

Philosophical Origins of the Idea of Natural Equality

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WITHOUT GOING BACK further in time, we can say that the Greeks and the Romans, with the exception of several great jurists, did not believe in the natural equality of man. In their society, some were supposed to be descended from gods or heroes, hence their right to command; the others were descendants of mere mortals. In Athens, after having enumerated the hierarchy of the cosmic gods in the *Timeé*, Plato comes to the mythological gods and declares, not without malice, that he will leave the trouble of talking about them to those who claim to be their descendants. In Rome Julius Caesar attached great importance to the legend that he was descended from Venus, the ruler of gods and of men, because he realized that in the eyes of the multitude this gave him the clearest possible title to command *urbi et orbi*, Rome and the universe. Mark Anthony presented himself to the masses of the Orient as the reincarnation of Dionysius, at the side of Cleopatra-Séléné, daughter of the moon. Galba displayed a family tree in his atrium which traced his origins, on his father's side to Jupiter, and on his mother's side to Pasiphaë, the wife of king Minos. Elagabalus claimed descent from a Syrian Baal. It was acknowledged, from Diocletian

onwards, that the emperors were a *Diis geniti* and *deorum creatores*. Diocletian, by taking the title of Jovius, and Maximian, his right arm, that of Herculus, let it thus be understood that they were descended from Jupiter Capitolin and from Hercules, just like Constantine's family, claimed descent from Apollo, or Julian from the invincible sun, likened to Mithra.

As far as mere mortals were concerned there was reason enough to set the slaves apart. Aristotle goes to great lengths to establish that there are slaves by nature. "There are individuals as inferior to others as the body is to the soul, as the beast is to man, so that these individuals are born to be slaves."¹ The slave is nothing but a "living tool." Thus the city-state of antiquity was based on a social stratification resulting from the inequality of origin of human families.

In proclaiming that the human race came from the same original couple, Christianity professed the natural equality of all men. An equal dignity was added to this natural equality: all men were the children of God, equally redeemed by the merits of Christ's passion. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, there is neither male or female; for you are all one

in Christ,"² Saint Paul declared to the Galatians. On the other hand, teaching that all power comes from God, the Apostle preached a kind of social conformism to the Corinthians. "Everyone should remain true to his calling; was yours slavery? Never mind. But if you can gain your freedom, rather follow your calling as best you can."³ The fathers of the church could not imagine any more than the pagan writers that a society could exist without slavery. Natural equality, as proclaimed by Christianity is equality on a religious and moral level, and not on a civil, political and social level.

The feudal society of the Middle Ages in the West was based on three classes: those who prayed, those who fought, and those who worked: *oratores, bellatores, laboratores*. Bishop Adalabiron of Laon declared in 1080:

These three parties which coexist do not suffer from being separate; the services rendered by one class are the prerequisite of the work of the other two. Hence this triple assemblage is nonetheless united and it is thus that the world can enjoy peace."⁴

This division of society into three groups, which brings to mind Plato's *Republic*, continued under the *ancien régime* in the form of the three orders: the clergy, the nobility, and the third estate. It was a statutory hierarchy which excluded all civil, political and social equality.

How the Cartesianism and Empiricism of the concept of a tabula rasa imply the idea of natural equality

It was not until the second half of the seventeenth century and above all until the eighteenth century that the idea of natural equality asserted itself as the result of two rival philosophies which divided the intel-

lectuals of that day: French Cartesianism and English Empiricism. Cartesians taught that all men were equally endowed with reason; the empiricists taught that the mind at birth is like a *tabula rasa* offering the same possibilities of development to all newborn children.

According to Aristotle, specific characteristics, *i.e.* those which determine what species individuals belong to cannot vary in contrast to accidental characteristics which allow us to distinguish among men by singularizing them. Since man is defined as a "thinking animal," it follows that reason, being the specific difference between man and all other living creatures, is the same in everyone. This is the Aristotelian conception as taught by the Scholastics, which Descartes, a student of the Jesuits at the Collège de la Flèche, takes up again on the first page of his *Discourse on Method*:

Common Sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men . . . , for as to reason or sense, inasmuch as it is the only thing that constitutes us men and distinguishes us from beasts, I would believe that it is to be found complete in each individual. And in this I follow the common opinion of the philosophers, who say that the question of more or less occurs only in the sphere of accidents and does not affect the forms or natures of individuals belonging to the same species.

Possessing the same capacity to reason, all minds are equally capable of learning and of thinking; what distinguishes them is that the methods they adopt are more or less good. Everything, in short, is a matter of instruction.

To be human, Bossuet declares, suits the wisest and the most foolish equally well, without anyone ever being able to say, properly speaking, that one man is more truly man than another. Hence the axiom of the school: that the essences or "*raisons*

propres" of things are indivisible, *i.e.* one has nothing of them or one has them in all their integrity.

Racine, in his preface to *Iphigénie* says the same thing, "It is with pleasure that I have recognized by the impression made on our theater by all that I have imitated from Homer or Euripides, that Good Sense and Reason have remained the same throughout the centuries." A German mother will say to her child, "*Sei brav*," an English mother, "Be good," a French mother, "*Sois raisonnable*": such is the very expression of Cartesianism.

The rival philosophy of Cartesianism, which competed for the loyalty of intellectuals in the eighteenth century, was English Empiricism, developed by Locke and Hume, and popularized in France by the sensualists, encyclopaedists, physiocrats, ideologues, and in particular by Condillac.

Locke was inspired by a theory of knowledge which was quite different from that of Cartesianism.

For Descartes, reason is one and complete in each individual because it is the specific difference which distinguishes us from other kinds ("genres") of animals.

Locke rejects the belief in the objectivity of genera and species, which he sees as nothing but abstract concepts fabricated by the mind. Proof lies in teratological cases, for it is a fact that there are men who are imbeciles from birth, and who do not fit the Aristotelian definition of human nature. With a single stroke the famous distinctions between essential and accidental characteristics is dismissed: "That which we call the essential and non-essential refers solely to our abstract ideas and to the names we give them."⁵ In nature there exist only individuals all of whose characteristics are equally necessary: the noevus of the face, the curve of the nose, or the pigment of the iris, as well as the structure of a vital organ such as the heart or lung. The power

of reason is not given once and for all to each human who comes into this world; it is rather the result of a long process of adaptation of the mind to nature. Descartes holds that reason includes a certain number of ideas and innate principles which we grasp intuitively when impressions are transmitted by the senses. Locke rejects this conception: neither principles nor ideas are innate; all perceptions of the mind come from the senses: "*nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.*"

It would seem logical that Locke's philosophy would react against the belief in the natural equality of all men. This, however, was not the case, because Locke's Empiricism ignored physiological and psychological heredity, which we know to be coded in the nucleic acids of the chromosomes. He maintained that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*, "a sheet of white paper" on which nothing has been written: It is pure receptivity. The result is an equal aptitude in all men of becoming equally intelligent. It is solely differences in education that account for differences between minds.

Taking the Empiricism of the *tabula rasa* as his starting point, Helvetius wrote his enormously successful book *De l'Esprit* to show that "spirit, genius and virtue are the products of education." "Having decided to examine," he tells us, "what power nature and education have over us, I have discovered that it is our education which makes us what we are." The greatest error one could commit in this respect would be to believe that "genius and virtue are pure gifts of nature." Genius is a fruit of education, and not a gift of nature, "so that from the humblest Alpine shepherd one can shape at will a Newton or a Lycurgus." "Accordingly, men are nothing but the product of their education; as for education it must be acknowledged that it can do anything."⁶

Mably, one of the most influential thinkers of the French Revolution, professed the same ideas:

It is our education, so capable of brutalizing some and of developing in others the mental faculties, that has persuaded us that providence has created different classes of men. In those rocky caves which we saw as we were climbing up this mountain misery is perhaps hiding Horaces, Fersens, Marlboroughs, Aristides, Epaminondases and Lycurguses. In the first society of men, an equal education developed more or less the same talents in everyone.⁷

Babeuf voices the same opinion:

Who can doubt that many ignorant men wouldn't have been so if they had had the possibility of educating themselves? Doesn't the most common shepherd put as much ingenuity into the carrying out of his work and into the discussion of his interests as was necessary for the discovery of the laws of gravity? Everything depends on the object toward which our attention is directed."⁸

Often the two rival philosophies coexist or mingle in the writings of one and the same author, which is not surprising since they reach the same conclusions. Such is the case with d'Holbach:

However great the enormous variety which can be found among individual members of the human race, they all have a common nature which can never be denied.

The concept of nature applied to man is defined as that which appears in the works of the Scholastics:

The combination of properties and qualities which make him what he is, which are inherent in his species and which distinguish it from, or liken it to other animal species.⁹

Whether they adopt Cartesian rationalism or the Empiricism of the *tabula rasa* all profess the dogma of natural equality. The eighteenth century merely speaks of "nature" where the seventeenth prefers to speak of "reason." Thus claims Voltaire in his *Essai sur les moeurs*:

Everything inward in human nature is alike from one end of the universe to the other. . . . The force of custom spreads variety over the universal scene. . . nature spreads unity."¹⁰

Thus also writes Mably in his *Principes de Morale*:

The third thing that I demand is that my philosopher be persuaded that all men are equal; and that he come to live this truth.¹¹

And again Morelly in the *Code de la nature*:

In the moral order, nature is one, constant, invariable. . . . Thus everything one can cite concerning the diversity of customs among savage or civilized peoples, does not at all prove that nature varies.¹²

Also Babeuf in his *Doctrine des égaux*:

We are all equal, aren't we? This principle remains undisputed because unless one is mad, one cannot seriously say that night is day.¹³

The belief in the power of instruction over the individual entailed the belief in the power of legislation over the nation. Legislation plays the same role for the nation that instruction does for the individual. All individuals being equal by nature, it is the same with nations: Legislation alone is the cause of their differences. "The vices of a people," Helvetius wrote, "are always hidden in the depths of its legislation."¹⁴

One can only hope to make any change in the ideas of a nation after

having changed its legislation, and it is by reforming laws that one must start reforming mores. It is solely through good laws that one can shape virtuous men. . . . The lawmaker creates at will heroes, geniuses, and men of virtue.¹⁵

Hence Condorcet concludes that a good constitution must be valid for all states:

Since truth, reason, justice, the rights of man are the same everywhere, it is not understandable why all nations should not have the same criminal laws, nor the same economic laws. One law must be good for all people just as a theorem in geometry holds true for all minds.¹⁶

Rousseau drafted constitutions for Corsica and Poland without feeling any need to investigate either nation. Indeed: "Today there are no longer French, Germans, or English, whatever one might say; there are only Europeans."¹⁷ "Europe will remember," Condorcet adds, "that men of all regions, equal and proud by nature, were hardly created to sustain the pride and avarice of several privileged nations"¹⁸

The Consequences

The belief in the natural equality of all men has had political, social and moral consequences which will now be discussed. One of the first was the doctrine of natural rights professed by the doctrinaires of the School of Natural Law whose philosophy goes back to the Stoics and to the great Roman jurists. Gaius defined *jus gentium* as "the law that natural reason (*"raison naturelle"*) has established for all humanity." Roman law aspired to become "reason in writing." Cicero said:

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, immutable and eternal. . . . There is not a different law for Rome and for

Athens, or one for now and one for the future, but only an eternal and unchangeable law valid for all nations and all times. . .¹⁹

The result is, wrote Ulpian, "that by natural law all men are equal." It is this conception that Althusius, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolf, Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Barbeyrac, take up in turn and which ends up by appearing in constitutions under the title of the "Rights of Man and of the Citizen."

These rights are natural "because they derive from the nature of man, in other words from his essence of reasonableness." "As such, these rights are, in the same way as obligations, inherent in the nature of each individual: everyone benefits from the same rights, and all acquire the right to resist whosoever wants to commit an offence against them; the equality of all and the first society are examples of natural law: everyone is obliged to contribute to the improvement of the others."²⁰

What is true for individual members of society is also true for nations, Vattel declares:

Since men are equal by nature and their rights and obligations are the same, likewise coming from nature, therefore nations, composed of men and considered simply as many free persons who live together in nature, are also equal by nature and receive from nature the same obligations and the same rights. Power or weakness do not make any difference in this respect. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant, a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.²¹

Condorcet said:

Such is the origin of these Declarations of rights which are regarded today by all enlightened men as the basis of liberty, and which the ancients did not and could not even conceive of because domestic slavery sullied their constitu-

tion, because in their society the right of citizenship was either hereditary or conferred by a voluntary adoption and because they had not reached a knowledge of the inherent rights of man, belonging to all men with complete equality.²²

The Declarations of which Condorcet speaks are the Bill of Rights of Great Britain, The Bill of Rights of the emancipated North American colonies, and the two French declarations of the rights of man and of the citizen of 1789 and of 1793. The Bills and Declarations agree on three points:

1. The existence of innate rights "natural and inalienable because they are peculiar to man and his nature."²³

2. The equality of natural rights for all men: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal" (Declaration of Independence of the U.S.A.).

"Two men, being equally men, possess to an equal degree all the rights which proceed from human nature" (*Reconnaissance et Exposition raisonnée des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* by the Abbé Siéyès). "The equality of rights is established by nature." *Declaration of 1789*; "All men are equal by nature and before the law" (*Declaration of 1793*).

3. Social institutions have as their purpose "the maintenance of the natural and inalienable rights of man" and since these rights are equal, the progressive realization of civic, political and social equality, the consequences of the belief in the natural equality of all men do not end here. Civil equality and political equality are considered pure formalities if they are not accompanied by social equality, *i. e.* equality of economic conditions.

Rousseau developed the following idea in his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754): Nature made man good,

free, and happy; society has made him evil, a slave and miserable. The origin of social evil is property which has created the unequal distribution of goods. Mably commented:

It is inequality alone that has taught men to prefer many useless and pernicious things to virtues. I believe it has been proven that in a state of equality nothing would be easier than to prevent abuses of power and to strengthen the rule of law. Equality must necessarily produce all good things because it unites men, ennobles their souls and prepares them for mutual feelings of goodwill and friendship: I therefore conclude that inequality is the cause of all evils because it degrades and humiliates men and sows disunity and hate among them.²⁴

Babeuf came to the conclusion that: "The French Revolution is but the precursor of another much greater, more magnificent revolution, which will be the last."²⁵ The French Revolution brought about civil equality in 1789 and political equality in 1793; social equality remained to be attained; this was the goal of the *Conjuration des égaux* in 1796 which was founded on the abolition of private property and an egalitarian redistribution of wealth. Babeuf wrote:

It is necessary that social institutions change to the point where they will remove from each individual the hope of ever becoming richer, more powerful, or more distinguished by means of his intelligence than any of his equals. The only way of reaching this goal is by establishing a communal administration, by suppressing private property, and by establishing simply an administration for supplies, which, taking into account all persons and goods, will redistribute the latter with the most scrupulous attention to equality. . . . This government, proven practicable by experience, since

it is applied to the twelve hundred thousand men of our twelve armies, is the only one from which one can expect universal happiness, unchangeable and unalloyed, to result.²⁶

Babeuism leads to a communal conception of life, such as the communist colonies of Robert Owen and of Cabet, the phalanstery of Fourier, the conventual life of *Enfantin* and of the Saint-Simonians at *Ménilmontant*, the folkloric Hippy communes and the urban and rural communes of Mao. To remedy "capitalist anarchy," some saw no other recourse than state-socialism: The state being sole proprietor of all the means of production, distributes them according to social need. The others, libertarians and anarchists, denounced the state as the supreme instrument of repression. They wanted "neither God, nor a Master"; no more laws, courts, police, or contracts. Individuals will freely enter into partnership, ready to help one another, recognizing as authorities only reason and science. Everyone will work according to his own inclinations and wishes, flitting from one occupation to another according to his mood, like Fourier's "butterfly."

The specialization which is imposed by the division of labor in highly civilized societies, and which is, as Adam Smith has shown, the mainspring of economic progress, is considered by both sides as a kind of alienation: it creates divisions and conflicting interests between the different groups of professionals.

These obstacles must be overcome with the help of education which will make each individual equally capable of doing everything, since everyone has the same abilities at birth. Education, compulsory instruction, and training will permit an individual, according to Lenin, to be able to do anything.²⁷ Above all it is necessary to eliminate the disparity between intellectual and

manual labor: hence Mao's sending of millions of professors and students to cultivate, in a permanent exile, marginal agrarian areas. Out of this all-round aptness will arise "a new man, a superman, a sublime being" declared Kautsky.²⁸ Man will be much stronger, much more perspicacious, much more refined. His body will be more harmonious, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The average will be on a level with Aristotle, Goethe and Marx. And above this crest new summits will arise.²⁹ Godwin didn't exclude the possibility of men becoming immortal after the abolition of property.³⁰

Such were the egalitarian utopias which Karl Marx claimed to replace by scientific socialism. In reality he took up the ideas of Babeuf and adapted them to the conditions of his times: *i. e.* those of the first effects of industrialization in Europe. The antagonism between nations is to be substituted by international class war: "Such is beyond a doubt," Babeuf exclaimed, "the exact analysis of the declaration of war published in France as early as 1789. Such is the solemn declaration of the plebeians to the patricians, and the true prologue to the insurrection and the revolution."³¹ Karl Marx went on to say that thanks to class warfare, which ends in the expropriation of the exploiters by suppressing private ownership of means of production, a situation will materialize in which peasants, workers, managers and intellectuals will benefit from like conditions of well-being and leisure in an era of economic exuberance. It is then that those instruments of oppression and alienation, the state, the police and the army, will disappear. The government of men will be replaced by a mere administration of things.

The Verdict of Experience

The Cartesian belief in the existence of rea-

son, one and identical in everyone, has been refuted by experience and by history. The idea of reason has been replaced by that of mental structures which lead to patterns of explanation and to motivations that are very diverse. The structuring of our knowledge moreover varies with the profusion of our information.

The Empiricism of the *tabula rasa* was based on a fallacy. It has been refuted by genetics, which causes individuals to manifest vastly dissimilar aptitudes at birth. The life of individuals is the result of interactions between their genetic make-up and their natural and social environment. The formative influence of the environment is considerable, but the genotype of each individual determines the potentialities which the environment favors or inhibits.

If one admits that environment is the sole determining factor, one must come to the conclusion that it, *i. e.* society, is responsible for what we are. This is the thesis upheld by Rousseau in his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754): Men are naturally equal and good, it is society alone that has perverted them; men are born free; society alone puts them in chains. Victor Hugo declared that if there are evildoers it is because there are wretched men. Karl Marx affirmed that if workers were alienated it was because they were exploited by capitalists who had appropriated the means of production and were interested in profits alone. Marcuse teaches that if society is repressive, it is the fault of the establishment. Even in nations, which, like the U.S.A., are built upon the cult of private enterprise the belief that "all men are created equal and that they are endowed by their Creator with an inalienable right to liberty and pursuit of happiness," which is at the basis of the "American Dream," determines, in an overly indulged youth the refusal of a selection which implies the necessity of making an effort, and,

as a result, the condemnation of elitism. Since society is responsible for our happiness and since the mouthpiece of society is the state, one ends up with the Providence State, the *Welfare State*, which is obliged to take charge of our destiny. The state, like Big Brother in 1984, George Orwell's novel of anticipations, ends up conditioning the individual with the help of mass media, going so far as to relieve him, according to Tocqueville's expression of "the trouble of thinking and the bother of living."

Experience has shown to what degree Marxism, a form of Babeuvism adapted to the industrial revolution, far from being scientific, has revealed itself to be utopian. The state, the police, the army, which were slated to disappear have only grown stronger in order to impose on everyone by force that which he must do and must consume according to a bureaucratic and centralized planning technique. The former class of "exploiters" has been replaced by the new class of apparatchiks. The necessity of a division of labor and the unequal distribution of natural talents impose *nolens volens* a structuring of society which by no means equalizes the condition of peasants, workers, intellectuals and functionaries.

The belief in the natural equality of peoples is a simple corollary to the belief in the natural equality of all men. Leaving aside the very controversial question of the intellectual coefficient of different races, to the extent that they constitute nearly pure ethnic groups, one can recognize that traditions, which, according to Taine are sorts of "historical prejudices," constitute for peoples the equivalent of what the hereditary patrimony is for individuals. For this reason, institutions which are suitable for one people are not necessarily transferable to another and Condorcet's assertion, "A law must be good for all people everywhere, just as a theorem in geometry is true for

all," is indisputably refuted. The desire to make the world "safe for democracy," without taking into account the degree of maturity of the masses called to vote, has incited tribal warfare, pronunciamientos, a succession of revolutions, and disasters without end.

The Beneficial Effects

Herbert Spencer maintained that there was a kernel of truth even in false theories. We have seen the pernicious effects of the theory of natural equality of all men. Now it is fitting to call to mind the beneficial effects.

By opening up careers to those who have shown themselves to be the most gifted, compulsory instruction has permitted social advancement which depends on nothing but talent and merit. It has replaced caste societies with open societies characterized by free circulation of elites.

Of natural law it has been said that it is the only one that does not exist in nature. The inalienable rights that every man is supposed to acquire at birth, whether they proceed from God, from reason, from nature or from experience, are pure fiction. Nevertheless they express the spontaneous aspirations of man toward security, the preservation of what he acquires by his work, and physical and moral liberty. Locke and the Natural Law theorists present the rights of man as the inalienable residue of those that individuals cannot give up in the Social Contract. The experience of history has proven that a society is all the more prosperous, happy and inclined to solve its own conflicts peacefully, the more it gives its members freedom to take in hand and decide on the best way to use their faculties and goods.

To the extent that the Doctrine of the Rights of Man has been institutionalized, it has led to the substitution of the royal caprice by constitutional forms of government; of a hierarchical organization, based on statutory privileges, by equality before the law; of restricted access to careers by free access to all kinds of employment; of the sovereignty of rulers by that of the people, exercising itself by universal suffrage; of the omnipotence of the state by barriers which safeguard the reserved domain of the individual. Such are the democratic forms of government based on the civil and political equality of all citizens.

The belief in social equality, designed to complete civil and political equality, is utopian in the sense that the difference in aptitudes and the diversity of tasks inherent in division of labor if a society is to be viable, will always entail a certain disparity in living standards. However, the desire to reduce these disparities has led to the promotion of social legislation which is aimed at redistributing the surplus value resulting from the combined work of all the active members of a given population. The result is a progressive equalization of living standards, as manifested by the growth of the middle classes at the expense of the very poor and the very rich.

This progressive equalization is beneficial in the degree to which, aiming at equalizing opportunities, it favors the rise of the most gifted. It becomes disastrous in the degree to which it aims at equalizing attainment discouraging effort, penalizing success. Instead of promoting, it levels. It would quickly lead to stagnation, then to the decadence of societies which would end up by sinking into the banality of the standard and the insipidness of comfort.*

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¹*Polit.*, 1, 2, 12.

²*Galat.*, 3, 10.

³*Eph.*, 6, 9.

⁴Cité par J. Le Goff, *La Civilisation de l'Occident médiéval*, Paris 1964, p. 319.

⁵*Logique*, chap. 28.

⁶*De L'Esprit*, discours 2, chap. 2.

⁷*De la Législation*, liv. 1, chap. 2.

⁸*Buonarotti*, Conspiration pour l'égalité dite de Babeuf, T. 1, p. 10.

⁹*La Morale universelle*, chap. 2.

¹⁰*Essai sur les mœurs*, chap. 197.

¹¹*Principes de morale*, liv. 2, p. 251.

¹²*Code de la Nature*, p. 23.

¹³*Doctrine des Egaux*, p. 85.

¹⁴*De L'Esprit*, Disc. 8, chap. 15.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, chap. 24.

¹⁶*Oeuvres*, T. 1, p. 378.

¹⁷*Considérations sur le gouvernement de la*

Pologne, p. 170.

¹⁸*Esquisse des progrès de l'esprit humain*, 15^e période.

¹⁹*De re publica*, 3, 22.

²⁰Wolf, *Institutiones juris naturae et gentium*, 1748, liv. 1, chap. 1.

²¹Vattel, *Le Droit des gens ou Principes de la loi naturelle*, Londres, 1758: Préliminaires, par. 18.

²²*Oeuvres*, VI, 131, -Comp. Wolf, *Op. cit.*, liv. IX, chap. 1, par. 2.

²³Opinions de M. Durand de Maillasse, député de la Sénéchaussée d'Arles, 1er Août 1789; *Bibl. Nat.*, le 29, no 89.

²⁴*De la Législation*, liv. 1, chap. 12.

²⁵Babeuf, *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

²⁶Buonarotti, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁷I. Lenin, *Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* (New York: International Publishers, 1940), p. 34.

²⁸Kautsky, *Die soziale Revolution* (Berlin 1911), T. II, p. 48.

²⁹Trotsky, *Literatur und Revolution* (Wien, 1926), p. 179.

³⁰Godwin, *Das Eigentum* (Leipzig, 1904), p. 73.

³¹Babeuf, *Op. cit.*, p. 53.