separate. The gangsters began to commit murders outside of their own ranks—the death of the prosecutor and of a newspaper reporter each set off exposures of corruption and cries of indignation. Reformist politicians and officials, mainly on the federal level, began to bring pressure to bear. The famed Eliot Ness and his associates alone deprived Capone of several million dollars in revenue. Federal judges and juries proved less subject to pressure, and a new tool—prosecution for income tax violations involving illegal income—finally enabled law enforcement agencies to jail those who had evaded other charges. The gangs succeeded temporarily because they were able to bring much of the Cook County electorate into their system. They failed in the long run because not even Al Capone could organize the nation.

Mr. Kobler has written a thorough and fascinating history of a man and an era that have current echoes in rampant crime and political violence. He provides a case study of how such a situation can develop —and of how it might be cured.

Reviewed by DENNIS R. NOLAN

Technology and Defense

The Strategy of Technology, by Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle; foreword by Craig Hosmer, *Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Dunellen Publishing Company, 1970. 189 pp. $7.50.*

CRAIG HOSMER, the ranking minority member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, says in the foreword that:

> Development of proper organization, with an understanding of the needs of a technological strategy and the ability to apply it wisely, is the major problem we must face—and face quickly. [This book is] one of the very first studies to deal with this grave problem.

The authors try to combine the technology of our nuclear age with strategic principles of war, tested by long experience, to assure survival. They succeed remarkably well.

Though no less for peace than those who daily extol it, the authors quickly lay to rest the phantom of an era of negotiation. Negotiations produce treaties, which all nations have broken throughout history. For a serious breach, the only redress is war. And while the Soviet Union may conciliate for tactical purposes, its strategy is directed to winning the world for communism. Against such an implacable foe, a friendly attitude will not keep the peace. The stabilizing element in preventing war is not diplomacy, but arms technology.

Though inherently uncertain, arms technology is certain to move forward and upward. The plateau theory is undermined by the dynamics of technology plus an aggressive enemy. Whenever we are on level ground for the moment, a new peak looms ahead. Technological breakthroughs will come. Our aim should be to achieve them first—as many as we can, both large and small.

The development of arms technology cannot be stopped, but can be harnessed and driven. To that end, the Soviet Union has developed a strategy of technology. The resources of the United States, compared to those of the Soviets, enable us to create an arms technology superior to theirs, but we have made only uncorrelated decisions on specific technological problems. What is needed, the authors assert, is an American strategy to indicate both the direction of discoveries and their employment. While the authors would encourage free scientific research and gladly embrace its yield, they wisely insist on an addition: strategists must direct research, development, and deployment.

> The history of technological development, particularly of weapons, leads us to believe that identification of a technological requirement increases the likelihood of fulfilling it.

Messrs. Possony and Pournelle accept the fact that the contest must be asymmetric because the Soviet Union can contemplate a first strike, but the nature of the West forbids one and forces a defensive posture. Nonetheless, an active defense can apply the major principles of strategy—objective, initiative, surprise, unity of command, economy of forces, mobility, security, and pursuit—all of which the authors apply to technological warfare in peacetime. They devote a whole chapter to surprise, which because of our defensive posture we must prevent, but about which we must "understand also . . . [our own] capabilities." Though commonly associated with the sneak attack, surprise always has a surprisor and a surprisee, and the surprisee may be the attacker. To the authors' illustrations of defensive technological surprise, one might add the successful use of Greek fire by Leo III against Suleiman's attack on Constantinople (717-718), which saved Christian Europe from the Moslems for a long time. In our age, to win or to prevent the battle, laboratory is pitted against laboratory to find new advances, for example, in radar. And deception about scientific progress or its lack can aid surprise.

One of the most interesting discussions in the book is about the neutron weapon (pp. 147-152). Apart from the weapon itself, the authors' application of the strategy of technology to the unknown is fascinating. When the advantages to be gained are so great, we must try and try again.

Chapter 6 on "Assured Survival" is the most important in the book. The Soviet Union has placed far more emphasis on defense than the United States, which has been relying on "assured destruction" for "assured survival." An example of the double talk that has clouded an understanding of the nuclear problem is the recent assertion that any American deployment for defense is aggressive. The authors, who do not share that delusion, discuss instead means of defense. They point out that laser technology is on the eve of a major breakthrough, and sensibly postulate that dual purpose systems, capable of offense and defense, are by no means impossible.

The authors, though seeking quality, know the necessity of quantity. While weapons are often obsolete when deployed, we must always have forces in being sufficient to win a war. The more ready weapons, the more likely is the continuance of peace. The catchword "overkill" obscures the fact that quantity can partly compensate for inferior quality and can deter while we are catching up after an enemy has made a technological breakthrough. Forces in being and the development of new weapons go together.

The difficult question is how to find the qualified strategists and put them in command. The authors suggest a continuing general strategic staff for the technological war in peacetime, manned mostly by military men, with junior general staff officers being trained for continuity.

> America's main chance is to trust ourselves instead of our enemies, to remain stronger and to be more effective builders of peace than our foes. Technology is America's manifest destiny.

Though the authors maintain this position, they are pessimistic about the prospect for the adoption of their strategy of technology by the American "demagogues." But since they cite Ovid in favor of the role of the accidental, they should take cheer. Any president who reads their work can easily put it into force. Perhaps the present or a future occupant of the presidential chair will do so. Meanwhile, the book will enlighten.

Reviewed by LAURENCE W. BEILENSON