

# *Enlightenment to Ideology: The Apotheosis of the Human Mind*

(Part One)

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MORE THAN ANY other historical period the eighteenth-century Enlightenment tempts one to generalizations. A close reading of the historical record gives most of these generalizations the lie; for any one thinker of this period who strikes us as "typical" there are others who oppose him. "Ambiguity" does prevail, indeed. What tempts us to generalizations, however, is the flow of ideas and emotions from this century to the next, experienced as a unified legacy. I do not conceive it my task to enter, once again, into the fray about the "character" of this century. For what I should like to say, the Enlightenment is a *terminus a quo*. I do need a *point d'appui* for a characterization of that *terminus*, and I have chosen Ernst Cassirer's *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, fully aware that thus I must stand or fall with what this mentor has to say to me.<sup>1</sup> Since Cassirer has asked the kind of questions that I would ask, and dealt with them in the manner I prefer, that situation suits me well.

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## I

Cassirer regards the eighteenth-century

concept of reason as the key factor in the picture. If it was radically "new," so was that of the preceding century, with Descartes' "bifurcation" of reality into a *res extensa* and a *res cogitans*. But to some extent Descartes still had one foot in scholasticism, and, anyhow, the eighteenth century depended on Newton and Locke rather than on Descartes, rejecting the "*esprit de système*" for an "*esprit systématique*." If the great seventeenth-century philosophical systems gave an impression of stability, sameness, endurance, quite the opposite mood prevailed in the eighteenth. Said D'Alembert, in his *Eléments de Philosophie* (1759): "It is difficult not to see . . . a very remarkable change in our ideas . . . a change whose rapidity seems to promise an even greater transformation to come," and called this "a revolution." This change centered in the eighteenth century's radically different conception of reason and what effects this had on the strivings and beliefs of the entire civilization. "Reason" is seen as "an original spontaneity of thought," an agency, a force, an "imminent activity" not so much engaged in an imitative function but in "the power and task of shaping life itself" (vii, viii).

Descartes had emphasized mathemat-

ics and had discovered analytical geometry. From then on, analysis was the only conceivable method to arrive at knowledge consisting of "clear and distinct ideas," ideas focused on the composing parts of any whole. But mathematics applied to a system derived from a few dogmatic axioms was one thing; Newton and Locke were empiricists, and that was quite another thing. Newton "does not begin by setting up certain principles, certain general concepts and axioms, when he is investigating the factual." Rather, "his phenomena are the data of experience, his principles are the goal of investigation. If the latter are first according to nature, then the former must always be first to us" (7). Hence the true method of physics can never consist in proceeding

... from a hypothesis ... for such hypotheses can be invented and modified as desired; logically any one of them is valid as any other. ... A scientific abstraction or 'definition' cannot serve as a really unambiguous starting-point, for such a starting point can only be obtained by experience and observation. [This] means that facts as such are not mere matter, facts exhibit an all-pervasive form. This form appears in mathematical determinations and in arrangements according to measure and number. But such arrangements cannot be foreseen in the mere concept; they must rather be shown to exist in the facts themselves. The procedure is thus not from concepts and axioms to phenomena, but vice versa (8).

The Enlightenment, then, models philosophy on the pattern of contemporary natural science, particularly physics. It demands that the mind "abandon itself to the abundance of phenomena and gauge itself constantly by them. For it may be sure that it will not get lost, but that instead it will find here its own real truth and standard." This is how Cassirer describes the *fides* on which the Enlight-

enment travels to "understanding." Cassirer perceives in this spirit two principles: the first is the identity of "the positive" with the "rational," not a mere postulate but a "goal attainable and an ideal fully realizable" (9). In this perspective reason appears as a dynamic force that, beginning with disciplined and systematic observation, will from there move on and on, expanding the horizon of knowledge wider and wider, from the finite to the infinite, from the concrete to the universal. The other principle holds reason to have become the lever of a new age, characterized by the combination of the "positive" and the "rational," in which combination "reason" becomes "the unifying and central point of this century, expressing all that it longs and strives for, and all that it achieves" (5).

D'Alembert greeted this philosophical method as a "revolution" because it replaced faith with certainty, dogma with process; and Lessing proclaimed that the real power of reason is found not in the possession but in the acquisitive pursuit of truth. The eighteenth century itself provides an illustration of this spirit, as it frees itself from the authority of mathematics at the very moment of relying on it, by extending the analytical process beyond quantity and number. Thus the "positive" which combines with the "rational" is no longer confined to a particular field of knowledge; it applies also to the psychological and sociological fields.

It was Condillac, in his *Treatise on Sensation* (1754) and *The Language of Calculus* (1798), who showed the way to this further expansiveness of "reason." This is remarkable in that Condillac agreed with Descartes on the immateriality and spirituality of the soul, and on the obvious conclusion that what is immaterial and spiritual does not consist of parts in the way "extended things" do. All the same, he found a way to subject psychological phenomena to mathemati-

cal analysis, relying on Locke's sense perceptions. Particular psychological phenomena, he argued, are continuous developments from a common source of all psychological phenomena. A continuous series of "impressions" and the temporal order in which they are produced "are sufficient to build up the totality of psychological experience and to produce it in all its wealth and subtle shadings. If we succeed in producing psychological experience in this manner, we have at the same time reduced it to the quantitative concepts" (25). The "higher powers of the mind," Condillac concluded, are "in reality only a transformation of the basic element of sense perception. . . . The mind neither creates nor invents; it repeats and constructs. But in this repetition it can exhibit almost inexhaustible powers. It extends the visible universe beyond all bounds; it traverses the infinity of time and space; and yet it is unceasingly engaged in the production of ever new shapes within itself." This passage from Condillac can well serve as an explanation of the central orientation that united thinking people in the eighteenth century. It is attention to "the mind . . . concerned only with itself." The immensely popular Helvétius was the chief herald (*On the Mind*) of this good news. One step further, and the same conception will be applied to theoretical distinctions.

Judgment is said to consist only in "grasping similarities and differences between individual ideas." But at the beginning of this process the Enlightenment thinkers presuppose "an original act of awareness which is analogous to, and indeed identical with, the perception of a sense quality" (27). Here Cassirer adds, "both the edifice of ethical values and the logically graded structure of knowledge are demolished." The *analogia sensationis* has replaced the *analogia entis*, but while the latter applies to the desire to know higher reality,

the former is the mind's desire to know itself and the newly discovered uses of this instrument.

If the revolutionary concept of reason may serve to represent the character of the Enlightenment, a brief look at the concepts of nature and history will round out the impression. Cassirer points out that the patterning of all reason on natural science must not be mistaken for just an addition of some different features to the scope of knowledge: "The knowledge of nature does not simply lead us into the world of objects; it serves rather as a medium in which the mind develops its own self-knowledge" (37). The new discoveries point toward the illimitable, "one world and one Being are replaced by an infinity of worlds. . . . But the important aspect of this transformation does not lie in the boundless expansion, but that the mind now becomes aware of a new force within itself . . . proving its unity equal to the infinity of being. . . . The power of reason is our only access to the infinite . . ." (38). The autonomy of intellect "corresponds to the autonomy of nature. . . . The philosophy of the Enlightenment attempts to show the self-sufficiency of both nature and intellect" (45). In the century of Newton, the idea of natural science

. . . is no longer shaped after the pattern of geometry, but rather after that of arithmetic. . . . On the question of the certainty or uncertainty of knowledge the roles have been switched about strangely as a result of this transition from the constructive to the analytical ideal of natural science. . . . We can escape deception only by penetrating beyond mere appearance, by relating the empirically given to concepts and expressing it in concepts which carry their proof in themselves . . . truth and certainty must be found in the body of knowledge which the principle validates (54).

Thus, with regard to the important assumption that past experience points

the way to future ones, a Dutch philosopher argued that the validity of this axiom stemmed not from necessity of the object of thought but from the necessity of action. Cassirer comments: "Mathematical empiricism here stands on the threshold of skeptical empiricism" (62). Hume, of course, takes the further step when he divests belief of all its transcendental elements and reduces it to purely psychological grounds, to an immanent necessity of human nature. In a similar way the Enlightenment eliminates the notion of substance by insisting that "the idea of a thing is simply the idea of a mere sum or aggregate of qualities." Says Cassirer: "The attempt to eliminate all metaphysical elements from empirical philosophy finally gains so much ground that it casts doubt upon the logical foundations of this philosophy as well" (64).

Nature, then, no longer justifying an inference from deduction, now justifies inference from the part to the whole.

But if the experimental method is to be completely effective, we must grant it full autonomy and free it from all tutelage. It is therefore necessary in the field of natural science to combat the systematizing spirit in mathematics as well as in metaphysics. As soon as the mathematician develops not merely his own conceptual world, but is convinced that he can catch reality in the meshes of his concepts, he has himself become a metaphysician. . . . [This amounts to] a demand for a purely descriptive science of nature (74f).

In this sense, materialism—which did form only a small part of the Enlightenment—presents itself not so much as a dogma but as an imperative (69). And Buffon, himself not a materialist, insists that in nature "there are only individuals, there are no species and genera" (79). Cassirer asserts:

But as the center of gravity of thought shifts from definition to description, from the species to the individual, mechanism

can no longer be considered as the sole and sufficient basis of explanation; there is in the making a transition to a conception of nature which no longer seeks to derive and explain becoming from being, but being from becoming (80).

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## II

This may be the right point at which to turn from an historical account of the Enlightenment to the problem of the links between this century and the ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

I shall approach this problem not with the rationalist methods of the past but rather with the greatly enriched political science of our time, which has room for the awareness that reason is born from experiences of the soul, the *open* soul participating in transcendent reality.<sup>2</sup> The characteristic trait of the Enlightenment is its universal cult of "reason," a cult quite evident even before November 10, 1793, the day when Robespierre turned Notre Dame into the Temple of Reason.

The entire century, particularly in France, seems bent not so much on knowing reality but on knowing and admiring the human mind. It was Locke who put the Enlightenment on this track, with his analysis of knowledge composed of sense perception and reflection. Beginning with Condillac, French thinkers rang the changes on this simple sequence, all the while obeying a canon of certain exclusions. "System," in the sense of seventeenth-century philosophy, was declared taboo, as was metaphysics, and as was any reference to transcendence. There may have been no unified concept of reason in the Enlightenment, but there emerged a unified attitude toward reason, the attitude of regarding it as an instrument, an agency, a force. Of what was it to be an agency, toward what force? The answer is, "power," even

though this end had already been put on its pedestal by Francis Bacon and Descartes. "For this age, knowledge of its own activity, intellectual self-examination, and foresight are the proper function and essential task of thought" (4).

Reason is no longer experienced as a partnership between the human soul and the divine inspiration, it is man's exclusive possession and favorite and powerful tool. "The lust for knowledge, the *libido sciendi*, which theological dogmatism had outlawed and branded as intellectual pride, is now called a necessary quality of the soul" (14). The Enlightenment does not ignore that man is born into this world, but it rejects any obligation to deference as flowing from this fact. "As soon as the power of thought awakens in man, it advances irresistibly against this form of reality, summoning it before the tribunal of thought and challenging its legal titles to truth and validity" (18). Not even facts are allowed to form a kind of metaphysical upper story: "The mere togetherness of the facts must be transformed into a conjuncture; the mere coexistence of the data must upon closer inspection reveal an interdependence" (21). Thus rational order demands "strict unification," which means that "the manifold of experience [must be] placed into such a relationship [of its part] that, starting from any given point, we can run through them according to a constant and general rule" (23). "Reason," hence, means ultimate control not only of nature but also of what philosophers used to call the mysterious soul, as well as power over the equally mysterious reality of social order. The Enlightenment, throughout its course, was celebrating the final attainment of reason's "almost limitless power," before which every reality had to prostrate itself in abject servitude.

At this point I must argue with Cassirer, my mentor, and with his statement that "the autonomy of intellect corresponds

to the autonomy of nature." It was not the autonomy of nature that the Enlightenment had discovered; that discovery had already been made by Aristotle and his Milesian antecedents. The Enlightenment forced its concept of nature into obedience to its newly acquired power tool of reason. Only that was nature which could be fully possessed and dominated by that power tool. Thus the Enlightenment eliminated, from the autonomous nature that Aristotle knew, the ends and purposes, the final causality, which went perfectly well with an autonomous nature but not with the demand of an all-powerful empirical reason.

The new attitude toward reason, and nature, carried with it a new moral attitude which may well not have been part of the design. Just as the actual adoration of Reason in its own Temple came late in the century, so the moral attitude of the Enlightenment did not become fully articulate until the next century, when its postulate, the superman, was openly and formally proclaimed. The idea that life is, above all, man's power began to stir in the last two decades of the eighteenth century as Europe's young poets revived the ancient myth of Prometheus, turning it upside down, so that now Prometheus is no longer the victim of divine punishment for his metaphysical rebellion, but the heroic leader of mankind against that "pack of gods." Man, in pursuit of "Promethean" power, needed to "transvaluate all values," which was initiated at that time by the Marquis de Sade and Lord Byron.

As a general principle of life, however, this vision of power was enthroned only by Romanticism. Thus Ralph Waldo Emerson spurred on "the American Scholar":

It is a mischievous notion that we are come late into nature; that the world was finished a long time ago. As the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of God, so it

is to so much of his attributes as we bring to it . . . in proportion as a man has anything in him divine, the firmament flows before him, and takes his signet and form. They are the kings of the world who give the color of their present thought to all nature and all art, and persuade men by the cheerful serenity of their carrying the matter, that this thing which they do, is the apple which the ages have desired to pluck, now at last ripe, and inviting nations to the harvest. The great man makes the great thing.<sup>3</sup>

In Germany, the young Marx saw himself as a modern Prometheus and superman.<sup>4</sup>

The postulate of reason's limitless power entailed certain manipulations of reality. Two types of manipulation are widespread: the reduction of non-corporeal reality to assumed artificial parts into which it appeared divisible; and the reduction of one kind of reality to another kind that appeared quantifiable. The latter appeared first: "[The Enlightenment] seeks another concept of truth and philosophy whose function it is to extend the boundaries and make them more elastic, concrete, and vital. The Enlightenment does not take the ideal of this model of thinking from the philosophical doctrines of the past; on the contrary, it constructs its ideal according to the model and pattern of contemporary natural science" (7). Mathematics, particularly after the discovery of calculus by Leibniz, became the dominant technical discipline. Where analytical division seemed impossible, as in the science of man's soul, of the social whole, of the moral order, a reduction to composing parts is achieved artificially, as previously noted. Reducing human society to its economic component made it suitable for both analysis and quantification. Thus any thought of mystery was disallowed; there were only things already known and things that eventually would be known.

Even more did an impression of enor-

mous power flow from the postulate of unity, a postulate that grew more urgent as more emphasis was placed on the particularity of facts as the sole reality given. "Knowledge" could not stop at particularities, it had to pull them together into a unified whole. The postulate soon came to play a very practical role, as Robespierre and St. Just sought by all means of power to achieve, out of the multiplicity of citizens, the seamless unity of The People. The new concept of reason also gave eighteenth-century man an utter confidence in his ability to shape human life according to whatever design he had in mind. In the past, as long as thinking men reflected not on the power of their mind but on the cosmos, the order of things which they knew not to have brought about, ignorance was the essential starting point of all philosophy. "All men by nature *desire* to know" is the opening line of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, attributing the urge to move from ignorance to knowledge to "all men," as a "natural" velleity.

The Enlightenment, by contrast, focused on the mind's power as its chief object. It identified that power with a particular method of inquiry and, if the reality was unsuited for this method, so much the worse for the reality. Reason appeared no longer as a process of partnership between the human and the divine, but as a self-sufficient faculty possessed by man, a force that could be turned even against nature, tradition, God, so that the kingdom of God could be replaced by the kingdom of human reason. The business of this kingdom was rebellion, for from rebellion against authority, superior norms—and the divine being—that reason's new self-sufficiency had originated. As Albert Camus states: "From this moment, every question, every word, is an act of rebellion. The rebel is a man who is on the point of accepting or rejecting the sacred and determined on laying claim to a human situation in

which all answers are human—in other words, formulated in reasonable terms.”<sup>5</sup> Camus continues: “It would be possible to demonstrate in this manner that only two possible worlds can exist for the human mind: the sacred (or, to speak in Christian terms, the world of grace), and the world of rebellion.”

Before exploring the link between Enlightenment and the nineteenth-century ideologies, we should recall that the eighteenth century was not unique. Enlightenment is a type of human form; other civilizations have known periods of enlightenment, too. In Athens the Sophists’ dominance continued for about a century. Of their books, however, only one is still known, and that only through a summary. Gorgias of Leontini wrote *On Being*, where he said, among other things: nothing exists; if anything exists, it is incomprehensible; if it is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. Regarding being he argued thus: “It cannot be everlasting; if it were, it would have no beginning and therefore it would be boundless; if it is boundless, then it has no position, for if it had position, it would be contained in something, and so it would no longer be boundless. . . . Hence, if Being is everlasting, it is boundless; if boundless, it has no position; if without position, it does not exist.”<sup>6</sup>

Similarly there was a period of enlightenment in China, a reaction to the rise of philosophy from Confucius and Mencius. Its protagonist was Han Fei Tzu, in the early third century B.C. As Confucius aimed chiefly at the restoration of public order in China, so Han Fei Tzu wrote about the same subject. Confucius’ way was that of moral regeneration, beginning with each person and each family. Here, by contrast, are samples of Han Fei Tzu’s advice:

In the state of an enlightened ruler there are no books written on bamboo slips; law supplies the only instruction. There

are no sermons of the former kings; the officials serve as the only teachers. . . . Therefore, the way of the enlightened ruler is to unify the laws instead of longing for men of good faith. . . . Benevolence may make one shed tears and be reluctant to apply penalties; but law makes it clear that such penalties must be applied . . . Men of antiquity strove for moral virtue; men of middle times sought out wise schemes; men of today vie to be known for strength and spirit.<sup>7</sup>

In China, the period of Enlightenment culminated in the Ch’in Dynasty, which to this day is proverbial for harsh rule and the burnings of philosophers’ books. But the Ch’in Dynasty lasted barely two decades and was followed by the Han Dynasty, which elevated Confucius’ thought to the rank of public philosophy. The Sophists in Athens had their way for not quite one hundred years. Then Socrates and, after him, Plato, rose to philosophical prominence, with the result that their insights are still taught to this day.

Now to return to “our” Enlightenment. The concentration of the mind on itself involved a new concept of history, that of necessary progress. About that something will be said later. Here we should remember the ancient distinction between *intellectus* and *ratio*, the latter connoting discursive thinking that produced concepts of perception; the former, the higher understanding of contemplation. The Enlightenment recognized only *ratio*, and when Kant, on top of this, reversed the meaning of the two terms, there resulted an entire civilization that oriented itself exclusively by *ratio*, the power of *concapere*, perception as grasping. In Milton’s words: “The mind is its own place, and in it self can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.”<sup>8</sup>

At this point a child of our age who has been listening with mounting impatience might burst in with: “What is wrong with that? Is thinking *not* power, and nothing

but power? Look at the results: Haven't we freed agriculture from weeds and pests? Haven't we put a man on the moon? Aren't we on the point of generating life itself?" This is, indeed, a "powerful" argument. The phenomenon of modern science, and the resulting technology, is and remains utterly astounding. And as for Enlightenment's concept of reason, has it not created human liberty and prosperity? It was indeed a great and significant movement that began early in the seventeenth century and culminated in the nineteenth. But an even greater and more profound movement began a little more than two thousand years before that time. Bruno Snell has aptly called it "The Discovery of the Mind."<sup>9</sup> The small people populating Attica's city-states brought it forth, and men of great authority in human history were its stars. And if we are ready to praise the Enlightenment for the prodigious achievement of natural science, should not the Greek discovery of the mind be justified for focusing on the human soul and its public order? It was the combination of Greek philosophy and Christian faith that accounts for the opening moves of Western science. Neither Copernicus, nor Kepler, nor Leibniz, nor Newton had felt a need to forget the knowledge of things human embodied in the earlier tradition. The Enlightenment's "prohibition of remembrance" cannot be explained as an intellectual necessity.

Plato was no follower of Parmenides, but he has Socrates speak of Parmenides as "a revered and awful figure. There was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble."<sup>10</sup> Parmenides was the one from whom came the concept of Being, in close connection with the *nous* (reason). Parmenides reports a vision of a deity and her words to him: "One should both say and think what Being Is; for to Be is noble, and Nothingness is not possible. This I command you to consider; for from the latter way of search first of all I

debar you. But next I debar you from that way . . . of blind, uncritical hordes, by whom To Be and Not To Be are regarded as the same and not the same. . . ."<sup>11</sup> And Socrates says of himself: "I have gained [my] kind of reputation, gentlemen, from nothing more or less than a kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom do I mean? Human wisdom, I suppose. It seems that I really am wise in this limited sense. Presumably the geniuses whom I mentioned are wise in a wisdom that is more than human. . . . But the truth of the matter is pretty certainly this, that real wisdom is the property of God."<sup>12</sup>

The astonishing Greek achievement of originating philosophy came both from the consciousness of ignorance and the realization that true wisdom is divine and that men, as men, are wise when they love divine wisdom; hence the word *philosophia*, love of wisdom. Plato establishes that "soul is prior to body, body secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real order of things, and body being subject to governance."<sup>13</sup> Of the *nous* he spoke of not only as an aspect of the human soul but also as a divinity. Similarly Aristotle, Plato's student, said of the *nous*: "Whether it be reason or something else that is this element in us which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with proper virtue will be perfect happiness."<sup>14</sup>

Thus the human creators of philosophy never spoke of reason in the way the Enlightenment did. Parmenides experienced the Is in a vision; Socrates, Plato, and others experienced being "drawn," "pulled," even "dragged" to the true reality beyond the cosmos. They respond to these experiences with something they call "the quest," "the arduous way," "the search," clearly conveying that the authority of truth is not found in themselves, nor in their method, but in their

participation in a higher reality. Their attitude was one of love of the cosmos and of divine wisdom. Where in the Enlightenment do we find mention of "love" to characterize the attitude towards the cosmos or divinity? Enlightenment focuses on the objects of knowledge which mind can convert from multiplicity to unity, or from unity to composing parts, all for the sake of human control and mastery over nature.

Enlightenment's "reason" is a myth of human power, a myth eventually generating another myth, that of human "self-salvation." It was not until a century later that Nietzsche gave a name to this attitude: the will to power. How much this had become a feature of culture in general is made clear by a letter from Beethoven to Nikolaus Zmeskall von Domanovecz: "I refuse to hear anything about your whole moral outlook. *Power* is the moral principle of those who excel others, and it is also mine."<sup>15</sup> A few pages later we read what Beethoven wrote about the addressee, his friend: "I regard him [von Domanovecz] and S. merely as instruments on which to play when I feel inclined."<sup>16</sup>

A few words may be said about the Enlightenment's idea of nature. Classical Greek philosophy experienced nature as an autonomous order whose structure and laws could be independently explored. Even Descartes, insisting that the human mind had "innate ideas," embraced a conviction that there was something as knowledge "by nature." Locke banned this concept. He, along with Voltaire and D'Alembert, agreed that knowledge of essences was impossible. Still, a tiny remnant of metaphysics was left in the Enlightenment, the "uniformity of nature," by virtue of which they trusted in conclusions drawn from today's experiment to future experiments. But the idea of substance was discarded in favor of that of a mere sum or aggregate of qualities. Cassirer declares: "The attempt

to eliminate all metaphysical elements from empirical philosophy finally gained so much ground that it cast doubt upon the logical foundations of this philosophy as well" (64).

On the other hand, the concept of nature serves the Enlightenment as a barrier against theology, and also against a rational order of ends. The exploration of nature was restricted to causes and effects. It was not supposed to include any teleology of nature, because it might become a science of ends in human life. A contemporary philosopher, Hans Jonas, has recently begun to argue that there was no need for this exclusion. "For natural science," he says, "it is enough that in the measurable regions the quantitative-mechanistic accounting always tallies; that is, that its equations each time stand the test of event and its method is rebuffed by none. And that is quite compatible with an underlying teleology."<sup>17</sup> If no logical necessity compelled eighteenth-century empiricism to forget what earlier great minds had taught mankind about the causality of ends, one must attribute the oblivion to the animus of rebellion pulsating in that age.

(TO BE CONCLUDED)

1. Boston, 1965. Page references from *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* are included in the text. 2. For the concept of the open soul, cf. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (New York, 1935), ch. 1. 3. Quoted in Marion Montgomery, *Why Hawthorne Was Melancholy*, vol. III of *The Prophetic Poet and the Spirit of the Age* (La Salle, Ill., 1984), 31 ff. 4. Cf. Leonard P. Wessell, Jr., *Prometheus Bound: The Mythic Structure of Karl Marx's Scientific Thinking* (Baton Rouge, 1984). 5. *The Rebel* (New York, 1956), 21. 6. K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Presocratic Philosophers* (Boston, 1966), 128. 7. Han Fei Tzu, *Basic Writings* (New York, 1964). 8. *Paradise Lost*, Book I, 245/5. 9. *The Discovery of the Mind* (New York, 1960). 10. *Theaetetus*, 183e. 11. Diels-Kranz, B6. 12. *Apolo-gy*, 20 d-e, 23 a. 13. *The Laws*, 896 c. 14. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1176 a, 13 f. 15. Emily Anderson, *The Letters of Beethoven*, vol. I (1961), 32. 16. *Ibid.* at 63. 17. *The Imperative of Responsibility* (Chicago, 1984), 72.