
Heidegger's Nietzsche'

As we showed in the first part of this essay, Heidegger conducts his discussion of Nietzsche's thought in the light of what he believes are the fundamental articulations of philosophy: beings understood in terms of their essence, their existence, their truth, and their ground or possibility.¹ This leads us to wonder about the origin of these articulations: from whence do they derive their power and evidence? Indeed, if these articulations are truly basic, we should also be able to grasp other thinkers in such terms. Does this supposition prove to be correct? If it does, then why do different thinkers understand things differently: are some or all in error, or are all in some sense true? Is there a nihilistic pattern in the history of thought or does the ending or fulfillment of philosophy in nihilism just happen to occur with Nietzsche? In general, in what way can thinking through the origin of philosophy's root articulations, and its fulfillment in Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism, illuminate Being itself?

Heidegger addresses such questions each time he lectures or writes about a philosopher, but *it is Nietzsche* that contains his "most explicit attempt to show the history of Being as metaphysics" (*End*, vii.).² This attempt is clear throughout the work, but it is most evident in its four concluding essays, and it is on these that we will concentrate. Our purpose will be to shed light on the questions we have asked, to indicate the suggestiveness of what Heidegger says for

¹This essay is the second and final part of a discussion of Martin Heidegger's *Nietzsche*. The first part appeared in the last volume (XXII) of *The Political Science Reviewer*.

students of political philosophy, and to (re)acquaint ourselves with the effort to understand philosophy's root terms by overcoming their ossified traditional sense and finding their essential origins.

I

Heidegger begins his probe into the distinction between essence and existence by reminding us of what we still believe, commonsensically.³ Being means *that* beings are, that they are not nonexistent. A being is something that is actual, or, as we also say, real, or existent; Being means actuality. To be actual is to be the product of an activity that is itself capable of activity, even the minimal activity of producing resistance.

Even if it were clear just how Being is determined by actuality or existence, however, we would still not grasp it fully, because we distinguish between what beings are and that they are. Whether or not something exists, *what* it is, its "essence," is not clarified by the simple fact of its existence. What a tree is as a tree is what is living, growing, treelike in it, the one origin and common species that makes it possible for something existing to be a tree.

The history of Being as metaphysics "begins with this distinction" between whatness and thatness. But the distinction, however familiar it has become, is hardly a matter of course. For, how the distinction originates from Being is questionable. Indeed, what Being itself is is questionable. According to Heidegger, this unclarity would not be alleviated by deriving a being's existence from its essence, or vice versa, or by locating them both in some vapid general definition of Being. In fact, Heidegger's crucial point is that the origin of the distinction is closed off to metaphysics because the Being that enters into the distinction "refuses" to approach metaphysics as such. (We will discuss this argument at length later in our essay.) Indeed, this concealment is what makes metaphysics possible. Being as Being, which means for our present discussion the "origin of Being divided into whatness and thatness," conceals itself "in favor of Being which opens out beings as beings." Metaphysics as such could only account for the origin of the distinction philosophically—say by discussing the origin's causal possibilities or actual

effects-but could not clearly bring to light the ground of the distinction in its own terms (*End*, 3-4; II, 402).

Heidegger now turns from the commonly accepted distinction and its obscure origin to a discussion of the distinction as we can find it throughout the "history of Being." Presumably this means that we are thinking about it in terms of its self-concealing origin, and not merely as it stands and changes within the different philosophical interpretations of the beingness of beings. Nonetheless, although merely reporting the changing teachings of philosophers does not constitute a history of Being, the heart of this history is the history of metaphysical doctrines, properly understood. The key question to keep in mind is this: "what essence of Being reveals itself" in the distinction between what something is and that it is.

In the beginning of its history, Being "opens itself out" as *physis* and *aletheia*, nature and truth or, as Heidegger understands them, emerging and unconcealment. Metaphysics "begins with Plato's interpretation of Being as idea" (IV, 164; II, 220), although metaphysics as fully conceptualized, metaphysics "proper," starts when Aristotle formulates being as *ousia*, i.e., as presence, as permanence in the sense of enduring. What is permanently present is something at rest, or something that moves into rest by emerging out of itself (*physis*) or by being produced (*poiesis*). This resting gathers the movement of producing into its completed boundary, as does, say, a finished house: such completion, not a mere cessation (or "*telos*" understood as an abstract purpose) is what Aristotle means by limit or end. (We can elaborate what Heidegger says by thinking of the "end" as the containing and placing-the shaping-by which the full house now stands out and begins to be itself.)

Something—a house, in our example—that is "completely at rest in the rest of its outward appearance," completely at rest in "presenting in unconcealment," is what Aristotle calls the work, the *ergon*. For Aristotle, therefore, and for the Greeks in general, work is not understood as an activity, or the effect or result of an activity.

Aristotle characterizes Being (presence) as *ergon* in the sense just described. His other key terms, *energeia* (workness, or working: being in the work as work) and *entelecheia* (having itself in the end)

are similarly understood. Aristotle also understands the eschaton, that is, the "ultimate" or highest presencing that grants all other presence, as *energeia*.

Heidegger's next question is how a distinction becomes necessary that divides presencing, understood as *energeia*, into whatness and thatness. Presence in the primal sense for Aristotle is not something that presences in or with something else. Rather, it is the persisting of something that lingers in itself, *this* individual man or house, for example. But these first presences ("substances", as they are usually translated) also contain presence in the secondary sense: that which first persists "allows that as which it presences to emerge." It allows that as which it presences to show itself as outward appearance. The individual man for example, is present as, shows himself as, *man* and as *animal* but only in the "most extreme present of the indivisible" appearance that is not derived from another. So: Being understood as *that* something is primary, and Being understood as *what* something is secondary (*End, 9; II,409*).

Needless to say, Heidegger's account is not a matter of course, but derives from his thinking through and, indeed, translating, Aristotle's key terms in a manner that is alive to the way in which Being originally opens itself out as emerging into unconcealment. He stresses the notion of outward appearance and origin rather than the ossified senses of species and class when he discusses and translates *eidos* and *genos*, and he emphasizes presence and lying present before us rather than the ossified notions of substance and subject when he discusses *ousia* and *hypokeimenon*.

Heidegger pauses to remind us that his account of Aristotle does not reach the true origin of metaphysics. For, we must see that we have still not clarified the difference between Being as such and beings, between presencing itself and those that are present. This difference precedes and underlies the distinction between *beings* understood as what they are and that they are. One may say that "presencing has within itself the difference of the pure nearness of lasting and of levels of staying in the origin of outward appearance. But how does presencing have this *difference within itself?*" (*End 8, II 407*). The essential origin and the belonging together of these

distinctions remain obscure, perhaps essentially so from the point of view of metaphysics. "The guiding projection" of metaphysics, Heidegger has told us earlier, "places beings as such in the open region of permanence and presence, representing them in their universal character with a view to their beingness. Which realm it is that yields our representations of permanence and presencing, indeed, the permanentizing of presence itself, never troubles the guiding projection of metaphysics. Metaphysics keeps strictly to the open region of its projection and interprets the permanentizing of presenting variously in accord with the fundamental experience of the already predetermined beingness of beings. Yet if a meditation stirs that gradually gets into its purview that which lightens, that which propriates all the openness of what is open, permanentizing and presencing will themselves be interrogated with a view to their essence. Both will show themselves as essentially bound up with time. Simultaneously, they will demand of us that we rid ourselves of whatever it is we usually designate in the word *time*" (III, 167; II, 13).

II

For Aristotle, as Heidegger sees it, Being consists in the *energeia*, the working, of the "that". Because what Aristotle uncovers as *energeia* is what we later interpret as actuality and reality, existence takes precedence over essence in our usual understanding of Being. For Plato too, the authentic and single beingness of beings is presence. But it is presence as "*idea*," presence as outward appearance. The "essence of Being gathers itself' in the idea as what is common and unifying; this unifying "is determined as the unifying One *by physis* and *logos*, that is, by the gathering allowing-to-emerge." But whereas Aristotle could, as we have seen, think of the idea in terms of the presence of the individual *this*, for Plato the "actual being" is only a non-being, when we consider it in terms of the ideas, for the ideas are what are purely present. The actual being is therefore "inconceivable in its beingness." Nonetheless, it is important to see that whatever their similarities and differences both Aristotle and Plato have already previously thought the "primordially decided essence of Being" in terms of "presencing in unconcealment" (*End*, 8, 9; II409).

If we bring Aristotle's and Plato's reflections together, we see that "*Being is presence as the showing itself of outward appearance. Being is the lasting of the actual being in such outward appearance*" (*End*, 10; II, 409).⁴ The truth or unconcealing of Being is from then on limited to what is in being in these two senses of whatness and thatness, and their changing interplay and understanding becomes the structure of all metaphysics. Metaphysics steps forward from this beginning, yet always carries it along. When whatness is emphasized, beings themselves (*what* a being is) are attended to and Being is ignored. When thatness is emphasized, Being is in a sense attended to (that a being is), but what Being is, what the "is" means, is taken for granted. The precedence of beings, and the presumed self-evidence of Being, thus characterize all metaphysics.

Because the mere fact that something is is what we usually refer to when we are trying to designate the sheer being of an entity, it is a changed understanding of existence, not essence, that is the first central change in the history of metaphysics. The change is precisely the change from understanding thatness as *ergon* and *energeia* to understanding thatness as what we have just called mere factuality, or mere existence. The Latin "opus" or "factum" or "actus" do not simply translate *ergon*: fact, reality, and existence mean something different from what Aristotle had in mind. The *ergon* as a product is by being freed in the openness of its presencing. Its essence is its workness, its being at work, its gathering into a limit, its presencing in the open. But the work or product comes to be seen as what is *effected* in the working and accomplished in the action, and its essence is now "the 'reality' of a real thing which rules in working and is fitted into the procedure of working" (*End*, 12; II, 412).

Although Heidegger names Cicero when he discusses this transformation, he does not attribute the change to him or to anyone in particular. Rather, he simply points to Cicero to show that the Greek sense of Being as coming forward to presence in unconcealment is no longer dominant even though "*ex-sistere speculo* means for Cicero to step out of the cave." The literal translation of, say, *energeia* to *actualitas* "is misleading. In truth it brings precisely another transposition to the word of Being. This transposition of another

(period of) humanity to the whole of beings occurs by virtue of the closure of Being. The character of *that-being* and of the 'that' has become another" (*End*, 12; II, 412).

III

Although Heidegger emphasizes that the history of Being is not to be identified with any particular philosophic writings, and although every people is in one way or another shaped by its metaphysics, we should note that it is only with the Romans that Heidegger does not point to a dominant thinker: it is unclear if Cicero himself saw the heart of beings in a new way or, inadvertently as it were, transformed Plato by fitting him to seemingly identical but in fact profoundly different concepts that were already lying at hand.

This Roman transposition is especially important because it is the heart of the Christian metaphysical understanding. Although, as we have seen, there are ways in which each metaphysics is alike, and although each thinker sets before him what the others have done, Heidegger nonetheless distinguishes the moderns from the medievals, and the medievals (as Romans) from the Greeks. Not ancients and moderns, but Greeks, Romans and moderns is the central division.

Indeed, if we must split into two alone, the Romans fit more decisively with the moderns than they do with the Greeks. The determination of Being as actuality and reality "underlies all history in advance" from the Romans "until the most recent of modern times." Even when we reawaken the Greeks we reawaken in a Roman way. Even when we look at an epoch we might consider to be exempt, such as "the Germanic character of the medieval period," we find that it too "is Roman in its metaphysical essence, because it is Christian." The "real," understood as what is truly in being, becomes central for everything that is possible and necessary. For this reason, it is especially the Roman distortions of the Greeks that need to be destroyed or deconstructed if we are ever properly to think the truth of Being (*End*, 12, 13; II, 412, 413).

When we say that Being understood as reality underlies all history in advance, we are also saying that "the structure of relationships of a certain type of humanity" to beings as a whole underlies

history: all Western history becomes Roman, not Greek. To understand "even merely historically" the scope of this transition from Greek to Roman conceptualization, we must understand the "Roman character" in its full "historical developments": Rome's political imperialism, "the Christian element of the Roman church" and the "Romantic" element which, through a "peculiar" fusion of the imperial and the papal "becomes the origin of that fundamental structure of the *modernly* experienced reality called culture" (*End*, 12-13, my italics; II, 412). For the Romans and German medievals themselves, as well as for the Greeks, such "culture" "was unknown."

IV

Heidegger does not develop these thoughts, but returns to a more direct discussion of the metaphysical determinations of Being. "Being as *actualitas* is itself historical in that it accomplishes the truth of its essence and in that it thus makes possible the fundamental positions of metaphysics" (*End*, 13; II, 413). We will refer to the general import of this statement later. Here, we will again follow Heidegger's argument. The distinction between that-being and what-being continues for the Romans, but it now takes the form of existence as actuality differentiated from essence as possibility and potency. Although actuality "preserves nothing of the essence of *energeia* over and above the indefinite relation to work...the essence of Being at its beginning still prevails in *actualitas*, too, since whatness is determined as *idea*." For, the fundamental characteristic of *idea* is *agathon*, good, not in the moral sense, but as making capable. When the outward appearance, the *eidōs*, shows itself, it makes a being capable of becoming present as this or that. In this way, whatness as *idea* has the character of causing: the cause of anything is what it is. "For the Greeks, and for Plato too, *agathon* means the suitable, what is suitable for something and itself makes something else suitable. It is the essence of *idea* to make suitable; that is, to make the being as such possible, that it may come to presence in the unconcealed. Through Plato's interpretation of *idea* as *agathon*, Being comes to be what makes a being suitable *to be a* being. Being is shown in the character of making-possible and

conditioning. Here the decisive step for all metaphysics is taken, through which the *a priori* character of Being at the same time receives the distinction of being a condition" (IV, 169; II, 225-6).

Because of Plato's understanding of the essence of the ideas as goodness, causality becomes a decisive determination as the essence of Being unfolds (that is, as Being unfolds in its enduring in its concealed opening.) The sense of "ground" or principle (*arche*) that premetaphysically determined Being is from Plato forward understood in terms of cause (*aition*). But cause in general means being-responsible-for, as making possible of presence; it is not restricted to effective working. Once beings are conceived as real or actual, however, they are then also conceived to be determined by causal making, whether this is divine creation or human action. God himself is the highest entity, which means that he is the entity which is pure actuality, always persisting in and for himself with nothing merely possible for him, and the highest good, which means that he *effects* persistence in everything that persists. Actuality is in this sense determined by causality. Thus, the original meaning of Being is still heard both in this relation of causality (of the conditions that make possible,) to Plato's ideas (as *good*) and in God's actuality thought of as an *omnipresence*. "The whole of beings is the effected and effecting product of a first producer." The reality of any thing corresponds to its making: making is the heart of the reality of quantities, for example, because their existence is "proved" when they are unequivocally constructed according to established methods of calculation. This construction, in turn, enables them to be calculated with effectively. "Being is given in the essence of reality, and reality determines the existence of what exists. Being essences as effecting in the unified-manifold sense according to which that which effects, but also that which is effected, and also the effected-effecting and the effective is the being. The being thus determined in a manifold way in virtue of effecting is real" (*End*, 18-19; II, 420). "Reality (*actualitas*) is the effecting causality which of itself effects the stabilizing of standing constancy." (*End*, 23; II, 425).⁵

V

The future career of metaphysics now depends on how the essence of reality is developed. This development is most visible in the changed understanding of truth: "the ownmost essence of truth, in whose light a (period of) humanity experiences beings, participates in the history of Being," however veiled this participation (*End 20*; II, 421-2). Most profoundly, the truth of entities means their *unconcealment* such that we can first grasp them for any further assertions or activities. The heart of truth is not true statements, but the way in which entities come into the open such that statements are then possible, and, beyond this, the openness itself. Almost from the beginning of philosophy, truth is seen as a matter of statements, but the Greeks, with their sense of Being as the presence of entities and their appearance in this presence, remain closer to the essence of truth than do later thinkers.

Modernity is characterized by the understanding of truth as the *certainty* of statements, and Being, reality, is now thought in terms of this certainty: entities that are fully in Being are those that are secured objectively. Objectivity, in turn, is the way in which entities are positioned over against the subject, which then grasps or represents these entities to itself. The subject is itself understood as the most certain thing of all. "Something true is that which man of himself clearly and distinctly brings before himself and confronts as what is thus brought before him (re-presented) in order to guarantee what is represented in such a confrontation. The assurance of such a representation is certainty. What is true in the sense of being certain is what is real. The essence of the reality of what is real lies in the constancy and continuity of what is represented in the certain representation" (*End, 25*; II, 427).⁶

We associate this change from a situation in which to know truly is to state correct propositions about entities seen and thought in their own appearance to one in which something is true only if we have completely secure self-conscious knowledge of it with Descartes, and truth as certainty, along with the use of a defined method as the key to knowledge that is completely self-assured, becomes the ground of subsequent metaphysics.

Despite the departure of modern philosophy from the root sense

of Being that makes it possible, we can still recognize how objective position is a form of presence, how the subject understood as the individual ego echoes the presence of the underlying Aristotelian first substance, how representation still, unwittingly, depends on truth as unconcealing, and, most clearly, how the nexus of causal effectiveness remains dominant in the modern notion of Being.¹ We can also see the link to the medievals: truth as the fully secure entering into God's creation, and salvation as the eternal permanence that God alone can guarantee (because he is the pure actuality who thus causes everything real) is transformed into the objective certainty of entities presented to the individual subject who is the most certain entity because "I" am the entity in whom we have unshakeable self assurance. The thinking and representing ego becomes the true "subject," (i.e., that which constantly underlies), not as a psychological structure, but in the metaphysical sense developed by Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel on the foundation that Descartes opens. What man effects, and what has an effect upon him, not the creating and effecting God, becomes dominant in understanding "reality." Nonetheless, the notion that the actual entities are those that God creates, not what is "objective" never fully lose its sway: Heidegger argues that the various epochs of Being overlap, not that they are exclusive.¹

The next element that Heidegger stresses in the history of representation, beyond the development of subjectivity and objectivity, is appetite or striving, that is, the will. For metaphysics, the importance of the will in representation is first especially visible in Leibniz. "Representation is transitional in that it strives toward transition. This striving is the fundamental characteristic of effecting in the sense of representing" (*End, 37; II, 440*). The new essence of actuality is "Being as existence in the sense of representational striving which simply and unifyingly effects a mundus concentratus (the monad) as speculum universii" (*End, 44; II, 448*). The key point is that perception and appetite are not two distinct determinations of reality and its representation; their unity constitutes the unity and beingness "of what is truly one." "The simple self-containedness of what is truly persistent consists in representing as striving" (*End, 37;*

II, 441). Moreover, by understanding forceful striving as a "driving endeavour" that already tends to realization, Leibniz interprets striving in such away that possibility and necessity are also essentially modes of its existence. Being "is the striving after itself which brings itself before itself (represents)"; the possible being is something attracted, "and thus a grounding and an effecting" (*End*, 43; II, 447).

The next epochs of the history of Being are determined by Kant's development of the link between representation and objectivity and by the continued development of appetite or "will" when will is understood "as a fundamental characteristic of Being." For Kant, representation is grounded in reflexion, which explicitly presents what is present to the representer. Indeed, this reflexion is a bending back, a "placing of itself in advance to itself representation of what is represented" (*End*, 60; II, 464). It is this reflexive, representing ego whom Kant considers to be the underlying subject, and "objects" are what are represented in their certainty to our certain self-representation. The Kantian "transcendental" (whose basic meaning Heidegger is uncovering in this discussion of reflexive self representation) is not the same as the *a priori*, but has a specific meaning: it is "what determines the object as object *a priori*, objectivity." Something "in the object itself goes beyond that object, by preceding it, in representing" (*End*, 62; II, 466).

Will is linked with representation in Kant, Hegel, Schelling and Nietzsche, as it is in Leibniz: will is "self-effectuation, striving toward itself in accordance with a re-presentation of itself." Will "contains a manifoldness of essence." "Where there is reality, there is will; where there is will, there is a self-willing; where there is a self-willing there are possibilities of the essential development of the will as reason, love, power" (*End*, 63, 47, 68; II, 467, 452, 473,). This leads Heidegger to the place where his lectures began: an examination of Nietzsche's work, and the world of technology or machination as its proper accomplishment as the end of metaphysics.'

VI

Heidegger's portrait of the history of metaphysics does not exhaust

his presentation of the history of Being as it comes forward in philosophy. There are at least five elements in this history. We have already displayed three of them. The first is the conceptual change, say from *energeia* to actuality that is the heart of the bulk of Heidegger's discussion. The second is how groups of concepts, and changes in them, belong together or underlie each other, say, the connection between truth understood as certainty and objectivity. The third is how concepts develop, or have their possibilities increasingly brought out, say, the steps from reality to objectivity or the developments in the concept of will. The fourth is the connection of each concept to a remembered or forgotten grasp of the pre-philosophic senses of truth as the unconcealment of entities, and of *physis* as the emergence of entities into their presence, their Being. The fifth is the way in which each conceptual whole in the history of philosophy, and the root senses of truth, nature, and being, originate in the forgotten or ignored questions of how Being itself emerges (before it is understood as the cause or most general property of entities) from the field or clearing, the truth, out of which it is both revealed and hidden.

The history of Being proper focuses on these final two questions, especially the last one, for although Heidegger usually shows how every interpretation of Being still depends covertly on understanding Being as presence, it is the unasked question of the origin of Presence as the meaning of Being and, especially, the clearing or truth within which Presence comes to light only to be interpreted strictly as the presence of beings, that most concerns him. Indeed, the fourth question is not clearly demarcated from the fifth, and can be productively considered only in relation to it. Heidegger notes in a brief discussion of Kant, for example, that the object as a unity of "standing together" before consciousness is connected to a sense of standing as constancy, of "together" as present collectedness, and of certainty as securing. But most fundamentally, "unity must itself be determined and questioned in essence in the question about the truth of Being" (*End*, 57; II, 461). Heidegger will sometimes use the term beingness to distinguish Being as it is understood by philosophers as the highest, or most effective, or most stable being (in the

various interpretations we discussed above) from Being in the hitherto unexamined sense that he has in mind. As philosophy develops, beingness as presence is barely seen, but it is this presence itself, and, therefore, the origin in Being itself of the beingness that the philosophers elaborate that is forgotten. "Being is beingness; beingness as *ousia* is presence, continual presence with *its* space-time forgotten" (*End*, 59 my italics; 462).

To take another example, when will re-presents itself and strives toward itself, "this essences, shut off from itself, in the clearing of Being" (*End*, 63; II, 467). The history of Being in the strict sense involves understanding how this opening in its very closedness to philosophy, that is, in its inaccessibility to thinking in terms of grounds, causes, existence, and truth as correspondence (and in the very forgetting that there is such Being to which there may be some access), nonetheless releases philosophy and makes it possible. "What was without question for Kant is for us worthy of question: the essential origin of 'position' in terms of letting what is present lie present in its presence." (*End*, 65; II, 470). To conceptualize reflexion in terms of the history of Being, for example, is to see it as "shining back into *aletheia* without *aletheia* itself being experienced and grounded and coming to 'Essence.'"

It would seem that until the realm in which Being as such comes to light is fully laid out, a more explicit conceptual grounding of philosophy within that realm could not be accomplished. The true history of Being depends on seeing Being fully in its truth. Leaving aside for the moment whether to wish for a more explicit grounding is already to mistake the essence of that realm, it is nonetheless true that Heidegger does not, in *Nietzsche*, present in detail each element of that realm that he uncovers in other works. He does not, for example, discuss the essence of "things," the determinations of language as saying, or the full dimensions of time, although he offers hints. He does, however, in the first and last of his concluding essays, outline several determinations of that realm, which help us further to understand the history of Being. It is to these that we will now turn.

Heidegger's main discussion of the realm of Being as such in *Nietzsche* comes in his discussion of nihilism. Nietzsche uncovers nihilism in his thought, and, indeed, believes that he can overcome it. "...Nietzsche experiences nihilism as the history of the devaluation of the highest values, and thinks of the overcoming of nihilism as a countermovement in the form of the revaluation of all previous values..." (IV, 200; II, 336-7). But this overcoming in fact implicates Nietzsche in nihilism in a deeper sense. For, both devaluation and revaluation are based on experiencing "will to power as the principle of the new-and ultimately of all-valuation. Value thinking is now elevated into a principle. Being itself, as a matter of principle, is not admitted as Being. According to its own principle, in this metaphysics there is *nothing* to Being. How can what is worthy of thought be given here with Being itself, namely, Being as-Being?" (IV, 203; II, 340). For Nietzsche, full devaluation means that there is nothing to beings. But as Heidegger understands it, the true nihilism is that there is nothing to Being. When there is nothing to beings, "one might find nihilism, but one will not encounter its *essence*, which first appears where the *nihil* concerns Being itself. The essence of nihilism is the history in which there is nothing to Being itself" (IV, 201; II, 338).

So, if Being itself and the way in which it becomes nothing is not experienced, nihilism is not truly experienced, and if it is not truly experienced, it cannot be overcome. Now, we remember that Nietzsche's thought is the fulfillment of metaphysics. Thinking in terms of values as conditions for the will to power completes in a fully visible way the nihilism concealed in Plato's notion of the ideas as good, i.e., as the fundamental causes. So, it is not merely Nietzsche, but it is "*metaphysics as metaphysics [that] is authentic nihilism*" (IV, 205; II, 343). But, because all metaphysics is based on failure to reflect on the origin of Being as such, the essence of nihilism, namely, the negating of Being is closed to all metaphysics. Philosophy cannot overcome nihilism because it is nihilism: "the essence of nihilism is historically as metaphysics."

The central clue about the origin of Being as such that emerges from Heidegger's discussion is this: it is of the essence of metaphysics

that its essence, namely, Being as such, is concealed from it. This negation, this concealment, is not a fault or mistake of philosophy. Rather, remaining concealed within metaphysics is a characteristic of Being itself. Concealing itself in favor of the opening of beings and concealing itself in favor of the metaphysical reflection on their beingness (i.e., on their existence and on what fundamentally causes them) belongs essentially to Being itself. "...Nihilism is a history that applies to Being itself" (IV, 204; II, 341). Failure to question how Being itself comes to be "present," failure to consider the realm in which its unconcealment is possible, failure to "allow Being to reign in all its questionableness from the point of view of its essential provenance," failure "to reflect on the origin of presencing and permanence," all this *is* not a failure of our thought, but belongs with Being's own withdrawal and concealment. Such self concealment in favor of beings is Being's first essential characteristic (IV, 201, II, 338).

It is important to recognize how this self concealment is connected to beings, and to beings as a whole. Metaphysics does not consider Being as such because it has already thought about Being. But it considers it in its own way. It sees Being only as entities *qua* entities, beings as such, the being in its being. It then interprets the Being of beings metaphysically, which is to say that it understands Being only in *terms* of and for the sake of entities. What *is* inquired about are beings, and "Being" comes to light only in terms of that inquiry: an entity as an entity is what it is and that it is, its root cause and the most general characteristic of its reality. Indeed, metaphysics comes to interpret Being as the highest and most general being: it is "ontotheological" and *in* this way believes itself to have fully uncovered Being.

The crucial point for Heidegger is that all such metaphysical interpretation overlooks the "as such" itself in which the philosopher inquires about entities "as such": the realm in which beings first come forth to be seen as being is overlooked. That is: the essence of truth as unconcealment is overlooked.

But Being itself *is* essentially as this unthought unconcealment, or "truth," of beings. To not think the unconcealment in which beings

come to presence is to not think Being as such. Unconcealment as such remains concealed in the philosophic unconcealing and metaphysical interpretation of beings.

Indeed, it is not only that unconcealment is concealed, but that the concealment is itself concealed. That is, it is not only that Being is absent or hidden, but that we do not recognize that we miss it. It is not something we cannot find, but something we do not recognize we have lost. Yet, it is not altogether closed to us, precisely because Being does show itself when we think of beings as such, even though it does not show itself as such. We see Being in a sense, but its own essence is hidden. Moreover, if it is true that the history of metaphysics is the increasing reduction of Being to beings, then the original Greek understanding of nature and truth obscured Being less than subsequent views. In fact, the ways in which Being reveals itself philosophically are the ways in which it keeps to itself, and preserves and secures itself. Again, it is not a failure of philosophy that Being is hidden from us and that we do not know that we are missing it. For, its essence is to be hidden in this way, and it hides itself precisely as the various "epochs," the various withholdings of its history as metaphysics.

In making these points, Heidegger speaks of the default, promise, advent, and secret of Being. It is less important to focus on the precise differentiations of these terms than it is to see how they belong together in a sense of Being that is essentially linked to revealing, concealing, sending and giving. Metaphysics understands every being as such in terms of what and that it is in its permanent presence. Being as such, however, is not the eternal cause, but the self-concealing field and dimension in which this presence comes to light in its historical variety.¹⁰

VIII

Heidegger's discussion of Being and concealment does not itself make clear what concept of history Heidegger has in mind when he says that there is *a history* of Being. In fact, he does not describe this in detail. He emphasizes, of course, that he does not have ordinary historiographical research in mind. Such research is both metaphysi-

cally mindless and focused always on the present as the standpoint from which we look back at the past. The past, and, ultimately, the present, is seen as the product of "a causally demonstrable sequence of effects;" the past is objectified, in accord with the contemporary triumph of objectification, the current and final stage of the nihilistic willfulness in which we attempt to completely secure and master every being, and "man himself, and every aspect of human culture is transformed into a stockpile" (IV, 240; 241; II, 385, 387).

Heidegger also does not limit history as a defined region of entities to an area first uncovered around the time of, say, Vico or Hegel. He thinks of Thucydides as an historian, but argues that Thucydides' thinking could not stay on its own course within the atmosphere of Greek philosophy.

Even if there existed an historiology that was philosophically thoughtful about what "history" is, however, it could not account for Heidegger's history of Being, because Being is not a being that can be subject to the concepts of metaphysics. Perhaps, therefore, we should begin simply by understanding the question of the history of Being to be inquiry about whether and how Being has a past, or, more broadly, about whether and how it changes or is capable of change. The question of Being's history therefore leads us to ask about the connection of Being and time.

When Heidegger differentiates the history of Being from ordinary historiology, he means to differentiate it from history that looks at the past in terms of the present. He also intends to understand the history of Being in terms of a temporality that is different from the usual common sense view of past, present, and future. In *Nietzsche*, however, this view is not elaborated in detail. We might therefore be lead to equate his unelaborated view here with the analysis of the historical in *Being and Time*. But man's historicity cannot simply be identified with the history of Being itself and, in any event, we cannot assume that Heidegger's analysis in *Being and Time* can be carried over unchanged to his later work."

The most useful clue to Heidegger's understanding of what history means in the history of Being can be found in his sense of Being as the *origin* of metaphysics and his view that this origin always

comes ahead of, always comes before, any metaphysics. "Recollection in the history of Being is a thinking ahead to the Origin, and belongs to Being itself. Appropriation grants the time from which history takes the granting of an epoch" (*End*, 83; II, 490). Indeed, the second characteristic we can glean about Being as such *from Nietzsche* (in addition to its being the hidden or negated essence of nihilism) is this double sense in which Being precedes being.

Heidegger does not thematically articulate this characteristic as fully as he analyzes the enigma of Being's self concealing, but it is an important part of his discussion. To begin with, we must see that metaphysics itself sees Being as *a priori* and as in some sense transcendent. But its notion of the *a priori* still makes Being dependent on beings, because the *a priori* comes to light only from the perspective of its priority to beings: how Being as Being enters into the *a priori* relation to beings, whether that relation merely chances on and accompanies Being or whether Being itself is the relation, and what Being and relation mean," is all unthought (IV 208; II, 347). As for transcendence, Being itself is what metaphysics skims over: for the philosophers, transcendence means either the transcendental surpassment to essential whatness, say in Kant's "equating of the transcendental with the objectivity of the object," or it means the transcendent, "which in the sense of the first existent cause of the being as existent surpasses the being, and in surmounting it looms over it in the perfect plenitude of what is essential." The link between the characteristics of essence, existence and transcendence that we find in all metaphysics is this: "Ontology represents transcendence as the transcendental. Theology represents transcendence as the transcendent" (IV, 211; II, 349).

As opposed to the metaphysical understanding of the *a priori* and transcendent, thinking that considers Being as such does not skim over it, or consider it only in terms of its grounding beings. Rather, "the essence of Being itself does not take place behind or beyond beings, but-provided the notion of such a relationship is permissible *here-before* the being as such. Therefore, even the presumed actuality of nihilism in the ordinary sense falls behind its essence" (IV, 238; II, 382-3). To properly understand this "before,"

this thinking ahead to the origin, we would need to articulate Heidegger's understanding of time, of the way the future and the past unfold within it, and of time's link to the essence of truth and Being. Our point here is that to discuss metaphysics as belonging to *Being's* "history" is to discuss it as stemming from Being as the future that always comes before, or ahead of, us, which future is at the same time the origin, or provenance, of metaphysics. The manner in which Being originates and comes before, moreover, is precisely as withdrawing, as holding itself back. "From the respective distance of the withdrawal, which conceals itself in any given phase of metaphysics, such keeping to itself determines each epoch of the history of Being as the *epoche* of Being itself (IV, 239; II, 383). Insofar as something truly is, it has already taken place, not in the sense that it has a past, but in the sense that it "has gathered itself into the essence of Being, into the having essenced from which and as which the advent of Being itself is—even if in the form of the self-withdrawal that stays away" (IV, 242; II, 388).

IX

Heidegger hints at aspects of Being in addition to self concealing and originating, such as the just mentioned "distance," for example, but they are not developed here. The third major aspect of Being as such that is developed in *Nietzsche* is Being's relation to man, seen from the point of view of nihilism.

Concern with the relation of man to Being, of course, characterizes all of Heidegger's thought. In his discussion of history, for example, when Heidegger says that Being is historical by "accomplishing the truth of its essence," he goes on to say that it "thus makes possible" the basic metaphysical positions; the end of metaphysics is the exhausting of these essential possibilities. Yet, "whether and how all the essential possibilities of metaphysics can be surveyed at once has yet to be decided." The standpoint for the decision can not come from something that transcends history by being above it, for men are not above history, as if history is a mere entity. Men exist historically and "are implied along with history itself." What *can* "bring us into proximity to a standpoint" for this decision is "presum-

ably" thinking about Being, that is, "meditation on the more original essence of metaphysics" (IV, 149; II, 202).

Here, however, Heidegger does not explicitly develop the link that he suggests between the essence of Being, its possibilities, and man's decisions. Presumably, such development would rethink from the standpoint of Being as such the analysis of man's historicity and projection of possibilities that we find in *Being and Time*. Rather, he concentrates in *Nietzsche* on two other features of the relation of man to Being as such: man as the abode for Being, a theme also familiar from *Being and Time*, and Being's needfulness.

Being conceals itself as such in its unconcealment of beings, and stays in this withdrawal. "Where" does this remaining and withdrawal occur? Although Being maintains itself in its difference from beings, beings *are* only by dwelling within Being. Somehow, that is to say, the place where Being stays and withdraws must belong to Being itself. Indeed, Being and unconcealment cannot first occur, and then look for a place in which to occur; they occur only together with that place. Concealment and unconcealment occur together with their abode "as the advent that Being itself is. The advent is in itself the advent of their abode. The locale of the place of Being as such is Being itself. That locale, however, is the essence of man" (IV 217; 357).

Heidegger does not mean that man is all that there is to Being, but he does mean that the essence or Being of man is to be Being's place for its own approach, for its own revealing and concealing. The essence of man is "being-there" (*Dasein*); this essence belongs to Being itself. Man stands essentially in Being's abode by thinking, not in the sense that thinking is independent of Being and can observe it *or* not at will, but in the sense that standing in Being's revealing and concealing first makes it possible that any entity can come to light so that we can deal with or observe it at all. Man does not make, create, or produce his essence, and he cannot, as man, somehow be apart from this essence. "Man belongs to that essence in such a way that he has to be such Being. *Da-sein* applies to man. As his essence it is in each case his, what he belongs to, but not what he himself makes and controls as his artifact. Man becomes essential by expressly

entering into his essence. He stands in the unconcealment of beings as the concealed locale within which Being essences in its truth. He stands in this locale, which means that he is ecstatic in it, because he is as he is always and everywhere on the basis of the relationship of Being itself to his essence; that is, to the locale of Being itself (IV, 218; II, 358).

If Heidegger's analysis is correct, any other analysis of man's essential constitution or "human nature"-analyses on which political philosophy so often depends-must be seen within the light of this more fundamental essence. Indeed, each must be seen as inherently• linked to the nihilistic essence of metaphysics. "The essence of man is universally and consistently established throughout the history of metaphysics as *animal rationale*. In Hegel's metaphysics, a speculative-dialectically understood *rationalitas* becomes determinative for subjectivity; in Nietzsche's metaphysics, *animalitas* is taken as the guide" (IV, 147; II, 200). Nietzsche's blond beast brings to completion the misinterpretation of man's essential relation to Being that the Greeks began when they conceived us as the animal who speaks.

When we think of the essence of thinking as Heidegger does, we must see that we have in mind a "thinking" that is not a quality of the intellect taken in its ordinary sense as "set off against willing and feeling." It is not "purely theoretical as opposed to practical activity and thus restricted in its essential importance for the essence of man." Rather, the essence of thinking "as the relation to Being, whether it is to the being as such or to Being itself is "ecstatic inherence in the openness of the locale of Being" (IV, 218; II, 358). If we do consider thinking to belong to the intellect, and see that "the issue for the intellect is understanding," then we see that "the essence of thinking is the understanding of Being in the possibilities of its development, which are conferred by the essence of Being" (IV, 218; II, 359).

Heidegger's discussion here reminds us of *Being and Time*, but he does not discuss the similarities and differences, or otherwise elaborate his argument. The central point is that the essence of man and the essence of Being belong together essentially. To put this in

another way, which returns us to some of the moral and political concerns inherent in a discussion of nihilism, man and Being, Heidegger claims, "need" each other. Being "draws forth" and "never abandons" its abode: it "needs" and "requires" an abode, i.e., man, never relenting from unconcealment. As need, however, Being "veils itself by staying away." The "utmost limit" of this need occurs in Nietzsche's completion of the dominance of metaphysics, when the unconcealment of the being as such so fully occupies us that Being, and its essential need for an abode, threatens to be annihilated. This means that "man is threatened with the annihilation of his essence." This danger is more grave than our age of "violence," "despair," and "impotence of willing," our age, in short, of the "darkening of beings." What "reigns" in our age is needlessness, in the sense of the "illusion" that Being is without need (IV, 244-245; II, 391, 392). This needlessness is "at the basis of the history of our world, with its "boundless suffering and measureless sorrow".¹² Still, even our current extreme needlessness remains the "veiled and extreme need of Being."

Although Heidegger finds the root of the current nihilistic degradation of beings to be the way in which Being itself has been made to be nothing, he does not attempt to link any particular degradation to the general reduction of Being to value. Indeed, once we remember that current nihilism is the completion of metaphysics, we might ask how any thinking that attempts to find a standard in beings themselves could fail to be nihilistic. Heidegger argues, indeed, that every attempt to overcome nihilism is itself trapped within it, because it will continue to interpret the being of beings as objective material for human fashioning, and in this way cover over Being, and man's essence as the place where Being comes to be.

Nonetheless, one wonders whether the "fact" that Being's self concealment is now no longer completely hidden and can begin to be experienced, and the fact that we can now begin to discuss its determinations, offers a direction in which we can step away from nihilism. Does what Heidegger calls the "step back" in which we recollect that the essence of nihilism is the default of Being help us properly and persuasively to judge and step away from the destruc-

tion and evil that lead us to talk of nihilistic destruction within beings themselves?

Heidegger's approach here is limited by his understanding that all philosophy is at root nihilism, and by his understanding of the freedom that is at the heart of the manner in which man can and must be the place where what "is" is said and comes to be. What he suggests-but not clearly and in so many words-is that to recover the origin in Being's unconcealment of man's thinking and acting is to allow once more the possibility of our attention being claimed by regions of beings, and beings that have faded from view, or have never come to the fore. Heidegger's Being is not for the sake of beings, as is true of metaphysics' Being, but it does inextricably belong together with the essence of man. To understand the possibility of Being is to make room for, to allow or permit, entities other than technological products to come into their own for us. In other works, as we have mentioned, Heidegger discusses the fourfold meaning of "things" and their world; among these four elements are the "gods." In *Nietzsche*, he does not discuss "things," but he does, briefly, discuss the gods, and, indeed, God. "The deepening dark entrenches and conceals the lack of God." Every "illumination of the divine" is eclipsed by the "closure of the holy." The openness of the holy, in turn, is closed off by the "evanescence of the hale." And, the "evanescence of all that is hale in beings" is released by the "default of the unconcealment as such" (IV, 248; II, 394). Presumably, as we now begin to enter into this default, as we see it for what it is, the hale might shine more steadily, and the holy might remain open and illuminate the divine. At the least, the lack of God, might no longer be concealed; the gods might, as Heidegger says, at least become present in their absence.

Heidegger does not develop this possibility, or explore the many questions it raises about God and the gods, reverence, the clash of beliefs, and the connection between the gods and the "theological" essence of metaphysics. Rather, he leaves it at indicating how the beings who might be thought to allow us to step away from nihilism also have their root in Being, and, therefore, possibly might come more steadily to light. Similarly, he speaks of the "courage" we need

to confront the "dignity" of Being. "The worth of Being, as Being, does not consist in being a value, even the supreme value. Being essences in that it-the freedom of the free region itself-liberates all beings to themselves." "Dignity is the noble which appropriates without needing effects. The noble of the worthy Appropriating of the origin is the unique freeing as Appropriation of freedom, which is unconcealment of concealment- because it belongs to the groundless" (*End*, 76, 79; II, 482, 485). In what way, however, such nobility and dignity is connected to, liberates and releases, paths that might guide our choices, however free, is unclear. Indeed, Heidegger recognizes that we might obliterate our own essence; to argue against this possibility merely by claiming that we are rooted in our essence even when we seek to obliterate it, i.e., that obliteration is contradictory, does not measure up to our essence, and what is compelling in it. In short, the courage and dignity of which Heidegger speaks do not offer any evident grounds for distinguishing the noble and the ignoble in beings themselves. At the same time, it would seem that attention to the dignified, and noble-the self contained simplicity of what comes to its own presence-could hardly fail to help us step away from nihilism.

X

Although Heidegger's discussion of the history of Being in *Nietzsche* may seem remote from the concerns of political philosophy, it, along, of course, with his discussion of Nietzsche's thought itself, has offered much on which to reflect: among others things, the status of history, the root of thinking in terms of causality, the essence of man, and the meaning of nihilism and the possibility of surmounting it. We will conclude by mentioning two additional areas.

First, Heidegger's analyses of the basic metaphysical positions of thinkers offer significant clues to the conceptions that underlie their philosophical explorations of politics and morality-their root understanding, say, of what is "common" in political communities, of what the "work" or "effectiveness" of statesmen mean, of the status of "will," desire, and appetite, and of the intelligibility of what guides or "causes" human action. To say the least, Heidegger's discussions

are a suggestive first step.¹³ What is especially notable to point out here, however, is the apparent incommensurability of the various positions. Nietzsche may understand will with a nihilism greater than Hegel's, for example, but this greater remove, which suggests a common measure, does not, in fact, make one body of thought more or less adequate than the other. Truth as certainty may be more removed from truth as unconcealing than is the Greek understanding of the possible correspondence of thinking and being, but beings that are objectively certain and secure *are*, for Heidegger, no less than what is the case for the Greeks. As the history of Being continues, truth falls into greater and greater nihilism and error. Yet, this greater falsity, this darkening of beings at the end of philosophy, is in a sense truer to the essence of metaphysics-annihilation of Being-than is any earlier thought. On their own grounds, as Heidegger sees it, philosophies do not seem able to judge each other. Yet, they all stem from a single origin and essence. For the student of political philosophy, for whom the contrasting reflections of thinkers about justice seem to demand a ground on the basis of which one might choose among them, Heidegger's argument requires genuine questioning. This need is deepened by his association with the Nazis.

Second, Heidegger's discussion of the history of philosophy connects metaphysics to a people in general, not to isolated thinkers. The Romans were formed by the interpretation of Being as actuality. In our own time, the objectification of beings "establishes for itself a public according to the positings of value thinking, and procures for the public its legitimacy." "Publicity" is a kind of unconcealment, "a necessary value for securing the permanence of the will to power" (IV, 242; II, 388). Such publicity is connected to 'journalism,' which, looked at fairly, is a kind of historical research to which academic history has advanced: journalism "identifies the metaphysical securing and establishment of the everydayness of our dawning age" (IV, 241; II, 386). A projection of being as such is the horizon that unites everything that occurs; today's projection has its own place in our increasing ignorance of true history as the history of Being. With this, however, we are led to ask whether Heidegger's exploration of the

link between the thought of Being and the questioning of the philosophers might not be more fruitfully conducted if asked in terms of the political philosophic question of the connection between what is first for us, as we see it within the horizon of politics, and what is first in and of itself.

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NOTES

1. See *The Political Science Reviewer*, Volume XXII, 1993.
2. The first reference will be to the English translation of *Nietzsche*, sometimes with minor modifications. The second reference will be to the German edition. In both cases, the Roman numeral refers to the volume and the Arabic numeral refers to the page within the volume. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Harpercollins, 1979 ff., edited by David Farrell Krell. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Verlag Gunther Neske, Pfullingen, 1961. The final three essays in the German *Nietzsche* are translated in *The End of Philosophy*, Harper & Row, 1973, translated by Joan Stambaugh. References will be given as *End*, followed by the page, and reference to the German edition. All quotations will be from Heidegger, except for the present one, which is from the translator's introduction. (The lectures and essays that make up *Nietzsche* were first composed and delivered between 1936 and 1946.)
3. In this part of the essay I will primarily follow Heidegger discussion in "Metaphysics as History of Being."
4. Heidegger argues that the broadest Greek name for Being *as* presencing is *hyparchein*, a term in in which "what already lies present is thought together with *arche*, the ruling origin; *hyparchein* means to rule while already lying present, 'ruling-forth' thought in a Greek way as to presence of itself" (*End*, 68-69; II, 475-6).
5. Although Heidegger still does not clarify the distinction between essence and existence, he offers a statement at this point in his argument about the "essential origin of Being as making possible." Causing, accounting for, and making possible (which, we remember, stem from goodness *as* what characterizes the ideas

which, for Plato, are what things are) are fundamental to the way in which metaphysics (and modern science) talks about the Being of entities. These "are determined in advance as gathering in virtue of the One as what is uniquely unifying." The essence of Being rests in this one, "which has the character of concealing-unconcealing." This One shows its unity in different forms throughout the history of Being, differences that "stem from the change of essence of *aletheia*, of concealing-unconcealing." This is to say that truth understood as unconcealing, at a level at which we ask how Being itself is unconcealed and how our thought belongs together with it, is the origin of the concepts of causality in terms of which we consider the Being of things to be what it is. This unconcealing, because it is of Being itself, is prior even to the pre-Platonic sense in which Being showed itself as the emergence of natural things into unconcealment.

6. To put this in another way, certainty "expresses the fact that truth concerns consciousness as a knowledge, a representation which is grounded in consciousness in such a way that only that knowledge is valid as knowledge which at the same time knows itself and what it knows as such, and is certain of itself in this knowledge" (*End*, 20; II, 422).

7. That truth becomes certainty," Heidegger nonetheless claims, is an event whose beginning is inaccessible to all metaphysics" (*End*, 21; II4422).

8. Heidegger also argues that "what is real becomes what can be effected within itself, that human activity which, knowingly basing itself upon itself, cultivates everything and takes care of it." This is the beginning of culture as the goal, means and value of "humanity's dominance over the earth." Certainty, the essence of truth that defines the modern period, "delivers man and his effecting over to the inevitable and never ceasing worry of increasing the possibilities of safety and making sure of them again in the face of newly enkindled dangers" (*End*, 22; II, 424).

9. Although Heidegger indicates the importance of the systematic link of will and reason here-"the unconditional certainty of the will knowing itself as absolute reality," for example-he does not in *Nietzsche* carry through a full interpretation of Hegel.

10. This discussion, and much of Heidegger's characterization of Being as such in *Nietzsche*, could lead one to believe that Heidegger thinks that Being is somehow apart or remote from beings, an alien backdrop. But Heidegger argues that, in fact, Being is what is nearest of all, and that our obscuring of it in our attempt to master and control all beings is the source of our homelessness and anxiety in the face of anxiety (IV, 246, 248; II, 393, 396). This argument is developed in the works in which he discusses the relation of things and world and the belonging together of presence, time and language in their origin in "appropriation," a term which recurs, unanalyzed, in the final essay in *Nietzsche* itself. To understand beings in their Being is to show how time, presence, and our speech, properly understood, fit together to release beings in their own full richness. Because the essence of Being is its belonging together with revealing and unconcealing, Heidegger will sometimes indicate, as he does in places in *Nietzsche*, that Being is no longer the fundamental term to designate what he seeks to understand. But it is never a term he gives up, both because the essence of Being is what he seeks to grasp, and because Being is fundamentally a matter linked to-but, for him, not in its most significant sense causing-beings.

11. We should note that the links are fundamental, whatever the changed arguments, some of which, such as the connection of space to time, Heidegger himself points out. See Heidegger's discussions of *Being and Time* in IV, 140ff. (II, 194ff) and *End*, 70, 71 (II, 475, 476).

12. Although he published these lectures in 1961, Heidegger does not decry the Nazis' treatment of the Jews as the acme of such suffering, or indeed, point to anything during the Nazi period as a specific example of this suffering.

13. Consider, for example, the relevance of Heidegger's discussion of security and certainty for modern political philosophy. We discussed this briefly in the first part of this essay.