

to the classical spirit exemplified in Story, and to those upon whom he leaned for the philosophical and religious meaning of American institutions. Conservatives like McClellan—and this reviewer—must inevitably seek to restore the Constitution to its golden age in legal creativeness, as we may discover it in the mind of Joseph Story. But much of this readoption of Story's legal philosophy must be accompanied by a critical evaluation, such as Story himself applied to British legal institutions when he studied their applicability to American conditions.

Reviewed by FRANCIS G. WILSON

---

### *The Anatomy of Gaullism*

**Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement**, by Anthony Hartley, *New York: Outerbridge & Dienstfrey, 1971. 373 pp. \$10.00.*

EVEN THE MOST BITTER critics of Charles de Gaulle will have to grant him one thing: he has given them plenty to write about. For the past thirty years both friends and enemies have found in him an overflowing source of inspiration. His concept of military strategy has been appraised. His foreign policy has been analyzed. His intellectual origins have been traced. His biography has been written—too many times. Now from the hand of an English journalist, Anthony Hartley, comes a study of the movement that surrounds the name. Is there such a thing as Gaullism? How is it to be described? When the passions involved in these questions are remembered, Hartley seems to be presenting balanced sensible answers. He does not make a partisan appeal. He does not aim at novelty. In many ways his Gaullism is already familiar

to us. It is a creed at the core of which stands a fervent and archaic loyalty to the nation state. The great nation state is, of course, France. Paradoxically, the masses of her people have seldom been dependable in recognizing her special character and destiny. Very seldom do the people instinctively behave with inspiration. The sacrificial leader who understands his own rôle long in advance is necessary to keep the nation on course. De Gaulle saw himself in this light, and implied in his attitude is certainty that France has had her great leaders in the past and confidence that there will be more in the future. Sadly enough, however, when de Gaulle died in 1970, he could hardly be sure that a fitting successor was already appearing on the scene.

In the Gaullist movement the stress on the nation state, the leadership principle, and the rôle of de Gaulle himself has not been accompanied by the kind of sectarian creed that is characteristic of numerous other political movements of the twentieth century. Though coexisting fairly easily with contemporary capitalism, Gaullism has had ultimately flexible, perhaps even ill-defined, ideas on the nature of economic man. For this reason Gaullism has managed to gain a great deal of support—or at least some support—in all segments of the population, even including the intellectuals and organized labor. Some critics of Gaullism have claimed that in some ways it is similar to the integral nationalism of Charles Maurras and other pre-World War II enemies of French republicanism, but after careful examination Hartley is convinced that the similarity is more apparent than real.

Although Gaullism has avoided the pitfalls of too much formal theory, it has certainly possessed the kind of intolerance that sometimes goes along with such theory. Huntley speaks of De Gaulle as being an element of reconciliation in France, and insofar as de Gaulle has been involved in the clash of current social forces, the judgment is probably correct. But from the liberation of 1944 onwards, when France sorely need-

ed moral reunification to make up for the blighting effects of the war, Gaullism stood openly for judgment and revenge against the numerous adherents of the fallen Vichy régime. It condoned widespread persecution including an immeasurable amount of bloodletting in the nation at large and courtroom travesties of justice that revealed all the dangers of *ex post facto* law. In the hour of triumph Gaullism showed far greater harshness towards its enemies than Vichy had ever shown towards his enemies in the past. Historians of modern French history as a whole like to compare periods of Red terror and White terror. Plainly, in the World War II years and afterwards it was the Red terror that was worse, all the more so because the Gaullist régime unlike Vichy could not claim to be acting involuntarily under the pressure of a victorious foreign army. Hartley himself remarks on the exclusiveness, maybe even the intolerance, of Gaullism when he notes that its leading personalities of the 1960's had already joined the movement by 1945. After that year newcomers were likely to be suspect and unwelcome at least in the immediate retinue of de Gaulle himself.

In all this situation, however, there is a kind of irony that has somehow or other escaped the attention of de Gaulle and of Hartley as well. It may be true that Gaullism as a formal creed does not resemble that of Charles Maurras or any other high-ranking figure of the Vichy years, but it is fairly evident that a great many Frenchmen who were once satisfied with Vichy's policies and ideas eventually reconciled themselves to Gaullism in the much different circumstances of a later time. It is true also that Pétain and de Gaulle were contemptuous of each other, de Gaulle probably being the more contemptuous of the two. Yet both had much in common: strong patriotism, belief in sacrificial leadership, and loathing of the traditional political parties, all combined with limited confidence in the mass of the people. What separated de Gaulle and Pétain was a matter of mood rather than of ideology. Pétain was pessi-

mistic, de Gaulle self-assured. In the early and distressing 1940's Pétain was certainly incapable of the glowing mysticism that kept alive de Gaulle's belief in a series of miracles that would shortly upset Hitler's firm domination of Europe.

In fact, throughout the last thirty years of his life de Gaulle was the spokesman for a kind of nationalism that meant a sharp defiance of reality, a streak of perversity, and a refusal to acknowledge the strongest tides of the time. This nationalism was never more evident than when he became the founder of Free France in the face of overwhelming odds. His basic unrealism was finally to look justified, and the authentic realism of Pétain was put to shame because of events which neither man could foresee or control in 1940, namely the entry of both the USA and the USSR into the conflict. When the defeat of Nazi Germany finally took place, de Gaulle consolidated his victory by gaining for France in a variety of ways a great power status which was not deserved according to the usual patterns of *Machtpolitik*. Early in 1946, having imposed himself on his wartime allies, he failed to impose himself on his own people. Despite the obvious traditions of French republicanism de Gaulle insisted that the presidency of the nation be given real executive authority under the new constitution, and when he was denied, he resigned as head of the provisional government. He withdrew to his country estate, proceeding to play an obstructionist role during the twelve years of the Fourth Republic. He was far from sympathetic with the strong tide of decolonization then spreading across much of the world, while on the subject of more directly French and European affairs, he set himself up as an enemy of the movement towards community and integration. In an almost archaic way that hardly does credit to his memory he allowed his name to be identified with opposition to the European Coal and Steel Community and to the European Defence Community. Almost to the day of his death he seemed to be saying that complete French independence was

worthwhile even at the price of military weakness and economic inefficiency.

Returning to power in 1958, de Gaulle proved to be no exemplar of the notion that politicians are likely to be more realistic and responsible in power than when out of power. De Gaulle's greatest accomplishment in strengthening the nation that he loved was the creation of a régime that history may one day record as the most workable one France has had since 1789. But, aside from that, de Gaulle continued in many ways to be erratic, nonsensical, and certainly unrealistic. His unforgettable "*Vive le Québec libre!*" during his Canadian trip of 1967 and his announcement that the Middle Eastern war of the same year was caused by U.S. policies in Vietnam were merely extremes of a perverseness that showed up in other ways. As Hartley makes clear, pride and patriotism caused de Gaulle to become fascinated with the development of an independent nuclear force, the value of which has remained very debatable. Never better playing the role of King Canute, he interfered with the growth of the Common Market chiefly through the rejection of British membership in the organization. Also he weakened NATO without making any corresponding gain for the desired détente with the Soviet Union. The hope that the iron curtain was lifting and that the time had come to start building de Gaulle's "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" foundered pitifully in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

De Gaulle's one great stroke of realism—and perhaps of Machiavellian betrayal—was Algeria. Up until 1958 he appeared to have the kind of nationalist attitude that meant a strong determination to maintain the French empire. It was because the Fourth Republic seemed to lack an equal determination that it fell and was replaced by the Gaullist régime. The traditionalist elements in French society that had been working for just this transformation were expecting that the general would restore French power and save Algeria in the proc-

ess. At first, he sounded and acted as if their trust were well placed. But later on, in his memoirs, de Gaulle claimed that from the start of his rule he foresaw the end of France in Algeria and acted accordingly. If that is the case, many of his followers were just in their accusations of betrayal, while today the French public as a whole might look back at the very early Gaullist years and conclude that its cunning leader had been practicing a gross deception far exceeding the kind of deception for which President Johnson has been held guilty in Vietnam.

Hartley is probably on safe ground in saying that in 1958 de Gaulle simply did not have the grand prescience that he claimed after the event. There was a lot more groping around in uncertainty than de Gaulle wanted to admit. De Gaulle was ahead of public opinion but not far ahead of it. Because of the delicacy as well as gravity of the situation he sometimes had to act and speak without candor in order to pull the people along after him. Before they understood, he understood the consequences of France's inability to use the brutal methods of a Hitler or a Stalin. Algeria was lost. Efforts to hold it would be a disastrously wasteful and futile distraction. The moral and political preliminaries of withdrawal were becoming necessary. Hence the de Gaulle of 1958 who could shout "*Vive l'Algérie Française!*" became the de Gaulle of 1959 who spoke of self-determination for Algeria, then the de Gaulle of 1960 who predicted the existence of an Algerian republic, and finally the de Gaulle of 1962 who gave up Algeria completely. In exchange he received from the Algerian rebels a series of guarantees for France that he himself recognized to be worthless. Altogether, de Gaulle's enemies regarded his overall behavior here as treason to the cause; his champions regarded it as a measure of ethnic justice. Hartley is more convincing than either in remarking that de Gaulle's behavior was that of the "iron Machiavellian prince rather than that of the statesman concerned to explain his ac-

tions to his fellow countrymen. His were the tactics and equivocations of a Richelieu, the secrecy of the *raison d'état* of the *ancien régime*.”

Reviewed by BRENTON H. SMITH