

Renewing Christianity's Link to the Past

But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach a gospel other than the one we preached to you, let him be eternally condemned! —Galatians 1:8

THE MAJOR CHALLENGE facing Christianity on the eve of its third millennium is the crisis of unbelief rapidly metastasizing within the body of Christendom. This cancer of unbelief, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Christianity has always had those within its gates who have sought to use Christian language, symbols, and institutions while engaged in the task of altering the essential nature of the faith. While pretending to be Christianity's prophets, priests, and gatekeepers, they have been busy subverting the nature of the faith, turning it into a totally different religion that is more acceptable to their tastes. In a day when honesty meant more than civility, such people were called heretics. They were also asked to peddle their new versions of the historic faith outside the city walls. However, a major change took place beginning about the middle of the nineteenth century.

Up to that point in the history of Christianity, Roman Catholics and Protestants continued to share a common world view that taught that this world was the creation of a personal, almighty God whose providence was manifested in history. They also agreed about the general historical reliability of the teachings and miracles that the Gospels attributed to Jesus. They agreed that Jesus' death was a sacrifice for human sin that was followed by his miraculous resurrection from the dead. This Catholic-Protestant consensus (otherwise known as orthodoxy) contin-

ued to be the dominant expression of Christian thought well into the nineteenth century.

But then, a century and a half ago, a process began that was to remove Christian orthodoxy from its central place as the unifier of Western life and culture. Doctrinal nonconformists and heretics, who formerly would have left the church or been expelled, began to teach their views *within* the church. To an increasing degree, unbelief began to set up residence within the church. The Catholic-Protestant consensus on such things as the trinity, the deity of Christ, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, Jesus' death as a sacrifice for human sin, the human need for redemption—all these came under attack not only from people outside of Christianity who had always rejected it but also increasingly from individuals who insisted on being denominational leaders or seminary professors. This anti-supernaturalist, anti-revelational, anti-Trinitarian, and frequently anti-theistic new religion that insisted on its right to use the old Christian label has dominated much of American and European Protestantism for the first half of the twentieth century. The neo-orthodoxy of Karl Barth and others functioned as a brief interlude in Christendom's dance with modernity. As Carl Henry notes:

Not even plastic surgery could restore ontic significance to Karl Barth's transcendent

revelation once he deemed public reason irrelevant to revelatory truth. Agreeing with Barth that God remains real only in personal decision, Bultmann capitulated outright to the secular worldview. Unimpressed by the theological subtleties of European theologians and metaphysics, hard-core naturalism unqualifiedly repudiated theistic ontology and insistently made scientism its creed.¹

In America the brief flirtation with a Barth was replaced with more serious attention to the anti-supernaturalist charms of a Bultmann and a Tillich. The neo-gnosticism with which Tillich and others infected Protestant theology has now spread to Roman Catholicism. Richard John Neuhaus describes the kind of unbelief that passes for theology in present-day Catholic and Protestant liberalism:

The new class of the diffuse denomination that is Catholic-Protestant Liberalism is . . . supremely confident about the implausibility of what millions of Christians believe. "A Christian in the modern world can no longer believe such and such," they authoritatively declare. But of course there are all kinds of Christians in the modern world who believe precisely such and such. The new class ploy in response to this embarrassing reality is that such Christians are simply stupid. Or, if such Christians are indisputably very smart, it is said that they are living in the nineteenth century.²

They new gnostic class that pretends to speak for contemporary Catholicism and Protestantism is not interested in reaffirming the historic Christian faith. As Neuhaus explains:

Between reaffirming the faith and reconceptualizing the faith, reconceptualizing wins hands down. It is the very stuff of the academic and publishing industries. If there were no need for thorough reconceptualizations, fundamental reexaminations, moral transvaluations, hermeneutical revolutions, and historicocritical transformations, there would be no need for all the people who are very expensively trained to engage in just such things. Those who resist the efforts of such talented people are perceived to be anti-intellectual. Frequently they are anti-intellectual, but in larger part they are per-

ceived and condemned as anti-intellectual because most of the people who are paid to be intellectuals are on the other side.³

One interesting example of this reconceptualizing of the Christian faith is Thomas Sheehan's book, *The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity*.⁴ Reviewing Sheehan's book for the liberal Protestant weekly, *Christian Century*, Paul Maier helps us see what Sheehan's reconceptualization of Christianity comes to. In Maier's view, Sheehan's Jesus "deemed himself nothing more than a fallible human prophet; he made no divine claims and never planned a new religion. He called instead for the end of religion in light of God's immediacy. The nativity stories are 'forged,' the Gospel miracles are myths, and the Easter accounts legends, and Christianity's first sin [is] the idolatry of deifying the person of Jesus."⁵ Students of Protestant liberalism will find nothing new in such claims nor in the radical biblical criticism to which Sheehan appeals for support. What will puzzle some is Sheehan's unfamiliarity with the serious scholarship that has challenged the historical skepticism alleged to follow from the methodologies of form criticism and redaction criticism.⁶ Equally surprising to many will be the fact that Sheehan is a professor at a Roman Catholic university, Loyola University, in Chicago.

Even though Sheehan teaches philosophy and is not himself a Jesuit, the Society of Jesus is riddled with individuals who embrace one version or other of the new theological radicalism. An even more obvious example of a Catholic order that has lost its bearings is the Maryknoll Order. As Neuhaus notes:

The Maryknollers were established many years ago to win the world to Christ and his Church. Many remember Maryknollers chiefly for their heroic mission work in China. Afficianados of irony will appreciate that years later, during the rule of Chairman Mao, the Maryknollers would be promoting the view that China was the most Christian nation in the world, albeit without Christ and his Church. Carrying Karl Rahner's no-

tion of "anonymous Christians" to an extreme, it is the triumph of the missionary enterprise by fiat. Certainly it is much more convenient than the heroic but apparently misguided course of Maryknollers of old who gave their lives to winning unbelievers for the Gospel one by one.⁷

The seemingly endless stream of books about liberation theology issuing from the Maryknoller's Orbis Press illustrates the extent to which radical representatives of the movement are willing to abandon the Christian faith's historic beliefs about the nature and mission of Jesus, the radical nature of human sinfulness, and the atonement for that sin on the Cross.⁸

Also worth noticing is the large number of Catholic and Protestant thinkers who have begun reshaping Christian thought in the categories of what is called process thought. Process theology is often advanced as the most important development in Christian thought since the first century. It is significant, proponents claim, because the movement gives sophisticated moderns an intellectually and emotionally satisfying reinterpretation of Christianity that is compatible with late twentieth century ways of thinking. Moreover, they add, process thought finally removes from Christianity the dominating influence of Greek and Hellenistic notions that have, in their view, distorted the essence of Christianity for almost two millennia.⁹ A proper reply to this nonsense begins by pointing out that process theology does not eliminate pagan ideas from the Christian faith. Rather, process thought is a total capitulation to paganism. Take any essential Christian belief and one will find that process theologians supplant it with an alien belief.¹⁰ Is God the sovereign, personal, omnipotent, and all-knowing creator of the universe? Is Jesus Christ the eternal and divine Son of God whose incarnation, death, and resurrection were necessary to effect the redemption of human beings? Is faith in Christ the only ground for human forgiveness? To these and other questions that touch the very heart of Christianity, the official proc-

ess answer is No. The finite, ever-changing god of process thought is a being to whom the future is totally hidden. This god for whom ultimate victory over evil is but wishful thinking is more akin to the god of Buddhism than to the God of Abraham, Moses, and the New Testament.

Even though Carl Henry's words are directed specifically to secular philosophy, they apply with equal force to contemporary liberals and radicals within the church:

The frayed remnant of anthropological transcendence that secularists affirm is but the death rattle of an expiring theism whose strangulation neo-paganism eagerly anticipates. Since its rupture with Biblical revelation, secular Western philosophy has progressively stripped away Christianity's arms and legs and head and heart—namely, its transcendent Creator, its purposive universe, its goal in history, and its unique incarnation of the Logos in Jesus Christ.¹¹

It is the battle over this unbelief that is the real issue in the dispute between liberal Roman Catholics and the Pope. Neuhaus hits the target when he states that Pope John Paul II "is exercised not about dissent but about apostasy. He is attempting to chart a Christian course that is not so much against modernity as it is beyond modernity. The only modernity to be discarded is the debased modernity of unbelief that results in a prideful and premature closure of the world against its promised destiny."¹² Once one realizes that what is at stake is nothing less than the integrity of the historic Christian faith, there is nothing ironic about a twentieth-century Lutheran pastor applauding the efforts of a twentieth-century Pope to steer Catholicism away from apostasy:

It conveys a feeling of relief that at last somebody, John Paul, is calling the church to order, is seizing a few unruly adolescents by the scruffs of their necks and knocking some sense into their heads. In short, there is a sense of being fed up, of having had enough, of refusing to take it anymore. No doubt many Catholics, along with church authorities, feel they have been subjected to

extreme provocations. When, for example, at the end of the 1970s the Vatican finally withdrew from the European theologian Hans Küng the licence to represent himself as a Roman Catholic theologian, the response of many Roman Catholics was to wonder why it took so long.¹³

To the extent that the theologically conservative American Protestants known as evangelicals understand what is going on, they will join in the applause.¹⁴

There is little value in discussing how Christianity will cope with the challenges of the twenty-first century if that "Christianity" is one of the essentially new religions now masquerading under the old label. The dishonesty inherent in such a practice and the confusion it generates among the uninformed leave the orthodox Catholic and Protestant no alternative: They must take the steps necessary to counter the illegitimate takeover of Christian language and institutions for the propagation of new and anti-Christian forms of faith.

One required step in this task is obvious. If the Christian church is to move responsibly towards the future, it must restore or renew its ties with its past. Contemporary Catholic and Protestant radicals want to claim that Christianity means whatever "Christians" today happen to believe and practice, be it pantheism, unitarianism, or sodomy. The Christian faith has suffered immeasurable harm because of the tendency of people to use the word "Christian" in a careless and nonhistorical way. Nothing in this article would preclude liberal Protestants and Catholics from developing and practicing any religion they like. But when a person promotes a religion in total conflict with the historic Christian faith, he ought to give it a new name that will indicate to the uninitiated that he is promoting a new product. What honorable purpose can be served by allowing the Christian name to be extended to beliefs that contradict the founding documents of the faith?

Many have broken with Christianity's past precisely because they have come to believe that no one can know the truth

about that past. The grounds thought to support this break with the past are specious, resting more in the presuppositions biblical critics have brought to their study than in any scientific methodology.¹⁵

Christianity's past defines its essence; it helps us distinguish between proper and improper uses of the word "Christian." Herbert Butterfield explains that Christianity is a historical religion because "it presents us with religious doctrines which are at the same time historical events" or interpretations of such events.¹⁶ Butterfield goes on to note: "Certain historical events are held to be part of the [Christian] religion itself—they are considered to have a spiritual content and to represent the divine breaking in upon history."¹⁷ Christians believe that in Jesus Christ God actually entered into human history. Christianity is also a historical religion in the sense that the occurrence of certain events like the crucifixion and the resurrection is a necessary condition for its truth. If there are good reasons to believe that an event like the resurrection of Christ really happened in history, important Christian claims will be vindicated.¹⁸ From its inception Christianity has been a religion with a past. Without that past, Christians can have no grounded or reasonable hope for the future.

If contemporary Christians are to restore their faith's ties to its past, three other steps must be taken. First, the Christian church needs to recover an understanding of the essential role that truth plays in the Christian faith. Christianity offers a faith to the world that it regards as true. As Christopher Derrick states:

This might seem too obvious to need saying. But in our sceptical time, there is such a widespread dislike of dogmatism—of certainty and final conclusions in any ultimate matter at all—that the Church's central claim is constantly being evaded or watered down. Some maintain that no question of truth or falsity arises in connection with doctrinal statements: these (they say) are merely verbalizations of religious experience, valid for those concerned, interesting for

others, but equally misinterpreted by the man who asserts them as truth and the man who denies them as falsehood. Others, certain Catholics included, want the Faith to be a suggestion, a point of view, a process of enquiry, anything rather than a blunt assertion: they want it to be offered to mankind as being congenial, or comforting, or relevant to modern problems of the political and social kind, or "meaningful" in some sense which implies a strong appeal to twentieth-century imaginations. Such people are right in what they assert but wrong in what they deny, and they confuse the issue.¹⁹

Almost a century ago, about the time when the liberal Protestant assault on the central place of truth in the Christian faith was just getting under way, Scottish theologian James Orr pointed out: "If there is a religion in the world which exalts the office of teaching, it is safe to say that is the religion of Jesus Christ." While doctrine is unimportant in most non-Christian religions, Orr continued, "this is precisely where Christianity distinguishes itself from other religions—it does contain doctrine. It comes to men with definite, positive teaching; it claims to be the truth; it bases religion on knowledge, through a knowledge which is only attainable under moral conditions."²⁰

The last two centuries of Christian theology are the record of an evolving attack on the role of knowledge and truth in the Christian faith.²¹ Typifying this new theological agnosticism is Gordon Kaufman of Harvard's Divinity School. "The real reference for 'God,'" Kaufman writes, "is never accessible to us or in any way open to our observation or experience. It must remain always an unknown X, a mere limiting idea with no content. It stands for the fact that God transcends our knowledge in modes and ways of which we can never be aware and of which we have no inkling."²² Kaufman goes on to add: "God is ultimately profound Mystery and utterly escapes our every effort to grasp or comprehend him. Our concepts are at best metaphors and symbols of his being, not literally applicable."²³ Theological skeptics like Kaufman always seem unaware of the contradiction inherent in

their position. If absolutely no knowledge about God is possible, where do they obtain their knowledge that God is unknowable?

When theologians begin to think that knowledge about God is impossible and that religious truth is unimportant, it is only a matter of time until doctrines and creeds lose their relevance. Why worry about denials of Christian creeds if doctrine and truth are unimportant? In this way, additional impetus is given to the movement away from historic Christian beliefs.

Liberation theologians such as Juan Luis Segundo or liberationist-cum-feminist theologians such as Rosemary Radford Ruether have no patience with the noble lie. They are eager to bring the masses in on the secret about traditional religion, namely, that it is not about what people have thought it was about. It is not about God and angels and heaven and hell "out there" or in the distant future but about radical change here and now.²⁴

"When theology becomes anthropology, when talk about God is just another way of talking about ourselves," Neuhaus continues,

then the question of authority in the church takes center stage. The reason this happens is not hard to discover. As a consequence of the aforementioned "geological shift," Christian doctrine and ritual become mere "symbols" that, like Silly Putty, are marvelously plastic in response to what we human beings think about ourselves, how we are and how we ought to be. First we make our decisions—political, ideological, social, cultural, psychological—and then, *mirabile dictu*, we discover that Christianity is in wondrous agreement with what we decided, thus once again demonstrating the "relevance" of the faith . . . the most touted of today's new ideas are, with few exceptions, time-tattered items in the list of the refuted and repudiated.²⁵

Because of their refusal to be moved with regard to truth's central role in Christianity, orthodox Catholics and Protestants will repudiate liberal claims that correct belief is unimportant; that the beliefs

earlier generations of Christians deemed essential are no longer indispensable; that the liberal Christian of today is free to believe anything he wishes.

As for the second step, the Christian church needs to recover an understanding of the essential role that *revealed* truth plays in the Christian faith. The church's access to truth is not a consequence of the greater wisdom of its apostles. It results from the fact that God himself has graciously revealed himself and truth about himself to select individuals who have given the church an inscripturation of that revealed truth in the Holy Scriptures. Many who today teach in Christian seminaries and colleges do not believe or perhaps do not understand the time-honored notion of revealed truth. To a great extent, much nonorthodox theology over the past 200 years is a chronicle of futile attempts to retain respectability for religious faith while denying Christianity any access to revealed truth. About the only thing such thinkers can agree on is that God has not spoken and, indeed, cannot speak. And even if God could speak, this view continues, humans are incapable of understanding whatever God might attempt to say. The human relationship to God must, therefore, be understood according to some model other than that of receiving information or truth. It must be understood rather as an inward personal experience with God that is totally cut off from any objective, cognitive tests of the validity of that experience.

Influenced by such views, many theologians and members of the clergy trivialize or repudiate the central role that revealed truth has played in the Christian religion. Knowledge about God is simply declared impossible and replaced by personal encounter, religious feeling, trust, or obedience.²⁶ This relatively new teaching clashes with the traditional view that divine revelation is a communication of truth and that human knowledge of this revealed truth is an essential component of any personal relationship with God.

A study of the literature reveals that religious thinkers who reject the possibil-

ity of revealed truth seldom bother to support their position with arguments. They advocate a theory that has simply become part of the theological mind-set in many departments of religion. Moreover, the doctrine of revealed truth that is so widely rejected today is a straw man. And finally, the most serious problems with their non-cognitive view of revelation are simply ignored.²⁷

Nothing in my position is inconsistent with an equally important stress on the human need to respond in faith to God's revealed truth. A proper view of divine special revelation will see it as both propositional and personal. Personal knowledge of God is not in competition with propositional knowledge about God. After all, what kind of encounter could occur between two people who had absolutely no information about each other? God does not treat humankind in this impersonal way. Scripture declares that people require information about God that He has taken the initiative to supply. As the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews put it, "Without faith it is impossible to please God, because anyone who comes to him must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him" (Heb. 11:6). The writer of the Fourth Gospel admitted that many things Jesus did were not recorded in his book. But those that are were written "that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name" (John 20:30). Personal encounter cannot take place in a cognitive vacuum. Saving faith presupposes some genuine knowledge about God (Rom. 10:9, 10; I Cor. 15:1-4).

The theological agnosticism that is such an important feature of contemporary theology marks a dramatic break with a major tradition of historic Christianity, a tradition that affirmed both an intelligible revelation from God and a divinely given human ability to know the transcendent God through the medium of true propositions. Once this theological agnosticism is adopted, New Testament Christianity, with its proclamation of a

divine Christ whose death and resurrection secured redemption from sin and gave hope beyond the grave, can be replaced by almost anything. The contemporary eclipse of God can be seen in Sartre's "silence of God," in Heidegger's "absence of God," in Jaspers's "concealment of God," in Bultmann's "hiddenness of God," in Tillich's "non-being of God," and finally in radical theology's assertion of "the death of God." In Tillich's version of theological agnosticism, all that is left of Christianity is a "religion" that is neither objective, rational, miraculous, supernatural, nor even personal. Why should anyone be surprised that this vacuum has been filled by systems that deny everything that the New Testament stands for?

A third step that must be taken if contemporary Christianity is to restore its ties to the past is this: The Christian church needs to recover an understanding of the essential role that supernatural truth plays in the Christian faith. In this last sentence, the adjective *supernatural* refers to an essential component of the reality witnessed to by the Christian revelation.

Use of the term supernatural in our generation has some disadvantages, due largely to its frequent association with the fantastic novels and movies of such authors as Stephen King. It is important that Christians make it clear that they use *supernaturalism* as the antonym of *naturalism*.

Naturalism is the conceptual system or world view that functions as Christian theism's major competition in the Western world. Reduced to its bare essentials, naturalism is the belief that the universe is a closed system; everything that happens within the universe is caused or explained by other natural events within the system. Hence, there is never need to seek the explanation of anything that exists in some alleged reality that lies "outside" the natural order. Nature, then, can be viewed as a type of closed box. Nothing that occurs within the box requires a cause or explanation of anything that lies "outside" the box. A consistent naturalist will view human beings as part of this great deter-

ministic machine. Since the transcendent God of Christian theism allegedly exists "outside" the natural order, the consistent naturalist will either reject God or ignore Him as irrelevant.

It is vitally important to recognize that a commitment to naturalism is not a decision based on science. Naturalism is not science; it is metaphysics. The acceptance of naturalism as one's model of ultimate reality is a religious decision. A commitment to naturalism is not a logical inference from indisputable evidence uncovered by the scientific method. Rather, naturalism is a world view that people presuppose and then bring to their study of reality. Understood in this way, naturalism is in the same epistemological boat as its competing world view, Christian theism.

Christian theism can be described as supernaturalist because it insists that the naturalist's picture of reality is incomplete. Reality is not a closed box or system; the universe, for the Christian, is not forever closed to reordering from a level of reality more ultimate than nature. There is a reality that transcends the natural and that reorders the natural from "outside."

Given their presuppositions, it is small wonder that people influenced by naturalism object to major elements of the Christian world view. Any naturalist is precluded from believing in God, spirit, soul, angels, miracles, prayer, providence, immortality, heaven, sin, and salvation as Christians normally understand these notions for the simple reason that such beliefs are logically incompatible with the naturalist's world view. It is their prior commitment to naturalism that grounds the historical skepticism of modern radical biblical critics.²⁸ It is their prior acceptance of naturalistic presuppositions that leads Catholic and Protestant radicals to reject the miraculous and supernatural elements of traditional Christianity. Their opposition to miracles is not a function of their superior education or greater degree of enlightenment; it is a function of their naturalistic world view.

While it is obviously not possible to provide a detailed, critical evaluation of

naturalism here, the interested reader can find those arguments presented elsewhere.²⁹ The contemporary church needs to recognize the extent to which the rejection of essential Christian beliefs by radicals within the church is a reflection not of their greater openness to truth or evidence, but of their religious commitment to an alien conceptual system which influences how they see reality. The contemporary church needs to know that Christian supernaturalism is neither dead nor irrelevant.

We all know the story of Aladdin's lamp. Though old and apparently less valuable than the shiny new lamps that the slick peddler offered in exchange, it was really invaluable and irreplaceable to those who understand its power and worth. Assorted theological hucksters are trying to persuade Christians to exchange the historic Christian faith for new-style religions more in tune with modernity. Informed Christians will reject all such offers. As the Christian church faces the new challenges that it is bound to encounter in the twenty-first century, these Christians will know that the only faith capable of meeting those challenges, the only faith worthy of their continuing commitment, is historic Christian orthodoxy.

—Ronald H. Nash

¹Carl F. H. Henry, "The Christian Scholar's Task in a Stricken World," *Faculty Dialogue*, Number 11 (Spring 1989), p. 56. ²Richard John Neuhaus, *The Catholic Moment* (San Francisco, 1987), pp. 81-82. ³*Ibid.*, p. 79. ⁴Thomas Sheehan, *The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity* (New York, 1986). ⁵Paul L. Maier, review of *The First Coming in Christian Century*, January 7, 1987, p. 29. ⁶For citations of some of this literature and summaries of

some of the arguments, see Ronald Nash, *Christian Faith and Historical Understanding* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1984), ch. 4. ⁷Neuhaus, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173. ⁸See Neuhaus, p. 173, for interesting observations about the publications of Orbis Books. Documentation of the deviant theology that accompanies so much liberation theology is available in a number of places. See, for example, Emilio A. Nunez, *Liberation Theology* (Chicago, 1985), Ronald Nash, *Social Justice and the Christian Church* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1984), and Ronald Nash, editor, *Liberation Theology* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1988). ⁹For answers to this charge about a Hellenistic influence on first century Christianity, see the author's *Christianity and the Hellenistic World* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1984) and *The Concept of God* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983). ¹⁰Detailed support for this claim can be found in *Process Theology*, ed. Ronald Nash (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1988). ¹¹Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 56. ¹²Neuhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 284. ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 99. ¹⁴One introduction to this group of Christians, estimated to number fifty million, is the author's *Evangelicals in America* (Nashville, Tenn., 1987). ¹⁵For one of many arguments on behalf of the historical authenticity of the New Testament's record of what Jesus did and taught, see the author's *Christian Faith and Historical Understanding*, *op. cit.*, ch. 4. ¹⁶Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London, 1949), p. 3. ¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 119. ¹⁸One of many books that argue for the reasonableness of belief in the Incarnation and the Resurrection is the author's *Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1988), ¹⁹Christopher Derrick, *Escape from Scepticism* (La Salle, Ill., 1977), p. 64. ²⁰James Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World* (New York, 1904), p. 20. ²¹The development of this attack is traced in the author's book, *The Word of God and the Mind of Man* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1982). ²²Gordon D. Kaufman, *God the Problem* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 95. ²³*Ibid.* ²⁴Neuhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 76. ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 82. ²⁶While these substitutes have their own important role to play in the Christian's faith and life, they must never be allowed to replace truth, sound doctrine, and cognitive knowledge. ²⁷I expand on each of these points in *The Word of God and the Mind of Man* (already cited). ²⁸See my elaboration of this claim in chapter four of *Christian Faith and Historical Understanding* (already cited). ²⁹See the author's *Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith* (already cited) for one presentation of these arguments. The bibliography of this book will direct the reader to other works.