

such men as Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun and, more recently, the authors of *P'U Take My Stand*.

The difference between the two views may be simply illustrated. When Publius speaks of the kind of men that will govern the republic he has constructed, he speaks of them as "speculative men," men free from local prejudices who concern themselves with the general and remote interests of the nation and not the homogeneous and immediate interests of the localities (*Federalist* Nos. 17, 35 and 36). When the anti-Federalists speak of the kind of men that they wish to form, they speak of local influences—of the ties to the land and to the small communities that form the character of their citizens (Cf., Query XIX of the *Notes on the State of Virginia*).

Kendall, in sum, continues the debate that began at the Founding and he reminds us, in his own strange and contradictory way, that there are two American political traditions—two traditions that finally tested each other in civil war.

Reviewed by LEO PAUL S. DE ALVAREZ

Protean Policy of France

The Foreign Policies of France 1944-1968, by Guy de Carmoy, *Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.* x + 510 pp. \$15.00.

THE UNIVERSITY of Chicago Press is known as one of the most reputable academic presses in the nation. For many scholars its seal on a title page has been a kind of secular *imprimatur*. So it is with a certain respect that one approaches the translation of Guy de Carmoy's work on

French foreign policy during the period 1944-1968. Many specialized studies, of course, have been written on different aspects of post World War II French policy, but as a panoramic view this is about the only thing of its kind in English. The need for it is beyond question. Plainly it is designed as a standard survey for anyone who wants to see what the world has looked like from Paris. Along with its obvious strength it has its points of weakness. Least among these is a matter of circumstance. Carmoy's book appeared a little while before the death or even the retirement of Charles de Gaulle. It has the curious effect of publicly giving advice and warning to the French President at a time when most readers are looking for a summing up of his career.

Style is not Carmoy's great asset; perhaps the translation is partly at fault. He does not have the clear outline, the taut organization, and the easy-flowing narrative that are the marks of the best diplomatic historians. His work tends now and then to be a disjointed stringing out of riots, wars, treaties, conferences, speeches, and official visits, all well punctuated by the quoted judgments of prominent writers in the field of military and political history. Steadily emerging in the process is the impression that Carmoy has not intended to present himself as a deeply erudite and penetratingly interpretive author. He is not pretentious. He has a long and involved set of events to deal with, and he proceeds to do so without missing many important ones. Very openly he is dependent on the searching analysis of such seasoned writers as Alfred Grosser, André Fontaine, Jean Laloy, General Beaufre, Henry Kissinger, and most especially Raymond Aron, who is cited on occasion with great esteem. In a broad way, Carmoy's views turn out to be a grouping of their views. His overall attitude follows that of the political center and the left-of-center. It follows the center in sympathy for the construction of an economically and politically unified Europe and the left-of-center in opposing efforts to save the French empire.

The whole period 1944-1968 is pictured as bearing the impress of Charles de Gaulle. When he was the chief executive of the nation in the first two years of this period and again during the last ten years, he looked upon foreign policy as having primary importance. He was the direct formulator of that policy, seeing to it that the accent was always on national revival. But even when he was out of power, he was an immeasurably vast influence if only because few were the Frenchmen who were willing to stand up against the ideas of the man who personified patriotism. At the very end of World War II, de Gaulle, in his capacity as head of the provisional government, was the one who, fatefully enough, decided to restore the French colonial empire in Africa and Asia in the face of native nationalism. In Franco-Soviet relations he asserted himself in December 1944 by negotiating a special nonaggression pact which was as much a slap at the Anglo-Americans as it was a gesture of good will towards the Soviets. Here already was a first intimation of the much later Gaullist policy of the 1960's to create a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," in which France would be in closer combination with Eastern Europe than with the Atlantic powers.

De Gaulle resigned as head of the provisional government in January 1946, disgusted that his ideas on a strong executive authority in the new constitution were being rejected. Even more completely rejected in the subsequent years of the Fourth Republic were the implications of Franco-Soviet friendship to be found in the nonaggression pact. Under the pressure of a transparent Soviet threat, France allied herself with various other Western powers in the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Alliance for the purpose of common economic reconstruction and common military protection. The underlying purpose of these arrangements was further realized in the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence Community. The Gaullists were appalled especially at the latter, for no matter what the alleged

benefit might be, it was being bought at the price of supranationalism, *i.e.* the submergence of France. But their obstructionism did not prevail. Though the defense community was defeated in an almost evangelical revival of Germanophobia, the need for German rearmament was acknowledged by the fairly prompt entry of Germany into NATO. However, the greatest triumph of the political parties, so much despised by de Gaulle, came in 1957 with the establishment of the Common Market. Here, as the Fourth Republic was stumbling into its grave, was a march towards supranationalism that was to be retarded but never undone in the future.

The irony is that this republic would probably have survived and de Gaulle would not have returned to power if the republic had been successful in casting away still more ideas of Gaullism. In European matters Gaullism was a fading creed, but in colonial matters Gaullism, or something very much like it, hung on to life very tenaciously. After a noticeable beginning of withdrawal in Indochina in 1945, France lapsed almost immediately into a vain and puerile effort to maintain her position there and elsewhere. What she refused to understand was that she was far from having the means required to implement a policy of imperialism that basically belonged to an earlier age. She did not understand either that her colonial policy was morally and materially incompatible with her role in NATO and in the integrated Europe of the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market. Eventually, in Indochinese affairs a rather novel kind of hero emerged. This was Premier Mendès-France. He was *not* a hero because he secured victory but because he decided abruptly to pull out and cut losses in a conflict that could only produce more losses. By contrast, in North African affairs this kind of heroism was lacking. The distinguished authority on twentieth century diplomacy and society, Raymond Aron, openly exposed the complete futility of "Algérie Française," but ideas such as his never stopped the politi-

cians in their course. And so the republic fell. It made way for the one man who could prevent the nation from dissolving into discord and maybe civil war.

De Gaulle and Gaullism are factors whose importance Carmoy is probably exaggerating at least for the period of the Fourth Republic. With or without de Gaulle this was a time when there was a strong current of public opinion against the abandonment of empire. It is largely because of the hindsight of the 1960's and thereafter that we suppose the French people and their leaders did realize or should have realized that such abandonment was inevitable. As Carmoy moves from the parliamentary Fourth Republic to the Gaullist Fifth Republic, he continues to be firmly opposed to much of the Gaullist program, but fortunately this opposition is set forth without the rancor and sarcasm that seem to possess a good many other critics of the regime. Naturally enough, Carmoy's first topic is Algeria. The handling of this problem, for which de Gaulle has received so much acclaim, is examined with a skeptical eye. Carmoy shows how de Gaulle moved step by step away from his "Algérie Française" stand of 1958 in the direction of the Evian accords of 1962 by which Algeria became completely independent. This final result is thoroughly agreeable to Carmoy, but he reproaches de Gaulle for not achieving it a year or two earlier. Thus de Gaulle, who has often been blamed for being an authoritarian, is being blamed in these pages for not having been something even stronger than an authoritarian. He should have been the kind of *deus ex machina* who can reverse the course of history almost as soon as the truth is perceived. Much of this attitude arises from Carmoy's assumptions about de Gaulle's rise to power in the first place. Although some of the French military, it is conceded, wanted to hold Algeria by force if necessary, the French people are portrayed as weary of the Algerian war and desirous of peace. Carmoy does not seem to recognize the great amount of mass support

for a policy of "Algérie Française" that persisted throughout the 1950's. Nor does he recognize that in 1958 de Gaulle was seen by himself and others as a symbol of that policy. The remarkable thing thereafter was not the slow but rather the quick change of course, whether for better or worse. Seldom in history have nations and their leaders decided on such a turnabout, except in cases of complete disaster.

It is with patience rather than pique that Carmoy recites a number of the idiosyncrasies of Gaullist behavior that have led to sharp reactions here and there around the world. Deciding after the Cuban crisis of 1962 that American domination was the greatest threat to the independence of nations, France's President flailed at it in every direction. When in 1965 American forces landed in the Dominican Republic, he protested. Previously he had been sympathetic towards the Kennedy attitude on dealing with Castro. Also, on the subject of general economy and finance he became more and more obsessed with the idea of American penetration and subjugation of Europe, and eventually he tried to stage a monetary counterattack by selling off France's dollar reserve for gold. More sensational, of course, than American economic imperialism was alleged American military imperialism. Back in 1954 the Fourth Republic had once been unhappy because of American failure to protect the whole of Indochina from Communist attack. Now, little more than a decade later, the Fifth Republic was accusing Americans of aggression merely for trying to block Communist advance into one section of Indochina, namely South Vietnam. So indignant was de Gaulle to become that he later declared that American policy in Asia was an important cause of the Middle Eastern explosion of 1967. Talk such as this was immensely pleasing to the "dove" intellectuals in the USA and elsewhere, but many of the same intellectuals were staggered when de Gaulle went on to press his opinion that in the immediate war crisis of June 1967 Israel was the aggressor to be condemned.

These episodes and others like them such as de Gaulle's shout of "Long Live Free Quebec!" during the course of his Canadian visit in the same critical summer of 1967 obviously do not arouse Carmoy's admiration, but in a practical sense the author realizes that they had a limited effect on the actual course of events. De Gaulle's truly disturbing influence, something morally tarnishing for France, has been largely in European affairs. His dismantling of NATO and his confused scheme for a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" could simply create a situation building up the hegemony of the Soviet Union or perhaps enabling Western Germany to steal a march on everybody. Meanwhile, the French nuclear deterrent has turned out to be no deterrent at all. France is actually falling behind in the race. In the business of the Common Market de Gaulle has sometimes tried to use the organization for the dubious purpose of procuring French domination; or else on behalf of an antiquated national vanity he has occasionally tried to prevent the organization from realizing the kind of ideal that would make Western Europe the equal of the Soviet Union and at the same time a truly viable and rational community of peoples.

Reviewed by BRENTON H. SMITH