

# Charles H. Cooley and the Modern Necessity of Tradition

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WHEN CHARLES H. COOLEY lamented in 1909 the American "lack of those snug nests of special tradition and association in which more settled communities are rich,"<sup>1</sup> he sounded a note of no special originality. Tourists and intellectuals since at least the time of Nathaniel Hawthorne had perceived a shallowness in the Edenic myth of an America liberated from the encumbrances of history. The nineteenth-century actuality of shattering social and technological change, moreover, had provoked a series of countermovements. Common to such projects as neo-Gothic architecture, the revival of arts and crafts, and sympathetic scholarly investigation of premodern cultures was regret for the seemingly lost continuities of tradition.

Cooley, as one of the founders of American sociology, developed an effective case for tradition as something other than the object of cultural nostalgia or the foil of modernity. In sharp contrast to most of his professional peers, he defended tradition as a practical reality and necessity of modern life.

To be sure, all serious sociologists had had to acknowledge the actual force of tradition. A distinctive product of the nineteenth century, sociology passed its formative years at a time when the contrast between "traditional" and "modern" ways of life was particularly sharp — between the peasant village and the

industrial city, as between imperial civilization and the societies which retreated before it in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. It is hardly surprising that "the rediscovery of custom and tradition," as Robert A. Nisbet points out, was a main theme of early sociology, producing such celebrated expressions of the traditional-modern antithesis as status-contract and *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, and leading Max Weber to his conception of "rationalization" as the distinctive, antitraditional feature of modern life.<sup>2</sup>

Although the founders of American sociology were convinced of the necessity of tradition for at least the premodern world—it was, as Franklin Henry Giddings aphorized, "social memory"<sup>3</sup>—they were, as a group, reluctant to admit its modern utility. Edward A. Ross, with the avidity of the early twentieth-century Progressive for efficient social control, conceded that custom and tradition might have regulatory uses. But he realized too that in the long run social control required the elimination of such troublesome clots of traditionalism as the American immigrant communities. "As pulverizing a lump of lime hastens its slaking, as comminuting food aids digestion, as splintering wood accelerates its combustion, so there is a speedier termination of the conflict between the peculiar and the general when the social lumps are bro-

ken up," was his hard comment.<sup>4</sup>

Other leading American sociologists appeared to rejoice with Ross that "the reign of custom with its vague terrors is about over."<sup>5</sup> A rational and empirical kind of decision-making, it was usually assumed, would succeed. Lester Frank Ward recognized in such traditional institutions as those of religion a social function analogous to the role of heredity in biology and evolution—necessary, but incapable in itself of achieving advancement.<sup>6</sup> His advocacy of "sociocracy"—the scientifically informed government of society by itself—looked to the capture of social evolution by immediate human volition. William Graham Sumner of course dissented from such hopes, and emphasized that "folkways" and "mores" continued to sway the lives even of moderns. Yet Sumner adopted science rather than tradition as his own bellwether. In everyday parlance, indeed, he could assume the latter term to be almost self-evidently pejorative, as in his approving remark that the American forefathers had been "able to throw off all the trammels of tradition and established doctrine."<sup>7</sup>

At least one of the founders of American sociology did not view traditions as trammels, however. Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929), although less generally known than Ward, Sumner, or Ross, exercised a strong and enduring influence in social science. He was a pioneer of the "interactionist" school of social psychology—further developed by John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and others—which de-emphasized biological givens in favor of "the actual field of interpersonal interaction as the primary source of social organization."<sup>8</sup> Cooley's conceptions of "primary groups" and of the "looking-glass self" were particularly influential: he understood the self as a social product, shaped especially by experiences in groups, such as the family, which afforded face-to-face association

and cooperation. Thus nurtured, the individual consciousness was ineluctably a social consciousness; consciousness of oneself directly reflected the perceptions of oneself which one attributed to others. Resolving "the dilemma of the individual versus society" by showing in this manner their interrelationship, in one generous but not unfounded estimation, Cooley fostered a "view which modern sociology accepts without question."<sup>9</sup>

Not all aspects of Cooley's thought have received equal attention, however. In particular, his fresh consideration of the nature of tradition, and of its fundamental role in the social process, has elicited surprisingly little systematic comment. Perhaps his frank defense of tradition is unwelcome, or at least unexpected. Cooley has been called both the Darwin and the Emerson of American sociology for the evolutionary and idealist aspects of his thought; for him to be the Burke as well might seem too much to ask. This is especially true because there seems to be no easy fit between his defense of tradition and the other ideas that shaped his work.<sup>10</sup>

Although well acquainted with Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and other figures of European sociological thought, Cooley was more deeply stirred by some of the representatives of the "New England Renaissance"—a devotion which he shared with many of his Progressive Age contemporaries. Emerson, especially, gave him a sense of the universals which underlie particulars, an optimistic commitment to democracy, even a tendency toward pantheism. These "Renaissance" ideas were combined with a subjectivistic and seemingly nominalistic sense of the self derived from the psychology of William James; for Cooley as for James, "imagination and habit, operating on instinctive self-feeling, create the social self."<sup>11</sup>

The combination of Emerson and James has appeared to commentators as

at best an uneasy one,<sup>12</sup> but it makes more sense from the perspective of Cooley's traditionalism. Tradition requires both an acceptance of the connectedness of experience and a respect for the particular; Emerson and James provided these for Cooley. In his idealist aspect, Cooley conceived of the social organism as a mental construct. "The great institutions are the outcome of that organization which human thought naturally takes on when it is directed for age after age upon a particular subject," as he put it, "and so gradually crystallizes in definite forms—enduring sentiments, beliefs, customs and symbols." Yet Cooley has been credited with a surer grasp of these "definite forms," in their concreteness and particularity, than such colleagues as Ward and Giddings.<sup>13</sup> Certainly he avoided the Transcendentalist extreme of idealism which annihilated—or deified—the individual by identifying him with the whole. Similarly James's thought seems to have impressed Cooley not with the isolation or autonomy of the individual but with the legitimacy of particular perceptions of the universe on the one hand, and, on the other, with the social sources of the sense of self. Cooley went beyond both thinkers in understanding society and tradition primarily as sources of individuality rather than as dangers to it.

It was not that Cooley gave a greater emphasis to the role of tradition than did other of the founders of American sociology. In one sense, indeed, he gave less. Since he did not regard tradition as essentially coercive or deterministic in its operations, he was therefore less inclined to the view that a human being was "a creature of tradition and habit," as Ellsworth R. Fuhrman notes.<sup>14</sup> But this was simply to reject the notion of tradition as one of the givens of life, to be passively followed or, with the exceptional individual, rebelled against.

For Cooley, on the contrary, traditions

were essential to the plasticity and practicality of human experience. Like Ward and others, he recognized the need to cut social theory loose from biological determinism. However, he avoided the simple bipolarity expressed in Ward's distinction between genetic and telic change, in which tradition could find a place only as an almost blindly inertial continuity, as opposed to the progressive development which could be planned by society. Despite his fundamental commitment to evolution, Cooley's approach to social change relied more nearly on a "social process" than a "social evolution" model, Roscoe C. Hinkle points out.<sup>15</sup> Conceiving of social change as adaptive growth—in which reason as well as tradition participated—the student of social process did not need to choose between the harsh and wasteful rigors of natural selection and the rather airless planning which Ward's "sociocracy" now suggests.

In according tradition its own role in social development, Cooley did not deny that an unthinking traditionalism could discourage needed change. But in his optimistic view tradition functioned most significantly not as inertia but as a set of resources; thus society appeared in one aspect as "a continuous and unified organism, with rich and varied traditions, intricate co-operations, and a wide interplay of thought and sentiment." Above all, perhaps, the availability of traditions kept a generation from becoming a prisoner of its age. "Culture must always mean, in part, that we rise above the special atmosphere of our time and place to breathe the large air of great traditions that move tranquilly on the upper levels," Cooley explained.<sup>16</sup>

It was an idea of tradition which actually expressed more nearly the reality of modern life than did the seemingly progressive understanding which lumped tradition with the primitive or backward. For it is available to modernity precisely

to be unconstrained by particular traditions, but to draw on tradition eclectically and pragmatically.

A growing insight into these problems had helped to chart the direction of Cooley's career by liberating him from the thrall of Herbert Spencer. Attracted as a young man to Spencer's individualism and view of life as a struggle, he later discerned a disturbing contradiction between organicist and individualist elements in the British philosopher. It seemed to him that Spencer treated individual and society as different and irreconcilable aspects of reality.<sup>17</sup>

Defections from Spencer were common enough, but Cooley described his as "one of the earliest and most complete." It was also influential. "The fate of Spencerian thought in America was determined in large measure by Charles Horton Cooley," Marshall J. Cohen goes so far as to say. It is significant, then, that the break with Spencer involved the question of tradition. One of Cooley's complaints was that Spencer seemed to lack feeling for "the traditional, social, and personal elements" of culture, and consequently tried to explain too much by a sharp dichotomy between egoism and altruism. A true sociological view, Cooley thought, would be that "the higher sentiments are in general neither egoistic nor altruistic as regards their sources, but just social, derived, that is, from the stream of an organic common life." The proof lay in the often observed fact that group customs and mores could make almost anything appear to the individual as right or wrong. Spencer's position seemed tantamount to maintaining that such ideas as that of justice were "created anew in each generation," while failing to see that they also represented "the accumulated wisdom of the past." The Englishman dealt well enough with the biological and individual terms of evolution but, as his erstwhile follower summed it up, had "little perception of a *social*

organism continuous with the past."<sup>18</sup>

Spencer's failure to allow for a distinctly social plane of development meant that for him (as for his American follower John Fiske) tradition tended to be subsumed as a phase of biological evolution. For Cooley, of course, the two were quite distinct: it seemed obvious that the newborn child represented a hereditary principle as separate from tradition as from other cultural influences. Tradition was no blind genetic force, but the conscious product of human intelligence and will.<sup>19</sup>

While this blind spot in Spencer prompted Cooley to reaffirm the distinct role of tradition, corollary reasoning led him to doubt certain other common dichotomies. Neither heredity nor tradition, in particular, seemed to him antithetical to environment; both, on the contrary, were environmental factors. Cooley, taking a broad view of environment, established the basis for an equally broad view of tradition as a perennial force in human affairs. In the case of "imaginative persons," he argued, environment might "extend itself to almost any ideas that the past or present life of the race has brought into being." In this view the traditional might become increasingly part of the intellectual environment with the passage of time. He cited, for example, the Gothic architecture of northern France, so "splendid" and "dramatic" an innovation in twelfth-century culture, but hardly appreciated for its distinctive features until much later.<sup>20</sup> This was to agree with Comte that the empire of the dead increases over the living but with far more positive connotations. Cooley here suggested the kind of weight that tradition can have in modern life—not the oppressive weight of an inert mass, but the pervasive weight of an atmosphere, necessary for one to draw a social breath.

Cooley's sense of tradition as part of the environment suggested the modification of another dichotomy, that be-

tween tradition and convention, which had become influential largely through Gabriel Tarde's *Les lois de l'imitation* (1890). "Tradition," Cooley acknowledged, "comes down from the past, while convention arrives sidewise as it were, from our contemporaries; the fireside tales and maxims of our grandparents illustrate the one, the fashions of the day the other." In the standard comparison, medieval society was traditional and modern society conventional. But Cooley found the description inadequate, for in reality tradition and convention were not opposite or even separate. Traditional usages were conventional for the groups which observed them, he pointed out, and enforced by the same informal sanctions. Conversely, conventions might also be traditions: "The new fashions are adaptations of old ones, and there are no really new ideas of any sort, only a gradual transformation of those that have come down from the past." Tradition and convention, in sum, were simply different phases of the same continuous "transmission of thought."<sup>21</sup>

This insistence on the interrelatedness of human experience led Cooley to suggest that the individual derived his life "from the whole through social and hereditary transmission as truly as if men were literally one body."<sup>22</sup> But where did so seemingly extreme a statement of corporate solidarity leave individual freedom?

As Cooley saw it, such freedom was in reality "organic"—not a freedom to act independently of society, but a freedom to accomplish "a fresh organization of life." Although there could be no break with history and environment, he refused to infer determinism from continuity. Rather, he postulated "a plastic heredity prepared to submit itself to the guidance of environment as interpreted by intelligence." Freedom consequently required "an orderly process of growth," and flourished best within a well-articulated so-

cial order. Apparent antinomies in these circumstances proved congruent: "... thus all innovation is based on conformity, all heterodoxy on orthodoxy, all individuality on solidarity."<sup>23</sup>

The "plastic" continuity of such a society was expressed in a multitude of different ways. Genealogy was one of the most basic. Like Ward, Ross, and others, Cooley perceived a growing regard for ancestry in some of the more settled parts of the United States, but he viewed this development far more favorably than did most of his colleagues. It seemed to him that modern society had gone too far "in differentiating the individual from his kin," and, sharing in a characteristic anxiety of his time, he even feared that neglect of the family would lead toward "race suicide." A revived familism was therefore doubly welcome.<sup>24</sup>

Beyond the family, Cooley argued, virtually every department of life existed in the dimension of the continuous—the traditional. The real life of the Constitution, for example, derived from the accumulated ideas of generations of jurisprudence; the written instrument itself was simply "an Ark of the Covenant, ensuring the integrity of the tradition." All great art grew out of particular traditions, and Cooley believed that when tradition weakened, as in his own time, it resulted in an aesthetic thinness. He regarded religion too as largely traditional, for even the most exalted sentiment required a form of expression which only usage could provide. Rationality itself had to have a traditional context.<sup>25</sup>

Although tradition was in some form inescapable, Cooley was obliged to recognize that some societies provided more satisfactory channels for it than others. In this respect, he acknowledged, his own country was deficient. He rejoiced, indeed, that the United States had largely freed itself from habits and traditions that stood in the way of progress—not all traditions, after all, were salutary. Yet he

could not but regret the relative paucity of those which could enrich the national life. Without strong traditions, people were thrown back upon "immediate human nature," and although this could stimulate such frontier virtues as plain-dealing, hospitality, and courage, it could also encourage sensual excess, pride, and caprice. Reduced to reason and impulse, without the traditional guides, human nature did not always respond well.<sup>26</sup>

In certain forms, such as those based on rural isolation, tradition was clearly doomed, Cooley realized. Yet he was not despairing. He drew a qualified solace from the traditionalism of the immigrants. He noted with regret that many immigrant traditions were left behind or soon lost; he was saddened, too, by the dilution of the native "English sentiment" by foreign strain. Yet, he exclaimed, "how poor American life would be without the immigrants—strangely colored threads from the fabric of the old world come to enliven our texture!" Jewish loyalty to family life and tradition especially won his approbation.<sup>27</sup> Cooley's benign view of new citizens with old ways of life was in sharp contrast to the xenophobic and racist tendencies in some of his colleagues, and especially to Edward A. Ross's discomfort with immigrant diversity.

In the largest sense, Cooley thought, men were "not less dependent upon the past than before; it is only that tradition is so intricate and spread out over the face of things that its character as tradition is hardly to be discovered." Modern communication extended the scope of tradition as well as of convention, and permitted people to draw upon the traditional forms which suited them. In the end he was optimistic. "I suspect," he said, "that we may be participating in the rise of a new type of culture which shall revise rather than abandon the old traditions, and whose central current will

perhaps be a large study of the principles of human life and of their expression in history, art, philanthropy and religion."<sup>28</sup>

Cooley's prescription for a "new type of culture" combined aspects of conservatism, religious idealism, and pragmatism—seemingly disparate elements, but shaped more or less harmoniously with each other within an organicist framework. Cooley did not call himself a conservative, and cautioned against the "reactionary" uses of organicist conceptions, but the conservative affinities of his emphasis on tradition, the interrelatedness of society, and the fundamental importance of such "primary groups" as the family, are evident. Edmund Burke's pronouncement that society is a partnership of generations seems closely paralleled by Cooley's comment that "man is formed to be a member of a social whole embracing not only the men of this lifetime but those past and to come. To live in the present only is as unnatural as to live in solitude." More directly, Cooley remarked that "a conservatism like that of Burke is always worth considering." He commended Burke's later writings in particular as

... largely an endeavor to make us conscious of the levels of consciousness, in order that we may conserve the benefits that we owe to unconscious growth. The traditional organisms of society—language, folkways, common law and the like—exhibit on the whole an adaptability to conditions, a workableness, that could not be equalled by a reflective consciousness alone. The latter may give us Volapuk, but from the former we have the English of Shakespeare.<sup>29</sup>

The reference to J. M. Schleyer's artificial language neatly expressed the conservative preference for the unplanned.

Cooley did not, however, share in the religious orthodoxy usually associated with traditionalist brands of conservatism. Like so many of his generation, he

retained a strong religious impulse from the wreckage of late Victorian doubt, but sought a replacement for orthodox creeds. He found it in an almost Transcendentalist approach to divine power, although without the Transcendentalist denial of the reality of evil. In this he resembled no one perhaps so much as his older contemporary Josiah Royce. Although there seems to be no definite evidence that Royce influenced Cooley, the two were kindred spirits in a number of ways. The philosopher's "rational thinking" was markedly similar in tone to the sociologist's organicism, "provincialism" in the one echoed the concept of "primary groups" in the other, and Cooley's notion of the "social self" agreed with Royce's insistence that "chasms don't individuate"—that the individual flourishes only in society. And as Royce interpreted God as community, so Cooley interpreted Him as continuity. Our conception of God, he suggested, "is of the same essence and spirit as that of social wholes, which partake of this continuity, make a like appeal to faith and hope, and a like demand for devotion and sacrifice." More explicitly, in a late intimation of more decided faith, he concluded that "God is apparently a process, an onward striving life, and we are members of him, real agents in his work, our conscience is his command."<sup>30</sup>

Cooley pursued the last thought on a note more reminiscent of Jamesian pluralism than of Roycean idealism. "No intelligence planned the slaughter and filth of the Great War," he mused late in life. "We win our battles as we can, and so, perhaps, must God." If this sounds like William James's finite chieftain-deity, it suggests as well the pragmatic approach which Cooley adapted from James. Cooley showed that pragmatism offers direction not only in lieu of tradition but—perhaps more surely—to tradition itself. His brand of traditionalism consisted not in the propagation of static

forms but in adaptive growth. After all, he pointed out, traditions and customs had originally been developed to "meet the exigencies to which the tribe is liable," and still properly performed this practical function.<sup>31</sup>

"Adaptive growth" is the key term. Cooley found a master-image in the grapevine, which "feels its way and has a system of behavior which insures its growth along the line of successful experiment." Similarly in human life he discovered a vital impulse, never breaking continuity with the past, but advancing in any number of different directions. Taking the form of traditions, institutions, associations and ideas, the impulse was stimulated or repressed by the situations it encountered.<sup>32</sup>

Cooley so emphasized the adaptive and pragmatic aspects of tradition as to rob it of much of its mystique of authority. This was doubly true in that he believed traditions to be most efficacious when they were consciously and selectively chosen. Under modern conditions, he held, "all the known past becomes accessible anywhere, and instead of the cult of immediate ancestors we have a long-armed, selective appropriation of whatever traditional ideas suit our tastes."<sup>33</sup> Such a cultural smorgasbord is characteristic enough of modern life—one can build a house in any traditional style and subscribe to any traditional creed—yet at an extreme it saps the very continuity which Cooley sought to preserve.

Seen in another aspect, however, Cooley showed a largeness and liberality of spirit incompatible neither with "traditionalist" brands of conservatism nor with modern realities. Significantly, and in sharp distinction from such sociologists as Ward and Ross, whose instinct it was to identify tradition with a narrow and rigid unity, Cooley associated it with cultural diversity. "Both consciously and unconsciously the larger mind is contin-

ually building itself up into wholes—fashions, traditions, institutions, tendencies, and the like—which spread and diversify like the branches of a tree, and so generate,” he thought, “an even higher and more various structure of differentiated thought and symbols.”<sup>34</sup>

This commendation of tradition-fed diversity was not simply a nostalgia for *Gemeinschaft*, but the recognition of a modern need. Advanced society, Cooley thought, required many types of person, formed by “many traditions and environments.” Consequently, he entertained an ideal of American democracy which differed sharply from that of Progressives who measured its progress by degrees of uniformity. Cooley was obliged to acknowledge a creeping sameness in the national culture; almost everything, he complained, suffered from “*panmixia*, like the flavors of a boarding-house dinner.” Yet he hoped that this trend would be reversed. Genuine democracy, he argued, fostered the kind of individuality which could only arise from distinct groups. We needed, consequently, “many kinds of family, of school, of church, of community, of occupational and culture associations, each with a tradition and spirit of its own.”<sup>35</sup>

Cooley in this way surmounted the limited conceptions of tradition which made it seem irrelevant or trivial in the modern world—tradition as the burden of the past, as a mindless, oppressive authority principle, as nostalgia, even as a bare-bones construct necessary to link past with present. He presented tradition, on the contrary, as integral even to American life, inseparable from environment, convention, from novelty itself. This insight in turn helped him to avoid, in his sense of a desirable society, both the extreme of collectivism and that, often attributed to America, of an atomistic individualism. There was no proper conflict, Cooley perceived, between individual and society; each gave strength to

the other.

Cooley was able to recognize society as a “continuing whole” partly because evolutionary thinking made it strictly impossible to understand it in any other way. Yet evolution interpreted in positivistic or radically naturalistic terms was apt to yield either a deterministic scheme which did little justice to human volition, as with Sumner, or a program, as with Ward or Ross, which recognized a measure of choice and freedom but for which the past was essentially something evolved away from rather than a continuing source of enrichment. Cooley saw something more—that “the human mind working through tradition is an artist, and creates types which go beyond nature.”<sup>36</sup> This was a kind of continuity which more nearly did justice to the complexity of human experience, no less in the modern world than in “traditional society.”

1. Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York, 1962), 243. 2. Robert A. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New York, 1966), 293-294. Early sociologists gave to “tradition” and “custom” at least partially distinct meanings, although in practice they often used the terms interchangeably. “Custom” was apt to have a more limited and practical application; “tradition” tended to be used in a broader and more intellectual sense. “By custom,” Edward A. Ross generalized, “is meant the transmission of a way of doing; by tradition is meant the transmission of a way of thinking or believing.” *Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book* (New York, 1909), 196. 3. Franklin Henry Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology: An Analysis of the Phenomena of Association and of Social Organization* (New York, 1908), 140-141. 4. Edward Alsworth Ross, *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order* (New York, 1922), 181; Ross, *Social Psychology*, 273, 240-243, 315. 5. Ross, *Social Control*, 415. 6. Lester Frank Ward, *Glimpses of the Cosmos: Comprising His Minor Contributions, Together with Biographical and Historical Sketches of All His Writings*, 6 vols. (New York, 1913), VI, 28. 7. William Graham Sumner, *Essays of William Graham Sumner*, 2 vols., ed. Albert Galloway Keller and Maurice P. Davie (New Haven, 1911), I, 73-74; William Graham Sumner, *Folkways, A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals* (Boston, 1906), 4; William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, ed. Albert

Galloway Keller (New Haven, 1919), 332; Robert C. Bannister, *Sociology and Scientism: The American Quest for Objectivity, 1880-1940* (Chapel Hill, 1987), 89. 8. J. David Lewis and Richard L. Smith, *American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Symbolic Interaction* (Chicago and London, 1980), 157-158. Other sources useful in placing Cooley in the context of his discipline include Hamilton Cravens, *The Triumph of Evolution: American Scientists and the Heredity-Environment Controversy, 1900-1941* (Philadelphia, 1978); Roscoe C. Hinkle, *Founding Theory of American Sociology, 1881-1915* (Boston, 1980); Arthur J. Vidich and Stanford M. Lyman, *American Sociology: Worldly Rejections of Religion and Their Directions* (New Haven, 1985); Ellsworth R. Fuhrman, *The Sociology of Knowledge in America, 1883-1915* (Charlottesville, 1980); Bruce Mazlish, *A New Science: The Breakdown of Connections and the Birth of Sociology* (New York, 1989); Don Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (Boston, 1960); and Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff, eds., *Sociology and History: Theory and Research* (London, 1964). Among studies devoted wholly or in large part to Cooley are Marshall J. Cohen, *Charles Horton Cooley and the Social Self in American Thought* (New York and London, 1982); Sister Mary Edward Healy, *Society and Social Change in the Writings of St. Thomas, Ward, Sumner, and Cooley* (Westport, Conn., 1972); Edward C. Jandy, *Charles Horton Cooley: His Life and His Social Theory* (New York, 1942); Richard Dewey, "Charles Horton Cooley: Pioneer in Psychosociology," *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, ed. Harry Elmer Barnes (Chicago, 1948), 833-852; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., ed., *Cooley and Sociological Analysis* (Ann Arbor, 1968); and George Herbert Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," *The American Journal of Sociology* 35 (March 1930), 693-706. 9. Vidich and Lyman, *American Sociology*, 164n.; Edward Shils, *The Calling of Sociology: and Other Essays on the Pursuit of Learning* (Chicago, 1980), 97; Roscoe C. Hinkle, Jr. and Gisela J. Hinkle, *The Development of Modern Sociology: Its Nature and Growth in the United States* (New York, 1954), 30-31; Mead, "Cooley's Contribution," 695; Margaret Wilson Vine, *An Introduction to Socio-*

*logical Theory*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1969), 166. 10. Healy, *Society and Social Change*, 93. 11. Lewis and Smith, *American Sociology and Pragmatism*, 163-166; Jandy, *Charles Horton Cooley*, 43, 49, 51; Reiss, *Cooley*, 59-60; Martindale, *Sociological Theory*, 344. 12. See e.g. Lewis and Smith, *American Sociology and Pragmatism*, 163. 13. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 313; Robert Gutman, "Cooley: A Perspective," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (June 1958), 251. 14. Fuhrman, *Sociology of Knowledge*, 214. 15. Cravens, *Triumph of Evolution*, 149; Hinkle, *Founding Theory*, 190-193, 214-234. 16. Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Progress* (Carbondale, 1966), 67-68. 17. Cohen, *Cooley and the Social Self*, 15, 34. 18. *Ibid.*, 2; Charles Horton Cooley, *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York, 1930), 263, 269-273. 19. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 315-316. 20. Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Revised Edition (New York, 1964), 48, 74-76. 21. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 335-338. 22. Cooley, *Human Nature*, 35. 23. *Ibid.*, 50; Cooley, *Social Process*, 200; Charles Horton Cooley, *Life and the Student: Roadside Notes on Human Nature, Society, and Letters* (New York, 1927), 9; Cooley, *Social Organization*, 321. 24. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 232; Cooley, *Social Process*, 211, 213. 25. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 314, 373, 375, 390, 392; Cooley, *Human Nature*, 360. 26. Cooley, *Social Process*, 348; Cooley, *Social Organization*, 352, 354-355, 371. 27. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 94, 168-170; Cooley, *Life and the Student*, 25. 28. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 338-339, 389. 29. Cooley, *Social Process*, 383, 418; Cooley, *Life and the Student*, 246. 30. Cooley, *Social Process*, 420; Cooley, *Life and the Student*, 250. I discuss pertinent aspects of Royce's thought in "Josiah Royce and American Conservatism," *Modern Age*, 13 (Fall 1969), 342-352. See also Lewis and Smith, *American Sociology and Pragmatism*, 162; Vidich and Lyman, *American Sociology*, 267-270. 31. Cooley, *Life and the Student*, 250; Cooley, *Social Process*, 244. 32. Cooley, *Social Process*, 3, 8-9. 33. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 339. 34. *Ibid.*, 21. 35. Cooley, *Social Process*, 363-365, 369; Cooley, *Life and the Student*, 39. 36. Cooley, *Life and the Student*, 236; Cooley, *Social Process*, 116.