

The Father of Totalitarian Democracy: Jean-Jacques Rousseau

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WHEN IN 1753, in response to a topic set by the academy of Dijon, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote his "second discourse" titled "What is the Origin of Inequality Among Men and Is It Authorized by Natural Law?", the condition of France was very different from the condition of England when Thomas Hobbes published his *Leviathan*. One might suppose that the "state of nature" as described by Rousseau and the origin of government which he illuminates would be rather different from the "state of nature" and the origin of government as discussed by Hobbes. And so they are, though the differences are rather more subtle than we might at first expect.¹

The extremes of anarchy that were Hobbes's experience, which were the very model of his "state of nature," and the war of all against all that he describes were unknown in Rousseau's France. France was in the mid-eighteenth century the most centralized, the largest, and most populous, the richest, and the most prosperous state in Europe. To be sure, France was emerging from an unsuccessful war with England and was troubled by both an inadequate constitution and grave social inequities. Still, the revolution of 1789 lay more than a generation in the future and the general attack which Rousseau mounted against the state, society, and culture must have indeed seemed puzzling to many of his contemporaries. When Voltaire wrote Rousseau in response to Rousseau's having sent him a presentation

copy of *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men*, Voltaire termed it his "second book against the human race."

The source of Rousseau's rejection of the condition of man, politics, and culture was due rather to Rousseau's perception of superfluity and social ennui than to the perception of want and anarchy. Rousseau is the first of the modern alienated intellectuals. His quest is for the unalienated society, the golden age in which sin, division, and conflict are unknown. His effort aims at the recovery of man and the restoration of primitive innocence. Again and again these feelings in historic societies arise and become widespread, not at the moment of anarchy or the extreme of inequality but at a moment of hitherto unimagined prosperity and well-being. It is just at such a moment that inequalities seem most unjust and the ordinary limitations of the human condition most unbearable. It is then that the typical modern revolutionary spirit, a revolution of satiety rather than a revolution of deprivation, arises among the intellectuals.

Rousseau's lifetime intersects with, and his ideas were powerfully influenced by, one of the most powerful moments of gnostic thought in the history of Western culture.² The myth of a fall from being, alienation, reconciliation, and reintegration at a higher and more inclusive level than that of primal innocence is the very stuff of Romanticism. Rousseau, like Hegel

and Marx after him, translates this archaic myth into political terminology. This myth at an even deeper and more primitive level draws upon the notions of transformational change common to all the archaic transformational myths associated with smelting and smithing, and at a more sophisticated level, the basis of alchemical science.³ These myths too have their political as well as their personal redemptive dimensions.

However important the contemporary *Zeitgeist* was in the formulation of Rousseau's thought, one need only to review Rousseau's tormented personality, and the relationships of envy, emulation, and disdain which he felt for the high society and high culture of his day.⁴ For this unlovely man, suffering from elephantiasis of the ego, decidedly projected the inadequacies, the guilt, the contradictions, and the evasions of his personality into an inflammatory political doctrine. The problem for intellectual historians is not the analysis of *ad hominem* arguments, however much they explain, but the discovery of why the thought of madmen in certain periods of human history finds such widespread resonance.

The "second discourse" is of a piece with the whole of the Rousseauian corpus. Rousseau's writings present a unitary argument, an argument which, in spite of a measure of dissembling, must be taken at face value. The "second discourse" provides the key to the great problem of the reconciliation of equality and liberty. The ingenious and perverse argument made by Leo Strauss⁵—that one must adopt a special Straussian hermeneutic and read through and beyond the text to a concealed Rousseauian intentionality hitherto undiscerned—is in a class with Robert von Ranke Graves' reading and explication of the New Testament. The Straussians have always been beguiled by "virtue," never mind that in the case of Rousseau as in the case of Plato it assumes a totalitarian form.

The "second discourse" is one of the most influential political and cultural essays of the contemporary period, though

this is not often recognized. We recall Rousseau for his teaching concerning the "general will" though we are usually unaware that *The Social Contract* follows directly from the problematic posed by the "second discourse." Moreover, we are less often aware of the impact of Rousseau's thought concerning equality.

In his essay "Rousseau and Equality"⁶ Robert Nisbet writes:

Rousseau shrinks from nothing in his passion to found a social order on the rock of equality. Only in a few religious figures in history do we find a like combination of zeal, relentless purpose, and willingness to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure salvation for mankind. After Rousseau, equality would be the Procrustean bed on which conceptions of freedom, justice, rights and compassion would be placed by an unending and constantly increasing line of intellectuals in, first the West, then most other parts of the world.

Chief among these intellectuals were Karl Marx and his confederate, Friedrich Engels. As Marx's *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844 clearly shows, Rousseau had a decisive influence on the development of Marx's conception of social alienation.⁷ That influence alone would make it imperative that we study closely "The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men."

Rousseau's hostility to French eighteenth-century society was a general cultural animus; a hatred of intellectuality, manners, science, and government. His "first discourse" of 1750, "On the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences," made clear his hostility to the world as it was. It was the diatribe of an alienated outsider denouncing the high culture of his time as vice, degeneracy, and fraud.

His "second discourse" is an extension of his theme, though in the "second discourse" his focal points are equality and justice. Moreover, the "second discourse" takes pains to demonstrate the fashion in which men who are naturally good have, through the course of history, been corrupted and have become depraved. Having banished original sin, Rousseau must

explain the fall in terms of secular history. The "first discourse" supposedly pulls aside the veil; the "second discourse" through historical reconstruction seeks to demonstrate how the corruption of mankind originated. Finally, the "third discourse," "The Social Contract," seeks to achieve the great sublated restoration and to reconcile liberty and equality.

The discourse begins, as we might expect, with a discussion by Rousseau of "the state of nature." Rousseau makes a frank and disarming beginning which has been much mocked by later scholars. He writes:

Let us begin then by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their certain origin; just like the hypothesis which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world. . . .⁸

With Rousseau as with Hobbes we have an admission that the reconstruction of the "state of nature" and primitive society is conjectural, hypothetical, and has something of the character of what we have come to call an "ideal type."

Arthur Lovejoy has taught us to see that Rousseau's "state of nature"⁹ is a developmental process of four stages. Nonetheless, Rousseau identifies the first as well as later stages as "the state of nature." Rousseau's "state of nature" is not, however, the "state of nature" which Hobbes envisioned. For Hobbes the "state of nature" was the war of all against all. For Rousseau the earliest and most primitive stage of man's existence is a stage characterized by little conflict and even less killing. These conditions prevail for the very good reason that mankind in the state of nature lived in isolation and without language or society. Humankind is naked, indolent, and unreasoning. The family does not exist and the race is reproduced by an aimless coupling in response to passion. There can be, by definition, no adultery or incest just as there is no property or territorial

claim. Children are unknown by their fathers and are cared for by their mothers only so long as they are physically dependent. The diet of man in the state of nature is simple and for the most part vegetarian though this "human" creature who is omnivorous sometimes resorts to feeding upon other animals. In short these men are amiable and unreasoning brutes who live according to their passions.

One might well argue that Rousseau's second discourse is a long commentary on Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Like Hobbes, Rousseau conceives of man as a machine although he concedes a measure of self-determination to this machine.

I see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath given senses to wind itself up, and to guard itself, to a certain degree, against anything that might tend to disorder or destroy it. I perceive exactly the same things in the human machine, with this difference, that in the operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his own operations, in his character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free will. . . .¹⁰

However, the essay itself reveals that Rousseau saw man as being far more causally determined than self-determining. Not only is man determined by forces and events outside himself but the passions rather than reason shape his understanding and motivate his actions. In this respect Rousseau is far closer to Hobbes than is generally acknowledged.

Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau recognizes that man in the "state of nature" is in a state of inequality. Rousseau distinguishes between two kinds of inequality among men. He writes:

I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species; one which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of mind or of soul; and another which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and is established or at least

authorized, by the consent of men. This latter consists of the different privileges which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more honored, more powerful, or even in a position to exact obedience.¹¹

Rousseau refuses to inquire whether there is any connection between the two inequalities. It is a matter fit only to "be discussed by slaves in the hearing of their masters." Unfortunately for Rousseau's theory the relationship between the two inequalities is a matter of essential importance. Rousseau makes a vague appeal to reason, but reason hardly accords with the passions and instincts to which Rousseau constantly turns.

In fact, for man culture and nature are one and the same. Art is man's most important possession, the very quiddity which makes him man. To separate inequalities which derive from man's biological-genetic heritage from inequalities which reflect and amplify this genetic sub-stratum is to give us half a man. To say that the process of ordering and defining, the creation of hierarchical structure, and the division of labor result in inequalities which are not inherent in man's nature is to mistake what that nature is. Unless one identifies nature and reason, as Locke and the tradition to which he appealed constantly argued, there is no possible way of sorting out those biological-cultural developments which are consonant with humanity, and distinguishing them from those which will lead eventually to the destruction of a fulfilling and orderly life. This cannot be achieved by an appeal to sentiment and revolutionary underdogery which serve as the basis of Rousseau's argument.

Rousseau's argument, like most ideological arguments, brushes all the important questions aside as inadmissible. "It is useless to ask what is the source of natural inequality, because that question is answered by the simple definition of the word." Therefore, while Rousseau admits the existence of inequality in the natural state, he denies that it is an inequality of any consequence. Such inequality is miti-

gated by the isolation and noncompetitive character of man in the "state of nature."

It is mitigated, moreover, by the natural goodness of man in the state of nature. This is a "goodness" of a particular and peculiar sort and not to be confused with virtue. Here Rousseau stands in direct contradiction to Hobbes. Rousseau writes:

Above all, let us not conclude, with Hobbes, that because man has no idea of goodness, he must be naturally wicked; that he is vicious because he does not know virtue; that he always refuses to do his fellow creatures services which he does not think they have a right to demand; or that by virtue of the right he truly claims everything he needs, he foolishly imagines himself the sole proprietor of the whole universe. . . . There is another principle which has escaped Hobbes; which having been bestowed on making, to moderate, on certain occasions, the impetuosity of egoism, or before its birth, the desire of self-preservation, tempers the ardour with which he pursues his own welfare, by an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow-creature suffer. I think I need not fear contradiction in holding man to be possessed of the only natural virtue, which could not be denied him by the most violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of compassion. . . .

It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling, which by moderating the violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the whole species. It is compassion which hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress; it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice; it is this which will always prevent a sturdy savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble old man of the sustenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired, if he sees the possibility of providing for himself by other means. . . .¹²

Rousseau goes on to substitute the maxim "Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others" for the golden rule.

This is not altruism but rather a selfish romanticism which creates the fiction of goodness as a substitute for the Christian notion of a fallen human nature.

The goodness of man then is not based on a rational virtue, the intellectual capacity to distinguish between good and evil, but rather on an instinctive sentiment of compassion and pity. It is compassion and pity, finally, which prevent the life of man in the state of nature from being, as Hobbes has described it, "mean, nasty, brutish and short." This idea of Rousseau's, of course, comported well with the sentimental Romanticism then sweeping over Europe, a Romanticism that Rousseau himself did so much to invent. In the twentieth century, after the experience of so much savagery, casual and premeditated, civilized and aboriginal, it is difficult to accept this fable of man's goodness with more than a horrified smile. It is well to remember that it was Rousseauian man who acted out the diabolical crimes of the French revolutionary terror.

Rousseau's "state of nature," however, was not an ideal state; it was not an idyllic condition. It was not mankind at its best, and it was not to this condition that Rousseau sought to restore mankind through the reconstruction of human society which he envisions in *The Social Contract*. Who wishes to live as Rousseau envisioned man living in the "state of nature"? The answer is that not even Rousseau cared for an existence which was little better than that of the brutes.

Just how, then, did man complete and perfect himself and what role did that perfection play in the question of equality? Rousseau tells us that mentally yet another factor in addition to compassion distinguishes man from the brutes. Man has a faculty of self-improvement, a *perfectibility*, which is, Rousseau adds, "the source of all human misfortunes" as it draws him out of his original state "in which he would have spent his days insensibly in peace and ignorance." One immediately notes the ambivalence Rousseau has toward the ideas of progress and perfectibility.

Rousseau has demonstrated to his own satisfaction that, in the state of nature, inequality "is hardly felt" and "is next to

nothing" in its influence. His problem now is to demonstrate how inequality progresses in "the successive developments of the human mind."

... Having shown that human *perfectibility*, the social virtues, and the other faculties which natural man potentially possessed, could never develop of themselves, but must require the fortuitous concurrence of many foreign causes that might never arise, and without which he would have remained in his primitive condition, I must now collect and consider the *different accidents* which may have improved the human understanding while depraving the species, and made man wicked while making him sociable; so as to bring him and the world from that distant period to the point at which we now behold him.¹³

Here it is well to emphasize again that man appears in history, according to Rousseau, not as an actor but as one who is acted upon. His *perfectibility* lies outside himself and is the consequence of accidental causes. In spite of Rousseau's assertion that man has a free will, in actuality he is a Hobbesian machine.

The transition from the "state of nature" to primitive society is the consequence, Rousseau tells us, of a "revolution." That "revolution" is above all else the consequence of building huts, the establishment of a fixed habitation. The establishment of the family is the result of the invention of the hut. Rousseau's explanation of the invention of civilization is on a level with Charles Lamb's explanation of the invention of roast pork.

Following the invention of the hut came the distinction of sexual roles and the first division of labor. Women minded the children and cooked and men hunted and gathered. Having been softened by family life, and losing something of their ferocity and strength, men now found it "easier to assemble" to meet the threat of wild beasts and "resist in common." Thus was society born.

This stage of primitive life was, indeed, the Golden Age for mankind, the Garden of Eden. Rousseau should be permitted to speak for himself.

. . . The more we reflect on it, the more we shall find that this state was the least subject to revolutions, and altogether the very best man could experience; so that he can have departed from it only through some fatal accident, which for the public good should never have happened. The example of savages, most of whom have been found in this state, seems to prove that men were meant to remain in it, that it is the real youth of the world, and that all subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps towards perfection of the individual, but in reality toward the decrepitude of the species.¹⁴

This golden age continued only so long as men were self-sufficient and there was little or no social differentiation. Their social relationships were characterized by "mutual and independent intercourse." However,

. . . from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops.

Metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts which produced this great revolution. The poets tell us it was gold and silver, but, for the philosophers it was iron and corn, which first civilized men, and ruined humanity.¹⁵

This, of course, is a science-fictional account of the primitive or barbarous state of human society. It is best to withhold our laughter in the light of the tremendous influence this vision of primitive mankind has had on political behavior. The revolutions, communes, and utopian experiments of the past two centuries testify to its enormous persuasive powers.

We should underline the fact that Rousseau says that it was metallurgy and agriculture which wrought the revolution that ended meaningful equality and shattered the pastoral Eden in which primitive man lived. Rousseau is among the first of the humanist intellectuals to assert that

science and technology are positive evils and that men will be happy once more only when science and technology have been abandoned.

This great revolution changed society drastically because it produced mutual dependence, what we would now style "the division of labor," and this in turn produced claims to property and destroyed natural equality. Even so, Rousseau says,

. . . equality might have been sustained had the talents of individuals been equal, and had, for example, the use of iron and the consumption of commodities always exactly balanced each other; but as there was nothing to preserve this balance, it was soon disturbed; the strongest did the most work; the most skillful turned his labour to the best account; the most ingenious devised methods of diminishing his labour; the husbandman wanted more iron, or the smith more corn, and while both laboured equally, the one gained a great deal by his work, while the other could hardly support himself. Thus natural inequality unfolds itself insensibly with that of combination, and the difference between men, developed by their different circumstances, becomes more sensible and permanent in its effects, and begins to have an influence, in the same proportion, over the lot of individuals. . . .¹⁶

It is important to note here that Rousseau, as was the case with many late eighteenth-century intellectuals, sees the step theory of civilization not as progressive ascent but as a story of degeneration. Corruption follows relentlessly in the wake of the division of labor and the growth of inequality. Men wish to seem rather than to be. They acquire a taste for pomp and show and, corrupted by their desires and their new wants, they become willing slaves to nature and to one another. They lose their independence and need the service and assistance of others.

Under these circumstances natural inequality, the inequality of strength and intellect which was of little importance in the state of nature and in primitive society, is transformed into conventional inequality; the inequality of riches as riches

is protected and fostered by politics and society. This latter inequality of riches is an artificial one perpetuated by the instrumentality of government. Government is not, as Hobbes had insisted, a contract between men to establish a civil order, a contract which grew out of approximate equality. Rather it is the consequence of the widest kind of inequality. Under these circumstances "usurpation by the rich and robbery by the poor," unbridled passions, avarice, ambition, and vice were the ordinary conditions of mankind. "The newborn state of society thus gave rise to a horrible state of war. . . ." The strong, the rich, and the intelligent institute the state for their own purposes under the guise of guarding the weak from oppression, restraining the ambitious, and securing to every man the possession of that which belongs to him.

Rousseau the revolutionary moralist writes:

Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery, and wretchedness. . . .¹⁷

Rousseau then paints an ugly picture of the downward progress of the human race following the institution of the state. The consequences of government are so enormous and monstrous that it is very surprising that men living in states had survived for thousands of years. The scene which Rousseau depicts is one that is unrelievedly depraved and filled with injustice.

At the close of the second discourse, Rousseau depicts the differences between the savage and the civilized man with all the advantages redounding, of course, to the savage state.

What a sight would the perplexing and envied labours of a European minister of state present to the eyes of a Caribbean! How many cruel deaths would not this indolent savage prefer to the horrors of such a life,

which is seldom ever sweetened by the pleasure of doing good. . . .¹⁸

Inequality is the consequence of the invention of civilization. Only the recovery of equality and the dismantling of the edifice of artifice will restore mankind to virtue and happiness. The picture of mankind in civilized society presented in the first and second discourses is a grim one. Rousseau's intention is to prepare us for the acceptance of the solution which he offers in *The Social Contract* or the "third discourse."¹⁹

What Rousseau gives us is a sentimentalization of Hobbes. In the "third discourse" the state has become supreme and totalitarian. Peter Winch puts it bluntly when he asserts:

Both Hobbes and Rousseau believed that a life suitable to human needs is possible—given the world as we find it—only in the context of the state, and that the state can exist only where there is sovereign authority of a sort which is as absolute as it is possible to conceive. What is more, they agree that a society in which such absolute sovereign authority is exercised will not be maintained in the natural course of events: human efforts and artifice are necessary. In particular, men must be *taught* to understand those conditions of human life which necessitate its acceptance. . . .²⁰

And so for the restoration of the original human condition of innocence, freedom and equality, Rousseau not so covertly demands the abolition of freedom. The "general will" of the second discourse is nothing more or less than Hobbes's *Leviathan*. All barriers to the "general will" ought to be removed, all partial societies and intermediary groups abolished so that the citizen will stand naked and unprotected before the power of the total society. Particular wills must be absorbed into the general will. Equality is achieved by the total subordination of the individual.

Michael Polanyi underscores the relationship of Rousseau to Hobbes when he observes:

. . . He [Rousseau] realized that an aggregate of unbridled individuals could form only a

totally collectivized political body. For such individuals could be governed only by their own wills and any governmental will formed and justified by them would itself necessarily be unbridled. Such a government could not submit to a superior jurisdiction any conflict arising between itself and its citizens. This argument is the same which led Hobbes to justify an absolutist government on the grounds of an unbridled individualism, and the procedure Rousseau suggested for establishing this absolutism was also the same as postulated by Hobbes. It was construed as a free gift of all individual wills to the will of the sovereign, and the seal of a Social Contract, the sovereign being established in both cases as the sole arbiter of the contract between the citizens and itself.²¹

J. L. Talmon has been much faulted for his reading of Rousseau. Talmon was convinced that Rousseau was the father of totalitarian democracy.²² And so he was, and only those blinded by ideology, the love of equality, and the adoration of democratic virtue can read Rousseau otherwise.

Like Hobbes, Rousseau saw the state as an organism (in Hobbes the operative term is "machine"), possessing a life of its own in which the individual only participates. This reification of the state that was to have such profound importance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is directly traceable to Rousseau and Hobbes. Rousseau wrote in his *Discourse on Political Economy* (1755):

... The body politic is also a moral being possessed of a will, and this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of all laws, constitutes for all members of the state, in their relations to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust.

For Hobbes and Rousseau the state not only exists independent of the individuals who compose it but is the moral arbiter defining right and wrong, justice and injustice.

However, the connection between Rousseau and Hobbes does not end at the level of the definition of the state. The an-

thropology of these two fathers of modernism is basically the same. In Rousseau the Hobbesian epistemology is softened by sentimentality. Man remains for Rousseau a creature determined by instinct and passion. The will rather than reason is the determinative factor. It is for this reason that education and compulsion play such a large role in the thought of Rousseau. Mankind must be conditioned to virtue and if necessary compelled to be free.

Finally, religion for Rousseau as for Hobbes is "civil religion," the cult of the state. It possesses no theological autonomy. Its role is posterior rather than antecedent to the foundation of the state. It is the religion of Robespierre rather than the testimony of the martyrs who have died resisting the power of the state and its pseudomorality.

This revolution which Rousseau projects is to be made in the name of equality, an equality he felt had been denied himself. No doubt Rousseau's insistence upon the corruption and servility of the society in which he lived found its origin in the psychotic dreams of an outsider. Rousseau was mad.²³ This fact did not prevent the philosopher Kant from finding him a great inspiration and hanging Rousseau's portrait in his study. Edmund Burke, a contemporary of Rousseau's, and a better judge of men and their motives than Kant, called Rousseau an "insane Socrates." He observed, "We have had the great professor and founder of *the philosophy of vanity* in England [in 1766-67]. As I had good opportunities of knowing his proceedings almost from day to day, he left no doubt on my mind that he entertained no principle, either to influence his heart or guide his understanding but *vanity*. With this vice he was possessed to a degree little short of madness." The cooler judgments of retrospective biography are hardly less severe.²⁴ One suspects Rousseau of being a great intellectual con-man whose performance was so consummately successful that he deceived even himself. The German poet, Goethe, said: "Lawgivers or revolutionaries who promise both equality

and freedom are either fantasists or charlatans.”

¹Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. with an introduction by G. D. H. Cole (London, 1913). ²M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism, Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York, 1971). ³Mircea Eliade, *The Forge and the Crucible*, trans. Stephen Corrin (New York, 1971). ⁴John McManners, “The Social Contract and Rousseau’s Revolt Against Society,” in *Hobbes and Rousseau, A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City, N.Y., 1972). ⁵“On the Intention of Rousseau,” in *Hobbes and Rousseau, A Collection of Critical Essays*. ⁶*Encounter* (September 1974), p. 41. ⁷*Early Writings*, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore, with a new

foreword by Erich Fromm (New York, 1964). ⁸Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, p. 161. ⁹“The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau’s *Discourses on Inequality*,” *Essays in the History of Ideas* (Baltimore, 1948). ¹⁰*The Social Contract*, p. 169. ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 160. ¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 181-82. ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 190. ¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 198. ¹⁵*Ibid.* ¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 202. ¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 205. ¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 220. ¹⁹Roger D. Masters, *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau* (Princeton, N.J., 1968). ²⁰“Man and Society in Hobbes and Rousseau,” in *Hobbes and Rousseau, A Collection of Critical Essays*, p. 233. ²¹*Beyond Nihilism* (Cambridge, Eng., 1960), p. 7. ²²*The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (New York, 1960). ²³William H. Blanchard, *Rousseau and the Spirit of Revolt, A Psychological Study* (Ann Arbor, 1967). ²⁴Lester G. Crocker, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A New Interpretative Analysis of His Life and Works*, 2 vols. (New York, 1973).