in natural philosophy are our feet, hands and eyes. To substitute books for them does not teach us to reason; it teaches us to use the reason of others rather than our own; it teaches us to believe much and to know little (as quoted in ST, 10-11).

Rousseau condemns misguided traditional pedagogy as a "short cut to knowledge" which produces only "superficial" knowledge, "mental confusion," and "the ruin of judgment."

The first meaningless phrase, the first thing taken for granted on the authority of another without the pupil's seeing its meaning for himself, is the beginning of the ruin of judgment...What would you have him think about, when you do all the thinking for him (as quoted in ST, 15)?

Although few have been able wholly to implement Rousseau's ideas, on occasion, "experimenters have based their plans upon his principles" (ST, 17). One such instance is conducted by "Mrs. Johnson at Fairhope, Alabama," whose *modus operandi* is dictated by "Rousseau's central idea: The child is best prepared for life as an adult by experiencing in childhood what has meaning to him as a child..." (ST, 17-18). Conventional education, according to Mrs. Johnson, "is arranged to make things easy for the teacher who wishes quick and tangible results," thus disregarding "the full development of the pupils." Among other deficiencies, it does not foster "creative activities" (ST, 18). Left to follow his curiosity, students voluntarily engage in rigorous study as "the interest of pursuit leads the child of his own accord into investigations that often amount to severe intellectual discipline." And thus by

[ollowing this path of natural growth, the child is led into reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, etc., by his own desire to know. We must wait for the desire of the child, for the consciousness of need, says Mrs. Johnson...(ST, 21).

Rather than following conventional class structure and schedule, Mrs. Johnson divides the school into "Life Classes" which fall between, for example, the eighth and ninth years, and the eleventh and twelfth. Johnson, according to Dewey, "feels that children in their early years are neither moral nor immoral, but simply unmoral; their sense of right and wrong has not yet begun to develop." For this reason, "prohibitions and commands" are avoided because they are "bound to be meaningless" and because they only encourage the children to be "secretive and deceitful" (ST, 25-6). Tests, if they can be called such, are "open-book," students are not given individual assignments which leave them free to develop "a real love of books," and they "are not tempted to cheat, for they are not put in the position of having to show off" (ST, 28-9). Considerable time is spent outdoors, in a fairly undeveloped "playground" that affords students the opportunity to explore natural history. "Nature study" and "field geography" are conducted necessarily out of doors (ST, 33-4). The teacher reads aloud to the children until they are nine or ten, by

which time she says their desire to read is "keen." Arithmetic is taught orally and based wholly on practical illustration (ST, 36-7). She calls her "method of instruction `organic'" because they "follow the natural growth of the child" (ST, 23). According to Dewey, the "Fairhope pupils compare favorably with pupils in the ordinary public schools," and Mrs. Johnson has plans to implement her ideas in the high school (ST, 39).

The second school on exhibition is the "Elementary School of the University of Missouri, at Columbia, under the direction of Prof. J.L. Meriam" (ST, 41). It also operates upon the premise that learning through school should be indistinguishable in method from the learning process of the first few years of life. "While there is a general plan for the year's work, if the children bring up anything which seems of importance to them and which fits in, the program is laid aside and the teacher helps the pupils in their study of their own problem (ST, 44). On the one hand, Professor Meriam seems to have made innovations not found at Mrs. Johnson's school, on the other hand, he seems to have institutionalized these innovations so that the school curriculum is more predictable than it might be otherwise.

Meriam sets his curriculum by asking himself the question, "What would these children naturally be doing if there were no school?" (ST, 42). He then organizes his school around the best answer he can provide. The first three grades consist of activity of three different sorts: "From 9 to 10:30 observation; 10:30 to 11, physical exercises; from 11 to 12, play; 1:30 to 3, stories; and 3 to 4, handwork." (ST, 44) Storytime involves students telling one another stories; when they run out of tales, they run to the library to find more. "Appreciation of good literature begins very early in this way, or rather, it is never lost." (ST, 49-50) Students are given the chance to do handwork-carpentry, weaving, and sewing-because they "are always clamoring to `make something'"(ST, 50) The fourth grade marks a turning point for more structured study, but it is still based upon the experience of the pupil who frequently engages in field trip activity. The subsequent grades continue in this mode, but the study is "widened." For example, in the fourth grade science

might be based upon gardening, in the fifth grade it includes study of area farms which involves more social studies, as do the later stages in which agriculture is studied on a global scale. (ST, 53) The school setting is a large subdivided building containing about 120 students. The sectional dividers, though, are often left open and students are relatively free to roam and converse as long as they do not disturb other students. (ST, 56)

Dewey offers an interesting compliment to Meriam:

Professor Meriam is insistent upon the fact that this study of the community in which the child lives is made for the educational value of the work itself to the pupil, never as a mere cloak for the teaching of "the three R's," which must be done only as it contributes directly to the work the children are doing (ST, 47).

In other words, even though Meriam teaches components of the conventional curriculum, in this case it is forgivable because it is inadvertent! Like Mrs. Johnson, Professor Meriam aspires to reform the high school, of which he is the director. "He believes," Dewey reports, "an equally radical reorganization of the work will have beneficial results." Dewey explains that the objective of Meriam's "experiment" is not to teach more productively, nor offer better college preparation. Instead, Meriam seeks to make the child "a better, happier, and more efficient human being...." This is done by "showing him what his capabilities are and how he can exercise them...." It may not be clear to the reader, though, why productive education toward better college preparation must be at odds with becoming "a better, happier, and more efficient human being" fully cognizant of his "capabilities" (ST, 58).

Education and Play

Important to progressive reform of education is the role of "play" in education. Dewey's discussion of play is revealing-and disturbing.²³ With reference to the German educational reformer, Froebel, Dewey notes that Froebel's

own sympathy with children and his personal experience led

him to emphasize the instinctive expressions of child-life, his philosophy led him to believe that natural development consisted in the unfolding of an absolute and universal principle already enfolded in the child (ST, 104).

The task of the educator in this "unfolding" of what is "enfolded" is to draw the instinctive qualities out of the child as unobtrusively as possible so that they are untainted in their expression by adult provincialism. The mechanism he recommends is "play." Dewey happily notes that "[s]chools all over the country are at present making use of the child's instinct for play, by using organized games, toy making, or other construction based on play motives as part of the regular curriculum" (ST, 107). We expect that it would logically follow, then, that children would be given as much latitude as is practicable, but such is not the case. Dewey places significant qualifications on play. He first notes that the "obvious" "educational value" of play is that it "teaches the children about the world in which they live." The nature of play, of course, is that it is imitative:

The more they play the more elaborate becomes their paraphernalia, the whole game being a fairly accurate picture of the daily life of their parents in its setting, clothed in the language and bearing of the children. Through their games they learn about the work and play of the grown-up world. Besides noticing the elements which make up this world, they find out a good deal about the actions and processes that are necessary to keep it going (ST, 108).

But there is a problem. Children may engage in play that is not supportive of Dewey's aspirations for social change. That is, they may imitate the wrong thing—namely the life of their parents! Dewey warns that without proper supervision, the play of children may constitute "a strong influence against change," if the child's play is merely "a replica of the life of his parents." For example, when they "play house, children are just as apt to copy *"the coarseness, blunders, and prejudices of their elders as the things which are best"* (ST, 109) (emphasis added).

Therefore, while imitative games are of great educational value in the way of teaching the child to notice his environment and some of the processes that are necessary for keeping it going, if the environment is not good the child learns bad habits and wrong ways of thinking and judging, ways which are all the harder to break because he has fixed them by living them out in his play (ST, 109).

Dewey is pleased to note that "kindergartens are beginning to realize this more and more." They provide, accordingly, directed play "for the educational value of the activities it involves, *and for giving the children the right sort of ideals and ideas about every day life*" (ST, 109) (emphasis added). Without question many of these "ideals and ideas" are necessarily contrary to what children learn at home. Dewey hopes, moreover, that societal change will begin immediately as children take the formation they have acquired through play at school back to their home to begin the daunting task of reforming the institution of the family!

Children who play house and similar games in school, and have toys to play with and the material to make the things they need in their play, will play house at home the way they played it in school. They will forget to imitate the loud and coarse things they see at home, their attention will be centered on problems which were designed by the school to teach better aims and methods (ST, 109-110).

Gender roles may be among the first misconceptions to fall:

Boys and girls alike take the same interest in all these occupations, whether they are sewing and playing with dolls, or marble making and carpentry. The idea that certain games and occupations are for boys and others for girls is a purely artificial one that has developed as a reflection of the conditions existing in adult life. It does not occur to a boy that dolls are not just as fascinating and legitimate a plaything for him as for his sister, until some one puts the idea into his head (ST, 115).

Students, then "are no longer dealing with material where *things* are needed to carry an act to a successful result, but with *ideas* which need action to make them real. Schools are making use of dramatization in all sorts of different ways to make teaching more concrete" (ST, 120). To be sure, although most of this discussion is in the context of the earlier grades, Dewey is not only addressing the activity of kindergarten and elementary grades. The same arguments apply to the secondary level. In this case, though, play is replaced by "dramatization," so that the "possibilities for plays, festivals, and pageants arranged on this plan are endless..." (ST, 120, 131).

Freedom and Individuality

By posing a false dilemma between moral education toward virtue by means of discipline, and individual student development and creativity, Dewey ensures his reader will reject benighted traditional moral education in favor of progressive innovation. He asks, "Are we to believe, with the strict disciplinarian, that there exist for the child the same number and kind of virtues as for the adult?"

Or are we to believe, with Rousseau, that education is the process of making up the discrepancy between the child at his birth and the man as he will need to be, that childhood has its own ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling and that the method of training... [is] to let the child test them upon the world about him (ST, 134)?

In this discussion, Dewey offers additional insight into his belief that the student should submit to the authority of the educational process, but not to the authority of and an individual educator. But, as in *Democracy and Education*, one must ask again if Dewey is making a distinction without a difference; or worse, if he is providing the pretext for the arbitrary and unaccountable imposition of the educator cloaked in the "the learning process." In this case, Dewey argues that Rousseau's conception of positive freedom will impose itself upon the pupil through the educational process. Dewey quotes his French master again, noting that Rousseau's freedom was a "heavy taskmaster," not an opportunity for "mere lawlessness and

licence." The following is a quintessentially Rousseauistic idea and illustrates Rousseau at his best-or worst-as the case may be.

Give him [the pupil] no orders at all, absolutely none. Do not even let him think that you claim any authority over him. Let him know only that he is weak and you are strong, that his condition and yours puts him at your mercy; let this be perceived, learned and felt. Let him early find upon his proud neck the heavy yoke which nature has imposed upon us, the heavy yoke of necessity, under which every finite being must bow. Let him find the necessity in things, not in the caprices of man; let the curb be the force of conditions, not authority (as quoted in ST, 135).

Freedom, in truth, for Rousseau and Dewey, is a freedom only to do as the student is directed. It is a freedom from tradition only. Employed in the progressive classroom, the process will be, in Dewey's view, far more efficient than a conventional learning environment: "Surely no discipline could be more severe, more apt to develop character and reasonableness, nor less apt to develop disorder and laziness."

Dewey complains that in the traditional environment the pupil is malformed so as to display "a docile or passive mind" (ST, 136). He continues, "It is no wonder that pupils who have to sit in this way for several hours a day break out in bursts of immoderate noise and fooling as soon as restraining influences are removed (ST, 136).

Dewey also justifies classroom freedom as necessary for "A truly scientific education..." This is an education "in which the pupil must have a chance to show what he truly is, so that the teacher can find out what he needs to make him a complete human being. Only as a teacher becomes acquainted with each one of her pupils can she hope to understand childhood..." (ST, 137). In language redolent of the laboratory, Dewey argues that "As long as educators do not know their individual facts they can never know whether their hypotheses are of value." To be more specific, a scientific education is one in which liberty is provided "for the child...to test all impulses and tendencies on the world of things and people in which he finds

himself, sufficiently to discover their character so that he may get rid of those which are harmful, and develop those which are useful to himself and others" (ST, 137-8). With such an attitude, the "teacher will find the spontaneity, the liveliness, and initiative of the pupil," as an aid in teaching, instead of "nuisances to be repressed" (ST, 139). Dewey's wholehearted endorsement of Rousseau's view of liberty is revealing as it shows how far he is willing to intrude into the autonomy of the pupil to realize his social goals. This is surely a serious contradiction on Dewey's part, especially since his boasting about the unfettered autonomy of the pupil has done so much to popularize his educational thought.

Dewey next engages in an extensive and illuminating discussion of the Montessori method of education which was in vogue in Dewey's day and is still somewhat prevalent even today in "Montessori" schools," developed by Madame Maria Montessori of Italy.' Dewey approves of Montessori's emphasis upon "liberty in the school so that innovative methods might be employed in pedagogy, involving, among other things, "learning by doing." The Montessori method, though, both in its early years and today, is highly structured and requires strong direction from the teacher, so that Montessori could claim "A room in which all the children move about usefully, intelligently, and voluntarily, without committing any rough or rude act, would seem to me a classroom very well disciplined indeed"(ST, 142). Dewey notes that Montessori believes "that the child possesses innate faculties which should be allowed to develop to their fullest; consequently part of the work is designed to give adequate expression to these faculties."

Dewey departs from his fellow progressive reformer Montessori, because, even though "pupils of a Montessori class are freer than they are in the classes of most American educators...intellectually they are not so free." They are not free, according to Dewey, because they are not free "to create" (ST, 157). Dewey, by his own description, holds a different view of "the nature of the human intelligence." (ST, 159). Dewey is also concerned that Montessori is not sufficiently experimental because a "child is not born with [predetermined] faculties to be unfolded, but with special impulses of action

to be [experimentally] developed through their use in preserving and perfecting life..." (ST, 160). Viewed differently-but less charitably-we might characterize Dewey's difference with Montessori in this way: if students are not sufficiently free to be creative in a Montessori school they are also not as disposed to be molded according to Dewey's expectation of where their "impulses" should take them. Understood from a different perspective, if the student is not so free under Montessori, then the educator is also constrained.

Such differences aside, at least Montessori provides considerable pressure to move us beyond "the passive education of imparting the learning of others." This obsolescent approach to pedagogy was better "adapted to feudal societies, in which most individuals are expected to submit constantly and [to be] docile to the authority of superiors..." More suited to a "democratic society" is "an education where initiative and independence are the rule and where every citizen is supposed to take part in the conduct of affairs of common interest" (ST, 163). Montessori should provide at least the initial inspiration to American educators to discover "a scientific method in education" (ST, 162).

By following a scientific method toward a more enlightened education, Dewey is hopeful that education will be less individualistic, as he understands traditional education to be, and more social. As it is, "the schools overlook, in the methods and subject-matter of their teaching, the social basis of living."

Instead of centering the work in the concrete, the human side of things, they put the emphasis on the abstract, hence the work is made academic and unsocial (ST, 165).

Consequently, "[w]ork then is no longer connected with a group of people all engaged in occupations, but is isolated, selfish and individualistic" (ST, 165). Dewey argues that the "ordinary school curriculum ignores the scientific democratic society of to-day and its needs and ideals, and goes on fitting children for an individualistic struggle for existence, softened by a little intellectual culture for the individual's enjoyment" (ST, 165). However, for all Dewey's empha-

sis on individualized, child-centered education, he is interested only in a particular conception of individuality. The focus on the individual student must not lead to *individualism* when the school day is over. As he has argued elsewhere, the country no longer needs an education that encourages "every man for himself" (ST, 166).

Culture and Education for Citizenship

Dewey prohibits an education that transmits culture for the sake of cultural transmission itself as liberal education is wont to do. Culture, Dewey argues, means nothing if it does not mean "a harmonious development of all the child's faculties. Dewey eschews "the storing up of historical facts and the acquiring of knowledge and the literatures of the past." He equally disapproves of "reviewing the achievements of the past, learning to read the dead languages, the deader the language the greater the reputation..." (ST, 166). He complains that "school curriculums were principally devoted, therefore, to turning the eyes of the pupils to the past, where alone they could find things worth studying and where, too, they might find the refinements of esthetic and intellectual development" (ST, 166-7). Dewey will later argue that his complaints about the irrelevancy of formal learning were only meant to underline the importance of focusing the student upon the present, and that it was not his intention to denigrate history and literature. His disciples, nevertheless, can be excused for misinterpreting his comments, when he asserts, for example, that

obviously the first business of the public school is to teach the child to live in the world in which he finds himself, to understand his share in it, and to get a good start in adjusting himself to it. Only as he can do these things successfully will he have time or inclination to cultivate purely intellectual activities (ST, 167).

At this point Dewey engages in an oblique but nonetheless remarkable discussion. He complains that the schools have been based upon unjust social arrangements, created for the advantage of a few and the disadvantage of many. He argues that the schools were

designed and maintained in a pre-revolutionary era. The curious thing, though, is that when he speaks of revolution, he has in mind the French Revolution. He ignores completely the American Revolution, a fascinating and disturbing omission for such a prominent and influential American philosopher.

The old schools, however, were not conducted to give equal opportunity to all, but for just the opposite purpose, to make more marked the line between classes, to give the leisure and moneyed classes something which every one could not get, to cater to their desire for distinction and to give them occupation (ST, 168).

The inference that the reader must draw is that, we in the United States still live in a pre-revolutionary period, the American revolution notwithstanding. Perhaps we are awaiting a true revolution on the order of the more fanatical and violent French revolution, only this time the revolution will come through the schools themselves.

The Gary, Indiana progressive school, led by Superintendent for Schools William Wirt, was widely regarded as the preeminent model of what progressive schooling could be. In respect to education for citizenship, Dewey proudly notes that the Gary schools do not teach civics out of a textbook. Instead,

[p]upils learn civics by helping to take care of their own school building, by making the rules for their own conduct in the halls and on the playgrounds, by going into the public library, and by listening to the stories of what Gary is doing as told by the people who are doing it (ST, 199).

Students learn by staging imitation campaigns, primaries and elections. In this way, "The children can see the things with their own eyes; they are learning citizenship by being good citizens (ST, 200).

Dewey notes the value of this "practical civics" is "doubly great" because in this school there are large numbers of children with foreign parents who need social assistance. It seems, however, by Dewey's own description, that progressive educators may not have the discretion to draw a line between helpful social support and

intrusion:

Every child brings measurements of the rooms in his home and draws a floor plan of his house. These plans are kept with the teacher's map of her district, so that she has a complete map of the neighborhood and home of every child living in it. By comparing these with any family record, it is a simple matter to tell if the family are living under proper moral and hygienic conditions (ST, 201).

This invasion of privacy does not trouble Dewey as he boasts, "[T]he schools not only teach the theory of good citizenship and social conditions, they give the children actual facts and conditions, so that they can see what is wrong and how it can be bettered" (ST, 203). By so doing, the idea that schools exist for the promotion and maintenance of democracy and for the cultivation of citizenship "becomes an obvious fact and not a formula" (ST, 206). Indeed, the community is owed such service from the school because "people who use it are paying their share" and by rendering neighborhood service, the school-neighborhood relationship becomes a "business" relationship, "not a matter of philanthropy" (ST, 208). The school is a beehive of activity as students learn cooking, cobbling, banking through a school savings bank, and carpentry, to name but a few of the activities.

The only conspicuous omission to the curriculum is academics, apparently because academic study does not replicate any community activity. Neither can it demonstrate an immediate social benefit to the students or to the neighborhood. For Dewey, then, civic education is better labeled "socializing education." This more "enlarged use of the school plant" and expanded conception of the role of the school produces "a more intelligent public spirit" (ST, 228). Schools thus animated are better equipped to "respond to changes in general social and intellectual conditions" and less prone to the inertia produced by "tradition and custom" (ST, 229).

Dewey's stated intention in his "educational readjustment" is to steer a course "between the extremes of an inherited bookish education and a narrow, so-called practical, education" (ST, 249).

Dewey eschews a "liberal and cultural" education because it lacks sufficient capacity for social change and because it perpetuates structure. He stresses instead a general education that is highly vocational and from which "bookishness" has been exorcized.

Education Through Industry

Dewey acknowledges the traditional relationship between the classical Greek concept of leisure (*schole*) and a liberal education with its opportunity for moral and intellectual enrichment. He concedes that all students need adequate leisure to receive an education without unreasonable restraint. However, he decries the alleged cultural elitism often symbolized by those with the opportunity for liberal education, in contrast with those who are limited to a vocational career track. Those in the latter category have been "looked upon with disparagement" (ST, 233).

So then, Dewey gravitates toward an education that is more vocational than academic in nature. This shift from "predominantly literary and 'intellectual' education" seems imperative for Dewey's social goals, whatever the price that must be paid in the derogation of academic education. This shift is necessary in order to place students in an "active" posture:

The separation of the activity of the mind from the activity of the senses in direct observation and from the activity of the hand in construction and manipulation, makes the material of studies academic and remote, and compels the passive acquisition of information imparted by textbook and teacher (ST, 238).

Dewey offers a remarkable commentary about the use of books in education. He says that in a previous educational era the school needed to supply books to students because books were otherwise unavailable.

Under such conditions, the schools could hardly have done better than devote themselves to books, and to teaching a command of the use of books, especially since, in most commu-

nities, books, while a rarity and a luxury, were the sole means of access to the great world beyond the village surroundings (ST, 240).

"But conditions change," Dewey asserts, as "libraries abound, books are many and cheap, magazines and newspapers are everywhere" (ST, 242). For that reason, "the schools do not any longer bear the peculiar relation to books and book knowledge which they once did" (ST, 242). Although schools should encourage habits of reading "it is no longer necessary or desirable that the schools should devote themselves so exclusively to this phase of instruction" (ST, 243). The more important question for Dewey concerns the social and community uses to which students will employ what they have gained from their reading.

While merely learning the use of language symbols and of acquiring habits of reading is less important than it used to be, the question of the use to which the power and habits shall be put is much more important. To learn to use reading matter means that schools shall arouse in pupils problems and interests that lead students both in school and after they leave school to seek that subject-matter of history, science, biography, and literature which is inherently valuable, *and not to waste themselves upon the trash which is so abundantly provided* (ST, 244) (my emphasis).

One problem for Dewey is that the schools do not have sufficient time to teach students to read and train them to change the world at the same time. He complains that it is "absolutely impossible" to cultivate habits of social change "when schools devote themselves to the formal sides of language..." The teachers "who attempt to remedy the deplorable reading habits with which many youth leave school by means of a greater amount of direct attention to language studies and literatures are engaged in a futile task." Dewey can justify his depreciation of books in the schoolhouse as he is confident that highly motivated social reformers eventually will be stimulated to read. This is because as soon as the student acquires a "lovely sense

of the interest of social affairs" he will "naturally" turn to the books that support his interest (ST, 245).

Enlargement of intellectual horizon, and awakening to the multitude of interesting problems presented by contemporary conditions, are the surest guarantees for good use of time with books and magazines (ST, 244).

The time for an education focused primarily upon books is past. It is "fairly criminal" if students are taught skills but not prompted to put those skills to "social uses." When the student is involved in social reform he will automatically redouble his efforts to read those things that are relevant to his activity (ST, 245).

Dewey has at least three motives for what he calls "education through industry." The first is to give students practical hands-on skills. He notes that many schools are awakening to the "necessity of linking their curriculum more closely to the lives of their pupils..." (ST, 268).

Arithmetic classes do the problems for their carpentry class, and English classes put emphasis on the things which the pupils say they need to know to work in the printing shop: usually paraphrasing, spelling and punctuation (ST, 265-6).

This at first seems a commendable goal, but Dewey makes an important distinction. He is not talking about "trade" education. He cautions, "For there is great danger just at present that, as the work spreads, the really educative type of work that is being done in Gary and Chicago may be overlooked in favor of trade training" (ST, 309). Although Dewey wants to give students "skills" he is not interested in taking that training to the point of teaching them a useful trade. To do so undoubtedly would distract from his larger social purpose.

Secondly, Dewey hopes that education through industry will erase social class distinctions that he perceives have been customarily justified by a division between academics and vocational training. To the extent that academic tracks exist at progressive schools, they should be "on exactly the same level as the academic, and the school takes the wholesome attitude that the boy who intends to be a

carpenter or painter needs to stay in school just as many years as the boy who is going to college" (ST, 262). Finally, as Dewey has clearly announced, this type of innovative education will raise up a cadre of young people who will reconstruct society. Education through industry puts them into the active mode necessary for the challenges they will confront.

Children in school must be allowed freedom so that they will know what its use means when they become the controlling body, and they must be allowed to develop active qualities of initiative, independence, and resourcefulness, before the abuses and failures of democracy will disappear (ST, 304).

As in other dimensions of the curriculum, we must ask whether Dewey's emphasis on practical, "hands on" education is motivated more by its utilitarian advantage or his antipathy toward the conventional. He speaks of the moral malformation of the "usual isolated text-book study method in contrast to the student's "freedom" to learn science, arithmetic, physics, and chemistry by cooking in the kitchen; but, he ignores the intense supervision required by such activity. In his unflagging assault against the "accumulation of facts presented in books" he decries an alleged overemphasis placed upon the child's memory by means of rewards and punishments.

Since no one's performance is perfect, the failures become the obvious and emphasized thing. The pupil has to fight constantly against the discouragement of never reaching the standard he is told he is expected to reach. His mistakes are constantly corrected and pointed out. Such successes as he achieves are not especially inspiring because he does no more than reproduce the lesson as it already exists in the book (ST, 297).

Dewey says disapprovingly, "The virtues that the good scholar will cultivate are the colorless, negative virtues of obedience, docility, and submission. By putting himself in an attitude of complete passivity he is more nearly able to give back just what he heard from the teacher or read in the book" (ST, 297).

He condemns this practice in part because it relies upon "motives which are foreign to truly moral activity," by which he means that encouragement for success and consequences for failure have nothing to do with moral growth or activity. Here and elsewhere, Dewey, perhaps inadvertently, manifests his own prejudicial view of human nature as he relies upon students who are motivated by the sheer delight of learning. Free from the imposition to learn, students learn automatically and autonomously.

Success gives a glow of positive achievement; artificial inducements to work are not longer necessary, and the child learns to work from love of the work itself, not for a reward or because he is afraid of punishment. Activity calls for the positive virtues-energy, initiative, and originality-qualities that are worth more to the world than even the most perfect faithfulness in carrying out orders (ST, 298).

The benefits are seemingly endless as the pupil's mistakes no longer "assume undue importance or discourage him." The only student who will not benefit will be the "the really bad character." The "temptation to cheat" all but disappears since the "moral value of working for the sake of what is being done is certainly higher than that of working for rewards..." Notwithstanding the advantages that may inhere in Dewey's method, he clearly overstates the benefits:

But in the schools where the children are getting their knowledge by doing things, it is presented to them through all their senses and carried over into acts; it needs no feat of memory to retain what they find out; the muscles, sight, hearing, touch, and their own reasoning processes all combine to make the result part of the working equipment of the child (ST, 298).

Not even a grading system is necessary since "[r]ewards and high marks are at best artificial aims to strive for; they accustom children to expect to get something besides the value of the product for work they do" (ST, 297-8).

The extent to which schools are compelled to rely upon these

motives shows how dependent they are upon motives which are foreign to truly moral activities (ST, 297-8).

Summary

For Dewey, "The moral advantages of an active form of education reinforce its intellectual benefits" (ST, 296). The "active form of education" is the one most suitable to Dewey's larger moral aim: social transformation. Equal or perhaps superior to its pedagogical usefulness is the "greater freedom for the pupil"(ST, 296). This freedom, in turn, cuts through the Gordian Knot of tradition and convention. Once "freed" the student is pliable for redirection.

This, though, raises the critical question of whether Dewey is freeing students to assume autonomous and responsible social roles, or if it simply disposes them to be more easily manipulated in the interest of Dewey's arbitrary social goals. Dewey contends that the "conventional type of education which trains children to docility and obedience, to the careful performance of imposed tasks because they are imposed, regardless of where they lead, is suited to an autocratic society" (ST, 303). Dewey, however, may create a new schoolhouse autocracy instead of a greater democratic experience. He has done little to refute the more conventional pedagogical belief that carefully selected and guided academic studies do far more to develop a critical habit of mind than comparatively unstructured school activity. Dewey has fallen short of proving his thesis that children require greater freedom so that they may wield their liberty democratically upon assuming leadership responsibility. Although he argues that a progressively educated cohort of citizens is needed "before the abuses and failure of democracy will disappear," he has raised the specter of an abusive classroom perhaps even more prone to failure than the society of which it is a part (ST, 304).

The irony of *Schools of Tomorrow* is that Dewey's legacy has undermined the inspired teaching that it occasionally illustrates. By means of his false premise that it is the educational *process* that is responsible for a great school rather than individual skill and

leadership, he laid the theoretical justification for imposing control over the educational process at all levels. This is precisely what discourages and inhibits great teaching.

Indeed, an expert and sensible teacher should have the flexibility to choose from a variety of educational methods because she could adapt those ideas successfully in accordance with her own strengths. The advantage of Dewey's instrumentalism as applied to *technique* should be that it allows such adaptation. As we have previously seen, though, Dewey's instrumentalism is often in name only, because he disallows, *a priori*, traditional educational methods and content—even if some of those methods have proven utility. He dogmatically refuses to consider any practice that resembles tradition.

Dewey also failed to anticipate the impracticality of reproducing small experimental projects on a vast public scale. Such programs are resource-intensive and often create their own sizable bureaucracy. Most objectionable, his progressive innovations are usually rooted in radical philosophy. One might even say that the schoolhouse innovations were a "cover" for his revolutionary theory. For that reason, reformers then and today sometimes find that their well-intentioned reforms provoke a firestorm of public reaction because the public in general and parents in particular discern the militant ideas often animating otherwise innocuous techniques.

As noted earlier, Dewey's radical socialism was not novel, but his identification of education as the means to bring about socialistic transformation was his unique contribution. Schools provided a shortcut to political and social change around the inefficient machinery of democracy.

Differences of wealth, the existence of large masses of unskilled laborers, contempt for work with the hands, inability to secure the training which enables one to forge ahead in life, all operate to produce classes, and to widen the gulf between them. Statesmen and legislation can do something to combat these evil forces. Wise philanthropy can do something. *But the only fundamental agency for good is the public school system*

(ST, 313-4, 15-6) (emphasis added).

The purpose of *Schools of Tomorrow* is to showcase schools that are pioneering in this effort. As Dewey proudly recapitulates his thesis, "Schools such as we have discussed in this book-and they are rapidly coming into being in large numbers all over the country-are showing how the idea of equal opportunity for all is to be transmuted into reality" (ST, 315-6).

EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938)

The objective reader will find it difficult to look upon *Experience and Education* kindly. It is a veritable study in insincerity. Dewey is "on the ropes" so to speak by the time he writes this book and it shows. While in one paragraph, he eschews the political polarization between opposing educational philosophies, in the next, he attacks traditional educational ideas as viciously as ever. The editor of the series on education in which this volume is found notes that it appears "in the midst of widespread confusion, which regrettably has scattered the forces of American education and exalted labels of conflicted loyalties" (EE, 9).

In this work, Dewey must confront many of the philosophical and practical problems evident in his earlier works. Although his acknowledgment of problems associated with his writing is important in itself, more significant is whether Dewey can adequately address these problems. Upon studying *Experience and Education*, one must conclude that he does not. He is essentially unrepentant in the face of every problem. He responds that either other reformers and practitioners have misunderstood his ideas, or they have misapplied his theory. Absent a misunderstanding or a misapplication of his theory, Dewey simply asserts that more time is needed for the experimental₂₅ method to develop philosophical coherence and practical viability.

His tactic in *Experience and Education* is to reiterate what he has always said, doing so once again with the ambiguity so characteristic of his earlier philosophical discourse. We find Dewey implicitly makes a great many concessions in this volume and we might even

admire him for his frankness except that he will take no responsibility for the failures of his philosophy. Although he correctly asserts that "any set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying principles," he fails to apply that critical examination to himself (EE, 22).

Dewey muses that it is "difficult to develop a philosophy of education." This may have been a disappointment to some of his supporters who after so many years would have expected to see a more mature philosophy of education from America's leading educational progressive. Yet, he warns against the easy path of returning to an established traditional approach to education. He notes that "every movement in the direction of a new order of ideas and of activities...calls out, sooner or later, to a return to what appear to be simpler and more fundamental ideas and practices of the past..." (EE, 5-6).

One must at least admire Dewey for his commitment, especially as perhaps the most conspicuous criticism with which he must deal is the complaint that after so much time he has so little to offer to replace what progressivism has discarded. It is in this complaint, though, that Dewey's self-described "experimentalism," or "empiricism" is evident. He can argue that the absence of philosophical coherence is not a problem in itself. The deficiency simply justifies the need for more experimentation, more observation, and more collection of data. Thus, the failures of Deweyan progressivism do not suggest an abdication in favor of traditionalism; on the contrary, they signal the need for more Deweyan progressivism.

Dewey must write this volume so as to meet the primary objections to his educational philosophy without appearing to do so. It therefore takes on the appearance of a tome, organized around his consistent view that education must be derived from experience. Although the ploy works to a point, the book nonetheless appears loosely strung together and lacks the unity of some of his earlier works.

Beyond Traditional vs. Progressive Education: Dewey's Disingenuous Strategy

Dewey's strategy is a familiar one to even casual observers of contemporary politics. As early as his preface, he adopts the posture of a peacemaker and elder statesman, standing above the fray, denouncing "isms's" and "labels" and "negativity." He argues that we should abandon "isms" and think in terms of "Education," (as opposed to "education") as if "Education" were some kind of Platonic ideal, unaffected by philosophical disagreements.

It is in this context that I have suggested at the close of this little volume that those who are looking ahead to a new movement in education, adapted to the existing need for a new social order, should think in terms of Education itself rather than in terms of some `ism as "progressivism." For in spite of itself any movement that thinks and acts in terms of an `ism becomes so involved in reaction against other `isms that it is unwittingly controlled by them. For it then forms its principles by reaction against them instead of by a comprehensive, constructive survey of actual needs, problems, and possibilities. Whatever value is possessed by the essay presented in this little volume resides in its attempt to call attention to the larger and deeper issues of Education so as to suggest their proper frame of reference (EE, 6).

The editor of the series in which this volume appears reinforces Dewey's rhetorical fiction when he declares that "this little volume offers clear and certain guidance toward a united educational front..." (EE, 9) But to do so, Dewey must address problems that have arisen from the application of his ideas:

Inasmuch as teachers of the "new" education have avowedly applied the teachings of Dr. Dewey and emphasized experience, experiment, purposeful learning, freedom, and other well-known concepts of "progressive education," it is well to learn how Dr. Dewey himself reacts to current educational

practices (EE, 9).

The editor claims that "*Experience and Education* is a lucid analysis of both 'traditional' and 'progressive' education." Dewey, the editor claims, frowns "upon labels that express and prolong schism... (EE, 10). The editor suggests that the "fundamental defects" of both traditional and progressive education are objectively treated. He provides a fairly good comparison between traditional and progressive education.

Where the traditional school relied upon subjects or the cultural heritage for its content, the "new" school has exalted the learner's impulse and interest and the current problems of a changing society. Neither of these sets of values is sufficient unto itself. *Both* are essential. Sound educational experience involves, above all, continuity and interaction between the learner and what is learned. The traditional curriculum undoubtedly entailed rigid regimentation and a discipline that ignored the capacities and interests of child nature. Today, however, the reaction to this type of schooling often fosters the other extreme-inchoate curriculum, excessive individualism, and a spontaneity which is a deceptive index of freedom (EE, 9-10).

The balance suggested by the editor's introduction, though, has little to do with the text that follows. The editor pictures Dewey as arbiter between two positions, both of which are extreme and therefore erroneous. He writes, "Dr. Dewey insists that neither the old nor the new education is adequate." The editor explains that each extreme "is mis-educative because neither of them applies the principles of a carefully developed philosophy of experience." He anticipates that *Experience and Education* will supply this "missing link" coupling "the meaning of experience and its relation to education" (EE, 9-10).

Such an evenhanded approach, though, is not to be found in this work. As much as the editor might wish, it is not true that *Experience and Education* provides a firm foundation upon which they may unitedly promote an American educational system which

respects all sources of experience and rests upon a positive-not a negative-philosophy of experience and education."

As much as it might be needed, *Experience and Education* is not the volume by whose persuasion "American educators will erase their contentious labels and in solid ranks labor in behalf of a better tomorrow" (EE, 11). On the contrary, this work is one of the most divisive that Dewey wrote.

Dewey initially appears conciliatory:

Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of *Either-Ors*, between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities. When forced to recognize that the extremes cannot be acted upon, it is still inclined to hold that they are all right in theory but that when it comes to practical matters, circumstances compel us to compromise. Educational philosophy is no exception (EE, 17).

Having announced this statesmanlike position, Dewey quickly abandons it to engage, once again, in harsh criticism of all things traditional. His misleading rhetorical strategy is transparent, though. It is typified by a statement later in the text when he says, "I do not wish to refer to the traditional school in ways which set up a caricature in lieu of a picture. But..." (EE, 55).

Dewey reminds his readers that progressivism in education would never have arisen but for dissatisfaction with conventional pedagogy.²⁶ Dewey asserts, "The rise of what is called new education and progressive schools is of itself a product of discontent with traditional education" (EE, 18). Reminiscent of his central thesis in *Democracy and Education*, he suggests "that the one thing which has recommended the progressive movement is that it seems more in accord with the democratic ideal to which our people is committed than do the procedures of the traditional school, since the latter have so much of the autocratic about them" (EE, 33-4). "Another thing," he continues, "which has contributed to its favorable reception is that its methods are *humane* in comparison with the *harshness* so often attending the policies of the traditional school" (EE, 34) (emphasis added).

For Dewey, the central focus of education, has been, and continues to be, the preparation of students to assume the role of social reformers. He asserts, "The main purpose or objective is to prepare the young for future responsibilities..." (EE, 19). By contrast,

The traditional scheme is, in essence, one of imposition from above and from outside. It imposes adult standards, subject-matter, and methods upon those who are only growing slowly toward maturity. The gap is so great that the required subject-matter, the methods of learning and of behaving are foreign to the existing capacities of the young. They are beyond the reach of the experience the young learners already possess. Consequently they must be imposed; even though good teachers will use devices of art to cover up the imposition so as to relieve it of *obviously brutal features* (EE, 18-9) (emphasis added).

As the preceding passage intimates, and as he has done many times before, Dewey condemns the "illogic" of expecting the young to comprehend "grown-up" subject matter, or even imitate the virtuous conduct they see in teachers and parents. He argues that the standard curriculum is *irrelevant* to the young because the "gulf between the mature or adult products and the experience and abilities of the young is so wide that the very situation forbids much active participation by pupils in the development of what is taught" (EE, 18). In non-progressive schools, students are condemned to "essentially static" learning, burdened with "a finished product," and prohibited from "active participation." They are sentenced "to do-and learn, as it was the part of the six hundred to do and die" (EE, 19).

The (After So Many Years Still Remaining) Need of a Theory of Experience

It has not been enough, Dewey admonishes his followers, to reject existing philosophies and practices. Still remaining is the task of replacing the old with something new.

In short, the point I am making is that rejection of the philosophy and practice of traditional education sets a new type of difficult educational problem for those who believe in the new type of education. We shall operate blindly and in confusion until we recognize this fact; until we thoroughly appreciate that departure from the old solves no problems (EE, 25).

"In the following pages," Dewey promises, he will indicate, the "main problems" in need of solution and he will "suggest the main lines along which their solution is to be sought." The solution is the same as that which he has offered previously, namely, an education derived from experience, even if that experience is artificially produced in the school.

I assume that amid all uncertainties there is one permanent frame of reference: namely, *the organic connection between education and personal experience*; or that the new philosophy of education is committed to some kind of empirical and experimental philosophy. But experience and experiment are not self-explanatory ideas (EE, 25).

Once more, the contradiction in Dewey's philosophy of experience is evident, because on the one hand, impulse should be given "full play" as he has earlier instructed; on the other hand, experience must be managed in the interest of the greater good of facilitating social reformation. He warns that not all experiences are "educative." Some are "mis-educative" and have "the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience" (EE, 25). "Mis-educative" experiences "may be such as to engender callousness; it may produce lack of sensitivity and of responsiveness." In Orwellian-like tones, Dewey patiently explains that even if an experience is "immediately enjoyable" it may cultivate "a slack and careless attitude." A poor attitude "operates to modify the quality of subsequent experiences so as to prevent a person from getting out of them what they have to give." The final consequence of these "mis-educative experiences is that "the possibilities of having richer experience in the future are restricted..." (EE, 26).

Other mis-educative experiences may leave the pupil in a "groove or rut. Others may be so "disconnected from one another that, while each is agreeable or even exciting in itself, they are not linked cumulatively to one another." In that case, [e]nergy is then dissipated and a person becomes scatterbrained." Yet other consequences of the wrong experience, because of "their disconnectedness, may artificially generate dispersive, disintegrated, centrifugal habits." In general, the consequence of such experiences is the "formation of habits" and, ultimately, "the ability to control future experiences" (EE, 26).

Dewey is as harsh in his attack on traditional education as he had been decades before. Perhaps he understands that since his own philosophy is as yet inchoate, especially when put to practical application, his success still rests upon the destruction and demise of the traditional:

The traditional school could get along without any consistently developed philosophy of education. About all it required in that line was a set of abstract words like culture, discipline, our great cultural heritage, etc., actual guidance being derived not from them but from custom and established routines (EE, 28).

Whereas in earlier works, Dewey had propounded that "it is better to travel than to arrive," he now must now deal with the problem that his philosophy had not yet matured into a stable system capable of providing the guidance schools required. Missing now is the brashness so characteristic of his earlier thought.

To discover what is really simple and to act upon the discovery is an exceedingly difficult task.... [S]o we come back to the idea that a coherent *theory* of experience, affording positive direction to selection and organization of appropriate educational methods, is required by the attempt to give new direction to the work of the schools. The process is a slow and arduous one. It is a matter of growth, and there are many obstacles which tend to obstruct growth and to deflect it into wrong lines (EE, 30).

He concedes that for progressivism to be successful, educators must

submit to more program and structure-even if to do so is to embrace what has been found blameworthy in traditional education.

Just because traditional education was a matter of routine in which the plans and programs were handed down from the past, it does not follow that progressive education is a matter of planless improvisation (EE, 28).

He admits that the lack of structure and substance of his philosophy leave him vulnerable; nonetheless, he remains defiant that progressivism can eventually produce a better product:

Failure to develop a conception of organization upon the empirical and experimental basis gives reactionaries a too easy victory. But the fact that the empirical sciences now offer the best type of intellectual organization which can be found in any field shows that there is no reason why we, who call ourselves empiricists, should be "pushovers" in the matter of order and organization (EE, 31).

Criteria of Experience or Why Just Any Experience Will Not Do

Dewey concedes, then, that the need remains "for forming a theory of experience in order that education maybe intelligently conducted upon the basis of experience..." (EE, 33). Such a theory, though, must be "democratic," unlike the tradition it replaces. Indeed, one of Dewey's most ingenious and successful strategies has been to tie education reform to democratic progress. That is to say, progressivism in education means a richer democratic experience; the absence of progressivism means the decline of democracy. He underscores this advantage again as he contrasts the democratic character of his educational philosophy with the "undemocratic" and "anti-democratic" nature of traditional education. Progressivism is more democratic because it promises greater sharing, greater community and communication-in short, a richer shared experience for all within the political community.

Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life... (EE, 34)?

The reason for the American "hospitality" to progressive education lies in "its reliance upon and use of humane methods and its kinship to democracy." This means, of course, that traditional education is both inhumane and hostile to democracy (EE, 35).

This assertion brings Dewey to a reiteration of his conception of "habit." In this instance he explains that the "basic characteristic of habit is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences" (EE, 35). Although this precise description of habit had not appeared in earlier works, it is consistent with his earlier discussions. He further explains that habit "covers the formation of attitudes, attitudes that are emotional and intellectual; it covers our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to all the conditions which we met in living" (EE, 35).

Dewey's ideas of the accumulation of experiences and acquisition of habits next afford him the opportunity to defend his conception of "growth," a discussion he introduces by acknowledging the criticism that he provides no direction toward which growth should aim. His explication, though, leaves his conception of growth as enigmatic as before. He only offers that growth is "good," if when properly directed, it encourages further growth. Dewey asks

Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions... (EE, 36)?

And his inadequate answer is, " *I shall leave you to answer these questions*, saying simply that when and *only* when development in

a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing (EE, 36) (emphasis added). Here as elsewhere, Dewey leaves the reader-and educator-with many questions to ponder. After this uncertain clarification of growth, Dewey offers it to illuminate the dynamics of learning by experience:

Every experience is a moving force. Its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into...Failure to take the moving force of an experience into account so as to judge and direct it on the ground of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the principle of experience itself (EE, 38).

Armed with these dubious theoretical principles, the teacher should now understand "his business to be on the alert to see what attitudes and habitual tendencies are being created (EE, 39). Once again, the role of the teachers is a demanding one, requiring energy, insight, and patience as they must "have that sympathetic understanding of individuals as individuals which gives [them] an idea of what is actually going on in the minds of those who are learning" (EE, 39). Educators should know "how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worth while" (EE, 40). This active pedagogical intervention should not become the pretext of "some sort of disguised imposition from outside" (EE, 38).

Perhaps reflective of Dewey's tendency toward paternalism is his not infrequent use of the first few months and years of life to explain his pedagogical ideas for elementary and secondary education. Here he is concerned with helping educators find the correct posture for managing the student's experience while neither violating his freedom nor imposing upon him traditional material that is not absolutely necessary.

Let me illustrate from the case of an infant.... The wise mother takes account of the needs of the infant but not in a way which dispenses with her own responsibility for regulating the objective conditions under which the needs are satisfied. And if she is a wise mother in this respect, she draws upon past experi-

ences of experts as well as her own for the light that these shed upon what experiences are in general most conducive to the normal development of infants (EE, 42-3).

**The Loss of Social Control *or*
"My Classroom is Out of Control, Dr. Dewey !"**

Dewey then turns to the problem of authority in education and by so doing, implicitly recognizes that he has not solved the problem he created. He acknowledges, "When external control is rejected, the problem becomes that of finding the factors of control that are inherent within experience." He also admits, "When external authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected, but rather that there is need to search for a more effective source of authority" (EE, 21). He notes, "Visitors to some progressive schools are shocked by the lack of manners they come across." (EE, 59-60). Conceding that progressive education has gone too far he says, "Because the older education imposed the knowledge, methods, and rules of conduct of the mature person upon the young, it does not follow, except upon the basis of the extreme *Either-Or* philosophy, that the knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive value for the experience of the immature" (EE, 21). He further concedes what we have already observed: progressive education may involve a substantial exercise of authority as "more, rather than less, guidance by others" may be required. He still wants to preserve the "principle of learning through personal experience" but concedes that "a well thought-out philosophy" is still required (EE, 21). He is surprisingly frank in acknowledging the lesson of experience from the previous decades:

It is not too much to say that an educational philosophy which professes to be based on the idea of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is reacted against (EE, 23).

To deal with these objections, Dewey now uses the analogy of a

game to try to explain how progressives can have the benefits of authority and dispense with authority at the same time. In doing so, he is returning to his earlier thesis that the educational *process* itself can provide order, without depending upon educators to *wield* authority. His argument, though, is no more compelling in this instance than it was in earlier discourses.

Children at recess or after school play games, from tag and one-old-cat to baseball and football. The games involve rules, and these rules order their conduct. The games involve rules, and these rules order their conduct. The games do not go on haphazardly or by a succession of improvisations. Without rules there is no game. If disputes arise there is an umpire to appeal to, or discussion and a kind of arbitration are means to a decision; otherwise the game is broken up and comes to an end. (EE, 52).

In games, presumably because of their established rules, "the players do not feel that they are submitting to external imposition but that they are playing the game." The players are directed "by the whole situation" and they "do not feel that they are bossed by an individual person," nor are they "subjected to the will of some outside superior person" (EE, 53).

What Dewey ignores in this analogy is that games bring an exhilaration and thrill that schoolwork, if it is serious, can rarely match. He also seems to forget that if a game is to be serious and its outcome reliable, all the players must, at times, submit to the arbitration of some sort of authoritative referee. Dewey is nonetheless pleased that the instance of games "illustrates the general principle of social control of individuals without the violation of freedom" (EE, 54). He continues to argue, to the surprise of the careful reader, that participants more easily submit to the rules of the game because they "have the sanction of *tradition* and precedent" (EE, 53) (emphasis added)! The only part of this analogy with which Dewey seems to be uncomfortable is the competition which defines games. He supplements this discussion, then, with yet other analogy, this time from family life. This is an odd analogy for Dewey to

choose because of the vigorous authority typically necessary for successful family governance. Dewey's characterization of the family is one in which authority is exercised by someone who is no more than a kind of "first among equals." Dewey asserts that the firm exercise of authority by parents in the family "is slight in comparison" with the much greater number of instances in which "control is exercised by situations in which all take part" (EE, 54).

With this analogy Dewey is "grasping for straws." To the extent that the family can function as Dewey describes, even in a limited way, such cooperation may take place only as children grow older and mature. That is to say, it is only as they move *out* of the age ranges of middle and high school that Dewey's argument is valid. Notwithstanding its incongruence with reality, this romanticized view of family order is the model he hands the teacher:

The teacher reduces to a minimum the occasions in which he or she has to exercise authority in a personal way. When it is necessary, in the second place, to speak and act firmly, it is done in behalf of the interest of the group, not as an exhibition of personal power (EE, 54).

Significant is Dewey's charge that if authority is exercised contrary to his theoretical assumptions of how it should be exercised, it is "personal" authority (EE, 54). Yet, teachers who wield such arbitrary power should not be blamed as the traditional school, with its theoretical myopia, "almost forced it upon the teacher." This is because the "school was not a group or community held together by participation in common activities." The teacher was forced to keep order since her control was not "residing in the shared work being done" (EE, 55).

Reasserting his earlier positions on human nature, Dewey describes children as "naturally `sociable,'"

The conclusion is that in what are called the new schools, the primary source of social control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a respon-

sibility (EE, 56).

To take this one step further, and to reiterate a central theme from *Democracy and Education*, Dewey argues that the school should be a form of "community," which is the context in which "shared work" is most likely to occur. He acknowledges that there "are likely to be some who, when they come to school, are already victims of injurious conditions outside of school and who have become so passive and unduly docile that they fail to contribute." There will also be those who, because of previous experience, are "bumptious and unruly and perhaps downright rebellious." Although the "educator has to discover as best he or she can the causes for the recalcitrant attitudes," the "general principle of social control cannot be predicated upon such cases" (EE, 56). Ultimately the instructor may be forced to turn to "exclusion" (EE, 57).

As for managing the rest of the students, Dewey leaves the teachers with no more guidance than he had in previous decades to thread their way between the Scylla of classroom authoritarianism and the Charybdis of classroom anarchy. To be sure, the teacher must move beyond the outmoded attitude of traditional teachers who "*kept order*" (EE, 55). Teachers must "arrange in advance for the kind of work (by which I mean all kinds of activities engaged in) which will create situations that of themselves tend to exercise control over what this, that, and the other pupil does and how he does it (EE, 57). A lack of sufficiently thoughtful planning is to blame for disorder.

On the contrary, there is incumbent upon the educator the duty of instituting a much more intelligent, and consequently more difficult, kind of planning.... The planning must be flexible enough to permit free play for individuality of experience and yet firm enough to give direction towards continuous development of power (EE, 58).

To thoroughly befuddle the sincere teacher, Dewey quickly warns that "it is quite possible to have preparatory planning by the teacher done in such a rigid and intellectually inflexible fashion that it does

result in adult imposition..." (EE, 57). In such a case the teacher will be a gentle facilitator in name only and an pedagogical dictator in reality (EE, 59).

The Nature of Freedom, or "Much Activity About Nothing?"

Dewey next addresses "the other side of the problem of social control, namely, the nature of freedom" (EE, 61). "The only freedom that is of enduring importance," Dewey explains, "is freedom of intelligence, that is to say freedom of observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while." The objection with which he is concerned, is that progressive education encourages students into unbounded freedom of physical expression which seems both aimless and unproductive. In dealing with this criticism he must take care not to encourage a return to classroom regimentation. He warns against the mistake of identifying freedom merely "with freedom of movement, or with the external or physical side of activity." Such a definition is a mistake because "this external and physical side of activity cannot be separated from the internal side of activity; from freedom of thought, desire, and purpose" (EE, 61).

On the other hand, real internal freedom is not possible *without* physical freedom. Traditional schools have misunderstood and confused this issue. They have constrained students both physically, mentally, and morally with seating arrangements and restrictions on free movement. The first task of progressive reformers was to mercifully do away with "[s]traightjackets and chain-gang procedures...if there was to be a chance for growth of individuals in the intellectual springs of freedom without which there is no assurance of genuine and continued normal growth" (EE, 61). Dewey notes, though, that some reformers had not understood that "freedom of outer movement" is but a *"means*, not an end." More freedom does not automatically solve the "educational problem...." The important question is the use to which freedom is put.

Everything depends, then, in so far as education is concerned,

upon what is done with this added liberty. What end does it serve? What consequences flow from it (EE, 61-2)?

He then makes two important but contradictory points in defense of the classroom disorder of which he is accused. He first tries to explain student misbehavior as the backlash of traditional classroom rigidity. First, he reiterates a serious charge he has made earlier, namely that discipline problems have been the *consequence* of traditional discipline. Disorder is not caused by excessive freedom; on the contrary, mindless regimentation spawns misbehavior. To think freedom leads to classroom anarchy is to misunderstand classroom dynamics.

Enforced quiet and acquiescence prevent pupils from disclosing their real natures. They enforce artificial uniformity. They put seeming before being. They place a premium upon preserving the outward appearance of attention, decorum, and obedience (EE, 62).

Ironically, this approach generates a classroom "counterculture" in which "thoughts, imaginations, desires, and sly activities" run an "unchecked course behind this facade." The witless instructor is aware of the state of the classroom "only when some untoward act" leads to its detection. Any real learning that takes place in this environment is "accidental."

There is a vicious circle. Mechanical uniformity of studies and methods creates a kind of uniform immobility and this reacts to perpetuate uniformity of studies and of recitations, while behind this enforced uniformity individual tendencies operate in irregular and more or less forbidden ways (EE, 62).

Dewey's second defense is to freely concede that the very nature of educational experimentalism necessitates disorder. Whereas "the older methods set a premium upon passivity and receptivity in the pursuit of outward conformance," he argues that there "cannot be complete quietude in a laboratory or workshop" (EE, 63). Freedom is "power": "power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate

desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation" (EE, 64). As he has argued earlier, "Natural impulses and desires constitute...the starting point." Dewey maintains that autonomous self-imposed student self-control is his goal, but he implicitly acknowledges that the route he has recommended to arrive at that goal has often detoured into a tyranny of unchecked impulses in the classroom:

But the mere removal of external control is no guarantee for the production of self-control. It is easy to jump out of the frying-pan into the fire.... Impulses and desires that are not ordered by intelligence are under the control of accidental circumstances. It may be a loss rather than a gain to escape from the control of another person only to find one's conduct dictated by immediate whim and caprice; that is, at the mercy of impulses into whose formation intelligent judgment has not entered (EE, 64-5).

He admits, "A person whose conduct is controlled in this way has at most only the illusion of freedom (EE, 65).

Defending "Intelligence"

Here Dewey has a two-fold concern. He needs to defend his concept of "intelligence." He is equally concerned that his emphasis upon student impulse and desire has been distorted so that progressive schools are disproportionately preoccupied with giving students a free rein to their emotional impulses. As a transition from the previous discussion of freedom, he notes that freedom must be accompanied by the "sound instinct which identifies freedom with power to frame purposes and to execute or carry into effect purposes so framed" (EE, 67).

Dewey further notes, "Traditional education tended to ignore the importance of personal impulse and desire as moving springs." That is, traditional education pays insufficient attention to student motivation. He concedes, though, "this is no reason why progressive education should identify impulse and desire with purpose, thereby

passing over the need for a rational "*educational* scheme" (EE, 70-1). The role of "intelligence" is to give direction to impulse and desire.

Intelligence is a two-step process: First, it involves the formation of purpose; secondly, it supplies the pragmatism to craft a strategy to reach that purpose. In regard to the former, Dewey identifies three components to the formation of purpose, conceding its complexity:

It involves (1) observation of surrounding conditions; (2) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past... [and] (3) judgment which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify (EE, 71).

But any resemblance of intelligence to the Aristotelian virtue of prudence is superficial because intelligence cannot be guided by preordained principles, and certainly cannot be the product of the arbitrary judgment and will of the teacher. The teacher's plan, moreover, "can be formed only by study of conditions and by securing all relevant information"(EE, 71).

It seems that Dewey leaves the reader where he began. The teacher is charged with making sense out of the impulse and desire of the student by insuring that these emotions are properly focused on useful objectives and are based upon productive strategies. The teacher, though, may not employ traditional principles as objectives nor recommend recognized virtues as even the means to accomplish objectives. Nor may the teacher do more than casually suggest to students that they may have deviated from pursuing meaningful goals, or if they are employing appropriate strategies to reach whatever goals they may have in mind. To do so constitutes "abuse" (EE, 71). The result of Dewey's idea of intelligence is no better than before: either the educational process will collapse into aimless academic anarchy, or it must be wrested from the student and directed by no more than the educator's caprice. Dewey's realm of "intelligent" student activity is patently untenable ground. Dewey cheerfully concedes the logical reaction to these ideas: "Why, then, even supply materials, since they are a source of some suggestion or

another?" (EE, 71). Yet he willfully denies the logic of such a response. Dewey may not like this application of his ideas, but such an application is reasonable. Dewey concludes, as he began decades before in maddening ambiguity: "The essential point is that the purpose grow and take shape through the process of social intelligence" (EE, 72).

Progressive Organization of Subject Matter or Re-inventing "Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic"

The attack upon Dewey specifically, and progressivism in general, had been its culpability for the collapse of a meaningful course of study. His challenge here, similar to his defense of freedom, is both to defend against abuses and at the same time maintain his very important principle that education must be intimately tied to experience.

One consideration stands out clearly when education is conceived in terms of experience. Anything which can be called a study, whether arithmetic, history, geography, or one of the natural sciences, must be derived from materials which at the outset fall within the scope of ordinary life-experience (EE, 73).

To combat the criticism that progressive education, while rejecting the traditional canon of disciplines, cannot offer a coherent substitute, Dewey acknowledges that the "newer" methods must develop a canon of their own. This canon, however, cannot be taken from tradition but must somehow be drawn from the student's own unique experience.

But finding the material for learning within experience is only the first step. The next step is the progressive development of what is already experienced into a fuller and richer and also more organized form, a form that gradually approximates that in which subject-matter is presented to the skilled, mature person (EE, 74).

To explain how this material might be accumulated, Dewey

returns once again to a now-familiar analogy-the learning process of infants. The advantage of the analogy in this instance is that it demonstrates how the material for learning can be set by the *environment*, without the imposition of a preordained curriculum. As before, though, Dewey conveniently ignores the authoritarian role of the parent or guardian in an infant's development.

The infant, for example, begins with an environment of objects that is very restricted in space and time. That environment steadily expands by the momentum inherent in experience itself without aid from scholastic instruction. As the infant learns to reach, creep, walk, and talk, the intrinsic subject-matter of its experience widens and deepens...(EE, 74).

Here the influence of Rousseau is still evident as Dewey obligates the educator to imitate the role of nature when the child comes of school age.

The educator who receives the child at the end of this period has to find ways for doing consciously and deliberately what "nature" accomplishes in the earlier years (EE, 74).

The choosing of appropriate subject matter is a formidable daily task for the educator. It appears, however, that lesson plans made this year could be invalid next year. Dewey is untroubled that the work of "the progressive educator is more difficult than for the teacher in the traditional school," because a "single course of studies for all progressive schools is out of the question; it would mean abandoning the fundamental principle of connection with life-experience" (EE, 76-78). "It thus becomes the office of the educator," Dewey explains, "to select those things within the range of existing experience that have the promise and potentiality of presenting new problems which by stimulating new ways of observation and judgment will expand the area of further experience." But what is taught today may not be regarded "as a fixed possession" (EE, 78).

Dewey recognizes that the educator needs assistance in determining which "things" are "within the range of existing experience" and in identifying what holds the promise of both "stimulating" the

student and expanding "further experience." He therefore suggests that "Connectedness in growth must be his constant watchword"(EE, 75). Dewey concedes that the traditional educator could enjoy the luxury of a preset curriculum as the "studies of the traditional school consisted of subject-matter that was selected and arranged on the basis of the judgment of adults as to what would be useful for the young sometime in the future..." Material so selected, though, "was settled upon outside the present life-experience of the learner"(EE, 76). Consequently, it deserves the worst possible condemnation: [It had to do with the past; it was such as had proved useful to men in past ages" (EE, 76-7). Dewey notes that his demand for present relevance has led some to "ignore the past." To avoid this error he teaches educators that present experience" must be "stretched, as it were, backward" (EE, 77).

The nature of the issues cannot be understood save as we know how they came about. The institutions and customs that exist in the present and that give rise to present social ills and dislocations did not arise overnight. They have a long history behind them (EE, 77).

For that reason, Dewey states, "Attempt to deal with them simply on the basis of what is obvious in the present is bound to result in adoption of superficial measures which in the end will only render existing problems more acute and more difficult to solve" (EE, 77).

At first glance, this statement might seem to be an uncharacteristically sympathetic statement regarding the conventional study of history; however, Dewey leaves the issue muddled. He concedes that history study is still a "problem" to be "worked out" (EE, 78). Dewey suggests that "If time permitted," he might render the issue more "definite and concrete" (EE, 77). Needful of the reader's sympathy, he apologetically notes that "progressive schools are new." As such, "they have had hardly more than a generation in which to develop." Accordingly,

A certain amount of uncertainty and of laxity in choice and organization of subject-matter is, therefore, what was to be

expected. It is no ground for fundamental criticism or complaint" (EE, 78).

Dewey candidly notes the tremendous burden he places upon practitioners when he admits, "There is no discipline in the world so severe as the discipline of experience subjected to the tests of intelligent development and direction" (EE, 90).

As he has before, he offers the sciences as a model for all disciplines. Dewey is clearly enamored of the progress of science. He states, "The experience of every child and youth, in the country and the city, is what it is in its present actuality because of appliances which utilize electricity, heat, and chemical processes" (EE, 79). He is still hopeful of the validity of his premise that *all* education can proceed along experimental lines (EE, 81-2).

For Dewey, classical and scholastic philosophy is wholly invalid in education today because it arose prior to the development of the modern scientific method. This is a highly dubious claim since the rational method of observation and inquiry of the ancients anticipated many contemporary scientific practices. Dewey wisely does not belabor the point.

Instead, in a kind of rhetorical preemptive strike, he describes the traditionalist attack upon his theory.

It is argued that science and its method must be subordinated; that we must return to the logic of ultimate first principles expressed in the logic of Aristotle and St. Thomas, in order that the young may have sure anchorage in their intellectual and moral life, and not be at the mercy of every passing breeze that blows (EE, 85).

This "appeal...to fixed authority...may be temporarily successful in a period when general insecurity, emotional and intellectual as well as economic, is rife." To take such a direction "is so out of touch with all the conditions of modern life that I believe it is folly to seek salvation in this direction." (EE, 86). Dewey doggedly maintains his demand for the "systematic utilization of scientific method as the pattern and ideal of intelligent exploration and exploitation of the

potentialities inherent in experience" (EE, 86). This has become an article of faith for Dewey since he believes that the "scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live" (EE, 88).

He still, though, has not done much to fill the gap between his aspirations and the questions of policy and practice. Too blithely he says, "Adaptation of the method to individuals of various degrees of maturity is a problem for the educator, and the constant factors in the problem are the formation of ideas, acting upon ideas, observations of the conditions which result, and organization of facts and ideas for future use." As a consequence of this heuristic gap between theory and experience, progressivism in education was known then, as it is now, by what it opposes more than by what it promotes, by what it seeks to destroy than by what it is capable of creating.

Dewey closes this book by returning to a posture entirely incongruent with the plain meaning of the work itself.

I have used frequently in what precedes the words "progressive" and "new" education. I do not wish to close, however, without recording my firm belief that the fundamental issue is not one of new versus old education nor of progressive against traditional education but a question of what anything whatever must be to be worthy of the name *education* (EE, 90).

Thus the reader is left, as he began, with a suspicion that at least in this work Dewey cannot wholly be trusted. His intellectual honesty is in question, no doubt due to the uncomfortable defensive posture in which he finds himself.

CONCLUSION

Dewey placed the school and its resources at the service of his philosophical aspirations. Consistent with his experimentalism, Dewey converted the classroom into a laboratory as he declared, "Education is the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested" (DE, 329). As a good social scientist, he knew that if "a theory makes no difference in educa-

tional endeavor, it must be artificial" (DE, 328). Symbolic of Dewey's experimentalism, of course, was his Laboratory School at the University of Chicago. The price of such experimentation was that, by definition, the "subjects"-pupils-must suffer the experimenter's mistakes, just as Thomas Edison tested hundreds of lighting materials before he discovered the proper filament for the incandescent bulb. One must ask then, if, when dealing with *human* subjects, the cost is justified by whatever benefits the laboratory might yield.

In Dewey's "education by experience," the curriculum is set by the student's experience. These experiences, in turn, are purportedly prompted by the student's natural impulse; however, this is misleading for experience does not mean what we would expect. Although, according to Dewey, experience means spontaneous classroom events, in truth these activities must be directed carefully by the teacher toward an ideological end.

By making the educational *process* the locus of pedagogy, Dewey justified a vast educational bureaucracy. Today in the United States, that bureaucracy has grown more top-heavy and less accountable than in perhaps any other industrialized nation. Education today is managed by an insulated establishment where process and method have supplanted substance and content. This bureaucracy often is accountable only to itself as indeed Dewey intended should be the case.

One must ask if Dewey has purchased his dynamic educational system at too high a price. This question of accountability not only surrounds educational institutions, it pervades the entire Dewey system. In *Experience and Education*, Dewey reluctantly acknowledged that his progressive conception of schoolhouse liberty might provide the pretext for an educational system as imposing and arbitrary as the traditional canon and pedagogy he had hoped to escape. Nothing is sacred: neither the autonomy of the family nor the boundaries separating school and society are safe from the intrusion of the school mission. Dewey's moral philosophy depreciated individual responsibility as the obligation for individual integrity was replaced by a demand for growth and useful social "habits." Because

motives and intentions are irrelevant, morality can be judged only *in activity*. Moral judgment is arbitrary, perplexing, and a matter for continual experimentation.

Another limitation found in Dewey's moral philosophy turns on Aristotle's distinction between the good man and the good citizen. Aristotle taught in the *Politics* that a good citizen in many regimes, one who is loyal to the constitution, is not the same as a truly good man, for a good man inevitably would oppose serious constitutional defects. It is only in the very best regime that the virtue of a good man and a good citizen intersect. Dewey not only refuses to recognize discrete individual moral virtues and the transcendent moral ideals that lay beyond the pale of society, he declines to allow for any morality other than the social.²⁸

In a curious way, Dewey leaves us with a dilemma: With no definition of virtues "apart from participation in social life," he makes it difficult to hold aloft the very virtues and ideals most often needed to inspire social change. The civil rights movement in this country illustrates why ideals that lay beyond the moral *status quo* may be insufficient for social reform. Ironically, Dewey limits the social reconstruction he so passionately seeks by denying the reality of ideals of human behavior which would elevate the standards of social experience, leading to moral improvement.

In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey stipulated that the curriculum should be neither academic nor vocational. It appears that in American education he has been granted his wish. In the closing decades of the twentieth century, Americans have been treated to a mind-numbing march of weekly reports exposing the scandalously poor academic achievement of their children. Alarming documentation also has emerged that American students are not alone in their scholastic decline, but are closely followed in their descent by the very group responsible for teaching them. Not only are American students deficient academically, they have little opportunity for meaningful vocational education. Too often they squander time in "shop" tinkering with minor pieces of furniture or doing enough *pro bono* automobile tune-ups to qualify as shade tree mechanics. Just as Dewey wished, American education has eschewed "ideals" of

academic excellence or vocational aptitude.

In his zeal, Dewey is grossly impractical. He falls under suspicion when his motives emerge as much more a crusade *against* the traditional than *a pursuit* of the useful. He ignores the obvious inutility of teaching students that there is no value in any subject matter if they themselves do not discover it firsthand. This position has less to do with protecting student autonomy than demolishing the existing curriculum. For example, he denies the intrinsic utility of mathematics as training in logic or the value of classical or foreign language study in developing rhetorical skill. Equally denigrated by neglect was the value of history for the cultivation of knowledge and prudence, and the use of literature to enrich the power of moral reasoning and imagination. Prior to emerging as a public figure, the ex-slave turned statesman Frederick Douglass reported that he memorized many speeches from the classic, *The Columbian Orator*, as a means to developing his very able rhetorical skills. These skills, coupled with his character, were instrumental in Douglass' role as an anti-slavery leader, both here and abroad. Dewey makes it patent that such an "uncreative" activity as memorizing some else's speeches contradicts the freedom and creative development of the student. Indeed, rote memorization of *anything is* prohibited for to do so would implicitly acknowledge that a body of information is authoritarian enough to warrant committing it to memory.

Dewey offered the Gary, Indiana schools as a model of civic education. To be sure, much is to be commended in this program which allows students to develop appreciation and acquire responsibility for civic affairs by interacting with their community and by staging student campaigns. But taking Dewey at his word, why did he applaud the exclusion of books? Presumably, this means that high school students have no obligation to read the *Federalist Papers*, Lincoln's Inaugural Addresses or his "Gettysburg Address," Washington's "Farewell Address," Frederick Douglass' "Fourth of July Oration," Martin Luther King's "I Have A Dream" speech, or even the U.S. Constitution! Surely this is a stunted civic education and cannot be superior to an approach drawing from a wider and historical range of experience. We must ask again why Dewey would

recommend such an *anti-utilitarian* education and recognize deeper motives on his part. He cannot argue that to include such general reading requirements would violate the principle of individuality in education. Nor could he argue that a knowledge of the American political heritage would render students less able to pursue social improvement, nor less able to interact with local officials and artisans.

In the United States today, those responsible for leading schools of education and business are just beginning to realize that an education based almost entirely on methodology and skills is prone to producing graduates who are unsuited for teaching or for meaningful business leadership. Yet it is the reaction to just such a "content-free" education that has sparked a renewed interest once again in the traditional liberal arts education as appropriate for any occupational or professional pursuit. At Dewey's urging, we have discarded the ancient belief that a liberal education prepares one for the appropriate use of leisure time. There is growing evidence, though, that American young people are helpless when challenged to use their leisure in meaningful ways. When they experience those rare moments devoid of frenzied activity and multimedia sensory inundation, they apparently plummet into despair and depression, at least judging by the skyrocketing rates of suicide by those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

One also must ask what role Dewey's virulent anti-authoritarianism has played in the emasculation of pedagogical authority today. Educational leaders, by and large, seem inept when confronted with the fractured consensus over whether an authoritative curriculum exists in Western education. To be sure, this confusion over our heritage is not simply a reflection of our pluralistic heritage, but rather the product of an aggressive calculated campaign against the corpus of traditional learning that has now spanned several decades. In many classrooms, the concern is whether sufficient authority exists simply to guarantee physical safety and survival.

Faced with the deterioration of conduct and order, a revival of the concept of virtue as the basis of all morality has emerged both in

popular culture and in classrooms in the shape of various kinds of school "character" programs. Most startling about this "rediscovery of virtue" is the stunning notion that moral and intellectual virtue could have been lost in the first place. On the other hand, perhaps it should be no surprise considering the unrelenting attack on virtue staged first by Dewey, then by successive generations of his disciples.

The scientific method has found a comfortable home in the social sciences and education, but has failed to emerge as the dominant "intelligence" that Dewey prophesied. Where social science and education have eliminated other sources of morality, students have often searched in vain for moral guidance. To the extent that schools of education have adopted Dewey's enmity with religion, students and parents can legitimately question whether their own values receive due respect in our liberal pluralistic society.

Little attention has been paid to the destructive tone of Dewey's philosophy, yet no theme is more conspicuous to careful observers of American education than this one.²⁹ It sometimes appears in the form of an imbalanced and misguided obsession with creativity, even though Nietzsche warned that to create we must first destroy. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey teaches that creativity may find its best inspiration in a release of the students own "will to power." Presumably, this "release" will become the means by which students might construct their own meaning from the curriculum in particular, and life in general. He subtly suggests the Nietzschean intimate connection between creation and destruction when he predicts that "the will to power will burst into flower."

The modern destructive impulse may appear also under the classroom guise of values clarification or "teaching students to think for themselves." Underlying such "innovative" pedagogy one often finds an unnecessary and irrational hostility to the traditional. For that reason, at a great sacrifice of resources, more and more families flee to private schools or stay at home for education, settings where they will not have to battle militant opposition to their ethnic, religious, or philosophical ideals.

Although it is impossible to determine exactly how much influ-

ence Dewey has had on American education, the number of parallels is striking between current educational trends and practices and the most conspicuous features of Dewey's thought. The extent to which these elements of Dewey's educational thought are the antecedents of problems in American education today is difficult to ascertain. The influence of popular culture, of the mass media and especially television, the instability of the family, and the waning influence of the church are all significant factors. But, if it is true that "ideas have consequences"-and certainly it is true-then John Dewey's ideas cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.

Henry T. Edmondson III
Georgia College and State
University

NOTES

1. Just as Dewey's influence on American education is incalculable, so, also is his foreign influence profound. Best known is his reputation in China, but as early as 1930, the number of his works translated into other languages was impressive-e.g., French, German, Russian, Hungarian, Arabic, Japanese-and his role was noted in shaping educational reform in Mexico, Germany, Turkey, and England. See Isaac L. Kandel, "John Dewey's Influence on Education in Foreign Lands," in *John Dewey: The Man and His Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 65-74.

2. *John Dewey: The Collected Works, 1882-1953*. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991). Jo Ann Boydston, ed. *The Early Works, 1882-1898* (5 vols.), *The Middle Works, 1899-1924* (15 vols.), *The Later Works, 1925-1953* (17 vols.).

3. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1995).

4. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).

5. Jennifer Welchman. *Dewey's Ethical Thought*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).

6. James Campbell. *Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence*. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1995).

7. Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

8. Philip L. Smith. *The Journal of Genetic Psychology*. V. 155 (Sept. 1994) p. 355-65.

9. John Dewey. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1927).

10. John Dewey. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935).

11. John Dewey. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939).

12. Dewey's more radical philosophical innovations on the liberal experiment cast him farther to the left than others of the same general persuasion. At the same time he fancies himself heir to the Jefferson tradition and eventually draws a clear line demarcating Marxist thought from his own. See John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939); and, John Dewey, *The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson*. From *The Living Thoughts Library*. Alfred O. Mendel, ed. (London and Edinburgh: Morrison and Gibb Ltd., 1941).

13. John Dewey. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. ^{2nd} edition. (Southern Illinois University Press, 1980).

14. Those seeking yet a different approach to Dewey might consider his two leading primarily metaphysical works, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), and *Experience and Nature*. (New York: The MacMillan Publishing Company, 1938).

15. I.e., the informal logical fallacy *argumentum ad baculum*.

16. The best translation of this important book of which I am aware is Allan Bloom, transl. (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

17. Dewey's fullest discussion of his instrumental approach to aesthetics is found in *Art as Experience*. (New York: Minton Balch & Co., New York, 1934).

18. Throughout all of his writings, Dewey's use of the word "evil" is reserved almost exclusively as a designation for traditional education-whether it be traditional pedagogical ideas practices, or arguments.

19. Although in *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey only makes vague references to Rousseau's ideas, in *Schools of Tomorrow* (1915), as we shall see, Dewey unabashedly embraces and endorses Rousseau's educational views.

20. Dewey was well aware of Nietzsche's writing. In *Freedom*

and Culture (1939), in the context of a general discussion of freedom, he mentions Nietzsche and in so doing, defends the German philosopher from criticism Dewey thinks is unfair. Dewey notes that "some writers, notably Nietzsche (though not in the crude form often alleged) proposed an ethics of power in opposition to the supposed Christian ethics of sacrifice" (p. 17).

21. John Dewey. *My Pedagogical Creed*. (Washington, D. C.: The Progressive Association, 1929. Originally published in 1897).

22. Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) *Swiss* educational reformer. Pestalozzi, who was influenced by Rousseau, advocated individualized student education.. He achieved international fame after the French Revolution with his several experimental educational institutes for orphans.

23. Friedrich Wilhelm August Froebel (1782-1852) German educator and founder of the kindergarten. His ideas on play were especially influential on Dewey in general, and on Dewey's Laboratory School at the University of Chicago in particular. Froebel was influenced by both Rousseau and Pestalozzi.

24. American educators even recognize an "Montessorri Education Week," which falls on the last week of each February. I think it is significant and ironic that Dewey expressed considerable disagreement with one of the few expressions of Progressive Education that have maintained relevance and practical value in American education.

25. Another similar work by Dewey during this time, although shorter and more superficial, is *The Way Out of Educational Confusion*. John Dewey. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931).

26. This is a premise Dewey has assumed from the beginning of his writing but has never supported. Other possible explanations for the appeal of progressive education include the American infatuation with novelty, or the allure of change simply for the sake of change that often seems to characterize American politics.

27. This statement is even more vitriolic than the preceding ones. It is an apparent reference to the "Charge of the Light Brigade," that was immortalized by Tennyson in the poem of the

same name. It was the sacrificial assault by the British against the Russians in the Crimean War in which the majority of the 600-man strong British forces were cut down by the Russians. Tennyson thought it the quintessence of self-interested heroism; others, a senseless waste. Not only does Dewey agree with the latter, he uses it to condemn the senseless "slaughter" of students in traditional education!

28. Aristotle, *The Politics*. Translated by Carnes Lord. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).

29. A notable exception is Paul K. Crosser *The Nihilism of John Dewey* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955).