

Hegel and Classical Philosophy

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A FEW seminal thinkers have deeply shaped the consciousness of Western man. In the classical era Plato and Aristotle, like St. Augustine in the Christian, are constant reference points and sources of renewed insight, much at home in our consciousness as persons and things more immediate. The same may be said of Hegel in the modern era. We are perhaps uncomfortable that his influence is so extensive, and we may harbor an abiding suspicion of his work, as well we might of anyone who has managed to become the fountainhead of such diverse movements as contemporary phenomenology, Marxism, liberal Catholicism, and secular Protestantism. But his influence is there, present on the Western intellectual landscape as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are present in American politics. To be sure, Hegel's influence is not undisputed. His position of prominence is not so unmolested that his supporters do not appear regularly in symposia, panels, and lecture platforms to reaffirm his greatness. Hegel is clearly under attack, suspected of much that is wrong in intellectual culture, but that merely confirms the judgment that Hegel is to be taken quite seriously. Should there be any doubts we need only turn to the vast literature on neo-Hegelians, or witness the imprint of Hegel's thought

on contemporary philosophers and theologians who would not choose to be considered "Hegelians."

Clearly Hegel cannot be ignored, and yet if the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and *Wissenschaft der Logik* were mastered by all who claim his influence, we cannot help but assume that their number would be much smaller than it is. His much admired lectures on philosophy of history, aesthetics, religion, and the history of philosophy are, of course, magnificent explications of philosophical problems, and vast in their scope. But they are not the basis of Hegel's reputation. Why, then, this influence? The not very startling answer is, perhaps, that Hegel stood in the center of the Idealist movement, at the apex of its internal development, and its rejection of man's humanity. A public had already been prepared for his work. For all that is revolutionary in Hegel's thought, he was still the master of an intellectual mode which had already a cultivated following. The massive influence of Hegel today, therefore, may be attributed not only to Hegel's genius, which is substantial, but to the preparatory work of his Idealist predecessors and the ensuing deformation of philosophy. Nevertheless, this development, of which Hegel himself was conscious, is not easily traced.

Robert Tucker, whose analysis of Karl Marx is a classic of modern political criticism, places the origin of Idealist humanism in Kant, whom he indicts totally, arguing that behind Kant's moral philosophy lurks "the expression of a compulsion in man to achieve absolute moral self-perfection."¹ Adopting Kant's distinctions between "noumenon," a thing not an object of sense experience, and "phenomena," objects of sense experience as they appear in consciousness, Tucker attributes to Kant a view of man as a "divided being, a dual personality: *homo noumenon* and *homo phenomenon*."² *Homo noumenon* is man's real self, of which *homo phenomenon* is only an appearance. Man is thus torn between what he is, and what he appears to be, but really is not completely. Kant, Tucker writes,

... portrays man in a posture of anguished striving to actualize an image of himself as divinely virtuous. He writes that there would be no need for morality at all, no obligation or "moral compulsion," if man were in actual fact a "holy being." This is a manner of suggesting that morality is the compulsion to become such a holy being in actual fact. It is a compulsion to become godlike.³

Passages in Kant's works do tend partially to support such an interpretation. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, for example, Kant writes that moral law leads us to religion because religion recognizes duties as divine commands. Our own moral action, then, must be conceived as an attempt to harmonize our own will with that of God's, even though such harmony cannot be attained by finite beings.⁴ Kant writes in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* that our ideal will which makes universal laws is the proper object of reverence.⁵ Kant also saw man's will as man's "proper" or real self, and this he called "the divine man within us."⁶ If the "real" or noumenal

self is divine for Kant, as Tucker asserts, has he not violated his maxim that the "thing-in-itself" cannot be known? Ironically the greatest difference between Kant and Hegel lies in Hegel's belief that his own absolute Idealism had gone beyond the limitations of Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself."

Kant argued that what we know, our phenomenal knowledge, exists in us, and not in that of which we are conscious. We know our own consciousness, our presentation to consciousness of appearances, but we do not know things in themselves. This is not to say that we alone constitute reality. The active powers of the mind create "experience" by presenting sense stimulus to consciousness, but there really *is* reality exterior to ourselves. For that reason, though Kant would write that the order which is in nature is introduced by us,⁷ he did not mean what ultimately Fichte asserted, that we are the lord of nature, the genesis of an illusory reality. The solipsistic *cul de sac* of Fichte was avoided by Kant for whom nature and its order were indeed real, but were introduced to consciousness by our own active intellect. Is this not the intellectual process recorded in the pre-Socratic philosophers' symbol *cosmos*? The order of the *cosmos*, as they first represented it, was perceived in legal terms, suggesting that its order was not the order of physical nature alone, but the order which contained within its realm the divine, man, the *polis*, and *physis*.⁸ For Kant the order of nature was neither an illusion nor reducible to sense experience.

Of things in themselves we can know only their appearance; this was Kant's first and last assessment of the problem. The limitations which this imposed on critical philosophy, however, were too restrictive to satisfy the intellectual appetites of Hegel. The Kantian categories of pure reason, Hegel argued, are unfit for speculative thought which must of

necessity ascend to the "Absolute" (*des Absoluten*).⁹ Of Kant's admonition against attempting to know "things-in-themselves," Hegel writes, "On the contrary, there is nothing we can know so easily (*es ist nichts leichter, als dies zu wissen*)."¹⁰ "Absolute idealism," he thought, went far beyond the "subjective idealism" of Kant because it allows us to know the identity of the Absolute, to know the "thing-in-itself," to know the nature of god ("*Belehrung über die Natur Gottes, und über diese allein wollen wir belehrt sein*").¹¹ This creates problems, for if ultimately the object of science is the nature of God, knowledge of which is beyond experience, to know God as He knows himself requires that the one who knows become like God. For the enterprise to succeed, the distinction between man and God must be cast aside, and replaced with a man-god. A project as radical as the one Hegel contemplated, therefore, necessarily involved a massive transvaluation of classic philosophy in the wake of which would be strewn the remnants of all hitherto philosophical reflection. Hegel's distortion of classical philosophy, the product of the speculative endeavor to which he devoted his life, has left a record of distorted philosophic symbols which, when analyzed, points towards and illuminates the nature of Hegel's thought. An understanding of Hegel's role in the development of Idealist humanism, therefore, must include an explication of those philosophical symbols which he distorted. We consider the following: man, act, *epekeina* (the beyond), finite and infinite.

MAN

Like his predecessors, Hegel was persuaded that man was essentially divine, and consequently was troubled by the effect upon what he viewed as the Christian religion "if human nature is absolutely severed from the divine, if no me-

diation between the two is conceded except in one isolated individual, if all man's consciousness of the good and the divine is degraded to the dull and killing belief in a superior Being altogether alien to man."¹² Apparently the divinity of Christ, if that excluded the divinity of all men, and gave to Christ alone the role of mediator between God and man, was too much for the young Hegel who could not accept that man and God were different in kind. On this same subject he wrote:

This hill and the eye which sees it are the object and subject, but between man and God, between spirit and spirit, there is no such cleft of objectivity and subjectivity; one is to the other an other only in that one recognizes the other; both are one.¹³

What motivates such a formulation? We noted that Hegel says in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* that he only desires to know the nature of God.¹⁴ Yet if man himself is divine, that aspiration is nothing more than a desire to know oneself. Isn't this what Hegel openly admits in the *Phenomenology*?

This curtain . . . , therefore, hanging before the inner world is withdrawn, and we have here the inner being . . . gazing into the inner-realm—the vision of the undistinguished self-same reality, which repels itself from itself, affirms itself as a divided and distinguished inner reality, but as one for which at the same time the two factors have immediately no distinction; what we have here is self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen.¹⁵

This passage is difficult precisely because of its clarity. Hegel is arguing that actual knowledge requires that we probe the curtain behind which God is hidden. But the act of probing is an aspect of the

object of the search: "there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there." The object of our search is the knowledge of our own divinity. Though this passage may be subject to other interpretations, compare it with Hegel's discussion of the story of Adam in the *Encyclopaedia* where he touches upon the role philosophy must play in a world composed of essentially divine men:

We are further told, God said, "Behold Adam is become as one of us, to know good and evil." Knowledge is now spoken of as divine [*das Göttliche*] and not, as before, as something wrong and forbidden. Such words contain a confutation of the *idle talk* [*des Geredes*] that philosophy pertains only to the finitude [*der Endlichkeit*] of the mind. Philosophy is knowledge, and it is through knowledge that man first realizes his original vocation, to be the image of God [*ein Ebenbild Gottes zu sein*].¹⁶

Hegel is clearly saying here that philosophy is not the means by which we manifest our love of truth. It is the vehicle of our *libido* to become "the image of God." Man, of course, is not "the image of God," in the sense in which Hegel intends it as the *exact* image (*Ebenbild*), unless Hegel was referring to an account other than that in Genesis which speaks of the Elohim having decided to make man "in our image." The crucial difference between Genesis 1:26 and Hegel's formulation is the difference between a view of man which identifies man with God absolutely, that is, sees him as divine, and the view which sees him as a spiritual, but imperfect human being.

Hegel's interpretation of the account of Christ's transfiguration is also of interest because its focus is not on Christ or the amazement of his witnesses, but rather on its ramifications for Peter's vocation as a type of clairvoyance:

After Peter had recognized Jesus as divine in nature and thereby proved that he had a sense of the whole depth of man

because he had been able to take a man as a son of God, Jesus gave over to him the power of the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. What he bound was to be bound in Heaven, what he loosed was to be loosed in Heaven also. Since Peter had become conscious of a God in *one* man, he must also have been able to recognize it in a third party [*in einem Dritten*] as that party's sensing of divinity or nondivinity, i.e., as the strength of that party's belief or disbelief. . . .¹⁷

Peter's clairvoyance pertains to his ability to see God in other men who had faith. But faith in what? The passage suggests that Peter's faith was in himself and to the degree that he too was divine, of himself as God. Peter, Hegel says, "had become conscious of a God in *one* man" and the result was his ability to recognize divinity in "a third party." Would not Peter be the "second party" in whom he recognized divinity?

In the *Phenomenology* we find much the same emphasis but with the distinction that Hegel has now entered into the attempt to systematize the consequences of his view of a deified man. He must now work out its consequences in knowledge. For that reason we do not find a discussion of the nature of man but the manipulation of logical categories. Man now is "the single individual," but the single individual is not man, "he" is a universal, a "this" which is not to be identified with any historical man. The single individual as consciousness, however, is aware of its own being as universal consciousness (*allgemeinen Bewusstsein*).¹⁸ Conscious of itself as universal consciousness, the single individual takes on the identity for Hegel of "god appearing in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge."¹⁹

To us, Hegel seems to have adopted a solipsistic ontology. If consciousness is all reality,²⁰ as is individual consciousness, and merely a moment in the development of absolute consciousness, then

it is apparent that Being is not only thought, but in Hegel's system can be reduced to his *own* thought. Like Noah, who looked upon a devastated world after the Flood, Hegel would create a new world by his own will. The allusion to Noah is Hegel's. He writes in "The Spirit of Christianity":

Certain phenomena, reactions to the impressions derived from this general manslaughter by hostile elements, have been indicated to us by history. If man was to hold out against the outbursts of a nature now hostile, nature had to be mastered; and since the whole can be divided only into idea and reality, so also the supreme unity of mastery lies either in something thought or in something real. It was in a thought-product that Noah built the distracted world together again; his thought-produced ideal he turned into a Being and then set everything else over against it, so that in this opposition realities were reduced to thoughts, i.e., to something mastered. This Being promised him to confine within their limits the elements which were his servants, so that no flood was ever again to destroy mankind.²¹

The above passage is lucid with motivation. The desire for mastery over hostile elements gives impetus to religious formulations. In such a mode Noah created a Being to master nature, but over whom Noah himself had mastery. Did Hegel himself aspire to be a Noah who had mastered God? If so, the genius of his *libido dominandi* is that Hegel could disguise his construction. If one seeks in the *Phenomenology* only Hegel's account of the various phases of the development of consciousness, then one will never find the *deus ex machina* of Hegel's own hand creating the "System" within which consciousness or truth exists.²² Yet Hegel clearly implied that truth does not exist without Hegel's system, a system by which knowledge (truth) could become real. It was Hegel's desire to "lay aside the name of love of knowledge" (*der*

Liebe zum Wissen) and attain "actual knowledge" (*wirkliches Wissen*).²³ Implied in this is the desire to abolish the tension between the philosopher and truth which he loves, and replace it with the *libido* to possess what was formerly the object of *noesis*.

Thus actual knowledge for Hegel is not knowledge *of* something, it *is* that something in its full reality. God has been brought into consciousness through the rejection of human consciousness. God is now, in Hegel, consciousness. Students of Gnosticism will detect in this a similarity to the system of Valentinus, in which knowledge "is raised to an *ontological* position of the first order . . . not merely of subjective and private experience."²⁴ In Hegel's system the sentiment that truth in a curious way becomes real through the system of Hegel itself, that Hegel's thought *is* truth in its full reality, not merely the experience of one man,²⁵ is, like the system of Schelling, the outgrowth of sixteen centuries of Gnostic development.

ACT

In its philosophic meaning act is an attribute only of man. The acorn, if actualized, becomes an oak. But this development is not the act of the oak. Physical, chemical, environmental, and formal causes operate to effect this development. In animals, too, instinctual behavior denotes them as animals, an instinct that does not imply consciousness, or even an impetus of which the animal itself is conscious. Man alone is conscious of his condition, his nature as a man, and this consciousness is related to his action. For example, consciousness is the means by which we distinguish between voluntary and involuntary acts. Because of our consciousness of what we are doing, we are responsible. But if by accident or unusual circumstances we become unconscious, this same social and moral responsibil-

ity is limited. Man is conscious of himself as a being capable of actualizing his potential as man, that is, as a good man. For that reason we see acts hierarchically, as somehow related in a scale of higher and lower acts.

Base acts deform us as men to the degree that it is common to describe a particularly base act as "animal." This is implied in the archaic term "naught," nothing, and its counterpart the word "ought." Though we today commonly define the "ought" as that which we *should* do, it also means that which is. "Aught" and "Naught" mean that which *is* and that which *is not*. The *naughty* boy, therefore, in a very real way has, in this hierarchical sense of act, deformed himself to the extent that he is less than he *is* because his act *is not*, meaning in an ontological sense, "less than being." "To be or not to be" in a universal sense is the dilemma of all men, to act and thus to *be*, that is, to actualize our potential as men, to do as we ought, which is to do that which is (ought). These ontic dimensions of act, in this philosophic sense, first became known in the two formulations of Parmenides' mystic poem the "Way of Truth" and the "Way of Seeming." The way we are encouraged to travel by the goddess has its opposite in the way which is not. A way which is unthinkable. The way which *is*, is the way of truth.²⁶

Pelasgus in Aeschylus' *The Suppliant Maidens*, when faced with the dilemma of granting asylum or turning his suppliant kin over to the Egyptians, confronts the issue thusly:

Without
Harm I cannot aid you; nor is it sensible
to
despise these your earnest prayers. I am
at a
loss, and fearful is my heart, To act or not
to
*act and choose success.*²⁷

To act, however, is not merely to do something, it is to act rightly. Only right action is required of Pelasgus. "We need profound, preserving care, that plunges / Like a diver deep into troubled seas," he says.²⁸ By analogy a man must plunge, like a diver, into the depths of his soul, and there, through contemplation, discover *dike*. Aristotle, too, expressed this insight, but with the philosopher's precise use of critical terms to describe the act experientially. *Nous*, which more than anything else is man, that which denominates him as man, he said, is divine, or the most divine thing in us.²⁹ Our human nous, mind or intellect, as it sometimes is translated, participates (*metalepsis*) in the divine *nous* (*nous theion*), and that, Aristotle says, is to act.³⁰

By openness to divine reality we act, or actualize ourselves, as men. The implication is that if we close ourselves off from the divine, we deform our nature as men. From this nucleus radiate the principal Aristotelian concepts of right action, virtue, *phronesis*, happiness, friendship, love, and community. St. Augustine would later formulate a philosophy of history on this same ground, by reporting that the movement of our souls toward God, our love for God, as opposed to our love for ourselves, forms us into distinct "historical" communities.

The rich texture of these formulations of the problem of action and history is to be contrasted with those of Hegel. For Hegel action is a category of mind, a property of a universal individual consciousness. From the perspective of this type of abstract consciousness, act is discussed as having three moments: as an object belonging to consciousness; as a purpose, the process of actualization of the purpose; and "The third moment, is finally, the object no longer as immediately and subjectively presented purpose, but as brought to light and established as something other than and external to the acting subject."³¹ The diffi-

culty that this formulation presents turns upon the problem of whose consciousness it is which is the subject of this process. Is it the consciousness of man as actor, or God as acting in man? If action is a mode of consciousness, shouldn't he clearly distinguish between the man who acts, and his consciousness of that act? In this sense, act in reality is not only consciousness, but the real act of historical men. Hegel's view of action, however, is clearly one-dimensional, entirely mental. Hegel has transposed the focus of a discussion of action from the noetic act of man to the activity of the divine mind. As a result, what is discussed is the nonexperiential movement of the divine, and what is discarded is the discussion of human consciousness of the unchangeable relation of human to divine *nous*.

EPEKEINA

Plato was the first to articulate the transcendence of the divine in philosophic terms. His symbol of the "beyond" (*epekeina*) refers to an experience of the transcendence of the divine *arche* which is beyond the good.³² The symbol is unique because of the experienced relation it implies. What is "beyond" suggests the transcendence of that which is experienced, and the immanence of the philosopher or the one who knows because of his experience of having been turned around (*periagoge*)³³ and upwards toward the divine. Philosophy, then, has as its function the imitation of this *periagoge*. For Hegel, however, the beyond is a phenomenal aspect of the self-development of the godhead. As such it has no value in itself as a datum of human experience, or as a symbol of an experienced reality. The "beyond" is a moment in the development of spirit aware of itself only in those intellects in whom spirit produces itself and "gets its existential form."³⁴

This act of becoming through men

occurs in a process in which "heaven is transplanted to the earth below," by which Hegel meant the reconciliation of the contradictions of "morality and objective nature," and "morality and will."³⁵ Such an eschatological proposition, however, places an obligation upon man to participate in the divine self-development, through the leadership of those in whom spirit is manifest, "the Teutonic world"³⁶ whom the divine has assigned this special task. Unfortunately, if man does not choose to be reconciled to God by the Teutons, he has no choice; "the return to the Godhead whence man is born, closes the circle of man's development."³⁷ In the context of Hegel's philosophic theogonic portrayal of an alleged cyclical return to the godhead from which man emanates, the Platonic symbol of "the beyond" has no critical meaning. It is a moment in the self-positing of consciousness which is Hegel's real subject.

FINITE/INFINITE

Like the Platonic beyond (*epekeina*), the symbol "infinite" (*to apeiron*) was conceived by Anaximander to describe what he understood as the divine *arche*, or the beginning of all that is. In this respect he was one of several "natural philosophers" (*physiologoi*) who sought a variety of symbols which would express the answer to the question of what is the origin (*arche*) of all that is. Thales suggested that water was the *arche*; Anaximenes, that it was air. To Anaximander the *arche* was infinite, the boundless. If has no beginning itself, he said, yet is itself the *arche* of other things. It is divine (*to theion*) and deathless (*athanaton*).³⁸ Significantly, *to theion* is not a mythic concept like god (*theos*), but a neuter noun consciously created to differentiate it and the contemplation of it from the mythic formulations of the past. Moreover, Anaximander specifically indicates that the *arche* is divine, whereas the other Milesians broached this point only

metaphorically. Air, for example, is obviously to be taken as symbolic of the invisible presence of the divine ground. This fundamental philosophic quest for the ground is the context in which the symbol "infinite" came into Western philosophical consciousness. Characteristically Hegel transposed its philosophical meaning into a logical manipulation of a logical category: "infinite." By treating it as a category, as a thing, albeit a mental thing, he is capable of using the symbol as if it had no experiential meaning, and thus is able to transpose the substance of philosophic discourse from the pursuit of truth to the movement of truth in a process of divine immanent actualization. In such a context, even "immanent," which is a synonym for "finite," is transvalued by Hegel.

The world for Hegel is only an appearance, having no real being.³⁹ This is the principal proposition of idealism, Hegel writes, shared with religion, which "refuses to recognize in finitude a veritable being. . . ."⁴⁰ Empirical reality, therefore, is for philosophy "a worthless existence."⁴¹ The radical dualism which Hegel shared with his Idealist predecessors, excluding Kant, a dualism which denied reality to the finite, is not to be confused with the dualism of the young Plato. Plato of the *Phaedo* considered the body the prison of the soul, but only because the body *has* reality and conditions or limits thought. With Hegel, however, thought is unlimited, unconditioned. "Spirit is alone Reality" are words spoken by Hegel, not Plato.⁴²

Matter for Hegel is not that which we experience, but is thought, pure abstraction, and as such is that environment by which "consciousness weaves and moves inarticulately within itself."⁴³ The image of the weaving and moving of a snake is probably not unintended, for Hegel considered the snake symbolic of God. "The serpent represents likeness to God as consisting in the knowledge of good and

evil. . . ."⁴⁴ Matter and consciousness were, for Hegel, symbolic of the twin forces of good and evil in the godhead. Students of Gnosticism will again detect in this formulation a similarity to the system of Valentinus. In Valentinian Gnosticism the rift of being in the godhead originates in the godhead itself. Hegel's own symbolism is similar in that it suggests that evil and matter, good and consciousness can be understood only in terms of the history of divine consciousness, what we have called a philosophic theogony and what for Valentinus would be called a divine history. Hans Jonas writes of Valentinus that "in this way, matter would appear to be a function rather than a substance on its own, a state or 'affection' of the absolute being, and the solidified external expression of that state. . . ."⁴⁵

1. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*, 33. 2. *Ibid.*, 34. 3. *Ibid.*, 33. 4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Lewis White Beck, trans. (Indianapolis, 1956), 33. 5. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, H. J. Paton, trans. (New York, 1964), 105. 6. *Ibid.*, 126; *idem*, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 486. 7. *Ibid.*, 147. 8. See Eric Voegelin's discussion of this development in *The World of the Polis* (Baton Rouge, 1957), 233-234 (hereafter cited as Voegelin, *World of the Polis*). 9. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Logic of Hegel Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, William Wallace, trans., 2nd ed. rev. (London, 1972), 91 (hereafter cited as Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*); *idem*, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), VIII:120, par. 44 (hereafter cited as Hegel, *Werke*). 10. *Ibid.*, 92; *idem*, *Werke*, VIII:121, par. 44. 11. *Ibid.*, 93; *idem*, *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, E. S. Haldane, trans., 3 vols. (New York, 1955), I:71 (hereafter cited as Hegel, *Lectures on History of Philosophy*); *idem*, *Werke*, XVIII:92. 12. G. W. F. Hegel, *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, T. M. Knox, trans. (New York, 1961), 176 (hereafter cited as Hegel, *On Christianity*). 13. *Ibid.*, 265. 14. Hegel, *Lectures on History of Philosophy*, I:71. 15. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, J. B. Baillie, trans., 2nd ed. rev. (London, 1955), 212-213 (hereafter cited as Hegel, *Phenomenology*). 16. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, 56. Emphasis added; *idem*, *Werke*, VIII:90, par. 24. 17. Hegel, *On Christianity*, 242; *idem*, *Hegels theologisches Jugendschriften*, Herman Nohl, ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), 291. 18. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 376;

idem, Werke, III:264. **19.** *Ibid.*, 679. **20.** *Ibid.*, 267. **21.** Hegel, *On Christianity*, 182-183. **22.** Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 85; *idem, Werke*, III:28. **23.** *Ibid.*, 70; *idem, Werke*, III:14. **24.** Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 174. **25.** The best modern criticism on Hegel is Eric Voegelin, "On Hegel-A Study in Sorcery," *Studium Generale*, 24:335-368. **26.** Voegelin, *World of the Polis*, 203-219. **27.** Aeschylus, *The Suppliant Maidens*, Seth G. Benardete, trans. (Chicago, 1956), 376-380. **28.** *Ibid.*, 408. **29.** *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a12. **30.** *Metaphysics*, 1072b20. **31.** Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 421. **32.** *Politeia*, 509b. **33.** *Politeia*, 515c. **34.** Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 86. **35.** *Ibid.*, 598; 620. **36.** Hegel, *Lectures on History of Philosophy*, I:105. **37.** Hegel, *On Christianity*, 273. **38.** G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers, A Critical History with a Selection of Texts* (Cambridge, 1964), 104-114. **39.** Hegel, *Encyclopaedia* 10, 104; *idem, Hegel's Science of Logic*, W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, trans., 2 vols., 2nd ed. (London, 1959), I:168 (hereafter cited as Hegel, *Science of Logic*). **40.** Hegel, *Science of Logic*, I:168. **41.** *Ibid.*, 124. **42.** Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 86; *idem, Werke*, III:28. **43.** *Ibid.*, 592. **44.** Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, 55. **45.** Jonas, *Gnostic Religion*, 174.