

political philosophy for counter arguments. These are the persons who support the Cult of Mediocrity, which is inimical to any type of elite. Since an elite is what makes a civilization great, there is the possibility that the devotees of the mediocrity cult will destroy what is left of civilization. The Cult has already gained dominance over the educational philosophy of the country, so that we are concentrating our effort on the education of people who will never contribute to progress.

Reviewed by F. C. J. McGURK

History at Firsthand

Diplomat Among Warriors, by Robert Murphy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. 470 pp. \$6.95.

OBSERVERS of the international scene have been waiting for two decades for that man of mystery, Mr. Robert Murphy, to complete his long career as a Foreign Service officer, retire, and tell us all about it, and especially about its long veiled and controversial aspects. In this large and handsome volume, packed with personal information that was once top-secret, he has fulfilled our expectations and given us a complete account of that career from the days of his consular clerkship in Switzerland in World War I to those of his final service as political adviser to former President Dwight D. Eisenhower on his goodwill tour of eleven countries at the close of the fifties.

He has set forth his story of dramatic and adventurous experiences with consummate organizational and literary skill, the result, assuredly in part, of years of writing clear, concise analyses of complex political situations for the guidance of the directors of American foreign policy. The chapters are short, controlled little essays, each complete in itself. The serious and sober narrative of each is preceded or followed by amusing incidents which vary the interest and subtly lighten the tone just when the more critical disclosures of the author may have shocked the reader. Important personages appear in the narrative at just the proper time and place to be

described, analysed, praised or criticized by the author whose destiny it was to become involved with most of the leading figures of world affairs at the most crucial moments of history during the last thirty years. Throughout the narrative his humor and sparkling wit alternate with touches of irony and cynicism. His forthright self-criticism of some of his own now questionable views and actions vies in its honesty with outspoken criticisms of the views and actions of others. And the whole is permeated with the intelligence and spiritual sensitivity of this exceptional Foreign Service expert and loyal American, Robert Murphy.

Of this intelligence and sensitivity, which so strikes the reader, the sources of the memoir give additional evidence. Not only has Mr. Murphy provided us with eyewitness accounts from memory, but also from his official reports and notes written at the time. And he has supplemented these with data drawn from the published memoirs and writings of other significant persons, from the captured German documents and even from the reports of other officials, filed in the archives of the American State Department, which he has taken the trouble to look up and read. Thus, he has produced a history of the times as well as a personal memoir. And in carefully distinguishing the sources, and constructing the story chiefly from primary materials, he has made the volume historically worth its weight in gold.

In the opening chapters the reader learns of the German-Irish ancestry, the upbringing, the education, and the early career of the author in Switzerland during the First World War and in Munich during the twenties where the inflation and its destruction of the German middle class left a lasting impression on him. His observation of the Hitler-Ludendorff "putsch," here described, corrects some erroneous views of their actions. Fluent in German and French, Murphy was next assigned to Paris where he became a witness to the events of the critical decades in France, 1939-40. The atmosphere of Paris at that time, the many delicate tasks he executed, the many French leaders he cultivated, are described and analysed. Especially thought-provoking is his account of trying to recover from a Communist, a naturalized American, four thousand American passports of men fighting in Spain, which were being used by Communist agents. The bitter feud between Ambassador Bullitt and Sumner Wells the author ascribes to the callousness of President Roosevelt and asserts that had the President had the support

of both in the last days of the war, American postwar policies would have been shaped much more realistically. Bullitt is praised for his work and credited by Mr. Murphy with saving Paris as an "open city" when the battle of France began. As for the French and international Communists, Murphy considers them chiefly responsible for French defeatism. Striking is his evaluation of German-occupied Paris as the best intelligence center in Europe, because the Germans, with whom he had to make contact, proved so unexpectedly communicative about their intentions.

The next phase of the author's career took place in Vichy where he was put in charge of the American embassy on July 3, 1940, the day when units of the British Fleet bombed French warships at Mers el-Kebir, killing or wounding about 2,000 French sailors. Murphy describes the impact on the French of this lamentable event and assesses its significance. He then analyzes the difficulties, the personalities, and the policies of Vichy France and reveals that secret American policy at that time was to prevent Europeans from concluding peace settlements with Hitler. In September, to Murphy's surprise, he was recalled by the State Department without explanation.

This was to be the turning point of his career. He had been summoned at the President's request. As a result of an hour-long conversation at the White House—of which there is to Murphy's knowledge no official record, and the essentials of which he now discloses—Murphy became the President's own personal representative in French Africa. Apparently Roosevelt believed that North Africa offered a place where French troops might be brought back into the war against Nazi Germany. He wanted to help, and instructed Murphy to make an inspection tour and report. "The French African policy of the United States Government," writes the author, "thus became the President's personal policy. He initiated it, he kept it going, and he resisted pressures against it, until in the autumn of 1942 French North Africa became the first major battle ground where Americans fought Germans."

The memoirs become richer and fuller, more revealing and more exciting as Murphy describes the sordid intrigues, the incredible confusions, the heartbreaking frustrations and the grave controversies which consumed all his energies for almost four years in the French empire in Africa and provided him with more adventurous assignments than many diplomats achieve in a

lifetime. Among the most important developments recorded and assessed are the author's setting of the stage in North Africa for the invasion, his experience of the invasion and its aftermath, his personal involvement in the inter-relationships of the British, French and American leaders and their policies, and the climactic Casablanca Conference which Murphy shows to have been victory for the war policy of the British whose brilliant tactics made the Americans for the next two years "a reluctant tail to the British kite." But the most important development of all in the career of Robert Murphy at this time was his assignment as political adviser to the Military, to General Eisenhower in this case, which inaugurated a new type of cooperation between diplomats and military men and which, epitomized in the title of the book, became his distinctive role throughout the rest of his career.

After the experiences of Africa come those of Italy with fresh facts on the surrender, among many the "merciless" long-term surrender document (still unpublished), on Anglo-American dissensions, on German intelligence and actions, and on all the significant personalities, including Vishinsky and Tito. Then follows a critique of the various plans for the occupation of Germany, the detrimental influence of the Henry White-Henry Morgenthau plan, the role in planning of our left-wing Ambassador to Britain, John C. Winant, who communicated directly with the White House by U. S. naval code, and who was responsible for the failure to define our right of access to Berlin in the negotiations with the Russian members of the European Advisory Committee, his "good friend" Gusev, and the role of Eisenhower. Two more chapters take us along the road to Yalta, to the unconditional surrender of the Nazis—who at first signed the wrong peace document—and to Potsdam and to the end of the war. Of particular interest is the author's account of his last sad evening with Roosevelt whose physical appearance and mental incoherence proved shocking to Murphy.

The second half of the book, covering Murphy's postwar experiences at Potsdam, Berlin, in Japan, in Korea, at the United Nations, at London during the Suez crisis, and in Lebanon, is as richly rewarding in its intimate details, first-hand knowledge, revelations, criticisms, and thrilling episodes as the first. He is severely critical of American policy regarding Berlin, the occupation of Germany, and Soviet Russia. He shows that Roosevelt's Grand Design, his policy of faith in Soviet-American cooperation, was catastrophic in

its effects. Murphy now believes that on the occasion of the Berlin blockade he should have resigned in public protest against Washington's policy.

I suffered anguish over this decision of our government not to challenge the Russians when they blockaded Berlin, and I still deeply regret that I was associated with an action which caused Soviet leaders to downgrade United States determination and capability and led, I believe, to the subsequent Communist provocation in Korea.

As for the successful Berlin Airlift it was a "deceptive victory" since "few observers" he writes, "seemed to realize that our decision to depend exclusively upon the Airlift was a surrender of our hard won rights in Berlin, a surrender which has plagued us ever since." Murphy believes, however, that the Berlin position is an invaluable asset to the West and worth whatever it may cost to hold it.

From his experiences in Japan and Korea comes another top-secret revelation: that the Allied forces would have had difficulty remaining in Korea had not Japanese shipping and railroad experts worked there with their own well-trained crews under American and U.N. commands. He further reveals that General Mark Clark recommended the same strategy in Korea which MacArthur earlier had proposed, even including the use of Chinese divisions from Taiwan, but the recommendation was similarly rejected by Washington. Murphy agreed with Clark and believed that "we were being bluffed out of a well-earned victory in Korea, as I felt we had been in Berlin." (p. 355) Bitterly he concludes, "The Communist negotiators were aggressive and insolent right down to the finish, but the American negotiators [and he was one] gritted their teeth and obeyed instructions."

Murphy, admitting that he is not enthusiastic about the United Nations, devotes a chapter to criticizing United States policy in relation to it. He admits also, and justifiably, his pleasure when in 1953 he was appointed to the highest career post in the State Department, namely, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and considers the six years in that top job his most satisfying. Murphy's role in Lebanon was again that of trouble-shooter and peace negotiator and he concludes the chapter with an account of his Middle Eastern tour which is based on his daily field reports to the State Department. He then sums up his long experience with the Russians in a chapter of American relations with Russia and

concludes his story with a critical analysis of the Department of State. The reviewer can only add that every page of Robert Murphy's brilliant memoir-history flashes with vital information, crackles with his criticisms, sparkles with the frankness of his personal judgments and is exciting reading throughout.

Reviewed by HENRY M. ADAMS

Tillich the Rationalist

Systematic Theology (Vol. III), by Paul Tillich. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. 484 pp. \$6.95.

THE APPEARANCE of this third volume of Paul Tillich's *Systematic Theology* concludes his broad survey of Christian doctrine. It is undoubtedly an impressive achievement, but the critical reviewer may well question its timeliness. Certainly Dr. Tillich has seemed to many people to speak with especial clarity to his own generation; yet in fact, despite the obvious relationship to a good deal of contemporary existentialist thought and a profound and imaginative handling of the popular psychiatric themes, the real affinities of Dr. Tillich are with nineteenth century German idealism rather than with the thought of this century.

We may perhaps describe the basic philosophy of Dr. Tillich as a kind of rationalistic existentialism. It is rationalistic in the sense that it attempts a rational interpretation even of man's many irrationalities. It is thus quite distinct from the thought of those contemporary existentialists who seem to want not only to accept the fact of the irrational in man but even to suppose that we must be irrational about it if we would interpret it properly. Certainly Dr. Tillich is neither Kantian nor Hegelian. Rather his affinities are with the smaller figures who intervene between the two great giants, with people like Fichte and Schelling. Looking farther back through the history of Christian thought, Tillich reminds us not so much of giants like Aquinas as of a great and solitary figure like the ninth century Scotus Eriugena who bequeathed to us a beautifully systematic Neo-Platonic Christianity.

From the point of view of the Christian theo-