

# *Santayana: Conservative or Philosopher of Reason?*

M I C H A E L A . W E I N S T E I N

GEORGE SANTAYANA presently holds a secure place in the pantheon of American conservative thinkers. Contemporary conservatives claim him as a source of their inspiration because of his critique of liberalism and his ideal of the life of reason. Peter Viereck asserted: "Santayana pronounced the history of liberalism virtually closed."<sup>1</sup> Russell Kirk remarks: "Beneath this general tolerance, however, Santayana adheres to a firm and haughty standard for judging dominations and powers: a good society is beautiful, a bad society ugly. Upon this premise he erects his conservatism and condemns the great tendency that modern life displays."<sup>2</sup> Michael Oakeshott claims that in Santayana's writings there is an "echo of Burke" and an "even more distinct echo of Coleridge."<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, liberals do not claim Santayana as one of their own. They are

willing to let him remain on the right. Sidney Hook comments: "What seems most paradoxical about Santayana's thought is that although his social position is conservative, if not reactionary . . . his moral theory is liberal."<sup>4</sup> Irwin Edman sums up the consensus of scholars who have interpreted Santayana: "He has a tendency to speak of certain facts of the political status quo as if they were the ineradicable principles of nature itself."<sup>5</sup> Thus, there is a tendency in modern American letters to view Santayana as an aristocrat who looked back to a golden age of hierarchical society, stability, beauty, and sound morality. Is this interpretation justified after a close examination of his works?

Throughout his writings Santayana treats the traditional problem of the relative merits of permanence and change. He first deals with the liberal and conservative ar-

guments in his play *Lucifer*. The two devils, Mephistopheles and Lucifer, express the opposing points of view in a spirited exchange. Mephistopheles presents the conservative side:

It was my word.  
A constant custom has the force of law.  
If he who made it, with a wayward  
mind.  
Recants his maxim, still it rules man-  
kind.  
That which the prudent people never  
saw  
Is dangerous to do, whate'er it be,  
But more if it be rash and mark disdain  
Of their poor safety in the strong who  
reign.<sup>6</sup>

Lucifer rejoins with the argument of change:

The law? Who made it, that it fetters  
me?  
I chose not hitherto to bid a guest  
To my rude hall, and am I now not  
free?  
He oft must change his ways who seeks  
the best.<sup>7</sup>

In his writings Santayana never resolves the conflict between Lucifer and Mephistopheles by choosing one of the attitudes over the other. Much of the time, however, he expresses traditional conservative beliefs. This conservatism usually takes the form of short aphorisms. For example, in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* he writes: "Custom does not breed understanding, but takes its place, teaching people to make their way contentedly through the world without knowing what the world is nor what they think of it, nor what they are."<sup>8</sup>

A similar statement appears in *Dominations and Powers*: "The mere fact that a social convention exists is an argument in its favour. At least that convention possesses, or has possessed in the past some congruity with the circumstances of life; and

this cannot be said of any dream, or wish, or utopia."<sup>9</sup>

Finally, an extreme interpretation of the doctrine is presented in *Persons and Places*:

Fixity of tradition, of custom, of language is perhaps a prerequisite to complete harmony in life and mind. Variety in these matters is a lesson to the philosopher and drives him into the cold arms of reason; but it confuses the poet and the saint, and embitters society.<sup>10</sup>

In these passages, Santayana is certainly enunciating a conservative philosophy. He draws the distinction between the philosopher, who is capable of living by reason, and all other people, who can only be content when they follow time-honored conventions. Even poets do not have the attributes necessary for a life without illusion. They become confused when they have to reflect. Further, we may question whether the philosopher can really be happy in the cold embrace of reason.

Santayana joins his distinction between philosophers and the common folk to the observation that customs possess or have possessed an appropriate function in the life of society. It is not wise to confuse, embitter, and cause unhappiness by tampering with institutions and substituting fantasies for them.

It is certain that Santayana often speaks like an aristocrat and that we detect an echo of Burke in his sentences. Burke, too, approved of "all the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal."<sup>11</sup> However, Santayana also argued for revolution. In *Reason in Art* he analyzed the contradictions in the modern age and saw a total revolution as the only possible means of realizing the life of reason:

A dilettante may, indeed, summon inspiration where he will; and a virtuoso will never lack some material to keep

him busy: but if what is hoped for is a genuine, native, inevitable art, a great revolution would first have to be worked in society. We should have to abandon our vested illusions, our irrational religions and patriotisms and schools of art, and to discover unstead our genuine needs, the forms of our possible happiness. To call for such self-examination seems revolutionary only because we start from a sophisticated system, a system resting on traditional fashions and superstitions, by which the will of the living generation is misinterpreted and betrayed. To shake off the system would not subvert order but rather institute order for the first time: it would be an *Instauratio Magna*, a setting things again on their feet.<sup>12</sup>

Here we are confronted with a different Santayana, who holds that custom is superstition and reason the only hope for progress and happiness. Past generations betray the living, and the existence of a convention is an argument against its goodness for men. Our vested illusions do not make power gentle. Rather they are one cause of unhappiness. They do not fulfill our genuine needs and create a false order. In fact, they subvert order.

Neither Santayana the conservative nor Santayana the revolutionist adequately describes Santayana the philosopher. His normal position is that of a moderate and a man of reason. Santayana writes in *The Middle Span*:

Individuals, especially in governments, are creatures of circumstance and slaves to vested interests. These interests may be more or less noble, romantic, or sordid, but they inevitably entangle and subjugate men of action. The leaders couldn't act or maintain themselves at the head of affairs if they didn't engage the impulses at work in the mass, or in some part of it. Catastrophes come when some dominant institution, swollen like

a soap-bubble and still standing without foundations, suddenly crumbles at what may seem a word or an idea, but is really some stronger material force. This force is partly that of changing circumstances, partly that of changing impulses, maturing in their season, and often epidemic like contagious diseases.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, Santayana gives the benefit of the doubt to neither established custom nor rational reconstruction. Social institutions do not provide the starting point for his political philosophy. Santayana's unit of analysis is the individual and his interests. If a convention satisfies the interests of enough people it will persist. If it does not fulfill desires it will crumble.

Santayana's analysis of political change does not, however, provide a standard for judging whether or not it is wise to retain a given convention. Such a standard is implied when he calls for an *Instauratio Magna*, and it is based on the discovery of the genuine needs or real interests of individuals. We can hypothesize that an institution is functioning in a satisfactory manner if it fulfills the real interests of individuals.

The notion of real interests has puzzled Santayana's critics and has provoked their attacks. David Spitz writes: "How do we know when an action is natural, that is, a response to a 'natural' need?"<sup>14</sup> Sidney Hook claims that the concept leads Santayana to adopt an authoritarian political philosophy: "The government can claim it is carrying out the will of the people even when they consciously and cordially detest it. This is worthy of Rousseau and Hegel—two of Santayana's philosophic abominations."<sup>15</sup>

It is quite proper for liberal thinkers to be vigilant when a philosopher promotes a doctrine of true interests. Modern totalitarian movements have always justified themselves by maintaining that they represent the real interests of various classes or

societies. When they have attained power, the leaders of these movements have generally set about forcing people to be free. However, is it necessary that any doctrine of real interests or genuine needs be unintelligible and a tool with which repressive regimes can justify their misdeeds? An analysis of Santayana's theory will yield a standard for evaluating institutions which is neither conservative nor revolutionary. The standard, based on real interests, cannot be perverted by authoritarian apologists.

Throughout his writings, Santayana makes frequent reference to the difference between a man's real interests and his more partial and momentary impulses. He summarizes his thesis in *Winds of Doctrines*:

No doubt any desire however capricious, represents some momentary and partial interest, which lends to its objects a certain real and inalienable value; yet when we consider, as we do in human society, the interests of men, whom reflection and settled purposes have raised more or less to the ideal dignity of individuals, then passing fancies and passions may indeed have bad objects, and be bad themselves, in that they thwart the more comprehensive interests of the soul that entertains them.<sup>16</sup>

According to Santayana any impulse has a value just because it partakes at aiming for a good envisioned by some particular individual. However, the human condition makes it impossible for a man to satisfy all of his interests. In the first place, circumstances may prevent him from doing or having what he desires. We may refer to such frustration as the gap between impulse and opportunity. Second, a man can have contradictory interests expressed in consciousness. This condition may be called vital self-contradiction. Thus, the exigencies of existence make it necessary for each man to decide which impulse is more important

to satisfy, when incompatible goods are desired, and which interests can find material realization. The origin of all desires is the individual's nature, which itself is the material expression of those interests, while the distinction between real and transient interests is arrived at through a process of reflecting on the impulses. Thus, the data of moral philosophy are interests which arise unconsciously. They are, in themselves, neither rational nor irrational, but are the stuff upon which reflection feeds. For a man, the definition of reason is a harmony among his impulses.<sup>17</sup>

Given the natural, or material foundation of morality, an adequate interpretation of interests must be representative of the most important goods to which individuals are directed. What impulses a man will have depend upon the forms which the flux of substance has exemplified. Thus, the moral ideal of an individual will be determined by particular collocations of matter. It will be an ideal both relative to other moralities and absolute in itself because it is rooted in a determinate existence. Hence, for Santayana the same real interests need not characterize all men.<sup>18</sup> It is possible though improbable that at points in time substance may be arranged such that men will share common ideals. Such an occurrence, however, is not demanded by the nature of things.

Further, there is a fixed good relative to the species, from one point of view, and to the individual from another.<sup>19</sup> By virtue of recognizing a category called humanity, we presuppose that there are at least some common interests among all men. The fact that we talk about individual organisms similarly demands that we allow for a wider set of real interests that are constant for the individual.

The judgment that the complex of real interests may vary from man to man is not inconsistent with the ideal that there is a

set of real interests common to all men. The restricted set of real interests which are universal for the species will form the basis of a social philosophy, while the unique interests of the individual will also be consulted in a personal morality.

The problem of the moralist is how he can faithfully represent the common and unique interests of individuals better than they can represent those interests themselves. It would seem an impossible task for the moralist to speak for others with authority. However, in terms of Santayana's philosophy, the need for a study of ethics is clear because ignorance of the circumstances may mislead a man in practice, and ignorance of self may mislead him in desire. The gap between impulse and opportunity may cause a man to try to get what he cannot have. Vital self-contradiction may cause him to desire incompatible goods. Of these two barriers to happiness, ignorance of the circumstances is a problem for the scientist or the engineer. The better our science, the better we will know what can be done with success; and the better our engineering, the better we can change circumstances to be appropriate to our desires. Ignorance of self is more a problem to the moralist. Vital self-contradiction describes the condition in which one desire checks or suppresses another impulse. If an individual's impulses are truly contradictory; that is, if he is aware of the contradiction, he cannot lead the life of reason unless he recognizes one of the impulses as more important than the others in a conscious harmony. The moral philosopher will attempt, at the least, to show the individual how he can realize this harmony. At the most, through reflecting on impulses, the moralist will adequately depict the interests of another individual. His reflection embodies the technique of Socratic examination and his results are true in so far as the individual in question accepts them as a correct

representation. Thus, the moralist does not attempt to impose a set of real interests on a passive individual. Rather, he employs what can best be called rational persuasion.

As a procedure in moral philosophy Socratic examination is the operation of placing a collection of interests, represented in consciousness, in the order of their value to the individual. Value is defined as the happiness which will supervene on consciousness when a given interest is fulfilled. Unlike Socrates, however, Santayana begins his dialectic with a specific problem confronting an individual rather than with a quest for a universal definition of a moral term:

A problem is a natural predicament, a living perplexity, limiting the relevance of the solution sought and creating its value. Discourse would not be cumulative, it would set and solve no problems if it did not share and express the adventures of a psyche in a material world; for the controlling force in reasoning is not reason, but instinct and circumstance opening some path for the mind, and pledging it to some limited issue.<sup>20</sup>

Vital self-contradiction expresses an actual problem which has arisen in someone's consciousness, and not a condition which can be analyzed through the application of the rules of any formal logic. It is a mode of consciousness on which unhappiness supervenes. There can be no vital self-contradiction if an individual perceives that his interests are harmonious. It is only when a man feels that some of his impulses are undesirable that he turns to dialectic. Dialectic resolves the felt contradiction in a complex essence:

Dialectic, like investigation, is a path to an end; it is instrumental. When successful and finished, it yields to intuition, for which the facts and relations discovered become an ordered system, a single complex essence. Then the pre-

dicament and the problem lose their malignity; they survive only in the interest or beauty which in dying, they bequeath to the new object spread before the mind. Contemplation becomes disinterested, but remains pleasant; for it is not the contemplation of any essences at random, but of those precisely to which a vital affinity drew the current of my blood, the hidden essences to which my nature was directed, partly from my birth, partly by ingrained habit and arts learned by experience. It is the consecutive sanity and moral integrity of a mind that hold it down to dialectical consistency.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, the process of self-questioning leads to an intuition of a complex essence which in itself is productive of happiness. In *Reason in Science* Santayana characterizes the dialectic as a way of finding out what a man really wants:

This method, the Socratic method, consists in accepting any estimation which any man may sincerely make, and in applying dialectic to it, so as to let the man see what he really esteems. What he really esteems is what ought to guide his conduct, for to suggest that a rational being ought to do what he feels to be wrong, or ought to pursue what he genuinely thinks is worthless, would be to impugn that man's rationality and to discredit one's own.<sup>22</sup>

The distinction between real and transient interests, at least at the outset, is defined through a procedure. Santayana does not initially specify a set of interests which are common to all men. Real interests are those which, if satisfied, would free an individual from vital self-contradiction. Self-contradiction is known, not through the laws of formal logic, but through a condition of unhappiness. Thus, real interests are those which, if satisfied, would bring happiness to the individual.<sup>23</sup> Their substance, as a totality, cannot be prejudged, and can

be known through the use of the dialectic. An individual finds out what he really wants by representing, in consciousness, how he would feel if certain of his impulses were fulfilled. Such rigorous self-questioning produces an ordered system of goals in which interests are placed on a scale of importance. Although the resulting harmony demands the sacrifice of the full play of each impulse, it embodies the life of reason:

Sacrifice first becomes possible, and constantly necessary, in a wayward being imperfectly unified; and in him it may be fruitful, because by restraining each of his impulses on occasion, and discharging them only in a certain measure and a certain order, a decent harmony can be established among them. Then the subjection of each fond passion is a reasonable precaution, and the orderly release of them all an admirable discipline: for this harmony when once formed is exceedingly sweet and beautiful in itself, and impossible to sacrifice to anything better. It is never out of place to think and to act intelligently, and there is no occasion to give the hysterical names of Duty or Self-Sacrifice to what is simply a happy art and a rational compromise.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, Santayana's theory of real interests does not eventuate in a plea for elite and authoritarian political rule. If a government prescribes a set of real interests for individuals to pursue, and those individuals find that the satisfaction of the interests is accompanied by unhappiness, the government is morally unjustified in imposing its policy. A regime cannot force people to be free and still fulfill the standards set by Santayana's moral philosophy. Real interests are relative to the individual and are defineable through the process of Socratic questioning. Santayana is an individualist who would have us subordinate ourselves to nothing but the dictates of our own reason.

The doctrine of real interests is neither conservative nor revolutionary. It bids us to critically examine our desires and environment, and to choose those patterns of behavior which will further a harmonious existence. By itself, however, the theory does not provide a fully developed standard for evaluating social institutions. Santayana does attempt in several of his works to remedy this defect by defining a set of real interests which are common to all men. In *My Host the World* he discusses the needs of most people:

Proletarians are human beings and their first interest is to have a home, a family, a chosen trade, and freedom in practicing it. And more particularly a man's true interest may exceptionally be not to have those things, but to wander alone like the rhinoceros; or perhaps to have a very special kind of home, family and occupation. There must be freedom of movement and vocation. There must be Lebensraum for the spirit.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, Santayana contends that most individuals need a home, a family and work which they have freely chosen if they are to lead the life of reason. Further, the type of home, the kind of family and the specific trade which will be satisfactory will vary between men. However, he considers these three interests as part of the data with which social philosophers must work if their conception of real interests is to be comprehensive enough.

Santayana again tackles the problem of defining common real interests in *Dominations and Powers*. He attacks the question by detailing the duties of a good government:

Now, we may see in the new-born child, as soon as the rhythm of his organism becomes normal, that the first and perpetual need of the primal Will is food. Therefore, the first duty of a good gov-

ernment is to see that the people have enough to eat.<sup>26</sup>

Closely related to the duty of providing food is the obligation to regulate population so that it does not outrun the means of subsistence.<sup>27</sup> Thus, in addition to the interest of a home, a family, and satisfying work is the more basic desire for food without which life itself could not be sustained.

A third function of government is defense, which mirrors the interest in protecting the conditions for whatever happiness man can attain:

Here we come upon the function that governments most readily exercise and make the basis of their permanent domination: the function of defense. Any settled population, if unprotected is exposed to invasion: if prosperous, its lands and possessions tempt ruder natures; if poor and sparse, richer neighbours will insensibly oust it or reduce its remnants to subjection.<sup>28</sup>

The final duty of a good government is to promote prosperity.<sup>29</sup> While the desire for food may be classified as a real interest, the impulses to defend possessions and attain prosperity are not rational unless the material goods are productive of happiness. Santayana recognizes the justice of this criticism in *Egotism in German Philosophy*. He takes German transcendentalism to task for hallowing abstract impulses and ignoring the fact that real interests are specific:

Of course, an abstract and perpetual happiness is impossible, not only because events are sure to disturb any equilibrium we may think we have established in our lives, but for the far more fundamental reason that we have no abstract and perpetual instinct to satisfy.<sup>30</sup>

The impulses for wealth, power, or protection are abstract in that they aim at no

specific good, or happiness. In themselves, they are neither real nor transient interests, but depict conditions in which the individual does not yet know what he desires. They are only important to a man who has a determinate harmony, clarified unconsciously or through the Socratic dialectic.

Santayana does not hold that his list of basic interests is an adequate representation of the impulses which must be satisfied if a particular individual is to attain the life of reason. Each man is uniquely determinate and self-knowledge will reveal to an individual a set of real interests constituting a new adventure in existence:

I am myself convinced that the absence of evil is the fundamental good, which returns at last to every creature; but this is not the supreme good, nor a guide to good of any other kind. Brave nature in each case must first choose her direction and show her colors. Man in particular is not a grazing animal and he would never stay long in a paradise where everybody has four meals a day and nothing else happens. <sup>31</sup>

Therefore, Santayana would have government promote certain very general interests and leave the other aspects of living to the initiative of individuals and groups. Since "brave nature" is notoriously variable between individuals, any political order which attempted to dictate the forms which art, religion, or education should take would be destructive of happiness.

Santayana embodies his reflections on the real interests which are common to most men in his ideal of rational government. He begins his discussion by detailing two types of rational authority:

These are indeed the two authorities that by their interplay determine the forms and the rational variations of morals: the *authority of things*, that permit, reward, or punish our actions; and the *authority of primal Will* within us, that

chooses our path and discriminates between success and disaster in our careers. <sup>32</sup>

The "authority of things" is the limiting power of circumstances which determines whether or not impulse can be materially satisfied, while the "authority of primal Will" is the complex of interests of the individual. A rational government "speaks to its people in the name of the nature of things, and acts by the authority."<sup>33</sup> It is because Santayana's best form of government is concerned primarily with material conditions that it is not democratic:

The authority of this government would be autocratic but not totalitarian; for it would speak for the material conditions imposed by nature on the realization of any ideal without dictating to any person or society what its ideal should be. Its own aim would be only to prevent conflicting desires from becoming material conflicts, fatal to both sides. . . .<sup>34</sup>

Rational government is a peculiarly political type of representation in that it presupposes a harmony made by the representative leader or leaders from the interests of different individuals. The harmony results in the maximization of happiness for all the members of society and, therefore, does not make the greatest good for the greatest number its standard. The life of reason, however, must be exercised without violence; and this requirement entails compromises. Thus, it is conceivable that no particular individual will fully realize his harmony of interests. If a man finds that his real interests include imposing his belief system on other individuals, he will not be allowed to fulfill this impulse:

The hot bloods and the ambitious talents would turn to the separate irrational rival forms of culture, and preach and work for some reform in some one of them; but they would be prevented by

the police in the service of that uninteresting government from smashing one another's heads. The tempests would all be cerebral, and would not hurt anyone but the militant hotheads who raised them.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, either the life of reason requires an individual not to use violence or attempt to forcefully impose his beliefs on others, or rational government is justified in limiting the individual's harmony in the service of another and more important harmony. Santayana cannot accept the first alternative because he is not willing to enunciate a comprehensive list of real interests. Hence, he must justify the compromise of a man's rational harmony by some standard external to the theory of interests.

Santayana claims that his political organ of reason functions in the same way that an individual achieves the life of reason.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, he believes that he can justify rational government. However, for Santayana the individual man is the ultimate seat of all values. Why should an individual accept any compromise with his real interests? He should only do so if, in the attempt to gain happiness, he would be thwarted by circumstances. A rational government would seem to be just another unfavorable circumstance in the way of realizing happiness.

Government has no interests of its own. In whose interests, then, is the harmony of a rational government? Evidently, it is an attempt to realize the maximum degree of happiness for a collectivity. If this is the

case, Santayana's argument breaks down in two ways. First of all, the happiness of one man cannot be compared to the happiness of another. Thus, it is impossible to approximate the maximal happiness of a collectivity. Second, the collectivity has no interests of its own. Since the standard of Santayana's moral philosophy is the happiness of an individual, only those individuals whose real interests coincide with those pursued by a rational government can accept the authority of such a government. Not all men would be happy under a rational government, which presupposes a general interest in compromise.

Thus, Santayana does not supply an ideal form of government consistent with this theory of real interests. However, he does suggest some general interests which governments should fulfill. Given the interests in food, a satisfying occupation, a good family life, and freedom of movement as those characteristic of most men, Santayana does not seem to be a conservative. His rational government is a kind of welfare state which attempts to keep limitations of individual freedom at a minimum. Conventions are judged useful if they satisfy the real interests of those who follow them, and pernicious if they produce unhappiness.

The problems in Santayana's political philosophy arise not because he is a conservative and an authoritarian in social theory and a liberal in moral theory; but because he is a rational individualist who finds it impossible to accept any political compromise with a man's life of reason.

<sup>1</sup>Peter Viereck, *Conservatism* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956), p. 105.

<sup>2</sup>Russell Kirk, "The Politics of George Santayana," VII *Pacific Spectator*, pp. 63-64 (Winter, 1953).

<sup>3</sup>Michael Oakeshott, "Philosophical Imagination," *Spectator*, Nov. 2, 1951, p. 578.

<sup>4</sup>Sidney Hook, "Liberty, Society and Mr. Santayana," *New York Times Book Review*, May 6, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>Irwin Edman, "The Last Patrician," *New Yorker*, Aug. 25, 1951, p. 82.

<sup>6</sup>George Santayana, *The Works of George Santayana*, Vol. I: *The Sense of Beauty. Poems. Lucifer*.

*Overhead in Seville*. (Triton Edition; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 350.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 351.

<sup>8</sup>George Santayana, *The Works of George Santayana*, Vol. XIII: *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. (Triton Edition; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 11-12.

<sup>9</sup>George Santayana, *Dominations and Powers* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 222.

<sup>10</sup>George Santayana, *Persons and Places* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 103.

<sup>11</sup>Viereck, *Conservatism*, p. 113.

<sup>12</sup>George Santayana, *Reason in Art* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 225.

<sup>13</sup>George Santayana, *The Middle Span* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 169.

<sup>14</sup>David Spitz, "George Santayana: Politics as a Secular Theology," LXII *Ethics*, p. 123. (Jan. 1952).

<sup>15</sup>Hook, *New York Times Book Review*, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup>George Santayana, *The Works of George Santayana*, Vol. VII: *Winds of Doctrine*. (Triton Edition; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 120.

<sup>17</sup>George Santayana, *The Works of George Santayana*, Vol. XIV: *The Realm of Essence. The Realm of Matter*. (Triton Edition; New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 303.

<sup>18</sup>Santayana, *Persons and Places*, p. 244.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>Santayana, *The Works*. . . , XIV, p. 102.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup>George Santayana, *Reason in Science* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 240.

<sup>23</sup>George Santayana, *Dialogues in Limbo* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), p. 134.

<sup>24</sup>Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz (eds.), *Obiter Scripta* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 271-72.

<sup>25</sup>George Santayana, *My Host the World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), pp. 139-40.

<sup>26</sup>Santayana, *Dominations*. . . , p. 422.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 423.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 424.

<sup>30</sup>George Santayana, *The Works of George Santayana*, Vol. VI: *Three Philosophical Poets. Egotism in German Philosophy*. (Triton Edition; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 212.

<sup>31</sup>George Santayana, "Bertrand Russell's Searchlight," *American Mercury*, Mar., 1935, p. 379.

<sup>32</sup>Santayana, *Dominations*. . . , p. 433.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 434.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 435.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 435-36.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 435.