

E Pluribus Unum!

Nationalism and Ideology, by Barbara Ward, *New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1966. 125 pp. \$3.50.*

THIS HIGH-MINDED, eloquent, and artless study began as a series of lectures on the Plaunt Foundation at Carleton University, Ottawa. Its thesis is that nationalism, especially nationalism serving ideology, is bad, that—in the age of the bomb—the Greek, Hebrew, Christian, and Renaissance visions of world unity have been intensified and the modern drives toward universalism speeded; for the very survival of the race, they must this time succeed. What we have, in brief, is another argument from the incontestable premise that the world is one to the conclusion that there must be one government to which all the nations, while retaining domestic flavor and differentiation, and grouped perhaps in intermediate power centers, must ultimately defer.

As the summary sign of the pride and parochialism that block the way to the unity she bespeaks, Miss Ward gives us President de Gaulle. His sense of France as an entity which would die if diluted, his jealousy of sovereignties superior to the French, merely exaggerates or caricatures the other nationalisms that block universalism. De Gaulle even resists the instant and total politicalizing of the economic integration which the six small to middle-sized countries of the European Economic Community have achieved. His critics do not ruminate very much on what might happen were the Common Market Six to merge into one political sovereignty—presided over, perhaps, by an even more intransigent, and ever so slightly Napoleonic de Gaulle. In a word, Miss Ward slights what may be called the application to politics of the check-and-balance doctrines

known in American political economy as the anti-trust principle. She is willing to risk those opportunities for freedom which undeniably exist in the subdivision of power. And her answer, wistfully implicit throughout, is that all she wants is the best of both arrangements in some benign species of federalism, for which, possibly the United States of America might serve as a model.

But it well may be that a study of the American federalism could also comfort Miss Ward's critics. The thirteen British colonies were, after all, better prospects for collaboration than the nations of the modern world—they were of a common culture, with a single language and a well-worn and universally accepted constitutionalism. Yet there was one problem on which they differed, a problem so intractable, tracing so far into evil, that they bogged even at facing it, and attempted instead to poultice and placebo and proceed as though it were not. But the problem festered and corroded, tormenting the national life for four score and five years and erupting into a war between federated states more bitter, bloody, and destructive than any before.

The war came to an end, and the states that won naturally imposed sanctions on the states that lost. The legal instruments embodying the sanctions were drawn narrowly and explicitly to the evil neglected in the original federalism, leaving, so it was universally assumed, the rest of federalism intact. But as the central authorities asserted the narrow rule imposed by war on the target evil, the assertion of central rules became more heady and enticing. In the end the very states which had imposed the narrow rule found always broader and Pandoran emanations from it applied to themselves in general—in their legislative arrangements, in their criminal jurisprudence, in the religious aspects of their school curricula, in the very ordering of their family life and marital relationships. The problem evaded at the beginning out of an eager hope for

federalism had ultimately generated forces impairing federalism itself.

But Miss Ward is as well aware as the next one that the modern world is divided just as implacably on issues fully as profound as those of Negro slavery. It is shorthand, a simplicism excusable only to reduce debate, to say that major states nowadays fall into two camps, those which believe that God Is and those which insist that God Is Not. Many nationals of the God Is nations say that God no longer is, though He may once have been. The fact that they concede He may once have been distinguishes their countries from those which say He is not and never was. A world government erected by states divided on this root question, and on all the inferences radiating therefrom as to the nature, role, and destiny of man, the function and potential of politics, and so on, would be a federalism which had tried to poultice and placebo issues intractable to such treatment. Professing the rule of law while of two—or more—minds about what law is, the world authority to end international war would sooner or later risk civil war; and whichever side won the world civil war would impose settlements of the explicit issues which, in turn, would generalize the central authority over all the parochial differentiations Miss Ward had started out by promising to maintain. One way, indeed, to describe the contemporary scene is to say the world is fighting its civil war before rather than after federation; and if, as Miss Ward quite persuasively argues, the fighting could scale up to the Bomb, why that could be true of the civil war after federation which the continuing differences between the contracting parties would almost certainly detonate—unless, of course, the Bomb had gravitated to monopoly control by one side or the other, one of which Miss Ward, a believer, would deplore.

To say all this, of course, is not to despair but to hope. It is not to deny but to rely on the continuing (within limits of human frailty) rationality of man, his ul-

timate acceptance everywhere of philosophies, theologies, even, if Miss Ward will, ideologies whose celebrants assert them precisely because they think them reflections of the true nature of man—of all men. De Gaulle himself might concede that, given such a consensus, world federation would face a prospect at least as fair, as pacific, as an American federalism which in 1789 had expunged human slavery and all its collateral abominations. Miss Ward cites the Soviets' membership in the United Nations:

Some of the liberal and universalist content of Marxism has after all survived in the despotic Russian container. The language of freedom and popular democracy—like the mask of virtue—may begin as hypocrisy. It could end as truth. . . .

Yes, it could. So let's just wait and see!

Reviewed by C. P. IVES

The UN: Faith and Failure

This Kind of Peace, by T. R. Fehrenbach, *New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1966. 402 pp. \$6.50.*

The Missile Crisis, by Elie Abel, *New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1966. 220 pp. \$4.95.*

TO HIS GROWING list of writings on World War II and on the world since 1945, including the best-selling *This Kind of War* (1963), the versatile Fehrenbach—Korean war veteran, erstwhile cotton farmer and insurance executive, and currently Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserves—now adds the book under review. Its purpose is to illustrate how and why the United Nations came about, who made it, what it was meant to be, and finally what it ultimately became. In fulfilling this purpose the author has given us, of necessity and all to the good—for what could be duller than the tale of the United Nations told in a vacu-