

Divine Providence. The great difference between Marx and Lincoln lies not in the way in which the tragedy of history is transformed into ultimate good but in the fact that Marx believed that he knew the goal of the process and the mechanics by which history is ordered. Lincoln was humbly ignorant of the purposes of Providence.

Reviewed by STEPHEN J. TONSOR

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## *Fictional Romances*

### **The Romance of American Communism,**

by Vivian Gornick, *New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977. xiii (265 pp \$10.00.*

THE IDEA was good: to interview in depth a cross-section of ex-Communists in order to discover why they joined the Communist Party, why they left it, and what they feel about their experience now. Most Americans ask this question in anger, disgust, or amusement. Observing the devastation that organized communism has brought to the world, they simply ask how any sentient human being, once aware of the nature of the Communist Party, could remain in its thrall.

In *The Romance of American Communism*, Vivian Gornick chose forty-seven of the "many" ex-Communists she interviewed, gave them false names, and in a haze of adulation put down such of their thoughts as coincided with her own bias. But with one exception, the people whose lives are adumbrated are ex-Communists only in the literal sense. That is, they are no longer members of the Communist Party, but they are still lower-case communists, or very close to it. The one exception, who sees communism as an evil force, is drawn harshly in acid caricature. The others refer to Karl Marx and his writings reverentially or ecstatically—as if they were a latter-day Isaiah and Holy Writ.

It is Ms. Gornick's thesis—based on a childhood in a fellow-traveling ghetto Jewish

family, on a period within a watered-down version of the Young Communist League, and on the interviews she has published—that membership in the Communist Party was the sole ennobling and significant experience for those who lived between the early thirties and the mid-fifties. Only by such membership did one become a "whole" individual.

It was the Party [she writes] whose moral authority gave shape and substance to an abstraction, making it a powerful human experience. It was the Party which brought to astonishing life the kind of comradeship that makes swell in men and women the deepest sense of their own humanness, allowing them to love themselves through the act of loving others.

This is pretty rhetoric, belied by her off-hand and brief expositions of the sustained and ordained cruelties of Party members to each other, the humiliations imposed on them by the Party leadership, of the Party's total disregard of human values. The Party came first, no matter what it did to the lives of its members, the marriages and friendships it determinedly destroyed, its betrayals and smear campaigns against those who deviated from the Party line, the careers in the arts and letters it thwarted. The Party was, as some of the people she interviewed frankly noted, a "father figure"—but a cruel father who unrelentingly drove his children into the travail of a political sweatshop, and beat them if they complained.

Ms. Gornick's "ex-Communists" broke with the Party, when they were not expelled, only after Nikita Khrushchev added a few details to what the world had long known of the reign of terror, the mass murders, the anti-Semitism, and the other horrors of Stalin's communism. They turned on "Stalinism" although it is but the logical and inevitable extension of Marxism-Leninism, and they continued to cleave to the "abstraction" which produced it. The millions slaughtered by Mao Tse-tung never touched them, perhaps because he never delivered a speech about it.

The "why" of membership in the Party is further distorted by Ms. Gornick's choice of interviewees. They were, for the most part,

psychiatric basket cases—in flight from alcoholic fathers, broken homes, emotional hopelessness, alienation, an overbearing sense of guilt—and they found their escape in the nurtured hatreds that hold Communists together. They left the Party when it became too much for them, when they could no longer deceive themselves as they had been deceiving others. The distortion is further compounded because Ms. Gornick has, in those I recognized, altered the facts of their lives to fit her thesis.

I have known many people in and out of the Party—rank-and-file members, *apparatchiks*, leaders—though I was never one of them. They joined the Party for a variety of reasons—out of an idealistic belief in the “abstraction,” because it favored their careers in fields where membership was a help, as a form of self-immolation, after a cold analysis of what it and the Soviet Union were about but with the conviction that it was the wave of the future.

They left the Party for another variety of reasons—because they could not stand the backbiting and pettifogging, because they realized that the ruthlessness of the Stalin regime was endemic to communism, because they thought through the Marxist concept and found that it was wanting, because it was no longer fashionable to carry a Party book. Many entered the Party whole, suffered the trauma of membership, and emerged to reshape their lives and their psyches.

Most of them retained their interest in politics—as semi-Marxist or anti-Communist liberals, as conservatives, as libertarians who learned in the Party that the more any system becomes the totality the more cruel and repressive it becomes. Some came to see Marxism-Leninism as a bigoted religion-in-reverse that enslaved the mind and anesthetized the conscience—and fought it.

For this last category of ex-Communists, Ms. Gornick has only contempt, as she has contempt for all those who left the Party and did not continue to romanticize it, or for those socialists who share the Marxist myth but do battle against its Communist excrescence in the Soviet Union, in Asia, and in Latin America. They see what the sentimental Ms.

Gornick closes her eyes to, and what even a pro-Soviet apologist like Harold Laski was aware of when, in 1946, he wrote for the British Labour Party:

I accept as a fact beyond dispute the devotion of Communists to their party. But in the light of experience I am bound to suggest that devotion so absolute develops in those who are moved by it a power within themselves to make simple truth and plain honesty things of secondary importance to be sacrificed by a coercive casuistry. . . . It makes conspiracy endemic to such a party, it makes success the sole criterion of methods. . . . The real purpose inherent in the strategy which Communists everywhere are determined to employ is the organization of catastrophe.

That catastrophe is both external and internal—for the world and for those members of the Party who never free themselves from its coercive casuistry. For them, membership in the Party *was* a romance, no matter what murder of bodies and destruction of souls it linked them to—a romance induced by the “controlled schizophrenia” which Klaus Fuchs described in explaining his espionage days. For Ms. Gornick there is some excuse. For her the Party was represented by those Talmudic debates of the fellow-travelers who gathered around the family kitchen table in her childhood. Her break with the adjunct of the Party to which she belonged was, as she describes it, really a fight with those members of her family who were able to swallow the Krushchev speech, corpses and all.

Ms. Gornick is now temporarily in the women’s liberation movement. *The Romance of American Communism* is her expiation of sin for having left the Party while she still adhered to its dogmas. The crudities of women’s liberation will eventually drive her out, for she is a compassionate person. But she will never become the “whole” individual she and her interviewees thought they were in the Party until she faces squarely the regressiveness and the inhumanity of lower-case communism.

Reviewed by RALPH DE TOLEDANO

## *Liberty and Virtue*

**Does Freedom Work?: Liberty and Justice in America**, by Donald J. Devine, *Ottawa, Illinois: Caroline House Books, Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 1978. xii + 192 pp. \$10.00 (paper \$5.95).*

WELFARE IDEOLOGY portrays private institutions as quaint and intrinsically weak, degrades voluntary solutions, and assigns responsibilities for social problems to the national government. Taxation, inflation, and mandatory administrative requirements hamper attempts of private institutions to cope with social problems, while welfare ideology gives individuals a rationalization for personal non-involvement in social problems. In the face of such strong opposition it is nothing short of a miracle that the voluntary sector remains as strong as it is, even if it works only at a fraction of its potential. Professor Donald J. Devine chronicles the successes of private institutions such as the Red Cross, scouting, better business bureaus, mutual insurance companies, co-operatives, humane societies, schools, hospitals, and rescue missions, not to mention private businesses, which still provide the bulk of our goods and services. Cohesion could be established in the social conflict between blacks and whites, Devine suggests, through mutually beneficial exchange and feelings of commonness resulting from holding shared views. National policy, however, has instead promoted the use of national laws and regulations. By depriving whites of liberty, government-imposed social integration has undermined the reconciliation of the races.

Devine contrasts the success of private associations with the failure of the government's attempts to grapple with social problems. For example, increased national government involvement has retarded the development of the general welfare, hurting most the less fortunate, who are the objects of assistance. The welfare state has promoted inefficiency, attenuated democracy, and rewarded power. Unemployment has not become much lower,

nor learning better, despite huge expenditures for fiscal policy and the thirty billion spent annually on education by the national government. Medical costs to taxpayers have soared with government medical programs, and, with all these programs, diversity is destroyed, and liberty diminished. Furthermore, one of the government's basic missions, that of protecting people from injury, is ignored as criminals are released to victimize society repeatedly. Despite the government's intervention, as supported by intellectuals and national leaders, Devine argues that the American people retain the moral values of religion, family, liberty, and private ownership; and private institutions cope with social problems.

These observations prompt two questions: First, why do intellectuals and national political leaders support welfare ideology; and second, why do most Americans believe in private solutions? Devine focuses attention on John Locke, who has been called by some, perhaps prematurely, a champion of liberty. Locke came from an influential school that presupposes that only particulars are real and individuals ultimate. Locke believed there were no forms, so nothing could be said about social structures. Their very existence was in doubt. Expressing the same view, Bentham said, "The interest of community . . . is . . . the sum of the interest of the several members who compose it." Since, in Locke's view, all private institutions were collections of individuals and created by individuals, they are inferior to them if they had any real existence, and unlimited experimentation with private institutions was permissible. The absolutizing of the individual at the expense of private institutions frustrated inquiry into the basis and purpose for the healthy functioning of marriages, families, clubs, and businesses, and dissolved their integrity. Having reduced the importance of private institutions, Locke required a strong state as a matter of urgency to stop the chaos, the uncertainty, and the disintegration that would otherwise prevail in the private sector.

Believing personally in individual liberty, Locke tried to assign to government the limited rôle of defining and regulating coercion so as to allow virtue to develop spontaneously in pri-

vate life. The burden that Locke placed upon government to keep individuals from danger and uncertainty, either real or imagined, was unfortunately too great for a limited government to handle and provided a blank check for government interference. While personally championing the concept of individual liberty, Locke weakened social structures in the private sector, provided a rationale for the modern welfare ideology, and justified the continuous encroachment of liberty. In answer to the first question, it is this part of Locke's philosophy which has been assimilated by intellectuals and political leaders.

With respect to the second question, the American people still believe in private solutions to social problems because Locke's nominalism does not accurately describe the state of the world. Institutions give external form to relationships between people for particular purposes and on given terms. Devine gives ample illustrations that social institutions have a unique created character which cannot be violated with impunity, nor obliterated. He points out that private schools, philanthropic organizations, churches, businesses, and families can be crippled and severely impaired by the welfare ideology and government policies but not destroyed, and the American people have experienced this. Locke erred in denying the existence of social institutions, as evidenced by their persistence and potency even in the face of a hostile ideology.

What follows from a consideration of the vitality of private institutions is that society, in the absence of a strong government, is not as dangerous as Locke suggests because private institutions have an independent stabilizing influence and are capable of maintaining order and safety and so share the burden of social stability. Difficulties arise when there are disputes between individuals or institutions in their external relationships with each other. In these cases a judge with governmental powers is necessary to mediate or adjudicate. As F. A.

Hayek has pointed out, law, which is a system of general rules of conduct, is necessary to resolve these disputes and force compliance when necessary. General rules develop through adjudication to justify decisions in particular cases, and legislation can help in difficult cases so long as it aims only at imitating rules started in judicial decisions. As private disputes are resolved, justice results that is not in conflict with the liberty of individuals or social groups.

In welfare ideology the meaning of justice is changed to encompass beneficence. Fairness implies government ownership of property and redistribution of income and wealth. Being relegated to a contracting residual area, individual liberty suffers death by qualification in the face of increasing demands for positive welfare. Liberty need not be extinguished if it is recognized as the non-interference in the protected spheres of others—individuals *and* social institutions. When the internal and the external relationships within and among social institutions are functioning harmoniously without serious disputes, the end result is justice, virtue, or righteousness. Liberty and virtue are then not only compatible; liberty is a necessary condition for virtue. When the state acts only as an adjudicator, it is not a threat to liberty; the individual and the state are not opposites; and individual liberty does not have to be given primacy over the power of the state along the unidimensional power-continuum of Locke's devising. Instead of choosing between the primacy of the individual or of the state, as is done by individualists and collectivists, the full range of institutions and of the government's limited rôle as adjudicator of external disputes should be recognized. This revision in the view of the state and other private institutions is necessitated by our experience as Devine recounts it and is a valid moral basis for supporting limited government and liberty in the private sector.

Reviewed by DOUGLAS K. ADIE

## The Great Division

**Cultures in Conflict**, by Otto A. Bird,  
South Bend, Indiana, 1976. Notre Dame  
University Press, 1976. 220 pp. \$19.95.

PROFESSOR BIRD'S BOOK is diagnostic: it probes the disharmony in our Western intellectual community and suggests a remedy. The two cultures in conflict are those noted by C. P. Snow in 1959, namely, the scientific and the literary, or humanistic. The main reason the two are not one, that there is an every widening gap between the two cultures, is that there has occurred an increasing "imperialism" of specialization within Western, chiefly the American, universities. While the first two parts of the book trace the ideological and historical grounds for this opposition between science and the humanities, the third part describes similarities between the two areas and notes points of contact. The suggestion is made that reconciliation is possible.

The most obvious characteristic of science as contrasted with the humanities is its abstractness—"it immediately departs from the *Lebenswelt* and not only leaves it behind, but also ceases to take it into account." Indeed it is this very abstractness, together with the fixity to purpose of the scientist *cum* technologist that has "altered the shape of our world, but has also generated a host of new problems that in many cases derive directly from the method of isolating and solving piecemeal . . ."

In saying this, however, Bird insists that we not ignore the fact that the scientist at work resembles the artist in certain important respects (as Arthur Koestler and Jacob Bronowski have noted). Science "as inquiry" or as "creative achievement" is not totally unlike "any of the other creative works of the humanities and the arts." In addition, "science employs all the ways of knowing that we possess: experience, ideas, imagination, memory, reasoning, insight, as well as all the arts of signs and of learn-

ing." In a word, science, like the humanities, is a "linguistic" and a "liberal" art.

Whether or not these creative and linguistic dimensions of the activity of the artist and the scientist are sufficient to allow for an alliance remains a question after Bird has made his case. This is especially true when one reflects on the way the scientist employs his language as contrasted with the way the artist or poet employs his—a point which Bird himself makes quite forcefully. Further, we must recall the many considerations noted by the author in the first two parts of his book—the fundamental differences in temperament, preoccupation and expectation between the artist and the scientist, together with the tendency of the sciences to claim "exclusive right to reason, knowledge and truth." Bird wants to adjudicate differences and if not marry the two protagonists at least invite them to lie down together like lion and lamb. His plan calls for "a center or agency charged with the responsibility for the intellectual community as such . . . a *summa dialectica* to make manifest and illuminate the pattern of agreement and disagreement in the philosophical controversies over basic ideas." In the end, Bird calls for communication between the sciences and the humanities and, ideally, a sense of community in the university as envisioned in the classical model of the academy. One must agree with Bird that the modern version of the academy falls far short of the model, and Bird is assuredly correct in hoping for a reconciliation among warring parties. Whether or not he is correct in *expecting* such a reconciliation, however, is a question that is suggested most particularly by the tone of caution at the end of this book. But there is another, deeper problem which the book suggests by implication.

Bird's book is markedly elementary: it lacks the profundity one expects from a writer who draws from the deep well of Western classical literature. The reader waits in vain for the writer to describe the distant horizon from his vantage point atop these giants—but he seems to delight in

simply being there. The author is widely read, to be sure, but he seems to be instructing his readers whom he suspects of having no first-hand knowledge of such writers as Augustine, Bacon, Galileo, Newton, and Descartes. Despite the fact that it is decidedly a flaw in the book, one cannot resist the thought that the very basic level on which Bird operates is somehow appropriate, which is to say that Bird's book exemplifies another aspect of the intellectual crisis which it ignores. Ignorance of our cultural heritage is widespread and prevalent even among the so-called educated Americans who (especially of late) take little away with them from the university except the academic degree which they have expended a modicum of time and energy to "earn." As Bird takes pains to show, the two cultures have been in conflict since Socrates (at least) and it is difficult to see why it has suddenly become a "problem." The author makes the case that the "imperialism of specialization; has brought this about, but surely specialization is not all bad: it has brought exciting new discoveries, raised fundamental questions, and provided important answers as well. But such intellectual narrowness when combined with a diminished spiritual outlook does seem peculiarly modern and decidedly problematic.

In a word, the intellectual crisis that is generated by the cultures in conflict which Bird has recounted in his book is merely symptomatic of a deeper, spiritual crisis that is marked by Western man's increasing inability to see beyond the narrow limits of his own dwarfed feelings. Doubtless this is brought about in part, at least, by his increasing conviction that there is nothing "out there" worthy of his attention; but in his preoccupation with himself—his own material and hedonic well being—Western man has cut himself off from the other, and communication has become impossible be-

cause the status of his fellow man had been reduced from person to thing. To be sure, self-preoccupation is a human failing that has always been with us, but since the Reformation powerful forces have conspired to lock Western man's consciousness within itself and he has lost touch with his world and his fellow man. In this regard, specialization within the academy is nothing more than a sign of our increasing self-preoccupation: we have compartmentalized inquiry just as we have reduced life itself to a set of calculations designed to guarantee security and "progress." Life has become what Jacques Ellul called *technique*.

Clearly, the only thing that can shake Western man out of his spiritual stupor, and bring about community within the academy and in society at large, is a sense of urgency about the task at hand and mutual dependence among all human beings, together with a rebirth of the conviction that life is tragic but nonetheless worth living and loving for its own sake. One suspects, however, that such a change can be brought about only by a profound shock: discovery follows, or accompanies, *peripeteia*.

Bird's book insists upon the fact that man's intellectual life requires both *mythos* and *logos*, and it reminds us, when we reflect on it, that man's spirit has diminished along with his intellect to the point where he is little more than a poor, bare, forked animal. But while it is lucid, Bird's diagnosis is rudimentary and the remedy suggested is therefore implausible. The resolution of the intellectual conflict between science and the humanities will not occur until man is forced by circumstances outside himself to attend to the still small voice of the human spirit within that demands a holistic approach to learning and wisdom in the place of knowledge.

Reviewed by HUGH MERCER CURTLER

## *Beyond Secularism*

### **Facing Up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion,**

by Peter L. Berger, *New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977. xix + 233 pp. \$11.50.*

PETER BERGER, a sociologist at Rutgers University, is not so much the author as he is the editor of this book—that is, the editor of his own writings. All but one of its eighteen chapters were originally published as essays in periodicals. Professor Berger has now collected them together, unrevised, and has added thirteen pages of introduction. This is unfortunate, not only because a few of the essays could stand some revision (like “The Blueing of America,” first published in 1971, which predicted that working-class youths would step into the key positions of power scorned by the sandal-making children of affluence), but also because it leads to an uneven thematic development. But I am determined to say no more about the flaws of this book, because there is so much more to say about its virtues. There may be unevenness in the development of its themes, but the themes are there for all to see.

Berger is a self-declared conservative, though his conservatism is broad enough to encompass elements of New Deal liberalism and New Left radicalism. If this seems to be carrying catholicity close to the border of incoherence, let me be more specific. Berger is a Christian, an apparently orthodox Lutheran, despite his claim to be “heretical.” He does not believe that God is dead; he thinks that the church should speak with authority instead of trying to be “with it”; and he predicts that if religion makes a comeback in America it will take place within a Judaeo-Christian framework. When it comes to social structures, Berger shares the Burkean-Tocquevillian view that the strength of a nation comes through traditional “mediating” institutions such as family and church. (It is in this context that he finds a good word

to say about the New Left: its members recognized the dangers of the all-encompassing state and experimented with their own mediating structures.) Politically and economically, Berger opposes socialism as well as such attempts at class-leveling as “affirmative action.”

These positions add up to conservatism, though a kind of conservatism which is closer to *The Public Interest* than to *The National Review*. Berger accepts many of the basic principles of the New Deal, and has no desire to turn the clock back to any bygone era (or at least no hope of doing so, though he does admit to a certain nostalgia for Maria Theresa’s Austro-Hungarian empire!). What makes this book remarkable stems not only from the fact that its author is both a Christian and a conservative but also from the fact that he is a sociologist. Since the time of Comte “the science of society” has often warred with Christianity and even tried to replace it. But Berger knows the “enemy” discipline so well—and loves it so much—that he can fight the secularists with their own weapons.

Relativization, for example, is a technique often used by social scientists to debunk religion. “You think you’re saving souls,” they say, “but what you’re really doing is bringing people peace of mind.” Which is all right, they sometimes concede, except that a trained psychiatrist can do the job at least as well without all the hocus-pocus. But supposing relativization is turned around and applied to the psychiatrists themselves. Berger is not concerned with what the psychiatrists think they are doing but what, given the structure of modern society, they *are* doing. He notes that “institutionalized psychologism” came along at a time when the bureaucratization of society had begun to cause people great anxiety as to how to define themselves. It filled a consumer “identity market.” Yet it was precisely these huge bureaucratic structures which also needed the skills of psychologists and “human-relations” experts as a means of insuring their control

over citizens and workers. Institutionalized psychotherapy came to perform a strategic rôle in American life; it straddled the line between public and private, commuting between home and office, while enjoying a quasi-official status in American life. Here Berger resembles Christopher Lasch, whose *Haven in a Heartless World* calls attention to the invasion of "the caring professions" into a realm once occupied by the family. Berger's analysis certainly dovetails with Lasch's (and with those of other critics of institutionalized psychiatry, such as Thomas Szasz and Martin Gross). His target, however, is bigger. What he finally has in mind is Irving Kristol's "new class," which includes not only the professional shrinks and social workers but the popularizers and communicators of secular culture: therapists, atheist theologians, radical academicians, all sorts of "innovators," and, of course, the media elites that bring them all into our living rooms. In Berger's analysis these evangelists play a "repressive" rôle in contemporary America—that is to say, they repress transcendence.

There are times when even the most worldly people may be struck with the notion that there could be something beyond this world—or above it, or inside it—which may be worth exploring. This is a dangerous thought. It threatens the monistic *Weltanschauung* of secular liberalism, a view of the world which Berger (borrowing from G. K. Chesterton) compares to that of "a slightly sleepy businessman right after lunch." But the experience of transcendence is a compelling one; left to themselves, people who have been brushed by it might start taking it seriously on its own terms. Thus there is a need for what Berger calls "reality policemen," whose function it is to account for those strange and frightening moments when, perhaps even without willing to do so, we find ourselves transcending—literally, "climbing over"—the world of secular liberalism. The "new class" plays this rôle. Its members serve to explain, which is to say explain away, those

moments as chimeras or "mystifications" of something that is happening in the "real" world. In another age these explainers would have been considered scandalous, but the circle has turned: now they serve to buttress the *status quo*. As seen from the command posts of American culture, it is the religious who are scandalous today; Berger invites anyone who wants to test this proposition "to make religious affirmations at an upper-middle-class cocktail party." Still, scandals have a way of spreading. The liberal-secular world of the 1970's is being pressured at a number of points. If it ever does crack, Berger will deserve a share of credit for the breakout.

Reviewed by GEORGE MCKENNA

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### *From the Heights*

**Zarathustra's Sister: The Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche**, by H.F. Peters, *New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1977. 243 pp. \$8.95.*

THIS IS THE SECOND biography H.F. Peters has written of a person important in Nietzsche's life. The first was of Lou Andreas-Salome, the remarkable woman who was for a short time loved by Nietzsche. Interest in Lou Salome, however, stems not just from her relationship with the German philosopher; her friendships spanned an amazing array of writers and scholars, including Rilke, Freud, and Buber, and she was a prolific essayist and novelist in her own right.

The same cannot be said for the subject of Peters' second biography, Nietzsche's sister, Elisabeth. Elisabeth was remarkable only for the banality of her intellect and character—an impression which Peters' book, building on the

brief accounts of Elisabeth's life so far available, strengthens. Whereas Lou, at the age of twenty-one, understood and appreciated Nietzsche's ideas to an extent he rarely encountered, Elisabeth, though she lived until she was almost ninety, understood few, if any, of them. As Rudolf Steiner remarked after fruitlessly attempting to tutor her in her brother's philosophy: ". . . her thinking is void of even the least logical consistency." Nor was Elisabeth possessed of a generous character that might have compensated for her intellectual deficiencies. Nietzsche nicknamed her "llama"—an animal which, when it does not want to go on, "turns its head round and discharges its saliva, which has an unpleasant odor, into the rider's face." There were many occasions throughout Elisabeth's life when she used her saliva—against her brother, her mother, close friends, and associates. After Nietzsche suffered a total and permanent breakdown in 1889 as a result of what was probably tertiary syphilis, Elisabeth gained control of his writings and not only became rich and famous from them (he had been unknown and impoverished throughout his career) but also falsified his manuscripts to make them conform to her own proto-Nazi beliefs. A friend of Hitler's when he came to power in the 'thirties, she was not even principled in her anti-Semitism, but took money, to the dismay of some of her friends, from Jews.

Yet, for all that, Elisabeth is a key figure—far more so than Lou Salome—in assessing Nietzsche's life and philosophy. Any discussion of Elisabeth raises the issue of the relationship between Nietzsche's ideas and the political uses to which they were put. *Zarathustra's Sister*, though not ignoring this issue, fails to deal adequately with it. This is unfortunate, for the work is on the whole immensely valuable; clearly and carefully written, it is the most complete and scholarly account of Elisabeth's life to date.

The problem with Peters' handling of Nietzsche's politics lies in his view that, although Elisabeth and the Nazis perverted Nietzsche's thought (nearly everyone nowadays is agreed on that much), Nietzsche was in some ways responsible for this perversion. This view

is, of course, not unreasonable but unfortunately the arguments Peters uses to support it are untenable. Thus, in the Preface, Peters comments: ". . . in Nietzsche's case, the relationship between the ideological content of his writings and their political impact is particularly striking, and not by accident—he willed it so . . . he demanded action, including political action that called for a new Caesar to transform the world."

Peters, like so many writers of the past, is not giving us the whole story here. As early as *Human-All-Too-Human*, Nietzsche denounced excessive state power in modern times as the heir of "Caesaristic despotism." The admiration Nietzsche felt for Caesar was for the "nobility" of his character, which could stand strong and independent at a time of degeneration and collapse, and not for any military or even specifically political achievement. In innumerable passages (for example, *The Gay Science*, 338 and 377; *Beyond Good and Evil*, 256; and *The Antichrist*, Preface), Nietzsche issues what is tantamount to a call *not* to engage in "political action" and even counsels willful ignorance of political events. As he said in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (II, 18): ". . . the greatest events—they are not our loudest but our stillest hours. Not around inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve; it revolves *inaudibly*."

Yet, for all that, it is true that Nietzsche "willed" that there be a relationship between his writings and their political impact, though some knowledge of Nietzsche's views is required to understand in just what way. For Nietzsche, healthy politics meant politics imbued with spiritual values, values which could only be maintained by strong individuals operating within a common social arena; his model for such politics was pre-Socratic Greece (a model to be studied, not imitated). It was precisely the crisis of modern civilization that it lacked such a common social arena. People's consciousness had expanded so far that politics was no longer "a public matter . . . a subject of common consciousness," as Tracy Strong says; faith in the Judaeo-Christian ethic, the morality which had for two-thousand years constituted the horizon of Western con-

sciousness, had faded from view, leaving only "atomistic chaos." The possible consequences of this state of affairs were terrible—the onset of nihilism, "upheavals . . . the like of which have never been dreamed of," the collapse of the structure of Western society.

What could be done? In at least one sense of the word, Nietzsche proposed no "solution." Rather, he felt that it was in the nature of the crisis that no solutions could be given; the structure on which such answers could arise has proved to be irremediably false. Toward political ideologies, whether socialist, fascist, or capitalist, Nietzsche expressed even-handed contempt, believing them to be both superficial and dangerous. They were superficial because they did not take into account the true nature of the crisis of modern civilization, which was moral, not economic. They were dangerous because they could possibly hasten the destruction of the old world moral order before materials could be gathered to build a new one. Unlike Marx, Nietzsche did not believe that a creative world-building process would follow a destructive one, and he was frightened by the prospect of nihilism. Nonetheless, he felt that such nihilism was inevitable in one form or another. What were needed to counter it were not doctrines or ideologies but spiritually strong individuals who could face the crisis in all its immensity and reach within themselves for new values to hold the world together. Toward such philosophers of the future—"truly political" men who could redraw the horizons of our consciousness—he directed both his hopes and writings.

Nietzsche's political perspective was thus mainly individualistic and only secondarily social; though deeply concerned with the future of Western society, he saw this future in terms of the individuals who would create it. It is probably this extreme individualism, more than any other aspect of Nietzsche's thought, that has caused his writings to be so widely misunderstood in our age.

Reviewed by HENRY McDONALD

## *To H-ll with the Kaiser*

**The Kaiser: Warlord of the Second Reich,**  
by Alan Palmer, *New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. 276 pp. \$14.95.*

IN THE CURRENT *Book of Lists* Germany's Kaiser William II ranks third among the "Ten Worst Well-Known Human Beings in History," below Attila and Adolf Hitler but above Idi Amin, Heinrich Himmler, and Joseph Stalin. So persisting has been the British-created World War I propaganda image that the villain label seems to be pinned forever on the shallow, mercurial, bombastic, but the essentially decent and well-meaning last Kaiser. From my own childhood memory I recall the diabolic Kaiser Bill, in 1918 the ogre of our third grade in Boston's Martha Baker School, along with his son the Clown Prince, the most loathsome figure of our time. Only the residual Victorian proprieties caused Miss Sykes, our teacher, to forbid our wearing celluloid pins inscribed *To H-ll with the Kaiser*. His title itself has become eponymous: "Kaiser" means the arch-villain William II.

Yet when this grandson of Queen Victoria was born, his birth was celebrated in England as if he were an English prince. After he came of age his grandmother made him the youngest foreign Knight of the Garter, Admiral of the Fleet—the first foreign sovereign to be so created—colonel of a British regiment. Indeed, Victoria died in his arms. When he passed through London after her funeral many of the buildings flew German flags beside the Union Jack. Nine years later Conan Doyle, seeing him in Edward VII's funeral procession, wrote that he looked "so noble that England has lost something of her old kindness if she does not take him back into her heart today." As late as July 1911, on a visit to England, the Kaiser was cheered in the streets, and when he went to the theater he was given a standing ovation. Yet five years later he had become the most hated man in the British Empire. So he has remained to the general public, however historians might revise opinions about him.

Mr. Alan Palmer's relatively short biography

of William II, more concerned with his politics than his private life, is the most enlightening study of the unenlightened Kaiser that has yet appeared. As Palmer explains at length, only fitfully did the real world break through the world of William's fantasy. He liked to think of himself as the supreme warlord, but it was only a kind of play. His father had been a field commander in the war against Austria, his uncle had entered Paris in 1814 on the heels of Napoleon, he himself liked to appear at masquerades as Frederick the Great. One of his permanent regrets was that he was never made a colonel of a Scottish regiment so that he might wear a kilt. For a quarter of a century he strutted a stage part, designed uniforms, travelled endlessly, led cavalry charges on maneuvers that would have led to annihilation in actual warfare, spouted improvised remarks on world affairs that outraged opinion in London, in Paris, and in his own foreign office. After one of his gaffes his mother complained to her mother, Queen Victoria: "I wish I could put a padlock on his mouth. I tremble for him—with all his rashness and obstinacy . . . he is a big baby." For all his passing moments of hatred, he loved England. Yet if he had not insisted with Admiral von Tirpitz and the Navy League in building up a fleet to rival the British, his deepest wish for an Anglo-German alliance might have been possible. The European War might have been avoided. As Palmer explains, "he was childishly vain over world policy, resenting any development which did not confirm his prejudices and convictions." He loved the posturing while avoiding actuality until it overwhelmed him in the war he had predicted would be over in a few months.

The Kaiser lacked discretion, judgment, application. Probably he would have been well-suited for the rôle of Lohengrin in a provincial opera house. Instead fate brought him at the age of thirty to rule the expansive parvenu Second Empire. Had William, Palmer writes,

. . . left day-to-day politics to the chancellor and his ministers while amusing himself with ships, uniforms and parades, then Germany might have worked out a practical

and smooth system of government. But the Kaiser still thought as an autocrat. He saw nothing inconsistent in suddenly intervening on a grand scale after weeks of remote control, ruling spasmodically by telegram . . . . The Kaiser's intervention in foreign affairs—after snap reactions to the whim of a moment—could destroy in a few hours the diplomacy of several weeks.

The war, which in his heart he never wanted and which made him a villain to the outside world, made him a cipher within Germany. By the Battle of the Marne he was no more than a spectator of events beyond his control, helpless as he watched his dynasty founder, then after the war a powerless exile for almost a quarter of a century. Palmer is particularly informative about those last years, William's reaction to and relations with National Socialism, a movement he despised while yet admiring in spite of himself the national resurgence that it conjured up. After the fall of France he could not refrain from sending Hitler a congratulatory telegram. He died two weeks before Hitler's invasion of Russia.

I fail to find in this or any earlier biography an explanation of the mysterious George Sylvester Viereck, German-born propagandist in the United States for Germany in both World Wars. Viereck was close to the Kaiser, acting as his literary agent between the wars. Was he, as has been rumored, William's illegitimate son, and if so by whom? The Kaiser was a highly moral family man, in contrast to his eldest son who, after a wastrel's life, died some time following World War II in the arms of a chambermaid. Yet the Crown Prince in writing to Viereck always addressed him as "cousin."

One major event that Palmer all but skips over is Chancellor Brüning's scheme to restore the monarchy in 1931 as a means of stemming the Nazi tide, with Hindenburg as regent for the Kaiser's grandson, Louis Ferdinand. Such a regency was something the Social Democrats, the trade unions, and the Catholic Center would have agreed to, but they could not accept the long-discredited ex-Kaiser. The scheme might have worked. But the Kaiser refused to consider any Hohenzol-

lern restoration except his own. Bruening was rebuffed, the moment passed—possibly the last free moment for Germany.

It is seldom given to a man to destroy his country twice, yet that was the achievement of the well-meaning last Kaiser. His astute and able father, the unfortunate Kaiser Frederick William, would never have succumbed to the jingoistic naval rivalry with England, and he would certainly have avoided going to war in 1914. William blundered into that and the doom of his dynasty. In 1931 as an old man he might have saved his country from a far greater evil by renouncing his rights to his lost throne. Without this renunciation, Hindenburg, the creaky senile monarchist, would not accept the regency for Louis Ferdinand, the only tolerable Hohenzollern. And instead of King Log Germany received King Stork.

Reviewed by FRANCIS RUSSELL

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## *A Matter of Interpretation*

### **Final Entries 1945: The Diaries of Joseph**

**Goebbels**, edited, introduced, and annotated by Hugh Trevor-Roper, translated from the German by Richard Barry, *New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1978. xli + 368 pp. \$14.95.*

THIS VOLUME contains the last surviving part of the author's diaries, which he began in 1924, and covers the period from February 27 to April 9, 1945, with some entries missing, which are properly noted. Neither the author, the famous or infamous Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment in National Socialist Germany, nor the editor, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper, the eminent British historian of seventeenth-century England and of National Socialist Germany, is in need of any further introduction here. What is valuable to the reader is the editor's illuminating and analytical evaluation

of the character of Goebbels and his meaningful interpretation of the daily entries in the diary. Also helpful is the brief documentary history of Goebbels' diary presented by Peter Stadelmayer, which makes clear the authenticity of the diaries that Goebbels regarded "as his most valuable possession." The diary material published here comes from a microfilm copy originating in East Germany and is part of a large amount of material received by Hoffman and Campe, the publisher of the German edition, who now possesses copies of almost 16,000 pages of the diaries from the years 1924 to April 1945 as well as other written material from Goebbels' papers.

Stadelmayer points out that up to July 8, 1941, Goebbels wrote his diary entries in manuscript; that thereafter he dictated them to a stenographer; that each of the daily entries begins with the "Military Situation" presented every morning to a small group in Goebbels' study by the liaison officer from the High Command of the German Armed Forces; that the "Military Situation" paragraphs reproduced in this book were drafted by the liaison officer and the stenographer; and that Goebbels' dictated entries were never reviewed by him for publication, which explains many of the careless errors which otherwise he would have corrected.

Necessary for the reader also is an important note by the translator, indicating that, in the German edition, the date of dictation that was used produced some erroneous statements, and that, therefore, in this English language edition, the dates of the entries are those on which the events in question occurred, thus requiring the omission of the word "yesterday" from the "Military Situation" sub-headings and from the text.

Trevor-Roper's compact introductory essay, analyzing and delineating the character and personality of Goebbels from his own writings, from the writings of his biographers, and from other writings about him, such as those of Albert Speer and Alfred Rosenberg, and culminating in the interpretation of these *Final Entries*, is superb and should prove to be most helpful to readers who proceed to make their own interpretations and evaluations. Although

some readers will agree with the editor's analysis of the diary entries, others will disagree, given the infinite variety to which interpretation is subject. In many respects it depends on who is interpreting the thoughts of the diarist and what the conditions are that shape the diarist's thoughts at the time, as well as when the interpretation is being made and what the conditions are that shape the thoughts of the interpreter at that time.

The conditions shaping the thoughts of the diarist are those of the months of February, March, and April 1945, during which period the continuing destruction, invasion, and final defeat of National Socialist Germany by the Armed Forces of the Allied powers was to take place, while the German Armed Forces fought to prevent their defeat and while the civilian population struggled to survive. The conditions shaping the thoughts of interpreters are those experienced through the war years and the years since 1945, during which Hitler's Third Reich, and all that it represented, had been condemned as a "criminal" despotism. Other events of a catastrophic character—wars, revolutions, atrocities, and disasters of nature—have marked the years to the present.

Who then may be interpreters? A German National Socialist survivor of the war years? A German citizen of West Germany or of East Germany, who is of the older generation or the new? A foreigner of the younger generation? A foreign participant in the war who has survived, such as Trevor-Roper or this reviewer? It is a problem. (Has it not been said that "you can make anything you want out of a document"?)

In the last few pages of his introductory essay the editor concludes his interpretation of the diary with a number of observations too numerous to be cited here. Indicative of the whole, however, may be his observations that "Goebbels on every page is true to himself" and that

Here we see his opportunism, his radicalism, his nihilism, his hatred of humanity; but also his incredible mental energy, his unflinching flair for propaganda, and his personal courage. Most prominent of all, perhaps, is his passion for destruction.

This reviewer does not deny that these and other observations may be made from a study of

the diary, nor that there is any need for the editor "to summarize the dramatic history of those weeks or Goebbels' reactions to them." But quite apart from the value of the editor's introductory essay, the reports on the military situation and Goebbels' reactions to the events of those weeks do make up the essential and most valuable aspects of the diary and underline the reasons why it should be read, as tragic and depressing as it is.

The diary gives us an additional account of a people and a state fighting for survival against overwhelming odds; a people and a state in the process of being defeated and destroyed, their land overrun by hostile forces, their life snuffed out in chaos and death. The diary also confirms the rivalries and animosities of the National Socialist leaders (in this case Goebbels' denigration of Goering, Ribbentrop, and others) and discloses the hopes and fears, the illusions and fantasies of Goebbels, of Hitler, of Himmler, of Ribbentrop, and other leaders grasping for straws in defeat, as well as the stop-gap civilian and military measures to avoid it. The diary gives us the daily reactions of Goebbels to the domestic situation, to the military situation, and to the reports on the foreign political situation. It contains the substance of his many conversations (those with Hitler being especially significant) and of his continuous propaganda activity to counter the breakdown of morale by strengthening the people's hopes in some last minute miracle. It also gives us those apparently negative, or abnormal, components of Goebbels' personality, in part caused by the conditions of war, there being hardly anything normal about such conditions.

The editor has also annotated the diary so that persons mentioned in it are identified and listed in a name index. *Final Entries* includes a place index, a selection of photographs, a Gazetteer to identify the names of battle sites used by Goebbels and their 1977 equivalents, two outline maps, a detailed chronology from January 1 to August 2, 1945, and appendices, the most significant of which are the letters of Goebbels and his wife to Harold Quandt, dated April 28, 1945, and Goebbels' appendix to Adolph Hitler's Will and Testament, dated

April 29, 1945, indicating not only their loyalty to Hitler and Germany but also their suicidal intentions, which were carried out. Thus the reader of the diary is richly aided as he makes his own interpretation and evaluation of Goebbels and his account of the last days of National Socialist Germany.

Reviewed by HENRY M. ADAMS

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## *Jacques Ellul's Bad Dream*

**The Betrayal of the West**, by Jacques Ellul, translated from the French by Matthew J. O'Connell, *New York: The Seabury Press, 1978. ix + 207 pp. \$9.95.*

M. JACQUES ELLUL had dreamed a bad dream. He has envisioned the end of things—things once held precious and dear by a noble civilization. But, as when recollected in the aftermath, the *dramatis personae* of this nightmare appear as vague, shadowy images and formless specters, though nonetheless haunting in their menacing powers. Ellul lashes out at these dark and sinister elements and summons them to his judgments. There are the new primitivists whose siren call would tempt us back to an innocent nature and unshackle modern man from the suffocation of civilized restraints. The irrationalists, lurking everywhere, rediscover body language and do away with rational discourse. The Third World, betraying the great hopes of the naive, gives us savagery without nobility and projects new tyrannies upon the world. Cynics and power-worshippers prevail on the Left. Utopian dreamers perfect the art of managerial despotism and override all freedoms. And the “intellectuals,” vaguest and most awesome demons of all, spell our doom with the fallacies of their pens. For among this group especially lurks that “self-destructive rage” that year by year corrupts and tarnishes “the great western venture.”

But our dreams have always something to do with reality. That Ellul cannot refine and sharpen the slippery symbols of his little treatise by no means certifies that he is speaking of meaningless issues. The cause that he defends is a real one and worthy of his effort, and this pensive and prolific scholar here accentuates the positive. The West is being betrayed and Ellul rises to defend it. He is no Sir Gowan and expects no great victories, though. The West is doomed by the irrevocable contradictions of its own history.

To be sure, Ellul is no blind apologist. Readers familiar with his works know him as a penetrating critic of our technological society and the political apparatus erected under its auspices. Nor does Ellul disregard the awesome controls inflicted on the world by the West's pursuit of power. Accepting this sad fact of history, Ellul retaliates with a capsule summary of the barbarisms of the non-Western world. What is more decisive, he believes, is the fact that reforms and revolutions that inspired the elimination of historic abuses—for instance, foot-binding and the subjugation of women—were Western inspirations. For revolution is a uniquely Western way, and “nowhere in the world . . . has there been a revolution, not even in China, until the western message penetrated that part of the world.” The West has taught the world; the world rises against the West only because it has been a good pupil.

Ellul looks at the rest of our globe and sees amidst its turmoil the quest for freedom and liberty. And in these great concerns the unique contribution of the West is bearing its fruit. For “it was Christianity that did away with the ideas of destiny and fate.” The Greeks had assured the dominance of reason and the unquenchable drive of intellect. But the Western formula is really completed only when we add the special emphasis of discipline and self-control. The careful pursuit of these qualities alone made possible the gains of reason and freedom. Ellul brooks no romantic talk of spontaneity and natural human goodness and perceives in our modern Dionysian illusions the decadence of Silenus. Around these passages the conservative strains of Ellul's sentiments are most pro-

nounced. He yearns for the disciplining effect of reason, but fears its uncontrollable quest for efficiency and mechanical precision. Reason itself needs the discipline of myth and symbol; it must humble itself beside the mystery of the supernatural. It was Christianity then that provided the last special ingredient of the Western psyche. Agape now merged with Eros and their peculiar, fragile, precarious balance, their dialectical tension, has fashioned the Western experience and the great achievements that describe it. Ellul thus greatly fears all unreflecting liberationist philosophies. The new morality of "instantaneous desire" is next of kin to that hatred of reason that accompanies the new upsurge of primitivism and recalls Rousseau. And Ellul warns: "The man who is free with the conscious deliberate freedom for which the West stands cannot be a man of utter spontaneity, a man utterly unfettered." The West stands for "the subtle, infinitely delicate interplay of freedom and reason."

Conservative thinkers from Edmund Burke to Irving Babbitt have built on this kind of perspective. But Ellul's narrative goes on to a confusing admixture of terminology and prescription that compromises his traditionalism. The West, he believes, failed to preserve the critical balance that sparked its genius. Reason cannot long live with dialectical tension. It must eliminate by assimilation. Christ did not die on Calvary; he died slowly as the will to intellectual domination consumed all. Modern man has mastered creation and has no further need of providence; Christianity has been domesticated; modern theology despises the once awesome gap that marked the sacred from the profane, the natural from the supernatural, and gave the Western imagination its necessary and sustaining sense of mystery. This, for Ellul, is the internal death the West has suffered. But the external death is even more decisive.

Reason must operate as an external principle, which Ellul in his several works has labeled *technique*. For whereas Western man's earlier alienation was first political (18th century) and then economic (19th century), it is now described as a spiritual alienation that springs from the complete rationalization of all

spheres of our lives. Ellul's language is thoroughly Marcusean. Technical alienation has absorbed political and economic alienation. "Technique has thoroughly permeated the structure of the state and the economic structure; political power and the economy continue to be causes of alienation, but in the form now of the technized state and the technized economy." Furthermore modern alienation is amorphous. Man feels dispossessed of himself but cannot articulate the cause of his alienation. A pervasive breakdown of personality describes the prevailing condition. For this reason, Marxist revolution, and all its shrill mimics, have become irrelevant. The revolution, Ellul insists, "must take place within man himself and not his structures."

Now Ellul has reached a critical juncture. Who can save the West? Radical opposition of some kind is required if the technological superstructure is to be undone. Some brave spiritual movement must rally the necessary strength to avert the fallen personality, recover the individual freedom that rational technique has quietly extinguished. Ellul looks leftward for a sign of help. The Left, he says, was once the real bearer of the great Western tradition, its authentic voice, "the promise of the world's future," nothing less! And now his anger rises. For the Left (one of the most amorphous of all the specters in this volume), has betrayed the West. It has gorged itself on outmoded symbolism, staid formulas, and meaningless rhetoric. To the Left all problems are political ones and demand political solutions. But the political has been assimilated by the technological system. The Left strives merely to take over that system and is drunk with power. The more it resorts to political strategy the more it builds itself into the structure and the less revolutionary it becomes. Ellul is righteously indignant: "It is a fact that the Left no longer makes any claim to be revolutionary. It has buried the revolution and is calmly getting ready to take and keep power . . . its function in modern society is to prevent the revolution." And so it betrays the West, which has always advanced by revolution.

Ellul has offered a Marcusean diagnosis of

our ills, but rejects a Marcusean prescription for their cure. For he sees no help in a radical reconstruction of thought. The appeal to ideology, the recourse to absolutist concepts, the exercise of the utopian imagination—these will avail nothing. To his credit, Ellul will not be fooled. He describes the utopian mentality as the quintessential exercise of reason and technique. In its passion for the managed society it epitomizes the megalomaniac worship of efficiency. The Utopian's ultimate hope is education, and he will teach us even how to make love. Our contemporary public schools now bring the death of sexuality, depriving love of mystery, romance, and dream. Rational eros, the quest for power, has conquered agape and absorbed all.

Ellul is thoroughly pessimistic; he sees no way out. *The Betrayal of the West*, building on the insightful diagnoses of Ellul's other works, weaves an outline of history that closes in on itself with impending doom. Ellul's dialectical mind has afforded him many perceptive glances at the modern situation. His *The Technological Society* (1964) illustrated the collectivist tendencies that transcend the political and ideological divisions of the twentieth-century world. *Propaganda* (1965) superbly diagnosed the dilemma of modern mass politics and warned that even honest democracies face unavoidable tyrannies in their efforts to govern. And *The Political Illusion* (1967) described the modern obsession with politics and popular solutions to our problems. Politics has consumed man's imagination and all else is uninteresting. And so goes the crisis of the West. But it must be asked of Ellul, who so skillfully describes the external machinery of our world, whether he has not too easily surrendered the entire human spirit to it, and whether his vision is not too narrowly Western. Has not Ellul too facilely joined to the predictable and efficient world of technique, which he so dreads, the radical and dynamic freedom of the human spirit? He who calls for the internal revolution despairs to look within for the means of its realization. He looks only to the Left, from whence cometh little help. But the right use of reason that Ellul cherishes must be combined with the right use of imagination,

one that is disciplining and conducive of self-mastery. Instead, Ellul wants to find help from a radical tradition that seized the expansionist imagination of Rousseau and put it to work in the arena of politics. Ellul overlooks the insights of a Western conservative tradition shaped by its classical and Christian ingredients, a tradition that might effect some melioristic way through the genuine nightmare that modern technology has set upon us. Drawing so heavily as he does on the literature of modern sociology, Ellul offers us little help in effecting the spiritual transformation that would save us. What Ellul's analyses consistently lack is an adequate philosophy of human nature. There is much in the Western tradition, which he feigns to uphold, that quite escapes his attention. One hastens to add that there is much in the Eastern tradition too.

Reviewed by J. DAVID HOEVELER, JR.

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## *A Faustian Pact?*

### **American Higher Education 1945-1970:**

**A Personal Report**, by Nathan M. Pusey, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978. 204 pp. \$10.00.

DR. NATHAN PUSEY was president of Lawrence College from 1944 to 1953, and of Harvard University from 1953 to 1971. Subsequently, until 1975, he was president of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. With the perspective of a long and distinguished career of academic leadership, Dr. Pusey has written an account of what he considers the more important developments in higher education in a period of phenomenal change. He argues that the time from the end of World War II to about 1970 "constituted a definable and notable period in the history of higher education," and one which "has claims to be considered the most creative yet experienced in the on-going development of higher education in the United States." It

opened at a time of general euphoria and hopefulness and came to an end with the institutions "facing a sharp decline in public favor, the prospect of shrinking enrollments, an impending end to growth, intensified financial difficulties, and increasing government regulations."

Although the book emphasizes the positive achievements of the period, it includes a chapter on two damaging conflicts which were "roadblocks" in a time of general advancement. The first was the anti-intellectualism, hostile to all professors and threatening to academic freedom, which arose with anti-Communist fears in an early period of the Cold War. The author describes the unfair and inflammatory attacks and the courageous resistance made by the more responsible academic leaders, rejecting the simplifications of extremists on both sides who thought there was "a single, correct way of dealing with all the cases that arose." The other conflict, stimulated by anti-Vietnam emotions, came in the late 1960's with radical anti-Establishment violence led by student militants and joined by many faculty. Pusey expresses strong distaste for "this new breed of scoundrels" whose activism was seriously divisive and fraught with unfortunate consequences from which higher education has not recovered. "If the McCarthy era was a 'scoundrel time,' so was this; and its saddest feature was that in this instance the attacks on the colleges and universities were contrived and mounted very largely by their own people." Unhappily, "members of faculties often seemed less mature than the majority of students in their readiness to accept contrived student protests at face value and to encourage misdirected demonstrations." These disorders brought normal academic life "almost to a standstill" for a few years and have much of the responsibility for bringing a creative period in higher education to "a confused and dispiriting close."

The most dramatic part of this history, however, is not the story of the conflicts but the facts given in two closely-related chapters on finance and on graduate education and research capability. Here the cool language of statistics, even allowing for population growth and inflation, reveals the dimensions of a

phenomenal change. Graduate study began in this country about one hundred years ago and advanced in the late nineteenth century, but its explosive expansion came in this century: in 1900 there were about 6,000 graduate students and 250 doctorates conferred; by 1940 there were 100,000 students and 3,000 doctorates; in 1970, 800,000 students and 30,000 doctorates. Many forces prompted this growth, but Pusey stresses the impact of a new concept of the role of the universities in research and in relation to the federal government that emerged in the Second World War. In 1940 there was only \$74 million of federal money for support of research and development, chiefly carried on in government laboratories. Suddenly, during the war years, the figure rose to \$1.5 billion, and there was a revolutionary shift to the support of research through contractual arrangements with universities and scientific institutes. Prior to 1940 all the colleges and universities never had more than \$27 million a year for the support of research, with virtually all coming from private sources. By the mid-1960's institutions of higher education had more than \$1.8 billion for research, chiefly in the physical and biological sciences—and \$1.5 billion of this was from agencies of the federal government.

The spectacular developments in research and related graduate studies, along with a vast expansion of undergraduate enrollments, brought a formidable increase in the total costs of higher education. In 1940 the expense of operating all the colleges and universities had been \$600 million; by 1970 it was \$24 billion, \$4 billion of it annually from some forty agencies of the federal government. Federal funds, heavily committed to the sciences, brought changes in emphases and priorities, especially in the most research-oriented universities. Before World War II "scientists had not replaced humanists as the most prominent and most honored members of university faculties." But the humanities and other disciplines had a share in the increased enrollments and improved faculty salaries, and Pusey remarks, perhaps wryly, that it was "to the delight of the humanists" that NDEA funds became available for modern foreign languages as well as for

science and mathematics. Faced with enormous costs and increased demands for their services, many institutions became excessively dependent on federal funds, and by the end of the period were concerned "not so much because the federal agencies might interfere with their freedom of action, as because the support . . . was not keeping pace with rising costs and inflation."

The chapters have told of growth and achievements "to be remembered happily and gratefully, perhaps even to be celebrated." But the author concedes that "not all was gain," and that "there were and are legitimate grounds for entertaining reservations." The emphasis on advanced research "tended to lessen faculty concern for undergraduate education in universities." The uneven distribution of funds brought distorting outside pressures on the curriculum and led to heightened personal and departmental rivalries in the academic community.

Although the author closes his survey with 1970, he observes that additional "worrisome elements" were becoming visible by that time. An over-expansion in graduate schools had created for many young people expectations that could not be fulfilled. A direct result of the student militance of the late 1960's was the relaxation or even elimination of requirements for degrees and their replacement by "individually initiated programs of study bereft of any organizing principle." Moreover, there was increasing evidence that a price had to be paid for federal support. In the late 1960's all institutions receiving federal aid were required to develop programs of affirmative action; and though "the quarrel was with the means rather than the ends," the institutions increasingly resented the enormous and expensive burden of paper work and the "mounting evidence that the educational institutions, even the so-called 'private' ones, were losing the privilege of controlling their own affairs."

A final chapter reviews conflicting ideas on the aims of higher educations, especially on the extent to which colleges and universities should be direct agents of social change. The author admits that no definition of aims will be universally accepted, and that higher educa-

tion "inevitably and quite properly, came to serve a variety of purposes." In a final personal statement, however, he aligns himself with the conservative view that although colleges and universities have always had and met a responsibility to serve the practical needs of society, their people "need to preserve a degree of detachment from the world of practice." He takes his stand with those "devoted to the humanities" who insist that literary and historical studies ought to have a significant place for all students in higher education.

This book has described a period of extraordinary expansion and prosperity in higher education and one whose achievements, especially in the sciences, must be a matter of pride and satisfaction. Nevertheless, the reader who shares the author's concern for the humanities and for the independence and detachment of the academic enterprise is left with troubling questions. In the light of the observation that "there are reasons why academics, intent on their own intellectual aims, should share the conservative distrust of big government," perhaps it may be asked whether at least part of this story is that higher education has made a Faustian pact and must look to repayment.

Reviewed by CHARLES D. MURPHY

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## *The Alchemy of Art*

### **Person, Place, and Thing in Henry**

**James's Novels**, by Charles R. Anderson,  
*Durham, North Carolina: Duke University  
Press, 1977. 308 pp. \$12.75.*

PROFESSOR ANDERSON quotes from James' 1875 essay on Balzac, concerning the French novelist's "mighty passion for things . . . [his] overmastering sense of the present world [which] gave him . . . his background, his *mise-en-scène*." From Balzac, according to Anderson, James got his first suggestion of a

means—besides that of a central consciousness—to cope with the problem of relationships between characters. It is Anderson's principal working thesis that James' characters establish relationships with each other "only indirectly through the places and things that symbolize what they are." Anderson quotes also from *The Portrait of a Lady* (though without stressing the irony that the speaker, in conversation, is the somewhat unsavory Madame Merle):

. . . every human being has his shell . . . you must take the shell into account. By the shell I mean the whole envelope of circumstances. . . . What do you call one's self? It overflows into everything that belongs to us. . . . I have a great respect for *things*! One's self—for other people—is one's expression of one's self; and one's house, one's clothes, the books one reads, the company one keeps—these things are all expressive.

Anderson's discussion focuses on six novels, chosen for their representativeness, as well as for the different challenges they offer to his thesis. There is in addition considerable use made of James' nonfictional writing: travel essays, essays on art and on the theater, literary criticism, letters, biographical and autobiographical works.

The relevance of most of these to Anderson's interpretive approach is perhaps easily enough recognized. The symbolic quality of a setting—a city, a quartier, a street, a palazzo—is analyzed in its context and function within the novel; but also, our understanding of it is increased by the added dimension achieved by tracing out James' initial, recorded reaction in a travel essay. Similarly references to *The Painter's Eye* aid our understanding of James' use of paintings for their emblematic significance in rendering character and consequently relationships, all the way from the crude copies perpetrated by Noémie Nioche in *The American* to the Bronzino portrait in *The Wings of the Dove*. However, especially in these two areas of travel and art, Anderson refuses to confine himself to the study, the library, no matter how well

equipped. He takes great delight, it is clear, in physically covering the ground himself, retracing James' steps or the steps of a character in a novel. He details for us (as James does not) the route Hyacinth Robinson follows to call for Millicent Henning in Pimlico and from thence escort her to the Strand Theatre. "By bending over to read it upside down," Anderson, apparently acting on his own prescription, makes out the Latin text in the book held by Lucrezia in the Bronzino (scholarly curiosity triumphing over professorial dignity). Thumb-ing through the collection of reproductions in the Courtauld Institute he discovers that the crucial river scene in *The Ambassadors* is less closely paralleled by a Lambinet than by Claude Monet's *La Seine à Vétheuil*.

James' literary criticism obviously did not serve in the same way as sources of place and thing. There are minor exceptions, from his criticism or simply his reading of other writers. "Many of Dickens' descriptions of streets and street scenes in *Oliver Twist* must have been recalled by James as he wrote *The Princess [Casamassima]*"; and Anderson finds a possible clue for the pub called the "Sun and Moon" in a favorite hangout of Bill Sikes. But the literary criticism served chiefly as aid to James, by observation of the trials and experimentation of his fellow craftsmen, in developing in his own way and for his own purposes the transformative process. "James shaped his own art by learning from many masters," Anderson says. Much of what he learned was to the good. Yet on occasion, when he obtained more from them than suggestions concerning fictional techniques, the results were less happy. *The American*, for example, is for the greater part a promising comedy of manners, but in the concluding third it breaks down into a formula-type melodrama, the fault, Anderson holds, of James' being too much influenced by George Sand and the dramatist Émile Augier.

Place and thing often provide Anderson with a controlling symbol or metaphor for his chapters on the individual novels, or for subsections within chapters. Rome becomes a controlling symbolic cityscape for part of the discussion of *Roderick Hudson*; Paris, for part of that of *The*

*Ambassadors*. "Abyss" and "labyrinth" pair for thematic purposes in the discussion of *The Wings of the Dove*. For *The American* Anderson draws upon a phrase in a letter from James to William Dean Howells concerning "walls which fatally divide us," American from European—walls of language, art, and manners. *The American* has of course its own physical walls, with their own symbolic force—those of the Hôtel de Bellegarde, those of the convent where Madame de Cintré is immured—which Anderson uses along with his more inclusive metaphor. For *The Portrait of a Lady* there is the contrast of "vistas"—"opening" vistas in the Italian sense of the word as panorama; "closing" vistas in the English sense of a long corridor whose lines seem to converge in the distance; with Isabel Archer's ultimate finding of "the infinite vista of a multiplied life to be a dark, narrow alley with a dead wall at the end." But Anderson points out, too, the somber significance that even the "opening" vistas—Gardencourt, Italy to Isabel's first view, the Tuscan hills and valleys from Osmond's terrace—"are set in a waning afternoon or in actual twilight, and in the autumn of the year or something that is akin to it."

Anderson gives general acknowledgment, and specific acknowledgment whenever he can, to other critics who have dealt with James' symbolizing techniques. His thesis does not make the pretense of being ambitiously new, designed to render all previous interpretations of James obsolete. It is nevertheless new in the sense of viewing from a different window, so that we are presented with a different perspective, as well as the sudden appearance of things not seen before. Along with this there is the thorough working-out in detail and the considerable body of material brought in from outside the novels themselves to bear on their interpretation. The book as consequence is not one that loses a good part of its value as soon as its thesis is grasped and understood, but rather one that the Jamesian—whether scholar or, in the best sense of the word, amateur—will want to keep within close reach on his shelf.

Reviewed by RAYMOND THORBERG

## *The True Victors*

**Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945**, edited by Paul K. T. Sih, *Hicksville, N. Y.: Exposition Press, 1977, 435 pp. \$20.00.*

FORGERY OF HISTORY is like a counterfeit currency which is deceptively close to the truth, but easily detected. When the Chinese Communists rewrote history by proclaiming that it was they (the CCP) who fought and won the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, debunkers merely needed to point to the fact that the recent picture of Chiang Ching, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan, taken with Hua Kuo-feng during the September 1976 funeral service of Mao in Peking, was altered after the downfall of the "gang of four" for the sake of political expediency. It was not the first time for the CCP boldly to insult the people's intelligence, and it will not be the last.

Amid the intellectual bandwagonism of studies on the CCP since 1971, little research has been done in solid pursuit of China's wartime history and biased views have prevailed in the very limited publications on the subject. It is refreshing to see that this anthology of war history finally got published. As a sequel tome to the excellent *Strenuous Decade 1927-1937*, the present volume is another outstanding contribution by the eminent scholar Professor Paul Sih. It is a result of the Conference on Wartime China 1937-1945 held from April 30 to May 2, 1976. Twenty-two scholars from the U.S. and the Republic of China took part in the conference and ten papers were presented covering a wide range of major subjects related to the historical background of the war, war strategy, wartime education, food supplies, economic development and war financing, wartime parliament, relationships between regional and central governments, and the foreign relations between the Soviet Union and China. Other important issues which

were not covered, such as war literature and the youth movement, had been dealt with during the 18th Annual Conference of the American Association for Chinese Studies in November 1976.

As a member of the war generation, this reviewer completed his college education during the war period and actually witnessed some of the brutal war itself. It is, thus, somewhat difficult to pretend to remain objective when some critical judgments have to be made on the papers and comments included in this volume.

Historically, the 1927 Tanaka Memorial's proposition of converting China into Japan's "continental empire," the Amai Statement insisting on American hands-off policy on Japan's grand strategy on China in 1933, Hirota's "Three-Point Principle" of 1934 and Japan's aggressive moves in northern China in 1935-1936 had prompted China to take a number of national salvation measures, such as China's New Life Movement in 1934, the National Economic Reconstruction Movement in 1935 and the continuation of nation-building efforts in the strenuous decade of 1927-1937. After the Sian Incident of 1936, Japan, which was alarmed by China's quickened drive of national unity under Chiang's leadership, decided to accelerate her aggression against China. This fact alone should suffice to refute the Chinese Communists' charge that it was China's weakness that encouraged Japan's aggression.

If there was any singular outstanding contribution made by China to the war in the Far East, China's strategy of a war of attrition should be recognized. It was Nationalist China which was willing to make all the sacrifices necessary to putting up a bitter resistance through a "protracted war of attrition" during the first four years. As a result, Japan was mired in the China theater. More significantly, President Chiang Kai-shek adamantly refused to sign a separate truce agreement during the repeated peace offensives launched by the Japanese during the war. If the Nation-

alists had signed a separate peace agreement with Japan, the latter in turn could have freed her manpower and resources to advance her aggressive plans against the West and the other Asiatic nations, it would not be hard to conceive what the outcome of World War II might have been. China's strategy of "trading space for time" eventually proved that the Western Allies' war plan of "Europe first, Asia second" had fatally crippled China's war effort throughout the duration. It is unfair to either downgrade or blame China for her war effort. Professor Wu Hsiang-hsiang articulated this point very well in his essay on "Total Strategy Used by China and Some Major Engagements in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945."

War education under the leadership of Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, epitomized China's relentless endeavor to preserve the continuity of her cultural legacy. Under the Nationalist government's wartime education system, massive student financial assistance programs were instituted and maintained. As a result, many students, including this present writer, were able to continue and finish their higher education during the war. Despite the costly war, the Nationalist government had never forgotten to live up to its political accountability and cultural commitment to educate its young people. Out of the 108 colleges and universities in 1939, 52 joined the government's relocation campaign and started their own "10,000-mile long march" to the rear. During the academic years of 1936-1944, students and faculties were increased from 2,166,377 to 3,871,688. Because of its painstaking effort in expanding wartime education, the Nationalist government should be credited for providing the sorely needed opportunities for students and for making it possible for the many leading Chinese nuclear physicists of today to receive their earlier training in China with few disruptions during the war, as well as to advance their further training and careers abroad in later years. Putting their political allegiance and educational

ingratitude aside, Yang Chen-ning and Lee Tsung-dao, two Nobel laureates, owe their education and careers to the national sacrifices made by both the people and the nation during the war. In *The China Cloud*, William L. Ryan and Sam Summerlin cited Cheng Chu-yuan's survey on *Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963* saying that more than three thousand five hundred Chinese students were at colleges and universities in the U.S. at the end of 1949, when China fell under the control of Communist armies and the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, 80 physicists, engineers, chemists, geologists and mathematicians were among the many U.S. trained scientists who subsequently returned to the China mainland. In fact, many leading scientists, including Chien San-ch'iang and Chien Hsueh-shen, who worked on Communist China's bomb and missile projects in the 1950's and 1960's were the products of wartime education under the Nationalist government.

In contrast to the intellectual persecution and educational demolition resulting from the CCP's Cultural Revolution, the CCP has failed to produce a single world-renowned scientist since 1949. The Nationalist government, however, remains committed to the nation's long tradition of education and scholarship by making Taiwan the foremost center of Chinese human resources, by sending thousands of students abroad for advanced training in science each year since 1954. In addition, many leading American sinologists, including Theodore de Bary, Martin Wilbur, Joseph Levenson, among others, were recipients of scholarships established by the Chinese government during the war period. In this regard, Professors Ou Tsuin-chen, John Israel and Chun-fan Mao have made solid analyses in the chapter on "Education in Wartime China."

Issues concerning food production and distribution for civilian and military requirements, wartime economic development and public finances as well as China's struggle in developing its overland trans-

portation system, were carefully analyzed in the book with little partiality. What must be pointed out is that the government of the Republic of China was faced with tremendous political difficulties when it had to deal with, in addition to the Japanese invaders, six other *de facto* political entities throughout China during the war, *i.e.*, the CCP's border governments, Wang Ching-wei's puppet government at Nanking, the puppet government of Manchukuo, the puppet government in Mongolia, the puppet government in Sinkiang, and other regional "independent kingdoms" of warlords. Critics of the Nationalist government have been unfairly ignoring this fact and unreasonably expecting the Nationalists to effectively carry on the national reconstruction task when the war devastation was going on full blast. Yet, Nationalist China managed to fight her war with Japan independently for the first four years without any aid from Western countries. China was ravaged by war which led to disruptions of food production and distribution. Rampant inflation caused further economic distress and social crises. Professor Chi-ming Hou and his colleagues have put the war economy in a much better perspective with their critical and incisive scholarship in their essay on "Economic Development and Public Finance in Wartime China."

As for political construction, it is a stark fact that the Chinese Communists skillfully masterminded a plausible campaign for *democracy* as a battle cry for mobilizing intellectuals and politicians to side with them against the Nationalists. Many intellectuals and members of the Democratic League who thought of the CCP as the champion of democracy, were willing either to run political interference for them or fight their ideological battles. The Nationalist government was in good faith when it decided to set up the National Political Council to reach a national consensus through cooperation with non-KMT leaders and members of other political groups. It was an honest effort on the government's part to invite the

CCP, the Democratic League and others to participate in the discussion of national issues and the policy-making process. It may be a political truism that war and democracy should go hand in hand and a coalition government could be formed to include the CCP and members of other political parties or groups. But the CCP had grown so strong militarily and really wanted nothing but a total victory. Unlike Euro-communists the CCP had never been interested in parliamentary politics sharing the political power through a coalition government. Professor Sih cited the eye-witness report of Li Huang, founder of the China Youth Party and a participant of the National Political Council: "The KMT originally intended to request the CCP to give up their army as a prerequisite for political collaboration. For this reason, we, the third party, proposed at the very beginning of the Political Consultative Conference a policy of 'Nationalization of the Army and Democratization of Political Institution.'" But the CCP refused to relinquish its army. How could it be possible for the government to make democracy work, if the CCP was only interested in military victory and not in political reconciliation?

What would happen to the constitutional government and democracy in the United States, if a democratic administration was challenged militarily by a well-armed Republican Party who professed to gain their political power through the barrel of a gun? Simply looking at the sad historical facts this was much the situation of the Nationalist leaders before their flight to Taiwan. Chang Po-chun, Lo Lung-chi, Chu An-ping, among others, during the so-called "hundred-flower bloom and hundred-school contend" campaign in 1957, one would know that it is utterly casuistic for any thinking scholar still trying to pre-empt those facts and still insisting that the CCP's proletarian dictatorship of the people of today was nothing different than their outcry for democracy prior to 1949? American students in my class on Chinese Communist Documents can fully appreciate the

predicament and ordeal of the members of the Democratic League of yesteryear.

Within a short period of forty years in the history of contemporary China (1937-1977), this writer was very fortunate to be able to observe several undisputable political facts: one is that the PPC did include the members of the CCP, the Democratic League and other political parties under the Nationalist government which tolerated their criticism and open discussions of national affairs during and after the war. By contrast, the CCP's People's Political Consultative Conference which was organized by the CCP to include the members of the Democratic League and other parties in 1949 when the CCP came to power, was not allowed to criticize the CCP as the latter had done to the KMT during the war and prior to 1949. During the ephemeral campaign of the "hundred-flower bloom and hundred-school contend" in 1957, the defiant members of the dissenting Democratic League and other political groups were either disgraced or silenced by the proletarian dictatorship. The second fact is that many political and intellectual supporters chose to blame the traditional culture for foot-binding and thought stagnation, but deliberately ignored the CCP's mind-binding and thought strangulation.

For the sake of defending the integrity of historical scholarship in contemporary China, and honoring the sacrifices of many patriotic fighters during the war, the authors of this excellent anthology of the Sino-Japanese war history 1937-1945 have made an admirable contribution to the indictment of intellectual perjury which has been committed so long by many in their world of sciolistic, snobbish and journalistic sinology. This volume serves as a constant reminder that the true value of a political polity must be measured by its commitment to and its action of humanistic goodness and I welcome its publication with three cheers.

Reviewed by RICHARD HSIUH YANG

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