

Rethinking the Nature of Government

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The polls say many of you want to send me a message. But after November 7, I may not be in the Senate any longer to receive it. Believe me, I've gotten the message, and you're right. Washington has gone overboard, and I'm sure I've made my share of mistakes. But in truth, your priorities are mine, too—stop the waste, cut the spending, cut the taxes.

—Charles H. Percy, TV Campaign Commercial in Chicago, Nov. 3, 1978.

THE PASSAGE of the now famous Proposition 13 in California (June, 1978), with its startling political repercussions throughout the nation, has provided, it now appears, a much needed occasion to rethink fundamentally what we expect of government in the Western world. President Carter, initially, had presumed to see all of this as another California aberration, but Governor Brown was more astute. He simply converted himself immediately from opposition to advocacy of the Spirit of 13 and proceeded to annihilate the Republican candidate who, by rights, ought to have found the issue a natural one with which to defeat the then vulnerable Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown, rightly or wrongly, then, is well on his way to becoming the national expert on how to implement a new spirit in the people.

The Economist in London, in its attentive reflection on all things American, saw in the ferment arising out of the California initiative a more profound, philosophical issue involved. "The present, or coming, tax revolt will not be

aimed like the Boston tea-party at unrepresentative colonial or foreign government. It will be aimed at the efficiency of allegedly representative government at home."¹ In looking at the various cutting proposals designed to save tax money, it is clear that the major opposition has come from various levels of employees working for government itself, from the highest to the lowest. The argument is made again and again that people want the services but do not want to pay for them. However, another kind of suspicion seems to be possible: "Do the people really want these services?"

In a representative editorial, a respected journal from one of California's middle sized cities made these very penetrating observations which serve to elevate a passing ballot to something more permanent:

Overgovernment is the rule, not the exception. Not only do the Congress and the legislatures pass laws people do not want, the bureaucrats find a way to make the initial regulations even more onerous. . . . It is a sad commentary when the average working family, not the multi-millionaire investors, seeks loopholes to find a tax shelter to protect its minimal earnings. The homeowner can move upward under the tax system, but gets absolutely killed when he moves downward. It is little wonder the people are upset. The people want less government, but they want it done better at a cost they can afford.²

The citizen, then, has begun to ask not only—"What do we get for our money?"—but also—"Why should it be exclusively government money by which we expect so much to be procured?" The word is out. Many of the things government does can be done more effectively and inexpensively outside of government with less political control. One of the reasons private and parochial schools have had such a hard time of it, I have always suspected, is that they can provide equal and often better product for less than half the comparative cost. Few in the educational lobbies and unions want this known.

In other words, then, government itself needs to be subject to the most rigid and rigorous criteria of what it has wrought through its own expanding activities which are not, and cannot be, equated simply with other actions within the general society. The eighteenth century American tradition of suspecting that government may still be what we most need protection from is not that misplaced after all. But this time, the issue arises not so much from government's coercive or police powers but precisely from its benevolent and spending-for-aid instincts. Even more frequently it arises from the exaggerated notions of "rights" as conceived by government employees themselves, people who do not hesitate to use their power against the general well-being of the public when their interests conflict with the latter. Ironically, the old individualist notion of "rights" seems most to flourish in bureaucracies designed theoretically to prevent the extreme dire consequences of rights, seen as claims, from injuring the ordinary run of the populace.³

Indeed, in a remarkably pertinent series of essays—"Doing Good": *The Limits of Benevolence*—it has been forcefully argued that what we are most in need of protection from is precisely the social services provided by a compassionate government.⁴ There is, thus, a kind of paradoxical relationship between a Proposition 13 with its limiting of government expenditures and our own capacity to remain free from the adverse consequences of the government's efforts to "do good." And there is a kind of moral and religious feeling in this

society—one growing by bounds in the Third World—which seems unable to distinguish between the desire to aid some person or people and the consequences of the plan or program designed to meet this want. Archbishop Helder Camara in Latin America, for example, is fond of rejecting materialist socialism, while opting or "hoping for a human type of socialism that, without the illusion of a paradise on earth, will bring about a society without oppressors nor oppressed."⁵ There is never any wonder about the capacity of the second option to meet the goal intended, nor whether the "elimination of oppressor and oppressed" is also utopian.

The very doctrines which have inspired our philosophy of government, consequently, especially those in the progressive-liberal-socialist eras, are now being examined not from the side of their admittedly good intentions but from the side of their actual consequences. Those still aware of the Augustinian tradition in social theory will not be overly surprised that intention and performance do not always and necessarily conform. But Augustine's powerful voice is little attended to, unfortunately. Professor Deane's *Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* ought still to be required reading for all bureaucrats, politicians and, not least of all, professors.⁶ The parallel between *The Limits of Benevolence* and Belloc's *The Servile State*, recently reissued, ought not to pass without notice to those fascinated by the Christian tradition. Nor should the similarity between the "rates"-poor laws dilemma of nineteenth century England and the welfare-Proposition 13 type enigmas of a modern state like California be ignored.

When Professor Markus asked in his essay, "Their Brothers' Keeper":

How is it . . . that good people—decent, upright, and well-meaning citizens—can continue when they act on behalf of others and in the name of some higher principle of some benign intent, to behave so badly, coercively, and callously, so at odds with what they understand to be their good intention?⁷

he asked a question as old as original sin and the scholastic distinction between the end of the agent and the end of the act.

More and more recently, then, both the radical and the conservative agree that our major danger comes from those who have vested interests in the operation of government itself, from those who shape the public policy about what "good" ought to be achieved in men. During the Memphis firemen's strike in 1978, for example, which was said to have cost some \$6 millions, some blamed on deliberate arson, I happened to hear a radio interview with a local fireman who affirmed stoutly that the strike would not end until the firemen got what they wanted. This seemed to epitomize the growing suspicion that our presumed public servants feel they can hold the public hostage to their wants, especially if they are in key areas, that their welfare is the same as the people's. The public is beginning to wonder if they want or need this kind of public service, beginning to ask themselves whether they will pay for it, especially when it is widely realized that the salary-benefit payment to public servants exceeds much of the income of local populations. Furthermore, anyone who works especially hard to save and invest is coming to be looked as unfair to those who are not so willing to do what is extra. Undoubtedly, there is a relation between the high numbers of immigrants into American society, people who are willing to work at unpleasant tasks, and the unwillingness of Americans to work hard at menial or difficult tasks.⁸

There is, to be sure, not only a domestic question about our own governments but also a legitimate concern about the quality of governing in the Third World and why it has been so singularly unproductive, such that we can identify no more than twenty or so real democracies left in the world today. I would agree with Daniel Moynihan, for the most part, when he suggested that this same Third World has not been original in approaching most of its real problems but has much too often and much too uncritically imitated stubbornly the Fabian type of socialism many of its leaders innocently learned in the West so that they have imposed on their nations and in their mind-sets, in the name of liberation, perhaps the least efficient form of rule they might have concocted for the task at home and at hand.⁹ The Third World is

still mostly an appendage of the West, mostly because of the Third World's own choices, choices invariably on the side of state control, not freedom, to motor development.¹⁰ When Mr. Nyerere recently stated that the Cubans were in Africa because the Africans had "invited" them, he baptized himself as what might be called "the father of voluntary neo-colonialism."¹¹ In spite of Mr. Nyerere's little book, socialist colonialism is still the most flourishing variety of Western imposed thought.¹² And of this latter, Solzhenitsyn stubbornly remarked to the incredulous Harvard graduates: "Socialism of any type and shade leads to a total destruction of the human spirit and to a levelling of mankind into death."¹³

Yet, in this same Third World, the little noticed and astonishingly rapid development of South East Asia outside the Marxist bloc may well be the most momentous thing happening there today. That this area is so progressing because it has rejected a theory of too much government is not one of the least of our ironies. Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the overseas Chinese seem to suggest that the only thing keeping the main body of Chinese from being the most productive in the world is their form of rule.¹⁴ In a rather devastating comment on the perceptive capacity of the American Vice-President on his Asian trip, *The Economist* pointed out that the eight non-communist countries of South East Asia are now the only ones in the world whose GNP is doubling every 7-12 years and that this area will soon be the fourth largest industrial power on earth. What is significant about this area, however, is the percentage of GNP (less than 15%) going to government spending.

The purely economic burden on the ordinary man from corruption in these governments is far less than the burden on him from bureaucracy in the countries which take more than 15% of national income in taxes, and then do not get the economic growth. . . . Of the free world's coming big four, ASEAN has the most valuable experience in achieving economic policies that work, together with political set-ups that are

just tolerable, in the mine-strewn ideological battleground in which the poor three-quarters of the world are soon to advance.¹⁵

There is, then, a valid relationship between thought on government in developed countries and those seeking a better life. Underdevelopment is usually and largely due not to lack of resources or even educated talent, but rather to the ideas chosen by the people on their own initiative, the exploitation theory of the intellectuals largely used against their own peoples.

The rethinking that most needs to be done, however, must first be accomplished in the West itself. I hold a view of human nature and institutions that locates virtue and vice ultimately in individual free choices. Thus, if there is such a thing as "social sin"—a most dubious and dangerous concept from any view—it must be understood in terms of identifiable, recognized choice made freely by known human persons. "Social sin" is very close to collective guilt, and this is ever near the justified pogrom, the political removal of the cause of the "social sin." Consequently, political and economic forms, however perfect, can be corrupting in practice, while quite rickety, even shady structures, as Burke taught, can often be made to work quite well. Christian social thought ought to be most acutely aware of this strange dichotomy because it inherits both the Augustinian and Thomist theses about political rule, the one that locates its origin in evil, the other in reason, but both of which must include and be aware of the other. No Augustinian could ever doubt the limits of doing good; no Thomist could ever hold that the good is not what ought to be done.

In this connection, then, it is interesting to call attention to the remarkable little treatise *Self-Reliance* by Roger Heckel.¹⁶ For various historical and intellectual reasons, modern papal social thought has often emphasized the governmental-responsibility side of Christian thinking about government. *Rerum Novarum*, *Quadragesimo Anno*, *Pacem in Terris*, and *Populorum Progressio*, I think, can be seen as efforts to think squarely and frankly about the positive side of government, what it can and

ought to do.¹⁷ Modern Catholic social thought has always been critical of the negative side of classical liberal thought on the purpose of government. However, this same social thought presupposed and was, indeed, based upon the family—that institution receiving currently more and more belated attention because it has been so positively discriminated against by government in modern times.¹⁸ Moreover, it was also based upon the viability of subsidiarity and voluntary groups. And while there is stress in this thought on personal initiative and autonomy as the driving force of a healthy society, especially in Pius XII, Father Heckel's essay marks the first concerted effort to spell this out precisely in this tradition.¹⁹ And the reason this can become the central issue of governmental reflection in our time is because it is clearly this issue—the need for and necessity of self-reliance at every level, local, state, international—that seems to come close to the cause of the failures in the public order we are experiencing.²⁰

The co-relative of this, moreover, is that the hired substitutes for self-reliance are simply too expensive or too inefficient or too graspy to do the job and, in their corporate capacities, often work against the very common good they were instituted originally to serve. Self-reliance here is no longer that "individualism" we so much hated in classical liberal theory, but precisely the growth of personhood and "localhood" and statehood and, indeed, "worldhood," which is the expression of the newness and uniqueness born into each person and family of persons. Heckel's principles are well worth reflection:

- 1) Self-reliance is a decisive moving force in the construction of a new international order; 2) it penetrates and inspires all aspects of human activity involved in such construction; 3) it grows in understanding and finds its driving force in elementary social combinations which are autonomous and self-determining; and 4) the horizon of universal solidarity toward which self-reliance aims is neither a static nor a remote objective. In and by itself, it is a force of attraction and cohesion for groups and people.²¹

This is not altogether *Small Is Beautiful*, of course, but it does reflect a growing feeling that what is wrong is precisely the too-much-doing of things in the only way government, because of what it legitimately is, can do things. Self-reliance insists there are alternatives, that there ought to be alternatives, that these are generally preferable to doing most tasks by the state and its apparatus. This is especially the case when in practice the interpretation of "human rights" imposes a theory of morality and value quite at variance with the traditional and religious value structures of the majority of the people in their own lives.²²

Interestingly, in this context, we are noting a renewed interest in and popularity for "business"—that *bete noir* of socialism and the second phase of liberalism. Not only does Milton Friedman's name appear in the most astonishing of places, but also our business schools are jammed to the point of making "Macrae's Law"—an announced shortage in any job field will produce a surfeit in that same field in five years—fully operative. Moreover, business itself, with the recent Supreme Court decision on its own freedom to argue its views in public, is now maintaining that it is ethically responsible, usually more so than comparable governmental agencies. Even John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in *The Harvard Business Review* a "Defense of the Multi-National Corporation."²³ And what I like to call the "two cheers books"—W. Beckermann's *Two Cheers for Economic Growth* and Irving Kristol's *Two Cheers for Capitalism*—make a clear and forceful argument for the validity of the system it is most fashionable to be against.²⁴ Professors Brannen and Molander, furthermore, state bluntly: "Those critics who continue to characterize the American business executive as a power-hungry, profit-bound individual, indifferent to the needs of society, should be put on notice that they are now dealing with a straw man of their own making."²⁵ And I suspect that much of the venality that is found, especially in the Third World where the claim is that business operates differently there, arises more from imposition of the country's own mores or power structure than from exportation of capitalist ideas. If capitalists sin, as no doubt

they do, it is not so clear that recipients are innocent.

Thus, a case can well be made today that the type of self-interested individualism so often condemned by the left historically is now more often found in the employees of the public sector and in various unions. The current mail strikes and controversies about them in the United States, Canada, and most other developed countries—this is just an instance—are important primarily because they force us to question more openly whether governmental monopoly of the post really serves the public in the best and cheapest way now that there is no longer any assuredly effective legal way to protect the public interest against them. As Norman Macrae has often suggested, few if any governmentally provided services should be granted apart from an opportunity of the private sectors to do this same thing better and more inexpensively.

From a Christian viewpoint, moreover, I think, there is also a deeper lesson which the Gaylin study on doing good suggests. Edmund Fuller in *The Wall Street Journal* pinpointed the issue when, in a review of the Gaylin book, he noted the question of whether true charity can ever really be institutionalized. Mr. John Kippley of the Couple-to-Couple League has wondered recently out-loud to me whether or not the cause of growth in government is not the result of a default in the private sector, especially the spiritual sector. We look with some envy at the private social service systems of the Mormons and the clear academic freedom from governmental control that a Brigham Young University really can have when it refuses all governmental aid. Again and again, Catholics in particular are often compromised on essential religious issues of their own definitions because of the nature of governmental aid and its control requirements. Historically, there is a considerable irony in all of this because many of the social service elements in modern governments—health, welfare, care—are at bottom secularizations of Christian instincts and institutions. What the tax revolt today suggests, I suspect, is that without charity, things are very expensive. What it also might imply, as Colin Clark hinted in San Francisco,

is the appearance of a demographic problem in which the ever fewer young are refusing to pay for the ever growing proportion of expensive oldsters.²⁶ All of this again brings up the problem I consider the essential one that recent political theory in its exclusive concern with justice ignores, namely, the inadequacy of precisely justice itself to touch those areas whose spiritual origins do not, and cannot, lie in this grim virtue. Justice, if I can put it that way, is, if not killing our society, at least is bankrupting it.²⁷

To be critical of justice, no doubt, especially with all of academia still reading John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, seems almost impolite, if not indefensible. Yet, I think, the recent reactions to government and its costs lead back by various intellectual routes to precisely this issue of the inadequacy of justice and its secularized appearance in the welfare and service ends of the modern state. Years ago, I wrote an essay in *The Commonweal* called, "The Necessity of Government."²⁸ I do not want to retract here what I wrote then in another context, except to note that government's necessity is precisely that, a "necessity." Its purpose is to acknowledge a larger place for those things—usually the most important and productive ones—that are not strictly "needed." Thus, if we are not to be mere romantics, our rethinking about the nature of government must return to questions of "self-reliance," initiative, true productivity, competition, that can clearly establish what is not worth what it costs because we can actually learn what things do cost.

Behind this, furthermore, lies not an individualist theory but a personalist one, one arguing for the legitimate necessity of government only when it argues for its limitations. Taxpayers' revolts in recent times have arisen symbolically because the people who have been most hurt by the inequities of our theorists felt that they had no means at their disposal other than the vote to remind government and the literally millions who work in its employment—"the cost of paying, housing, equipping and pensioning off the federal bureaucracy is more than 100 billion dollars a year," Jack Anderson pointedly calculated—that they themselves are not the end of govern-

ment, that the common good, in spite of its bad name among the class-strugglers, is more important than the doing good to achieve it by bureaucratic means in public employment.²⁹ There is a proper proportion, to be sure, but this is precisely the issue, what is the proportion? William Simon, in his *A Time for Truth*, has remarked that every cent earned by the average American during the first four months of the year goes to federal, state, and local taxes, while government now consumes more than 35% of the GNP, a figure worth recalling in the light of the previously cited remark that only in countries where the tax percentage is less than 15% is there much growth taking place.

The contrary view that this rethinking of government is really *not* at issue was perhaps best argued by *The New York Times*, after the California vote:

Half the states are already trying to figure out how to limit general taxes. . . . Half the states also want to clamp a similar lid on Washington with a constitutional amendment to prohibit deficits. . . . Stripped of its rhetoric this movement is a rejection of liberal values, a potent outburst of conservatism. . . .

What is wrong with the tax revolt is not its stated objectives. Surely legislators are too easily pushed into subsidies and support programs by powerful groups of constituents. By definition, the most powerful groups will retain influence and the weakest—the poorest—will be made to pay the price of arbitrary limitations.³⁰

Again this view argues benevolence and doing good as a reason not to limit overly expensive government. The question at hand, however, now seems to imply a drying up not so much of money but of incentive and energy in those classes out of which the funds for this doing such good ultimately derive. The poor would be hit in either alternative, and the suspicion is more forcefully made that the loss is greater due to loss of incentive than the kind of fear *The Times* worried about.³¹

This latter point was recently argued in another way by Tom Bethell, who noted that the

average American truck driver makes more than the average college professor—an aberration of absolutely the first class! Truck drivers, workers, thus, are harder hit by taxes than professors. This being, of course, against the natural order of things, further government growth and *caré à la* political benevolence will need to arise. There is, then,

a form of propaganda being urgently promoted by a “new class” of academics, bureaucrats and lawyers, and its long term effect would be to put the allocation of resources and wealth under political rather than market control.

In short, the productive sector of the economy finds itself subjected to a long barrage of dubious data about the “era of limits,” environmental pollution, carcinogenic substances and delicate ecosystems.

Curtailed output by the productive sector is the covert agenda of the new class. If its tactics are successfully applied over a long enough period, the market system will be so damaged that “scarce resources” have to be allocated by policy makers. That way, you can be sure, professors . . . will earn more than truck drivers.³²

This reiterates the growing realization that the surest way to prevent development and improvement for the poor is to espouse certain statist ideas about how to help them. The essential need for government, in other words, should not derive from doing good unto others, even though the rest of us should indeed do good and unto others.

Yet, in thinking about government, in conclusion, it is well to turn again to Europe, the historic origin of most of our thinking about civil rule in the first place. Futurologists now generally concede that many vigorous parts of the Third World are in fact advancing rapidly, as the ASEAN countries have already shown.³³ The productive center of the world seems to be moving to East Europe with its controlled labor costs and to the Third World rapidly at work learning how to do things more cheaply than expensive Western labor can. We mostly want this improvement to happen, of course. As

Richard Janssen recently wrote of Europe: “The central image tentatively coming into focus is that of a ‘post-industrial’ society in which relatively fewer productive workers are heavily taxed to support relatively more pensioners and others left jobless by the exodus of heavy industry.”³⁴ Behind this relative demographic decline of all the white races, at least as a percentage of the world’s population, the political question of Europe’s ability to form a political unity is still, as Henry Fairlie has argued, critical:

Europe at first was Christendom and then it was Empire, and as such was the guardian and missionary of its civilization. But now there is no Christendom and no Empire. . . . It has been the curse of the movement for European unification that from the beginning the emphasis has been on economic unity, so that a great part of the political genius of Europe has been exhausted in haggling about the price of tomatoes.³⁵

So from California to Europe and the Third World, what we need most to think about is precisely what government is capable of doing and whether doing good is really its main function as it is now its main cost.

The northern European governments beginning perhaps with Bismark have pioneered systems of benevolence but since World War II, when benevolence became a right, these same governments have been proportionately free of much of the classic political obligation of having to defend themselves. The “haggling over the price of tomatoes” has been, in fact, a luxury made possible in part by someone else’s army, and this someone else has now a population in which fighting for someone else’s problems is definitely unpopular. The Europe that was Christendom and is no longer Christendom, this Europe has taught us both benevolence and the limits of state power. Edward S. Corwin once wrote that “The distinctive contribution of the Middle Ages to modern political science is the notion of all political authority as intrinsically limited.” This Europe taught us that benevolence arises from spiritual sources that are not first nor primarily political. As we have watched the cost of state sponsored be-

benevolence soar and its spirit often become corrupt, especially in lethal policies to control birth, and life, and death, we are unavoidably brought back to the philosophical discussion of the nature of government and whether this "nature" comprises the higher things of the spirit and the lower things of the price of tomatoes and the salaries of truck drivers.

Thomas Aquinas, in his famous Treatise on Law, spoke surprisingly often about Augustine, almost as if to remind us that the most corruptible of corruptible things is our own zeal for doing good, a zeal which above all others needs to be controlled by the results of what our efforts and policies for benevolence do ac-

¹*The Economist*, London, June 17, 1978. ²*The Santa Cruz Sentinel*, July 13, 1978. A local California Assemblyman, Henry Mello, summed it up this way: "The people are giving us a message—less taxes, less service, less waste, and more efficiency and make it work." *The Capitola, California, Green Sheet*, June 17, 1978. ³*Cf.* the author's "Second Thoughts on Natural Rights," *Faith and Reason*, Winter, 1975-76, pp. 44-59. ⁴W. Gaylin, "Doing Good": *The Limits of Benevolence* (New York: Pantheon, 1978). ⁵Cited in Jose Maria Maybrink, "Archbishop Camera Says . . .," *The San Francisco Monitor*, October 26, 1978. ⁶Herbert Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). In this regard Professor John East's essay "The Political Relevance of St. Augustine," *Modern Age*, Spring, 1972, pp. 167-81, should not be missed; nor should Christopher Dawson's two essays on Augustine in *St. Augustine* (New York: Meridian, 1957), pp. 11-78. ⁷In Gaylin, *ibid.*, p. 42. ⁸*Cf.* the author's "The 'Yellow Peril' Reconsidered: Unorthodox Considerations on Declining Populations," *Vital Speeches*, July 15, 1973.

On the 250th Anniversary of Adam Smith, *The Economist* had these pointed observations: "Inflation now threatens to destroy the full employment which has been taken for granted for two decades. What has caused this crisis? A modern Adam Smith might identify three crucial factors:

1) The postwar creation of a man-managed international monetary system, of fixed exchange rates and a fixed gold price which allowed America, as the dominant economic power, to flood the western world with dollars.

2) The rapid erosion of "pure" private consumption as a share of national product in every major country. Pure private consumption is financed direct from earnings and property income and excludes consumption financed from state transfers. . . . Governments of capitalist countries now frequently lay their hands on, to spend or give back, almost a half of all income generated in the production process.

3) The swing of political power to the masses has not been accompanied by an equal awareness of the facts of

complish.³⁶ In an era when our welfare costs more than our army while other armies look stronger and stronger, when our population policies have killed more human life than all the wars and accidents we have ever been in put together, our central philosophical problem is to rethink clearly what it means to "govern."

One conclusion only, then, seems unavoidable: There are things that indeed do not belong to Caesar. If we are to save Caesar, we must again learn what they are. In the meantime, we are not to forget Augustine, who warned us what was in our hearts besides benevolence.

economic life. Electorates collectively demand, and politicians attempt to deliver, more by way of public consumption than individuals in aggregate are prepared to concede. Organized labor, operating its own restrictive practices, is able to bid back resources earmarked for public use, generating inflation in the process. This is the basic struggle of the affluent society which looks to the state to deliver butter but insists on drinking the cream. Where nationals succumb, the excess of world liquidity and the vastly increased international interdependence ensure that the resulting inflation is rapidly passed on to others." June 2, 1973, p. 17. ⁹*Commentary*, March, 1975, pp. 31-44. ¹⁰This appendage is more onerous for those countries that have chosen Western or Eastern socialist models than those that have chosen capitalist ones. *Cf.* Hobart Rowan, "Significant Rebound in the Third World," *The Washington Post*, October 29, 1978. ¹¹*Cf.* "President Nyerere's Statement on Western Manoeuvres in Africa," *The Daily News*, Dar-es-Salaam, June 9, 1978. ¹²J. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); *Man and Development* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). My favorite passage from Nyerere is this: "This brings me to the final problem which I refer to today—the problem of incentives. For it is all very well to say that members will 'live together and work together for the common good'; it is all very well to say a leader's job is to see that everyone does his fair share. But we are not all angels, and it is not known for everyone to do a fair share on a communal project just because everyone does as much as the laziest member, and no more! What kind of organization, or what kind of rules about distribution of returns, should be recommended to groups setting up together, so as to ensure that between them they produce the maximum? For if there is no difference in return, is it not likely that the good and fast worker may get tired of putting his best efforts forward while another member merely does the bare minimum which keeps him in the scheme?" *Ujamaa*, pp. 185-86. Had Nyerere really understood his own words, Tanzania, I suspect, would have been well on its way to modernization by now. ¹³Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "A World Split Apart: Harvard Ad-

dress," *The National Review*, July 7, 1978, p. 839. ¹⁴Interestingly, the recent visit of the Chinese Premier to Japan seemed to indicate that the Communist Chinese themselves are beginning to realize something of the importance of this data. ¹⁵*The Economist*, May 13, 1978. ¹⁶Roger Heckel, *Self-Reliance*, Vatican City, 1978. Father Heckel is the Secretary of the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace. ¹⁷Cf. the author's "The Pragmatic Encyclical (*Octagesima Adveniens*)," *Worldview*, Summer, 1971; "On the Non-Existence of Christian Political Philosophy," *Worldview*, April, 1976. ¹⁸Cf. R. Butts, "Whose Family: Yours or the State's?" *The Times*, London, June 8, 1978; C. Lasch, "The Flight from Feeling," *Marxist Perspectives*, Spring, 1978. ¹⁹E. F. Schumacher can in many regards be considered a kind of revitalizer of much of the central sensibilities of classic Christian thought. Cf. in this context again, Sir Ernest Barker's well-known essay "Medieval Political Thought," in *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Medieval Thinkers*, F. J. C. Hearnshaw, Ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1923), pp. 9-33. ²⁰Certain strands of Marxism are busily trying also to save the legacy of small and local groups. From another position, Reo Christenson's remarks are worthy of attention here: "It is this writer's belief that the greatest threat to American democracy comes not from overpopulation or communism or executive power or legislative weakness or structural defects in the system or maldistribution of power within society or challenges from the Left or the Right. The greatest threat is from the decline in self-discipline and the erosion of confidence in our legacy of moral values." *Heresies: Right and Left* (New York: Harper), 1973, p. 46. ²¹Heckel, p. 3. ²²John Kenneth Galbraith, "Defense of the Multi-National Corporation," *The Harvard Business Review*, March-April, 1978. ²³Cf. the author's "Conservatism and Development," *Cultures et Developpement*, Louvain, #2, 1977, 315-34. ²⁴Cf. Bartolomeo Sorge, *Capitalismo, Scelta di Classe, Socialismo* (Roma: Coines Edizioni, 1974); M. Novak, "Democratic Capitalism: An Underpraised and Undervalued System," *Worldview*, July-August, 1977, pp. 9-13; Irving Louis Horowitz, "Death and Transfiguration in the Third World," *Worldview*, September, 1977, pp. 20-25; P. T. Bauer, "Western Guilt and Third World Poverty," *Commentary*, January, pp. 31-38; P. T. Bauer, "Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Progress?" Occasional Paper, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1966; Norman Macrae, "Ameri-

ca's Third Century," *The Economist*, Survey, October 25, 1975; Irving Kristol, "Human Nature and Social Reform," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 1978; Paul Johnson, "Has Capitalism a Future?" *The Wall Street Journal*, September 29, 1978; P. Beckmann, *What Attracts Intellectuals to Socialism?* (Boulder: Golem, 1978). ²⁵"Is the Ethics of Business Changing?" *The Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1977, p. 681. ²⁶Lecture at University of San Francisco, July 22, 1978. ²⁷Cf. the author's "The Limits of Law," *Communio*, Summer, 1975. ²⁸"The Necessity of Government," *The Commonwealth*, November 26, 1954. ²⁹*San Francisco Chronicle*, July 4, 1978. ³⁰*The New York Times*, June 6, 1978. ³¹Cf. the author's "Austerity and Creativity," *Welcome Number 4,000,000,000* (Canfield, Ohio: Alba Books, 1977), pp. 61-78. ³²*The New York Times*, May 31, 1978. ³³Cf. Herman Kahn's *The Next 200 Years* (New York: Morrow, 1976). ³⁴Richard Janssen, "Europe's Future . . .," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 6, 1978. ³⁵Henry Fairlie, "The Roots of Europe's Current Identity Crisis," *The San Francisco Chronicle*, June 28, 1978. Cf. N. Weyl, "World Population Growth and the Geography of Intelligence," *Modern Age*, Winter, 1978. George Kennan's recent conversion to a pessimistic view seems worth citing also: "Poor old West: succumbing feebly, day by day, to its own decadence, sliding into debility on the slime of its own self-indulgent permissiveness; its drugs, its crime, its pornography, its pampering of the youth, its addiction to its bodily comforts, its rampant materialism and consumerism—and then trembling before the menace of the wicked Russians, all pictured as supermen eight feet tall, their internal problems all essentially solved, and with nothing else now to think about except how to bring damage and destruction to Western Europe. This persistent externalization of the sense of danger—this persistent exaggeration of the threat from without and blindness to the threat from within: this is the symptom of some deep failure to come to terms with reality—and with one's self." "Western Decadence and Soviet Moderation," Letter to *Die Zeit*, in *Decline of the West? George Kennan and His Critics* (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1978), pp. 8-9. ³⁶Cf. the author's "Political Theory and Political Theology," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* (Quebec: Février, 1975), pp. 25-38. Cf. also the author's *The Praise of 'Sons of Bitches': On the Worship of God by Fallen Men* (Slough, England: St. Paul Publications, 1978).