

# MODERN AGE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW



## *The Soviet Union under the Banner of Neo-Stalinism*

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### I

#### *The Trend of Developments in the Soviet Union since the Intervention in Czechoslovakia*

THE DECISION of August 20, 1968 to intervene in Czechoslovakia has greatly affected internal developments in the Soviet Union. It was, indeed, the most decisive turning point since Khrushchev deflated the Stalin myth. It improved the military-strategic position of the Soviet Union and thereby enabled Brezhnev and Kosygin to introduce a flexible policy toward the West within the framework of an offensive coexistence policy. Internally the decision to intervene means a renunciation of the policy of reforms initiated by the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956. It ushered in a kind of counterreformation which seeks to combine a modified Stalinist technique of government with the requirements of a more mature and more complex industrial society.

The tendency to rehabilitate Stalin has

grown stronger since the intervention. The present Kremlin leadership does not want complete rehabilitation; it sticks to the principle of collective leadership and rejects mass terror as a means of government. The result is a neo-Stalinism which, despite its orthodox-communist cloak, is primarily national-conservative in character. Totalitarian institutions still exist and totalitarian methods continue to be applied, but the specific totalitarian dynamic has come largely to a standstill. The establishment seeks to brake and regulate the spontaneous evolution from below, set free by de-Stalinization, making use of a restored centralist-bureaucratic system.

This system no longer works properly. Progressive and reactionary forces alike creep through its loopholes, while declining economic growth and growing social tensions undermine confidence. Weakness of the "collective leadership" and the stagnation of bureaucratic rule have left unsolved burning economic and socio-political problems that became obvious at the 24th Party Congress of the CPSU in March and April, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

At the Congress, Brezhnev and Kosygin attempted to resurrect Malenkov's "new course" of 1953—also revived by Khrushchev shortly before his downfall. The raising of living standards by greater emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods forms the core of this policy. The two Soviet leaders have not yet agreed how to realize it without internal relaxation. Brezhnev is critical of the results of the economic reform, which was of a limited nature only. His ideal is a "command economy," based upon increased production norms, strict labor discipline, drastic saving and increased production control by party and police organs. Labor productivity is to be raised by moral factors, such as appeals to Soviet patriotism, rather than by material incentives. Productivity is to be increased through production associations, which might be called socialist trusts. Kosygin is prepared to combine limited market features with the central plan, and is more ready than Brezhnev to offer "material interest" as a spur to effort.<sup>2</sup> The basic argument between the two leaders formed the most interesting feature of the 24th Party Congress, which otherwise followed the usual neo-Stalinist ritual.

The difficulties of the present Soviet system, causing Brezhnev to call for more controls, lie primarily in the lack of sufficiently capable managers and highly qualified workmen in the Soviet Union. They can only be trained if education is modernized and personal initiative encouraged. Such a personal initiative is only possible, however, in a system affording more democracy and liberty than there is in the Soviet Union at present. This Brezhnev is not prepared to allow because he considers democracy and liberty as a "class problem." He looks at himself primarily as a trustee of the ruling high bureaucracy and even more so of its core, the party bureaucracy, who view all attempts at a "democratic socialism" and at a "socialist market economy," granting more rights to intelligentsia and workers alike, as a threat to their absolute rule. Thus are to be understood the endeav-

ors of the party boss to strengthen the control of the party bureaucracy over other institutions of domination and over the individual provinces of society. Nor does Kosygin question the rule of bureaucracy. His concern is to increase the efficiency of the existing system by a limited decentralization and greater material inducements.

The basic conflict between the ideological-organizational totalitarian claim of the party apparatus and the evolutionary requirements of a modern industrial society finds expression in the arguments between the progressive and the reactionary factions of Soviet society. At the same time there are noticeable social conflicts of a lesser degree, involving various ranks and groups with common interests. The Kremlin rulers could, of course, base their common interdomination upon the intelligentsia and grant more rights to workers and peasants. But that would mean freeing important sections of society from control by the high bureaucracy and launching far-reaching internal political reforms. To take this risk, which alone could resolve the increasing differences between the totalitarian state and a society emancipating itself, the present oligarchic Kremlin leadership is neither prepared to do nor capable of doing.

## II

### *The Continuity of the Totalitarian Regime and the Stagnation of Bureaucratic Rule*

THE DEVELOPMENT in the Soviet Union since Khrushchev's downfall and even more since the intervention in Czechoslovakia, has disproved the statement by some Sovietologists that bolshevist Russia has entered a post-totalitarian phase.<sup>3</sup> Totalitarianism has various forms of appearance.<sup>4</sup> The "despotic totalitarianism" of Stalin became a "rationalized totalitarianism" under Khrushchev. The system of "neo-Stalinism" evolved under Brezhnev and Kosygin is roughly half way between these two forms of orthodox-communist totalitarianism.

Experience with Hitlerism and Stalinism

has led to overrating the importance of mass terror. A normal totalitarian system will never be able to renounce terror completely as a means of achieving social integration. But it need not rely upon mass terror, especially not in a system based upon state ownership of the means of production. The characteristic feature of a totalitarian regime is not so much the extensive form of terror, but the far-reaching exclusion of the society against external influences combined with comprehensive control of all functions and of the mind extending to all sectors of community life, reinforced at some neuralgic spots with a "legalized terror" through penal legislation. This applied to political, economic and cultural life in the Soviet Union of Brezhnev and Kosygin to a considerably higher degree than under Khrushchev, whose policy of de-Stalinization had resulted in a remarkable relaxation of the totalitarian system.

The dynamic of Soviet totalitarianism has considerably decreased since de-Stalinization. The structural elements of one-party rule, however, continue to exist. Their present form shows there is no question of the Soviet state and society having reached a post-totalitarian phase. Such a development, which would mean a transformation from the totalitarian to an authoritarian system of government, presupposes three conditions:<sup>6</sup>

1. A limitation of party autocracy, which might be a self-limitation as propagated by reform communism, practiced in Yugoslavia, and intended in Czechoslovakia. It can also be brought about by strong social forces.

2. A release from control "from above" of wide sectors of society while power remains largely centralized in the party, combined with a shift to "constitutional one-party rule."

3. Marginal planning limited to current social requirements, thus leaving room for autonomous spheres of public and private life combined with a socialist market economy.

These conditions do not exist in the Soviet Union today. The economic reform has brought only the first beginnings of a move toward condition three.

The social dynamics of a totalitarian society are not limited to processes initiated by the party. But as long as the party leadership, with the assistance of the professional party apparatus, has the will and the power to control the autonomous social processes and social spontaneity and to promote the latter to a certain degree, the society—despite some relaxation—will remain subject to totalitarian rule. It would also be hardly correct to assume the ruling totalitarian party might become an "authoritarian party" simply by reason of "variations of executive sanctions."<sup>6</sup> Actually what we see are the efforts of the party leadership to rationalize totalitarian rule and to adapt it to the requirements of a more complicated and more mature industrial society.

In considering the relationship between power structure and social structure in the Soviet Union it is important to note that there is no uniform class of functionaries. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between the high bureaucracy, occupying the actual positions of government, and the mass of intelligentsia who exercise leadership through their social functions.<sup>7</sup> The latter is divided into the technical-economic and the scientific-cultural intelligentsia. *Vis-à-vis* the ruling power elite, whose core is formed by the party bureaucracy, are the economic managers and the prestige elite, composed of writers, artists and scientists. As the high bureaucracy is largely recruited from members of the technical-economic intelligentsia, membership of some classes may be identical. The contrast between the ruling power elite and the prestige elite is consequently more distinct than between the power elite and the economic managers.

A closer investigation of the social structure of the CPSU shows that a confraternity of mostly intellectual professional revolutionaries, with a strong proletarian

strain, has evolved into a mass party, whose cadres are formed by bureaucratic professional politicians. Whereas in the party populace the "intelligentsia" predominates, the party leadership is dominated by the high bureaucracy. The CPSU thus primarily represents the interests of the bureaucratic power elite, which uses the institutions of government as its instruments of power.

Proportion of High Bureaucracy and  
"Intelligentsia" in the CPSU<sup>a</sup>

Intelligentsia in broader sense (excluding military)	Percent of Party Populace	Percent of Congress Delegates	Percent of Central Committee Members
	1968	1971	1971
High Bureaucracy	1.5	38.0	83.8
Technical-Economic Intelligentsia	23.1	12.1	2.1
Scientific Cultural Intelligentsia	10.6	7.1	0.9
	35.2	57.2	86.8

The ruling power elite also includes the military, whose share of party delegates was 7 percent, and of full members of the Central Committee 8.6 percent, whereas their share in the total party in 1958 amounted to approximately 5.2 percent.

The ruling high bureaucracy, grown too old in its higher ranks, does not wish for experiments. As Amalrik has pointed out, the bureaucratic regime in the Soviet Union is primarily interested that everything remains unchanged, "that the authorities are being acknowledged as hitherto, that the intelligentsia is keeping silent, that the system is not shaken by dangerous and unusual reforms."<sup>9</sup> The regime might persist in that state of internal stagnation for a long time, were it not awakened from its lethargy by two factors:

*First*, it is fascinated by the newly-gained position of the Soviet Union as a world power, which brings it into competition with the dynamic industrial states of the West. A discrepancy has appeared between the claim to be a world power, and

the Soviet Union's economic potential and the social maturity which are insufficient to preserve and to consolidate her position as a world power.

*Secondly*, forces have become apparent in Soviet society striving for far-reaching reforms, to make the system more humane internally and more competitive externally. The regime is confronted with the rise of pluralist forces, which impede the "total control" exercised through the party apparatus, while sections of the scientific-cultural intelligentsia are framing political alternatives.

### III

*The Beginnings of a "Democratic Opposition" and the Intensification of the "National Problem"*

WHILE the high bureaucracy insists on preservation of totalitarian one-party rule, the progressive sectors of the intelligentsia wish to promote a "socialist pluralism" and greater consideration for social interests. Among the technical-economic intelligentsia, the "progressives" are those who strive for greater economic efficiency, improved material incentives, a higher living standard, and social welfare. In the scientific cultural intelligentsia, all forces are to be considered "progressive" which resist social injustice, insist that the Stalinist past should be overcome, and champion the preservation of human dignity, more freedom of expression, scientific objectivity and political liberty. These reform efforts have their social base in the prestige elite rather than among the economic managers. The latter are more closely allied to the ruling bureaucracy and were partially satisfied by the economic reform, though they did not obtain a larger share of political power.

The economic reform of 1965, initiated by Kosygin, had a limited scope to begin with. It was mainly intended to stimulate higher productivity of enterprises, to which limited powers of decision had been dele-

gated. It was comparatively successful and brought about increased economic growth. Its extension to smaller enterprises, combined with increasing recentralization, reduced the initial impetus. Intensified rearmament also hampered further expansion of lagging economic sectors such as agriculture, while the reform was carried out at the expense of long-term developments including computer technology, electronics, chemistry, and infrastructure.

The party bureaucracy fears that the present economic reform might shake its totalitarian rule, whereas in the eyes of the technical-economic intelligentsia the reform does not go far enough. Among the economic managers and the economic scientists, who belong to the prestige elite, are forces representing ideas expressed in Czechoslovakia by Professor Ota Sik. A report of the chairman of Gosplan, Baibakov<sup>10</sup>, at the May 1968 "Economic Conference of the Union" indicated that some progressive Soviet economists demanded a greater limitation of central planning, greater independence of enterprises, wider use of market elements based upon the principle of competition, and a price system determined solely according to value. The introduction of such a "socialist market economy" is being resolutely rejected by the present Soviet leadership. This explains its vigorous reaction to the plans for economic reform in Czechoslovakia, drafted by Sik. The Soviet leadership finds the attraction of the liberal ideas of Prague reformists to the scientific-cultural intelligentsia an even greater danger. The fear from infection of the Soviet society by reform-communist thinking was apparently the chief motive for the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Even before the 23rd Party Congress, a hardening was to be noticed in cultural policy, which has since assumed the nature of a "cultural struggle." The court proceedings against writers in Moscow<sup>11</sup> and the prosecution of rebellious members of the intelligentsia in Leningrad and elsewhere<sup>12</sup> prove that the present Soviet lead-

ership does not shrink from the application of terrorist means against any opposition.

Yet opposition to totalitarian one-party rule continues to spread within the scientific-cultural intelligentsia. Its progressive sections are developing an explicit political consciousness. This has become very obvious through numerous "Samizdat" (self-published) writings.<sup>13</sup> Among those of the first phase special attention may be called to the "White Books" of the writer Ginsburg and of the Ukrainian journalist Tshornovil, and to the writer Galanskov's essay "Russia's road to Socialism," wherein he argues with the bureaucratic class dictatorship. The second phase has been marked by regular publication of the *Chronika tekushchikh sobytij* (Chronicle of Public Events) since March 1968<sup>14</sup> and by the atom physicist Professor Sakharov's Memorandum of June 1968.<sup>15</sup> During the third phase the decline of economic growth and increasing social tensions supplied the impetus for the formulation of programmatic demands by sections of the opposition. Of special importance in that connection is the letter of March 19, 1970, addressed to the Kremlin leadership by Professors Sakharov, Turtshin and Medvedyev, because it is to be considered as representative of the views of the larger part of the "democratic opposition." So far only a comparatively small group, composed mostly of "Westerners," supports the "Program of the Democratic Movement in the Soviet Union," which became known towards the end of 1969.

Sakharov believes that intellectual freedom, including freedom of information, discussion and thought, is indispensable for Soviet industrial society, if it is to progress further. This freedom, he considers, is threatened chiefly "by the ossified dogmatism of a bureaucratic minority and its favorite weapon, ideological censorship." He sees the guarantors of this intellectual freedom in the intelligentsia and repudiates their subordination "under the will of the party, or more precisely, under the

party apparatus and its functionaries.” Only the granting of full intellectual freedom, which is opposed not only by the party bureaucracy, but partly also by the managers who enjoy special privileges through the present system, will enable “the public” as a whole and the “creative intelligentsia” to control all plans and decisions of the ruling group, as Sakharov puts it. Progressive development of the Soviet Union requires the complete suppression of Stalinism, the abolition of censorship (in its widest sense) and ending the privileges of the high bureaucracy and the economic bosses. Sakharov unmasks without pity the inhuman nature of Stalinism. He sees the historic merit of Khrushchev, despite his Stalinist past and the weaknesses of his policies, primarily in the fact that he opened the door for the discussion of Stalinism.

Sakharov analyzes Stalinism as a system in which a bureaucratic elite occupies all key positions and rewards itself with open and secret privileges. This is an important if not the sole reason for the “vitality of neo-Stalinism.” His demands, intended to usher Soviet industrial society into a post-totalitarian phase of development, agree with those of the Prague reformers, illustrating anew why the Kremlin opposed reform-communism in Czechoslovakia.

Initial successes of the economic reform and a series of good harvests concealed for a while the structural crisis caused by totalitarian one-party rule. But it came to the surface after the intervention in Czechoslovakia and found open expression in falling productivity in 1969. Brezhnev responded by reverting to the traditional methods of bureaucratic economic policy, determined by the model of a central economic administration. This conception was sharply criticized in the “Sakharov Letter” of March 19, 1970, which pointed out that the existing system would result first in stagnation of the Soviet economy and then in reduction of economic growth. The technological gap, particularly in automation and computer technology, between the Western in-

dustrial states led by the USA and the Soviet Union, has become ever wider. The USSR, compared with the United States, was living in another age.

The authors of the letter do not blame these difficulties on the socialist order, but on “the antidemocratic traditions and norms of social life that arose during the Stalinist era,” which impede the unfolding of individual creative initiative. The essential dynamic and adaptability required to accomplish the second industrial revolution can only be achieved by a progressive democratization of political, economic, social and cultural life, enabling the intelligentsia to fulfill its social role.

The “democratic opposition,” active underground, consists mostly of reform-communists of varying shades, Christian democrats with Slavophile tendencies and liberals with Western sympathies. Its growth has caused a further sharpening of the conflict between the orthodox forces in the Soviet leadership and the progressive sections of the intelligentsia. All trends of the “democratic opposition” have in common the demand for the realization of general human rights in the Soviet Union and for effective protection of basic rights.

The oppositionists concentrate mainly on problems connected with the safeguarding of freedom of information, discussion and thought. The “Sakharov Letter” contains demands for a higher degree of information, for an end to the interference with foreign broadcasting, for the free sale of foreign books and newspapers, for joining the international copyright convention, and for the extension of international tourism and of international contacts. It also calls for a new press and information law, new press organs for associations and groups, and abolition of advance censorship.

The letter states:

Freedom of information and creation are prerequisite for the activity and social function of the intelligentsia. Its effort to extend freedom is legitimate and natural. But the state attempts to sup-

press this striving by all possible restrictions, like administrative pressure, dismissals and even prosecution in courts. This causes tensions, mutual distrust and complete incomprehensibility. . .

A large part of the intelligentsia and of youth understand the necessity of democratization and of a cautious and gradual procedure in its application, but they cannot understand and justify anti-democratic measures. How can it be justified that people are put in prison, in camps and in mental institutions, only because they make opposition, entirely legal, within the scope of ideas and convictions? In many cases it was not even opposition, but only a striving for information or a courageous and unbiased discussion of important social problems.<sup>16</sup>

A new wave of attacks against the progressive intelligentsia began in the fall of 1970. It reached its climax in the second half of December, after Gomulka's downfall in Poland.<sup>17</sup> Reacting to intensified police suppression, Professor Sakharov founded a "Committee for Human Rights" on November 4, 1970. He was joined in this endeavor by two colleagues, V. H. Chalidze and A. N. Tverdokhlebov.<sup>18</sup> The anti-Zionist measures,<sup>19</sup> aggravating further the situation of the Jews, the trials of Soviet citizens charged with collaboration with the Germans in World War II, and similar actions were all parts of the campaign of vigilance and ideological demarcation against the West. As usual in such situations, provocations by KGB organs increased sharply.

In dealing with cultural policy at the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev declared himself for an intensification of party control in the literary-artistic field, condemned critical writers like Solzhenitzyn, and demanded stricter, ideological arguments against bourgeois ideology, against deviations from Marxism-Leninism, and against nationalism. "Revisionism" of the right, *i.e.* reformist communism, was thereby represented as the main internal danger. Brezh-

nev pointed to the intensified struggle between the two contrasting social systems on an international scale, going so far as to use the term "ideological war." Masherov, the Byelorussian party secretary, inveighed against every "pluralism of Marxism" and declared that the violent discussion between the contrasting social systems does not permit anyone "to be a wanderer in two worlds."<sup>20</sup> It is hardly to be assumed, however, that by this ideological offensive Brezhnev will succeed in overpowering the "democratic opposition," which by now has become a firm component of the informal Soviet social order.

The most dangerous thing about the "democratic opposition," as seen by the Kremlin leadership, is its championship of the self-determination of the nations supposedly federated in the Soviet Union. This policy finds much resonance among the non-Russian peoples, especially in the European parts of the USSR. Members of the "democratic opposition" have shown much sympathy for the Crimean Tartars, whose unjust treatment was expressly mentioned in the "Sakharov Letter." That document goes on to demand restoration of the rights of nationalities deported under Stalin, and permission for them to return to their former homes.

The "national problem" has been intensified by increasing centralization and Russification. The authority of the Union Republics has been curtailed and federalism weakened by the abolition of the regional economic councils and by centralization of the police, of the judiciary, and of education on the Union level. In Soviet ideological training, particularly in military-patriotic education, the leading role of "Great-Russianness" is once more strongly emphasized, as in Stalin's days.

It is significant that the vigorous discussion about a new definition of the "nation," begun in January, 1966, was halted after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.<sup>21</sup> At the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev stressed the importance of the "Great-Russian Nation" as the pillar of the state. He urged a further

“rapprochement” of the nationalities, which according to the CPSU program will lead to a gradual amalgamation of nationalities and national groups with the Great Russians into a uniform nation.<sup>22</sup>

The emphasis laid by Brezhnev upon the “new stage” in Soviet nationality policy, in accordance with the party program, will sharpen existing conflicts in the Soviet multi-nation-state, and provide further impetus for the nationalism of the suppressed peoples. The continued extension of the “democratic opposition” depends considerably upon whether it will be able to fight Great-Russian chauvinism and embrace the justified demands of the non-Russian peoples.

#### IV

##### *The Development of the Party and State Apparatus and the Role of the Military*

THE ABOLITION of Khrushchev’s administrative reforms after his removal as head of party and government in October, 1964, has strengthened the state apparatus (in a wider sense) *vis-à-vis* the party apparatus. The state apparatus (in the narrower sense) including the economic administration, the political police and the Armed Forces as institutions of power have again gained in importance, so that a relative equilibrium has been established between the party and state bureaucracies. Since then, development of the party apparatus has been directed toward strengthening the top leadership and reinforcing control over the organs of state.

At the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU the party statutes were expanded and newly formulated. It became obvious after that Congress that the present party leadership was even less prepared than Khrushchev to conform to the current party statutes. The 24th Party Congress, intended to be held in March and April of 1970, was postponed for a whole year. The institution of a party conference for the whole Soviet Union,

reintroduced at the behest of Brezhnev, was not utilized at all.

According to the party statutes at least two plenary sessions of the Central Committee are to be held annually. A total of sixteen meetings were held between the two party congresses. They lasted only one or two days, so that there was never any genuine discussion of current political problems. The difficulties in reaching agreement within the Politburo and the reluctance of the leadership to ventilate its differences in front of the Central Committee foreclosed any discussion.

The crucial constitutional problem within the CPSU is how to achieve balanced interaction among the highest organs of the party on the basis of “collective leadership.” The first concern is the relationship between the General Secretary and the Politburo. The second is that between these two organs of leadership and the Central Committee, as well as the larger representative organs—the Party Congress and the Party Conference. An important article by V. Zazorin<sup>23</sup> criticizes Brezhnev’s style of leadership and emphasizes the Party Congress, the Party Conference, and the Central Committee as the proper organs of collective leadership, rather than the Politburo or the Secretariat. Zazorin insists that the Party Congress be called regularly at the appointed time to determine the basic principles of internal and external party policy. In between, the Central Committee is the organ of party leadership with “full power” to execute the policies established by the Congress or Conference. It will not do to have “enlarged meetings” of smaller organs, such as the expanded Politburo meeting that confirmed the intervention in Czechoslovakia, to deal with matters belonging to the constitutional party committees.

The amendments passed by the 24th Party Congress, however, call for ordinary congresses of the CPSU and of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics at least once in every five years, and not every four years as hitherto. By this arrangement

the importance of the party congresses has been limited further and the leadership guaranteed office for five years. The enlargement of the Central Committee to a total of 396 persons (241 members and 155 candidates) and of the Central Revision Commission to 81 members shows a tendency to reduce further the political weight of the Central Committee.

A marked continuity may be observed in the composition of the Central Committee.<sup>24</sup> Of the CC of 1966 149 members (76.2 percent of 195 members) and of the CC of 1961, which approved Khrushchev's removal in 1964, 107 members (61.1 percent of 175 members) have been retained in the new Central Committee. Through the core of the Central Committee, liaison to the last Party Congress of the Stalin era and to the 20th Party Congress of 1956, where the Stalin-myth was demolished, has been preserved. It is significant, however, that the number of state functionaries, especially from the central bureaucracy (Kosygin's domain), has increased in relation to the number of party functionaries on the committee. The small number of youth (0.4 percent) and women (3.7 percent) on the CC are conspicuous, in contrast to the total female membership (21 percent) in the CPSU.

Brezhnev's cautious statements on cadre policy show that he has more respect than Stalin or Khrushchev for the party dignitaries, mostly members of the Central Committee and of the Central Revision Commission. On the other hand he spoke of increased demands to be made of the leading cadres and declared that offices "are not given to anyone for ever." He also announced an exchange of party membership books, bound up with a purge of party rank and file.

The state apparatus in the narrower sense is formed primarily by the Soviet executive, whereas the one-party dictatorship deprives the Soviet legislative of significance.<sup>25</sup> The Council of Ministers of the USSR, the *de jure* government of the Soviet Union, having a membership of 97 on De-

ember 31, 1970, shows an even stronger continuity than the inner circle of the Central Committee. Among recent changes in the Soviet executive are the establishment of a Ministry of Education on federal level in August, 1966, the resurrection of the Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD) in November, 1968, and the restoration of the Ministry of Justice in August 1970. Kosygin demanded at the 24th Party Congress that the economic ministries concentrate on basic decisions, whereas the operative direction of enterprises is to be transferred to newly established production associations.

An expansion of the "Standing Commissions" of the Supreme Soviet and improvements in their procedures have made possible the passage of important laws dealing with subjects such as marriage and family (1968), land (1968), health (1969), labor (1970), and water (1970). But proposals to strengthen the legislature *vis-à-vis* the Soviet executive by extending its sessions, and to have choices of candidates for soviets at all levels have not been acted on. The "democratic opposition" is probing for a reform of the council system. The "Sakharov Letter" demands an extension of the rights and responsibilities of the Supreme Soviet, nomination of alternate candidates for party organs and soviets, and independence for the courts and the Public Prosecutor. Other documents of the opposition carry such demands much further.

The importance of the political police (KGB-MVD) has considerably grown since Khrushchev's downfall, especially since the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The activities of the KGB and MVD-organs, directed not only against Soviet citizens in opposition to the regime, show that the character of the Soviet Union as a police state has been considerably strengthened under Khrushchev's successors.<sup>26</sup>

Limiting the powers of the political police, particularly in the execution of sentences, is one of the principal demands of the "democratic opposition." The "Sakharov Letter" calls for an amnesty for po-

litical prisoners and for public control of all prisons, camps, and psychiatric clinics. A further demand calls for uniform identity passes for city dwellers and villagers, and for gradual abolition of the system of official endorsements in passes.

The Soviet Armed Forces have gained even more in importance. Their accelerated rearmament since Khrushchev's overthrow, the introduction of complicated weapons systems, and the transfer of military-patriotic education to the forces have increased their political weight considerably.<sup>27</sup> The linking of political and military strategy in the foreign policy of a world power, which for the time being must operate from a limited economic base, requires close cooperation between the political and military leadership. The rapid development of military science and technology obliges the Soviet leaders to call more frequently on the expertise of the military, whose influence is thereby increased. Together with the armament industry, the Soviet Armed Forces constitute a military-industrial complex, which has a strong influence on the distribution of resources to the various branches of the economy.

Military-patriotic education is now a task of the Armed Forces, which had little to do in this area in Stalin's and Khrushchev's days. It compensates in part for the waning attractiveness of dogmatic Marxist-Leninist party education. Military-patriotic education offers the military an opportunity to influence the education of the whole nation, and particularly of the youth, via history, literature and art, in the direction of Great-Russian and Soviet imperialist nationalism. Since the establishment of the Institute for Military History in August, 1966, the military have obtained decisive influence upon history-writing, insofar as it is concerned with the Soviet Armed Forces and the "great patriotic war." Military-patriotic education is a characteristic element of neo-Stalinism. It contributes to the increasing systematic militarization of the Soviet people and particularly of its youth.

The increased influence of the military, however, has not meant a greater direct role in political decisions. Brezhnev and Kosygin exercise party supervision over the Armed Forces no less resolutely than did their predecessors. Such supervision was the theme of an article in the April, 1969 *Kommunist* by the head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, Yepishev, who referred to earlier efforts to curb the role of political commissars. The same tendency might be seen in an article by Marshal Krylov, the chief of the strategic rocket force, who wrote in the *Krasnaya Svesda* of February 20, 1969: "The Soviet commander is not only the head (Natshalnik) but also a military and political leader." Such statements do not imply a rejection of party leadership, but express the desire for greater autonomy of the Armed Forces—a desire that led to Zhukov's removal in 1957.

In the Spring of 1969, several incidents made it obvious that there were forces in the military intelligentsia adhering to the "democratic opposition." In May, 1969, the KGB arrested three officers serving in atom-powered submarines of the Baltic Fleet, G. Gavrilov, A. Kosyrev and Paramanov, who were subsequently given long prison sentences. They had formed a "democratic association for the fight for political rights." They had also drafted an "open letter to the citizens of the Soviet Union" and a pamphlet "To Hope or to Act?," and they intended to publish an underground newspaper *The Democrat*. The contacts of this group, reported in more detail in the "Chronicle of Current Events," extended as far as Khabarovsk. Further arrests of officers followed a letter, written by one G. Alekseyev, protesting against the use of troops in Czechoslovakia. In early May, 1969, Major General Grigarenko, one of the most active representatives of the "democratic opposition," was arrested at Tashkent and soon thereafter imprisoned in a psychiatric clinic. Still another activist, arrested in July, 1969, was G. Altunjan, a

major of the engineers and a lecturer at the Military Academy of Kharkov.

At the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev criticized the state and economic administration, the planning apparatus, the trade unions and the party ideologists. He praised, however, the political police, the control apparatus, the Army, the Komsomol and finally the party apparatus in the narrower sense, *i.e.* the party organizers. He mentioned that the state security organs had been reinforced by "politically mature cadres" during the period covered by his report. Brezhnev further emphasized that problems of military reconstruction had been "continuously in the center of our attention." The Soviet Army he considers not only a military instrument of the Soviet state, but also a "good school of ideological and physical strength, of discipline and of organization."

Brezhnev's statement makes it fairly obvious upon which instruments of domination the party boss mostly relies. It is rather questionable whether organized Soviet youth is really behind the present leadership of the Komsomol. The party boss plainly views with suspicion the Soviet trade unions, whose head, Shelepin, is not a Brezhnev supporter. The party ideologists, who might be described as "party clerics," are also in the line of fire. They belong to the intelligentsia more than do the party organizers, and they prefer sharpness of argument rather than the repressive police methods that damage the reputation of the Soviet Union.

## V

### *Changes in the Kremlin Leadership and the Problem of Constitutional Reforms*

IT HAS BECOME ever more obvious since the 23rd Party Congress that Brezhnev is aspiring to sole leadership, whereas Kosygin, Suslov and "State President" Podgorny, who share top leadership in the Kremlin with Brezhnev, uphold the preservation of "collective leadership."

An article in the January, 1971, issue of *Kommunist* entitled "The Authority of the Leader" criticizes in a veiled manner "the chase for popularity, dallying with the masses and clumsy comradeship," with which Khrushchev has been taxed, as well as the "cabinet style," for which Brezhnev apparently is taken to task. The article states:

It is absurd if a leader thinks that by gaining a certain position he also gains authority automatically. . . . He must know that the trust placed in him is an advance payment. . .

At the same time it is emphasized that a leader cannot do without the advice of the experts "who know more than he does." This remark apparently criticized Brezhnev's attempts to interfere with Kosygin's sphere of competence, concerned primarily with the economy, without paying attention to the distribution of work agreed by the "leaders' collective." To give ideological support to the party boss, the director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, Fedoseyev, in the March issue of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, evolved the thesis of the "limited collegial spirit."

Brezhnev's first attempt to unite the offices of party boss and head of the government in one hand or to replace Kosygin by someone more agreeable to him miscarried in July, 1970. Although in 1971 the General Secretary was even more in the focal point of the Party Congress than in 1966, he did not succeed in achieving a uniform opinion in favor of strengthening the monocratic element in the Kremlin leadership.

Some delegates expressed agreement with the Kazakhstan Party Secretary Kunayev, who praised Brezhnev's qualities of leadership, especially in the Central Committee. Others followed the line of Masherov, who gave preference to the Politburo over Brezhnev. Masherov spoke of the "generally stimulating work of the Party, of the Central Committee and of the Politburo, which they have performed with Lenin-like persistence and consistency in

order to realize the resolutions of the Party Congress."<sup>29</sup>

The composition of the two ruling bodies elected by the Central Committee at the 24th Party Congress shows that Brezhnev strengthened his position but failed in the decisive breakthrough toward sole leadership. The wider leadership circle, which has hitherto included the eleven members and nine candidates of the Politburo plus the ten CC secretaries, has remained unchanged in membership. But three candidates of the Politburo have been made full members, leaving only six candidates, and one of the CC secretaries has been admitted to the inner leadership. The officials so promoted are Victor Grishin, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Premier Vladimir Shcherbitsky of the Ukrainian SSR, First Secretary Dinamuhamed Kunayev of the Kazakhstan CP, and the CC secretary for agriculture, Fyodor Kulakov.

Through the extension of the "leadership collective" from eleven to fifteen members, Brezhnev's influence, hitherto supported by Kirilenko as a faithful follower and therefore dependent on varying alliances, has increased considerably. Shcherbitsky and Kunayev are followers of Brezhnev, Grishin a close ally, and Kulakov a Brezhnev appointee. It appears that Brezhnev failed, however, in an effort to promote his protégé, the CC secretary Katushev, to membership on the Politburo. Brezhnev likewise did not succeed in removing his rival Shelepin, whose position he has gradually weakened since 1965, nor the prime minister of the RSFSR, Voronov, who is in favor of agricultural reforms. The general expectation that the chairman of the Committee for Party Control, Pelse, would resign from the Politburo because of advanced age was not fulfilled. On the contrary, Brezhnev praised Pelse in particular when announcing the new composition of that body. The partly anticipated promotion to Politburo member of KGB-head Andropov, and to candidate of the Defense Minister Marshal Gretchko, did not materialize, although the military and some of the regional KGB-heads are

represented in many newly-elected CC bureaus in the Union Republics. It is striking that the CC secretary and head of the party's organizational department, *i.e.* of the cadre administration, Kapitonov, did not even figure as a candidate, perhaps because Kapitonov did not support Brezhnev in his desire to have a wider range of new appointments. It was to be anticipated that the head of the ideological commission, Demichev, hitherto at the top of Politburo candidates, would not receive any promotion in view of the sharp criticism of party ideologists.

The extension of the "collective leadership" has two more important consequences. Brezhnev has succeeded in restoring the predominance of the party apparatus amongst the full members of the Politburo, as it was the case under Khrushchev. Hitherto five representatives of the party executive and control (Brezhnev, Suslov, Kirilenko, Shelest, Pelse) faced five members of the state executive (Kosygin, Podgorny, Mazurov, Voronov, Polyansky). The trade union chairman Shelepin practically tipped the scale. Now the party side has been reinforced by Grishin, Kunayev, and Kulakov, whereas on the state side only Shcherbitsky has been added. Even more significant is the change in the composition of nationalities. The preponderance of non-Russians, hitherto 6:5, is now expressed in the relation 8:7. Among the non-Russians are five Ukrainians (Podgorny, Kirilenko, Polyansky, Shelest, Shcherbitsky) one Byelorussian (Mazurov), one Latvian (Pelse), one Kazakh (Kunayev). They are faced by seven Great Russians (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin, Voronov, Grishin, Kulakov), whereby it is important that Brezhnev, although Great Russian, hails from the Ukraine. Among the remaining candidates there is an equilibrium; one Byelorussian (Masherov), one Georgian (Mshavanadse), one Uzbek (Rashidov) are faced by three Great Russians (Andropov, Demichev, Ustinov). The nationality membership can be important at some problems, as is shown by the decision to inter-

vene (in Czechoslovakia) in 1968, at which all non-Russians with the exception of Polyansky were at the side of Brezhnev in its favor, because they considered the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic republics particularly sensitive to reform-communist ideas.

Brezhnev's close support rests upon the party organization of Dnepropetrovsk, of which Kirilenko and Shcherbitsky were also members, and upon the Moldavian CP. Kunayev attached himself to him during his period in Kazakhstan. Brezhnev, therefore, has to rely upon an alliance with Podgorny and with the First Secretary of the Ukrainian CP, Shelest, who have their own supporters in the Ukraine. Kirilenko is also supported by the party organizations of the Ural territory. A less close ally is Mazurov, who came from the partisan movement in Byelorussia and who takes a hard line. He and Masherov are representatives of the Byelorussian party groups. The Leningrad group has lost much of its influence since the death of Koslov. It opposed the treaties with the German Federal Republic, as it would appear.

At the final meeting of the 24th Party Congress Brezhnev cited the reelected eleven full members of the Politburo in a sequence deliberately chosen by him.<sup>30</sup> A comparison with the official sequence of the nominations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet USSR in June 1970 permits some inferences as to the changed power constellation in the Kremlin:

#### Hierarchy of Members of the Politburo

June 1970	April 1970
Brezhnev	Brezhnev
Kosygin	Podgorny
Podgorny	Kosygin
Suslov	Suslov
Kirilenko	Kirilenko
Polyansky	Pelse
Shelest	Mazurov
Mazurov	Polyansky
Shelepin	Shelest
Pelse	Voronov
Voronov	Shelepin

This comparison shows that there was no change in the top leadership, which is composed of the four "oligarchs" Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov. The alliance between Brezhnev and Podgorny, who was deliberately named before Kosygin, does not change the fact that the actual position of power of Kosygin and Suslov is still stronger than that of Podgorny, who as chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet has more representative functions. This is also valid of Pelse, named in sixth place to give the impression that Kirilenko, who precedes him, is a member of the top. It is more remarkable that Brezhnev has placed Mazurov above Polyansky and Shelepin at the foot of the list. This points not only to a disagreement between Brezhnev and Polyansky, but to the desire to exclude Shelepin completely. The relations with Shelest, who is self-willed, also appear to have suffered. Brezhnev has meanwhile managed to have Voronov replaced as premier of the RSFSR by the CC secretary Solomentsev, who is close to the "military-industrial complex."

The present power constellation in the Kremlin shows that the forces upholding "collective leadership" are still very strong. Brezhnev could only overcome them by placing himself at the head of the reformist forces. He appears to be prevented from doing that not only by his basically orthodox attitude, but also by the structure of his personality. He is neither a charismatic leader like Lenin, nor a despotic ruler like Stalin or a popular tribune like Khrushchev. He is an administrator, who will conscientiously manage what has been entrusted to him. But he is not a man to stake out new roads. Nor has he promoted many of the younger generation to important positions.

More than half of the members of the CPSU were below the age of 40 in 1966; those in their forties accounted for about a quarter of the membership.<sup>31</sup> At that time 89.2 percent of the members had joined after the war and 44.2 percent since the 20th Congress of 1956. In the meantime,

despite the admission of two million new members, the figures have shifted in favor of the older generation. The party leadership is dominated by those over 60 and not by those in their forties or fifties. It will not be possible to avoid a change in generation before the next Party Congress, when the full members of the Politburo will average 66 years of age and the leading "oligarchs" (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, and Podgorny) will be 72 years old. The new leadership will necessarily consist of party members who have grown up in the Khrushchev era and who have had no contact at all with Stalinism.

Until this change of the guards a balanced teamwork between the Politburo and the General Secretary resting upon the principle of "collective leadership" will remain the decisive constitutional problem in the bolshevist one-party state. A compromise between the conception of the majority of Politburo members and Brezhnev became obvious from the CC report. It stated:

For the growth and the training of the cadres for the correct organization of our work it is an absolute prerequisite to combine collective leadership with personal responsibility for the given task. If we develop the collective basis of leadership, we have to remember that a basic principle of leadership, as already formulated by W. I. Lenin and understood by our party, is that a certain person is fully responsible for the direction of certain work.

One task which Brezhnev appears not to have pursued diligently, however, is that of drafting a new constitution. The Stalin Constitution of 1936 seems more suited to the political style of Khrushchev's successors.

During the interval between the 23rd and 24th Congresses, the state apparatus appears to have strengthened its position at the expense of the party. It would thus be difficult to restore party control over the organs of the state. Only by gaining con-

trol over the state apparatus can Brezhnev approach his goal of sole leadership. There are two ways to do this. One is to renew the attempt to combine the offices of party boss and prime minister, as Stalin and Khrushchev succeeded in doing, or to install a subservient chairman of the Council of Ministers. The other is to combine the offices of General Secretary and "State President" as in Rumania and now also in Bulgaria, and until recently in the Communist part of Germany. Both these solutions will be opposed by Soviet leaders who, like Kosygin, uphold the independence of the state apparatus or who prefer "collective leadership" to one-man rule. The party purge announced by Brezhnev is likely to intensify the struggle for power in the Kremlin as well as the party-state conflict. Yet the intensification of ideological indoctrination and repression will hardly prevent the "democratic opposition" from pursuing its demand for liberalization and democratization of the political system.

## VI

### *The Dilemma of Soviet Politics*

THE INTERNAL development in the Soviet Union since the intervention in Czechoslovakia has clearly shown the dilemma of the present regime. If it listens to the counsel of "democratic oppositionists" like Sakharov, it will regain the lost dynamic, but it will also open the doors to the pluralistic forces. If this is not done, on the other hand, there is the danger that the Soviet Union will fall back more and more in economic and technological competition with the fully developed industrial countries.

The 24th Party Congress resolved on a way that would least disturb the bureaucratic regime: a restricted economic reform. At the same time an effort is being made to increase labor productivity through better management combined with material incentives. Foreign policy faces a contradiction. On the one hand, ideological hostility is to be maintained to safe-

guard cohesion in the Soviet bloc and to enable the regime to withstand the pressure of the "democratic opposition." On the other, the Soviet Union is interested in reduction of external tension so as to reduce overengagement, to procure access to Western technical progress, and to be able to devote more attention to internal problems.

Whether a policy of détente can be combined with a hard line in internal politics for any length of time remains doubtful. It could succeed for a limited period, if the Kremlin would desist from a further armament race. But here a basic contradiction could be noted in the CC report and in some other statements at the Party Congress. On the one hand it is stated that the Soviet Union has all that is necessary "to secure the inviolability of our frontiers against every attack and to protect the achievements of Socialism" (Brezhnev), and that the Soviet Armed Forces dispose "of weapons of the greatest destructive force capable of reaching every place on earth" (Gretchko). On the other hand it is declared that further strengthening of the Armed Forces and of the defensive power of the Soviet state is "one of the most important tasks" (Brezhnev) and that the defense capacity of the Armed Forces has to be increased (Gretchko).

The foreign-policy program in the CC report reveals a considerable Soviet interest

in partial disarmament measures to reduce the ever increasing load of weapons costs. But there are strong forces which are not content with the military equilibrium with the United States that has been achieved to a large extent. They strive for a superiority to be able to carry on a "global policy of strength," perhaps because of the potential threat by China.

If the main goal of Soviet foreign policy is really "the securing of favorable international conditions for the reconstruction of Socialism and Communism," as has been stated in 1966 and 1971, then there is no reason why the Soviet Union continues the armament race which must produce automatically countermeasures on the other side. In this way it will hardly be possible for her to achieve the desired increase in productivity and a modernization of the Soviet economy under the new Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet Union has reached a crossroads in her development. She will have to decide between military rearmament or economic expansion, between absolute party dictatorship or autonomy of individual social spheres, between more internal suppression or more internal freedom. At the 24th Party Congress this decision was postponed. It cannot be circumvented forever.

<sup>1</sup>See the detailed description in the special number, "The 24th Party Congress of the CPSU," of *Osteuropa*, August-September 1971.

<sup>2</sup>The text of Brezhnev's CC report of March 30, 1971, is to be found in *Pravda* of that date; of Kosygin's report of April 6, 1971, regarding the directives for the ninth Five-Year Plan, 1971-1975, in *Pravda* of April 7, 1971. Concerning Brezhnev's statement at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in December, 1969, see B. Meissner, "The Soviet Union on Her Way to the 24th Party Congress (I)" in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 21, pp. 378-9.

<sup>3</sup>See R. Löwenthal, "Development as a Cause of Conflict and Change in Communist Political Systems," in Chalmers-Johnson, *Communist Political System: Patterns of Development and Change*. (Citation from advanced draft.)

<sup>4</sup>The concept of totalitarianism is being argued in the political sciences. Most Western political scientists engaged in research on politics in the East retain it, e.g. Merle Fainsod, Adam Ulam, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Leonard Schapiro. The arguments advanced by Alfred Mayer in *The Soviet Political System, An Interpretation* (New York, 1965), pp. 470 ff., against application of the totalitarian idea to the Soviet Union are not convincing. The concept is indispensable, especially when investigating the difference between the orthodox communist and the reform-communist systems of government.

<sup>5</sup>The author has proved this by cases taken from Yugoslav and Czechoslovak reform-communism. Comp. B. Meissner, "Moscow's Orthodoxy and Reform Communism" in A. Domes, Ed.,

*Reformen und Dogmen in Osteuropa* (Cologne, 1971), pp. 25 ff.

<sup>6</sup>As proposed by Peter Christian Ludz, who is of the opinion that the "German Democratic Republic" has attained the evolutionary stage of a "consultative authoritarianism." See his "Draft of a Socialist Theory of Totalitarian Society," in *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR* (Cologne-Opladen, 1964), p. 19.

<sup>7</sup>See B. Meissner, Ed., *Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel* (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 92 ff. and 115 ff.; "The Power Elite and Intelligentsia in Soviet Society," in K. London, Ed., *The Soviet Union: A Half Century of Communism* (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 159 ff.

<sup>8</sup>The Chart has been prepared on the basis of the author's analysis in the special number "The 24th Party Congress of the CPSU," of *Osteuropa*, August-September, 1971.

<sup>9</sup>A. Amalrik, *Kann die Sowjetunion das Jahr 1984 erleben?* (Zürich, 1970), p. 27.

<sup>10</sup>Text of the Baibakov-report: *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 1968, No. 21.

<sup>11</sup>On the trial against Sinyavsky and Daniel, see E. Hayward, *On Trial, The Soviet State Versus "Abram Terz" and "Nikolaj Arzhak"* (New York, 1967). As to the report on the trial against Ginzburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova, see *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 9 to 16, 1968. Regarding the protest against the arrest of the Ginzburg-Galanskov group, see K. van het Reve, *Witnesses Who Have Not Been Summoned*. Letters and telegrams to Pavel M. Litvinov (Hamburg, 1969).

<sup>12</sup>Concerning underground groups whose members have been sentenced in secret trials, see Amalrik, *loc. cit.* p. 13. The largest illegal organization was the All-Russian Christian-Socialist Association for the Liberation of the People, which had its center at Leningrad. It is reported to have branches in the Ukraine, in the Ural territory and in western Siberia. In December 1967, *i.e.* even before the trial of the Galanskov-Ginzburg group, four members had been given prison sentences from eight to fifteen years. A further eighteen intellectuals were tried in March 1968 at Leningrad. See *Der Spiegel* No. 17, 1968, p. 135.

<sup>13</sup>See "Underground Literature in the Soviet Union," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* September 10, 1967; K. von het Reve, "Die andere russische Literatur—Samisdat: Untergrund-Dokumente in der Sowjetunion," *Die Zeit*, April 10, 1970. See also, *Bestraft mit Weltruhm. Dokumente zum Fall Alexander Solshenizyn* (Frankfurt a.M., 1970).

<sup>14</sup>In nearly three years altogether sixteen issues of the *Chronicle* have been published. Eleven were as special numbers of the magazine *Posev* in August, 1969, December, 1969, and April, 1970, at Frankfurt a.M. See also C. F. Ströhm, "Chronicle of Resistance," *Christ und Welt* of April 24, 1970.

<sup>15</sup>A. D. Sakharov, *Razmyshleniya o Progresse, mirnom sosushchestvovanii i intellektual'noy svobode* (Thoughts on progress, peaceful co-existence and spiritual freedom).

<sup>16</sup>Text: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 22 and 24, 1970.

<sup>17</sup>See B. Meissner, "The Soviet Union on Her Way to the 24th Party Congress (II)," *Osteuropa*, Vol. 21, 1971, pp. 479 ff.

<sup>18</sup>*New York Times*, November 16, 1970.

<sup>19</sup>See R. W. Schloss, *Let My People Go. The Russian Jews Between the Soviet Star and the Star of David* (Munich, 1971).

<sup>20</sup>See *Pravda*, April 1, 1971.

<sup>21</sup>See E. Oberländer, "The Soviet Idea of the Nation Today," *Osteuropa*, Vol. 21, 1971, pp. 273 ff.

<sup>22</sup>See B. Meissner, *The Party Programme of the CPSU, 1903-1961*, (Cologne, 1962), p. 111.

<sup>23</sup>V. Zazorin, "Collectivity of Labor," *Partinaya Zhizhn*, No. 3, 1969.

<sup>24</sup>A detailed analysis of the personal composition of the Central Committee and of the Central Revision Commission is contained in the special number "The 24th Party Congress of the CPSU," *Osteuropa*, August-September, 1971.

<sup>25</sup>Concerning the development of the Soviet Executive and the Soviet Legislative between the two Party congresses, see B. Meissner, "Changes in the Governmental and Administrative System of the Soviet Union," in *Sowjetstaat und Sowjetrecht nach Chruschtschow*, *loc. cit.* pp. 20 ff.

<sup>26</sup>See Solzhenitzyn's open letter addressed to the director of the Committee for State Security (KGB), Andropov, of August 13, 1971.

<sup>27</sup>See Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 427 ff.

<sup>28</sup>*Chronika tekushchikh sobytij*, 1969, No. 9-11.

<sup>29</sup>*Pravda*, April 1, 1971.

<sup>30</sup>TASS report of April 9, 1971. In the official news in *Pravda* of April 10, 1971, as in 1966, the alphabetical sequence was strictly observed in view of the "collective leadership principle."

<sup>31</sup>On the generation problem compare the data in the special number "The 24th Party Congress of the CPSU," *Osteuropa*, August-September 1971.