

# *Liberalism and Neo-Conservatism: Is a Synthesis Possible?*

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IT IS the contention of a number of leading political theorists that the current spectrum of political opinion follows a line from communism and socialism on the left, through welfare-statism, and on to conservatism and its offshoots, libertarianism, laissez-faireism, individualism, Burkeanism, traditionalism, etc., on the right. Many of those who currently espouse a "right-wing" political position have accepted the conclusion, advanced by some writers,<sup>1</sup> that the two main political philosophies which characterize this movement have today been reconciled and synthesized, and that those who hold to a liberal<sup>2</sup> position on economic questions can, consistently with it, support a conservative social policy. As against this view, it is the argument of the present paper that there exist fundamental differences between classical liberalism and conservatism, that, in fact, the two positions are irreconcilably at odds, and that, far from being closely related political philosophies, they could more reasonably be classified as polar opposites.

In the following discussion, I do not mean to suggest that the position which I shall set forth and discuss is one which, in

all its aspects, is accepted by those who would identify themselves as conservatives. What I shall attempt to do is to offer a systematic version of what appears to me to be characteristic of this school of thought, as it is represented in the writings of its most prominent theoreticians. The fault will inevitably be on the side of over-schematization; nevertheless, I mean no injustice by this to those writers whose works I have taken as indicative of the thought of the group.

Modern conservatism, like the conservatism of any age, lacks a formal set of principles upon which to base its position, but cherishes a presumption in favor of existing political and social institutions.<sup>3</sup> This is not to say that it would lend its support to a changed social order immediately upon, or even necessarily a number of years after, that order was established. Conservative theoreticians argue that the new order, precisely because it is new, cannot yet have built up sufficient value as a tradition, nor can it have been assimilated into the whole structure of society; much time is required to integrate it into the complex of received institutions.

Yet this complex is, of course, on more

than the totality of all previous innovations. Each distinct institution and value-pattern of the old order is itself comprised of numerous elements, each of which was introduced at some time in the past and was itself either an alteration of or in direct conflict with the elements preceding. Conservatism, in its situational sense,<sup>4</sup> is forced to look with distrust upon all innovation, no matter how salutary it may be. If having stood the test of time is the predominant criterion for an institution's acceptability, it follows that the older the institution, the better it is. The consistent conservative, when investigating the history of political and social arrangements, is logically compelled to condemn any basic change as it occurred, in favor of the then-existing order, despite the fact that these changes might form the groundwork of the order they now wish to conserve. Hence, for the same reasons that he supports the execution of Socrates in the interests of preserving existing Greek mores, Willmoore Kendall could not but support the Roman persecution of the Christians, in as much as Christianity—"the Revolution of the Cross"—then posed the gravest threat to established Western society.

If one concept had to be chosen as most crucial to the conservative system, it might well be the concept of tradition. By "traditionality" is not necessarily meant the age of any particular institution, but rather the extent to which that institution is embedded in the values of society. The fact that Druidism is older than Christianity among Britons does not compel the conservative to reject the newer institution, in as much as Druidism can no longer properly be called a part of the English tradition and finds little, if any, support in the current consensus. This criterion, however, suffers from the same difficulties that are met with in an analysis of the criterion of mere longevity. When traditions conflict conserv-

atives can offer no principled reasons for choosing one over another, and such conflicts of traditions abound in any complex society such as ours. Thus, religious toleration and the forced imposition of a particular religious belief are both found in the history of Western society and are both parts of the Western tradition. Since conservatives consciously reject the use of reason outside a traditionalist frame of reference, there exist no clear guidelines which might allow for a proper choice. It is no solution to contend, as does Frank S. Meyer,<sup>5</sup> that reason must operate *within* tradition when the crucial problem to be answered involves the choice of which tradition to follow.

Seemingly disparate, but in fact closely allied to tradition as a criterion in determining a proper social ordering, is the principle that in the consensus of the community resides the fountainhead of wisdom concerning the institutional framework society must have. As generally interpreted, this means that all men, over a long period of time, will, in some mysterious way, arrive at a system of values approximating the optimum; as Burke put it, "The individual is foolish, but the species is wise." Thus, at any one time, some conservatives conclude, the choice of institutions should properly be left to the community consensus. Since tradition, in the conservative lexicon, is reflected in the values most commonly upheld, this "consensus of society" will, therefore, almost always approximate those values hallowed by the criterion of being traditional.<sup>6</sup> In so far as this criterion coincides with that of tradition, it is open to the same criticisms, for what is to be done when consensus conflict? Should this "most common choice" not, however, follow what the conservatives want to classify as falling within the range of traditional values, then, since again no principled grounds

for choice are offered, social consensus is reduced to the totality of individual arbitrary decisions and unchecked majoritarianism.

While conservatives speak disparagingly of "metaphysical" approaches to politics, they are forced, since received traditions obviously conflict, to pick and choose among such traditions. Clearly, this cannot be done by using tradition as the criterion, for a vicious circle would result. Therefore, they are compelled in the end to have recourse to "rules of thumb," "prudential maxims," and other such inexact touchstones. The deficiencies implicit in a purely situational political theory have forced most conservative thinkers to add to a tropistic defense of the *status quo* more positive criteria for judging the social order. Let us, therefore, turn to the ideational aspects of their program and examine what the policies they advocate are.

One of the leading contentious aspects of the conservative platform is the policy which aims at the imposition of a particular set of religious mores on the members of society. In the United States this takes the form of advocating a variety of strictures upon free action, such as Sunday blue laws, outlawing "immoral" sexual practices, religion in the public schools, etc. If one believes, as does Russell Kirk, that "political problems at bottom are religious and moral problems," a clear delineation between Church and State becomes impossible. L. Brent Bozell, in his now famous article, "Freedom or Virtue?", takes the position that the cardinal principle for the governance of society can be either the maximization of freedom, to which the liberals hold, or the maximization of virtue, which is the conservatives' goal, but not both. Once having accepted the truths of Christianity it is incumbent on the conservative to employ the State apparatus in advancing those truths.

"Go . . . and teach all nations."

These are the marching orders of Christianity, and from a theological viewpoint, its central operational command. God's purpose, if we may put it so, is two-fold: to give the widest possible access to supernatural grace—that is, to magnify the Christian Church; and to establish temporal conditions conducive to human virtue—that is, to build a Christian *civilization*. The latter purpose is the genesis and justification for the notion that Western Civilization, being the historical fruit of the Incarnation—and so, in a manner of speaking, "God's civilization"—must be preserved at all costs, and itself magnified.

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The good commonwealth, taking the measure of its governors, and the prospects for their corruption, may charge them with say building roads, or maintaining a postal system or passing anti-obscenity laws, or giving tax-exemption to its churches. . . It [the good commonwealth] will look upon the state merely as one potential instrument for articulating and thus defending the community consensus about such things. . .<sup>8</sup>

Bozell's conclusions on this question follow this schema: (1) "The goal of man is virtue." (2) The chief purpose of politics is to aid the quest for virtue. (3) "Political (and economic) freedoms are . . . 'institutions' " and not ends. (4) "The urge to freedom for its own sake is . . . a rebellion against nature; it is the urge to be free from God."<sup>9</sup>

No less pronounced than its rejection of the open society of moral and religious ideas is the opposition of many conservatives to industrialism, the free market, and to the liberal concept of limited government. Once the State is conceived as a "divinely ordained moral essence,"<sup>10</sup> then it

ceases to be open to criticism or examination in any but the most subordinate aspects. The actions of the State, once traditionalized, are looked upon with the same reverence as are those institutions which have been freely adopted by the members of a society and assimilated into the individual's way of life. Willmoore Kendall's appears to be the most extreme example of this approach. In *The Conservative Affirmation*<sup>11</sup> he enshrines the American legislature as the great exponent of traditionalist sentiment in that it reflects the sound prejudices of American society and is prepared to act upon those prejudices. Thus, Congress is the strongest proponent of tight internal security, indulges in salutary "pork barrel" legislation (reflecting the desires of its constituents), supports a protectionist foreign trade policy, tends to act as a brake on action to end segregation in public schools, is committed to tight immigration quotas, is inclined to be "bullish" about the size of the Air Force, is nationalistic, and is not fastidious about supporting dictatorships, provided, of course, that they are "right-wing."<sup>12</sup> That any liberal could discern even a distant kinship to his ideas in this program, based as it is on ignorance of the workings of the free market and on blatant racism and nationalism, is out of the question. At no point is it indicated *why* these policies serve to promote the welfare of American citizens, save that they reflect traditional rural-American values, hardly what a liberal would consider a necessary or sufficient condition for accepting a political proposal.

Conservative literature is replete with references indicative of a distrust of a modern capitalist economic structure and individual choice. Kirk berates the liberal for his "infatuation with 'rationalism' . . . which terribly damaged true communal life" and which led to confidence in the

competitive market economy and "heartless individualism," thus denying to men their simple, honest longings for continuity.<sup>13</sup> Modern capitalism has, in effect, destroyed the old communal order, they argue. It has created what Kuehnelt-Leddihn and other conservatives refer to as "soulless corporations" based upon a system of property which they appear to consider less justifiable, because less direct, than the predominant property forms of pre-capitalist ages.

That conservatives do not shy away from government economic intervention is illustrated also by Francis Graham Wilson's integration of much social welfare legislation into conservative philosophy<sup>14</sup> and by Professor Röpke's willingness to use the State to promote the particular structuring of industry which he favors.<sup>15</sup> Unlike the liberals, for whom "liberalism is applied economics,"<sup>16</sup> the conservatives, who often seem to share Carlyle's and Disraeli's disdain for economics, possess no scientific reasons for supporting the free market. Further, since the maximization of freedom cannot be a fundamental axiom of political philosophy for the conservative, there remain no principled checks on State action.

The conservative rejection of the free movement of goods and ideas in favor of a tradition-bound system of State control rests upon their belief that, somehow, the community, characterized as an organism "having the special cohesiveness that comes from being alive,"<sup>17</sup> is superior to the individual, and that, consequently, an atomistic approach to questions of personal interaction cannot genuinely encompass the totality of social phenomena. By too greatly widening their alternatives of choice, which a liberal system offers, men are unleashed to indulge themselves to their own detriment, to give way to their "anarchic impulse." To secure the old or-

der, to insure that men will act according to God's will and society's interest, the conservative would impose upon them the coercive devices of the State. It is in this respect that the conservative most closely approaches the communist, in that they both possess *Weltanschauungen* and are both prepared to forcibly impose such a communalist world-view upon recalcitrant members of society. Frank Meyer points out that the concept of "alienation" plays a large role in the thought of both Marxists and conservatives, and by this term they appear agreed to mean "the separation of individual persons from a social matrix by the development of capitalism and the free society of the nineteenth century."<sup>18</sup>

Popper maintains that the concept sprang up in Plato as a reaction to the comparatively open society of fifth century Athens.<sup>19</sup> It is interesting to note the rebirth of this attitude with the re-emergence of a modern society of contract. In this, Russell Kirk borrows from the arsenal of the British and German romantics and the French reactionary writers:

Industrialism, radical democracy, and a mistaken individualism destroyed the ancient ties which united men in a common purpose—church, class, guild, local rights and obligations, the whole sense of purposeful obligation which had kept all things secure in their places for many centuries.<sup>20</sup>

Closely affiliated with the conservative's almost mystical concept of society as an organic whole is their rejection of reason as a legitimate tool in investigating the propriety of political institutions. Conservatism, in this, shares the revolt against reason that has characterized our age, which might, in part, explain why conservatism tends, in this century, to be more popular than liberalism. Distrust of reason per-

vades practically all of modern conservative writing. Kirk, for example, quotes Keith Feiling's indictment of the intellect with approval:

We do wrong to deny it, when we are told that we do not trust human reason: we do not and we may not. Human reason set up the cup of hemlock, human reason was canonized in Notre Dame.<sup>21</sup>

This critique of the use of reason is not restricted to recommending the establishment of a value system in which consideration of human emotion might be looked upon as of greater importance than at present but, rather, invades the discussion of political institutions as well. James Burnham's case for the necessity of government is, as he himself admits, not a rational one, but rests on nothing more than the "that's-just-the-way-things-are" form of argument:

But why should I accept the hereditary or democratic or any other principle of legitimacy? Why should such a principle justify the rule of that man over me? Does it prove him better than I because he had his father instead of my father, his color skin in place of mine, because his arts can win more votes than mine? I accept this principle, well . . . [sic] because I do, because that is the way it is and has been. This may be a sufficient and proper argument, but it is certainly not a rational one.<sup>22</sup>

Even more extreme is Burnham's rather touching description of the origin of the State, which, we are assured, contains a deep and central truth:

In ancient times, before the illusions of science had corrupted traditional wisdom, the founders of Cities were known to be gods or demigods.<sup>23</sup>

This is admittedly a far cry from the mean and calculating rationalism of men

like Bentham and James Mill; whether any clarity is gained by the conservatives' sentiment in the already complex science of political theory is another question.

Further light on the character of conservative thought—and especially on the possibility of a synthesis between it and liberalism—will perhaps be gained if we now briefly examine the origins of conservatism and the relationship which it has had to liberalism in the past.

Conservatism arose, towards the end of the eighteenth century, to supply a rationale for the Old Regime, which up to then had possessed no systematic defense. The earliest of the thinkers to apply himself to this task was Edmund Burke. Although imbued with many liberal ideas, he manifested certain ideas, especially the attachment to longevity as the predominant criterion in judging the propriety of social arrangements, which marked him as the originator of British and the inspirer of Continental conservatism. John Morley writes of this aspect of his thinking:

. . . Julian [the Apostate], as we all know, had a strong feeling for the past. But what in that remarkable figure was only the sentimentalism of reaction, in Burke was a reasoned and philosophic veneration for all old and settled order, whether in the free Parliament of Great Britain, in the ancient absolutism of Versailles, or in the secular pomp of Oude, and inviolable sanctity of Benares, the holy city and the garden of God.<sup>24</sup>

Unlike most of the conservatives who followed him, Burke supported the economics of a capitalist society. But his lack of faith in the separation of Church and State and even occasional religious intolerance make it impossible to classify Burke as a true liberal. This attitude manifested itself most clearly in his *On the Petition of the Unitarians* and stems from that same

desire for uniformity of moral behavior and from the acceptance of that same canon that it is within the proper sphere of government to control opinion that has motivated conservative thinkers even to the present day. "Religion," says Burke,

is so far, in my opinion, from being out of the province of the duty of a Christian magistrate, that it is, and it ought to be, not only his care, but the principal thing in his care.<sup>25</sup>

And for all one's good will, no trace of the liberal spirit can be detected in a sentiment such as the following:

I go on this ground, that government, representing the society, has a general superintending control over all the actions, and over all the publicly propagated doctrines, of men, without which it never would provide adequately for all the wants of society.<sup>26</sup>

Burke's *Reflections*, translated by Friedrich von Gentz in 1793, found ready soil in German-speaking Europe, and provided the inspiration for a whole school of political philosophers, including Gentz himself, Adam Müller, Karl von Haller, and the other German Romantics.<sup>27</sup> (Among the German statesmen most strongly influenced by Burke was Metternich, who has found astonishing favor among contemporary American conservatives as a seer, but was, clearly, little more than an old-fashioned reactionary.) The German Romantic school, which had been seeking a theoretical justification for a society of privilege, was delighted to find one in the writings of the same man who had defended the independence of the American colonies. Insofar as the Romantics were concerned with political affairs, their ideas were largely derivative of Burke, with the addition, however, of a mystical reverence for the Middle Ages, which was little more

than an inchoate protest against the modern world. This glorification of the Middle Ages remained a characteristic of German romanticism for a number of decades, and, as Viereck himself points out, the irrationalism and organicism inherent in German conservative thinking loomed large in the later social philosophy of Naziism.<sup>28</sup> The German intellect, already unreceptive to thinking in individualistic terms about social phenomena, found the transition to an entirely collectivist and totalitarian approach to political problems an easy one. In this way, however the modern representatives of this school may react against the idea, conservatism provided much of the philosophical underpinning of National Socialist thought.

In France, the reaction to the Revolution took as its starting point the blanket rejection of the Enlightenment. Such writers as Joseph de Maistre (consumed by a personal hatred of the *philosophes*) and Bonald applied a logical framework to the vindication of monarchical absolutism and Papal theocracy. The optimistic view of the nature of man prevalent in the eighteenth century was replaced, in the thought of these writers, by the conception of man as naturally depraved and corrupted. The Christian idea of original sin was made the pretext for State tyranny and ecclesiastical authoritarianism (just as today neo-conservatives often attempt to use this doctrine to justify greater State control). The bitterness engendered by the Revolutionary upheaval made the French right-wing into a group of irreconcilables which, fighting against liberal reform generation after generation, has played such a continuously ominous role in French history to the present day.

Although the particular situations in the various countries supplied nuances to the conservative philosophy, in general the direction of their beliefs was everywhere

clear. Throughout Europe, for instance, the glorification of the Middle Ages has as its corollary a distaste for modern industrial society. But in England, where capitalism had advanced far forward of the other European countries, this distaste was supported by relatively sophisticated anti-capitalistic arguments on the part of the conservative thinkers. Many of the arguments later advanced by the socialists first found expression in the writings of this group, including Wordsworth, Coleridge, and most especially Southey. Southey had developed a theory of the trade cycle which saw periodic unemployment resulting from overproduction of wealth in a society, and both he and Coleridge favored high rates of taxation and a graduated property tax in the interests of equalization of income.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, many of the principles set forth by the early conservatives were to motivate the Christian socialists and were later to join with other anti-capitalistic theories to find full flower in the doctrines of the welfare state. This clear historical connection between conservatism and socialism is most remarkable. It is difficult, for instance, to decide whether the later Sismondi was a forerunner of socialism, an exponent of conservatism, or—what is most probable—both. The crucial influence of de Maistre and Bonald on the theories of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte is, of course, well known.

In the contemporary conservative references to the urgent necessity of employing sociological and anthropological concepts in political philosophy we seem to hear an echo from the time when the enemies of liberalism considered the new science of society, with its emphasis on "community," as a promising weapon with which to combat liberal economics. Leon Bramson, in *The Political Context of Sociology*, emphasizes that it was the conservatives and

not the socialists who were responsible for most of sociology's key concepts:

The French conservatives of the early nineteenth century denounced the individualism of these [Enlightenment] theorists and their strictures against divine-right monarchy, aristocracy and Church. The attempt to put these theories into practice, they said, had destroyed the social fabric, separated men from one another, and created individualistic atoms floating helplessly in an anarchic void. The restoration of social order was the preoccupation of Bonald and de Maistre, but also of Comte, the father of sociology.

Many of the key concepts of sociology illustrate this concern with the maintenance and conservation of order; ideas such as status, hierarchy, ritual, integration, social function and social control are themselves a part of the history of the reaction to the ideals of the French Revolution: individualism, secularism, scientific rationalism, and egalitarianism. . . The view of society and human nature developed by such conservative thinkers as Burke, Bonald and de Maistre and to some extent Hegel, was in fact quite opposed to the view of the rationalists and individualists such as Locke, Voltaire, and Bentham. Society for the conservatives was an organic entity, not a mere aggregate of individuals capable of manipulation by the man with a blueprint for a new order.<sup>30</sup>

On the political, no less than on the theoretical level, was the battle between conservatism and liberalism fought out in the nineteenth century. Until the emergence of strong socialist parties in the 1880's, undoubtedly the principal factor in the internal politics of the major European countries was the struggle over the introduction of the modern liberal state, a

struggle in which liberalism stood alone against the forces of reaction. While in England, which was generally liberal from the start, this struggle was waged in terms of relatively peripheral issues such as increased suffrage and free trade, west of the Rhine and south of the Alps and Pyrenees the battle concerned such fundamentals as the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of constitutional government, and the suppression of the Inquisition.<sup>31</sup>

Can this world-historical battle between conservatism and liberalism be interpreted as accidental or contingent? In reason, this does not seem possible. The profound enmity between liberalism and conservatism which permeated nineteenth century thought and politics resulted from basic philosophical differences, which, as we have seen, have not disappeared with the passage of time. To contend, as does Frank S. Meyer,<sup>32</sup> that the struggle is over, that the twentieth century has seen these differences resolved, is to misread the nature of the argument between the two camps.

The rejection of reason as a tool in deciding on the acceptability of any particular social order cannot be reconciled with the liberal's firm reliance on reason as the only valid method for the appraisal of societal affairs.<sup>33</sup> The liberal is interested in tradition only when that tradition can rationally be shown to serve a useful function. He is not prepared to throw over tradition entirely, as has erroneously been contended by some conservative writers.<sup>34</sup> But he, unlike the conservative, is equipped to measure it against certain criteria for the proper governing of society, and is further prepared to reject it should it conflict with those criteria. Nor is the liberal ready to impose any particular *Weltanschauung* on society. As Professor von Mises puts it:

Liberalism is no religion, no world-

view, no party of special interests. It is no religion because it demands neither faith nor devotion, because there is nothing mystical about it, and because it has no dogmas. It is no world-view because it does not try to explain the cosmos and because it says nothing about the meaning and purpose of human existence. It is no party of special interests because it does not provide or seek to provide any special advantage whatsoever to any individual or group.<sup>35</sup>

It is just this lack of a world-view that marks the open society to which the liberal adheres, a society in which men are free to subscribe to any set of moral and social principles they wish, and are at liberty to act upon them to the extent that their actions do not involve the restriction of the equal right of others. The liberal supports those policies aimed at enlarging the area of existence within which the citizen might regulate his own activities as he sees fit, free from governmental interference.

The most fundamental issue involved in the conflict between liberalism and conservatism—as Herbert Spencer indicated in his essay on, “The New Toryism”—is just this: to what extent are men to be allowed to act freely or are to be coerced. The issue which lies at the base of all political theories is not *which Weltanschauung* is to be implemented, whether it be that of the “altruistic Tory” (the socialist or welfare-statist) or the “egoistic Tory” (the conservative), but, rather, the degree of free choice which is to remain to the

citizen. On this question, the liberal stands alone against both conservatism and his opponents on the left:

The altruistic Tory as well as the egoistic Tory belongs to the genus Tory; though he forms a new species of the genus. And both stand in distinct contrast with the Liberal as defined in the days when Liberals were rightly so called, and when the definition was—“one who advocates greater freedom from restraint, especially in political institutions.”

. . . Toryism and Liberalism originally emerged, the one from militancy and the other from industrialism. The one stood for the *regime* of status, and the other for the *regime* of contract—the one for that system of compulsory cooperation, which accompanies the legal inequality of classes, and the other for that voluntary cooperation which accompanies their legal equality; and beyond all question the early acts of the two parties were respectively for the maintenance of agencies which effect this compulsory cooperation, and for the weakening or curbing of them.<sup>36</sup>

Such, then, are the differences between conservatism and liberalism, and, although in present-day America liberals and conservatives may join for short-run political ends, in the last analysis their paths must be as divergent as their origins. A reconciliation between these two political philosophies must wait upon the unlikely advent of a Hegelian dialectic process which will synthesize the great opposites.

<sup>35</sup>See especially, Frank S. Meyer, “Freedom, Tradition, Conservatism,” and M. Stanton Evans, “A Conservative Case for Freedom,” both articles reprinted in booklet form by the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, Philadelphia, Pa., and originally appearing in *MODERN AGE*, Fall, 1960. Murray N. Rothbard has also indicated that a

philosophical reconciliation was possible, in “Conservatism and Freedom: A Libertarian Comment,” *MODERN AGE*, Spring, 1961, pp. 217-220.

<sup>36</sup>I use the term “liberal” here and throughout this paper as it was employed in the nineteenth century, to signify those who call for strict limits on the power of government and support a *lais-*

sez-faire economic policy.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1957, p. 458.

<sup>3</sup>For the use of the terms "situational" and "ideational" as applied to conservative philosophy, see *ibid.*, pp. 454-455.

<sup>4</sup>Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>Kendall goes so far as to make the criterion of "community consensus" the governing principle for the acceptability of social arrangements, particularly as this consensus is manifested in the lower house of Congress. Willmoore Kendall, *The Conservative Affirmation* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963), pp. 19-35.

<sup>6</sup>Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 7.

<sup>7</sup>L. Brent Bozell, "Freedom or Virtue?," *National Review*, Sept. 11, 1962, pp. 184-185.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>9</sup>Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup>Kendall, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

<sup>12</sup>Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-444.

<sup>13</sup>Francis Graham Wilson, *The Case for Conservatism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1951), pp. 66-67.

<sup>14</sup>Wilhelm Röpke, *The Social Crisis of Our Time* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), *passim.*, and esp. pp. 178-180.

<sup>15</sup>Ludwig von Mises, *The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth*, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 195.

<sup>16</sup>Peter Viereck, *Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill* (New York: Anvil Books, 1956), p. 18.

<sup>17</sup>Frank S. Meyer, *In Defense of Freedom* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 140n.

<sup>18</sup>Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).

<sup>19</sup>Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 429.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>21</sup>James Burnham, *Congress and the American*

*Tradition* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), p. 8.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup>John Morley, *Burke* (New York: Harper, n.d., pp. 129-130).

<sup>24</sup>*The Works of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke*, (London: Bohn, 1856), vol. vi, *On the Petition of the Unitarians*, p. 115.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>26</sup>See Hans Barth, *The Idea of Order* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1960), pp. 18-47, for Burke's influence on German conservatism. Also, Adam Müller, *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, reprinted in *Der Konservative Gedanke*, edited by Hans Barth, (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1958).

<sup>27</sup>Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler* (New York: Knopf, 1941), *passim.*

<sup>28</sup>Alfred Cobban, *Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the 18th Century* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1929), pp. 206-220.

<sup>29</sup>Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 13-14.

<sup>30</sup>Kendall, who is a realist, has properly seen the enmity between conservatism and the philosophies which oppose it (including liberalism) as extending from the present back over the course of the past 100 years. He considers the first major defeat on the American scene for the conservative forces as the emancipation of the slaves in 1863 (and, astoundingly, appears to disapprove of this measure). *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

<sup>31</sup>Frank S. Meyer, "The Twisted Tree of Liberty," *National Review*, January 16, 1962, p. 26.

<sup>32</sup>Cf. von Mises' statement that "man has only one tool to fight error: reason." *Human Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 189.

<sup>33</sup>F. A. Hayek has shown the importance traditional arrangements can play in a society of contract. See his *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

<sup>34</sup>Mises, *Commonwealth*, p. 192.

<sup>35</sup>Herbert Spencer, *The Man vs. the State* (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1940), p. 20.