

Is it prudent policy for the U.S. to assist "deviationist" Communist governments?

TITOISM:

Trojan Horse in Poland and Hungary?

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EVENTS IN POLAND and Hungary of the past year have been accompanied by an orgy of Western Titoist efforts and manifestations. Western Titoists have not missed a splendid occasion to launch a new offensive against the mind of the free world, realizing that the emotional impact of the tragedy in Hungary would induce many free people to relax their mental alertness and make them uncritically receptive to interpretations which they would otherwise reject as senseless and preposterous.

The salient facts which emerge from an analysis of the revolutionary events of October/November 1956 in Poland and Hungary can be formulated as follows:

1. *Titoism is not an anti-Soviet drive, but Moscow's weapon against the West.* Titoism is not some heretical ideological line of independent, "national" communism, which Tito would be promoting among satellites against Moscow. It is a communist strategy agreed upon by Moscow and Tito to confuse, deceive, weaken and destroy the West.

Khrushchev and Bulganin had visited Tito in May/June 1955 and recognized communist Yugoslavia's right to its own "road to socialism," because they had found out that Tito's "different" communism was much more efficient than Soviet communism in destroying the free world. For practical political reasons, the recognition of the right to a separate road to socialism could not remain confined to Yugoslavia, but had to be extended to all communist-ruled coun-

tries. That is what the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party did in February 1956.

Although Moscow was becoming intensely Titoist, the Soviet leaders deemed it necessary to add prestige to their conversion and make it more convincing by having Tito put his authentic seal on it.

In this manner the former dispute between Moscow and Tito about the best way to spread communism was to be substituted by the common Soviet-Yugoslav task of jointly spreading communism by promoting "different" communism, national "independence" from Moscow, national sovereignty, "Titoism."

Such an offensive against the West's political mind would not only unite all communists in a common action against the free world, but the new "Titoist" basis of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation would "provide an ideological resting place for India, Burma, Afghanistan" and Moscow's other new non-communist friends.¹ The consequences would be that without any changes in the position of the enslaved peoples, Tito would gain popularity, Moscow would maintain and consolidate its rule, the West would be induced to extend its help to all satellites. The free world would almost entirely take over from the Soviets the task of spreading communism in the world and thus commit accelerated suicide.

To make this scheme work, Moscow and Tito had carefully, in the typically communist manner which combines blunt admission of aims and deceit of the "bourgeois" enemy, prepared the ground by a number of significant moves.

¹ From *Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse*, by Slobodan M. Draskovich. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957.

In March 1956 Tito had, after six years of banishment, returned to the Moscow-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.

In April, the U.S.S.R. had dissolved the Cominform, which had "exhausted its function," since "socialist successes have created new conditions for the activities of the Communist and Workers' parties."² From now on the communist parties would "according to the particular national conditions of their own countries . . . find new useful methods of establishing links with each other."³

This had unloosed a wave of "Titoist" moves and manifestations among European communists.

The Italian communists started talking about "the Italian road toward socialism." The Bulgarian Communist Party demoted Stalinist Premier Vulko Chervenkov to Deputy Premier, and put in his place his right-hand man, Minister of Interior Anton Yugov, who was for the occasion proclaimed a "national" communist.

Tito praised the Soviet de-Stalinization campaign as "brave and bold," paid tribute to the Soviet "socialist democratization," decentralization and alleged struggle against bureaucratism,⁴ and hailed Moscow's "new methods in international relations" as portents of world peace.

In Poland a movement among trade unions for greater independence was allegedly encouraged. In Czechoslovakia, Premier Viliam Siroky declared that Tito had never been a "Western imperialist agent." In France, during his visit of May 1956, Tito advised Thorez and Duclos to follow the new Moscow line of "nationalist" and "independent" communism.

Thus the work to be done during Tito's sojourn in Moscow (June 2-21, 1956) was thoroughly prepared. Khrushchev and Tito spent their time not only in manifestations of indissoluble communist solidarity and eternal friendship, but in working out plans for the systematic de-Stalinization and Titoization of Eastern Europe.

While Tito was in the Soviet Union, the official CPY periodical, *Komunist*, fully endorsed the "new" Soviet line and stated that "the Yugoslav leaders are impressed by the possibilities for an expansion of socialism." They had agreed with the Soviet leaders that "the renunciation of Stalinism will gradually dispel the resistance and apprehensions evoked by Stalin's dictatorship over communist parties as well as countries." That common Tito-Khrushchev line was now solemnly expressed in the communique on the relations between the two communist parties, of June 20, which once more declared that "different countries" may take "different roads to socialism," and stressed that "any tendency of imposing one's own views on determining roads and forms of socialist development is alien to both sides." Khrushchev and Tito agreed that cooperation between communist parties was to be "based on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism and on comradely exchange of views on disputes between their parties."⁵

These very lofty Leninist principles were of course meant for intra-communist use. As for non-communists, Khrushchev had stressed in his "anti-Stalin" speech of February 24, that Lenin "demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the revolution and of the working class."

The common Khrushchev-Tito line of communist independence was promptly echoed by communist leaders in various countries. Togliati, the Italian communist chief, voiced his demand for "more and more" autonomy from Moscow. Two days later, the French communists criticized both Stalin and his successors.

The British communists, the East German communist leader, Walter Ulbricht, the Belgian communists, the American Communist Party, obediently joined the chorus of criticism of Moscow.

Tito signed a pact with communist Rumania to help it "move toward independence from Soviet domination." In Czechoslovakia students asked for some democratic reforms. In Poland allegedly the

secret police was on the ebb and the Stalinist Prime Minister Josef Cyrankiewicz fired a number of high officials for their Stalinist misdeeds. More freedom of expression was allowed, "a privilege unheard of since the war."

However, all European communists, Stalinists and "Titoists" alike, were careful not to overdo their criticisms and their "liberalization." Khrushchev and Bulganin were Stalin's accomplices, but so were they all. Tito himself did not want those attacks to go too far, pretending that the defeat of Khrushchev "would strengthen the Stalinist opposition and could even bring a return of that group to power."(!)⁶ He was opposed to anything more than verbal "loosening of ties" between satellites and the U.S.S.R., because that would "boomerang now and result in a new constriction of the Soviet bloc." Besides, according to Tito, the satellites were not satellites, but free and independent. When he was asked whether he expected more freedom for the satellites from his visit to Moscow, Tito answered: "Why do you always call them satellites. . . . *We saw here in Rumania that the Rumanians are self-ruling people.*"⁷

Tito's drive for the anti-Moscow independence of the satellites was obviously dialectic! European communists were to attack the Soviets only within the limits of Soviet instructions. That is why the *New York Times* of June 28, 1956 was able to say that "the Yugoslavs do not consider that the attacks on the Soviet leadership weaken the position of Nikita S. Khrushchev."

The distinctly pro-Soviet character of the drive for "independence" from Moscow was made plainly apparent in Poland on June 28, 1956. The Polish workers, encouraged by anti-Stalinism and "Titoism," demonstrated in Poznan for bread and freedom. Josef Cyrankiewicz, the Stalinist Premier, and Edward Ochab, the Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party, who in the meantime had been proclaimed "liberal" communists by Western observers, called the Soviet tanks to restore order.

A politically more alert West could not have failed to grasp immediately the monstrous fraud of the new communist line of "independence" and "national" communism.

But the West failed to draw any conclusions from the Poznan uprising. So Khrushchev and Tito continued their drive for de-Stalinization and "Titoization" of the satellites. Mikoyan and Suslov visited Hungary, and Matyas Rakosi resigned his post of secretary of the communist party. His place was taken by Erno Gero, his most trusted accomplice, who denounced Rakosi's "Stalinist mistakes" which had "reduced the attractive power of the party" and given the enemy quite a wide target for attack. Gero promised "broader democratization" and wanted closer ties with the United States. But at the same time he promised "iron discipline" and vowed that there would be "no second Poznan" in Hungary.

In Warsaw the communist party announced that it was going to stop ruling and confine itself to providing "political inspiration" for government leaders. Mr. Harrison Salisbury thought that "Poland may be the laboratory for new experiments in the liberalization of rule behind the Iron Curtain"(!)⁸ Wladyslaw Gomulka, the alleged "Titoist," purged in 1949, was readmitted to the party.

Thus the moment had arrived for a bold and speedy "Titoization" of the whole Soviet-East-European empire.

Dramatically, Khrushchev visited Tito in Brioni on September 19, and even more dramatically Tito suddenly flew with Khrushchev to Yalta, where they were joined by Voroshilov, Bulganin and Erno Gero.

No communique was issued about these talks, which gave Western Titoists another opportunity for indulging in publicity without responsibility. Tito's stature in the communist world was allegedly such that Khrushchev, who with his anti-Stalinist policies had incurred the wrath of hardcore Stalinists in the Soviet government,

had asked Tito to defend him at a "party trial."*

Although Tito went to the U.S.S.R. on the eve of President Eisenhower's decision about further aid to Yugoslavia, he not only did not deem it necessary to tell anything to the U.S. Government about why he was going to the Soviet Union, but refused to tell why he had been there. The United States Ambassador in Belgrade tried in vain for eleven days to be received. Tito had more important business to attend to.

The Italian Communist Party sent a delegation to Tito, headed by Luigi Longo. Tito stopped at Bucharest for a friendly chat, and the Rumanian communist leaders, Gheorghiu Dej and Chivu Stoika, paid a visit to Tito immediately after. Then Erno Gero came to see Tito, and Edward Ochab, the Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party, went to see Mao Tse-tung. There were many other intracommunist visits as well.

The reasons for these visits were kept as secret as the reasons for Tito's flight to the U.S.S.R. The official explanations were couched in very general terms of brotherly relations and exchange of communist experience. In the interpretation of Western Titoists, Tito was conspiring with other communists to make an end to the subservience of proud "national" communists to Moscow. In the light of plain facts, it would seem nearer to the truth to assume that they were conspiring—under Moscow's leadership—how best to use the weapon of communist "independence" and "nationalism" against the enslaved peoples and against the free world. And since the latest outbreak of anti-communist spirit of national freedom and independence had taken place in Poznan, the new strategy was first tried in Poland.

2. *Stalinists are "Titoist," and vice versa.* The experiment succeeded admirably. From the moment the Moscow-directed Titoist

show started with Khrushchev's "unexpected" visit to Warsaw on October 19, his "clash" with the Polish communist leaders and their "tough" talk, to the signing of the Soviet-Polish pact of "indestructible union and fraternal friendship" on November 19, the Western public was kept under an intense barrage of pro-Titoist propaganda. All "make-believe" ingredients were thought of in advance and introduced on the scene at the proper time: Ochab's "threat" to Khrushchev that if the Soviet troops did not leave Poland, there would be trouble;* the "clashes" between Soviet and Polish troops; the Soviet "reinforcements" from Eastern Germany; the alleged apparition of Soviet Navy units in Polish waters; Gomulka's "unwavering" stand which made him a "Polish national hero."

What actually happened is an entirely different story. First, all the news about the political tension and military clashes and threats were never authenticated. Whatever was allegedly about to happen, never happened. There were no clashes between Soviet and Polish troops, Gomulka's rise to power did not bring about the slightest change in the domestic or foreign policy of Poland. Whatever Gomulka said and did was strictly along the lines and within the frame of the new Moscow-directed policy of anti-Stalinism and "independence" from Moscow.† Western newspapermen were able to proclaim and the Western public opinion was able to accept the tale of Gomulka's opposition to Moscow only because the spiritual defenses of the West against

* Actually, at the meeting of the central committee of the Polish Communist Party which returned Gomulka to power and which immediately preceded the talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, Ochab had urged his Polish comrades to "make clear that *the Red Army* is our ally and *defends our independence* and our frontiers." (*Chicago Tribune*, November 13, 1956. Italics added.)

† Gomulka's statement of October 21 that "There is more than one road to socialism. There is the Soviet way. There is the Yugoslav way. And there are other ways," was by no stretch of imagination a defiance of Khrushchev and Tito, but an expression of strictest adherence to the line of the Soviet-Yugoslav communique of June 20, 1956.

* When asked about this, Tito's Foreign Minister, Koca Popovic, could not help saying, "That's the best one I've heard yet." (*Gary Post-Tribune*, September 29, 1956.)

any communist strategy and tactics had suffered substantial damage in the last fifteen years, and especially since 1948, as a result of Titoist poisoning.

Gomulka was accused of "nationalist deviationism" in 1951 and jailed for it, but the Titoist stigma was by no means a proof that he had any intentions of becoming independent from Moscow. Besides, what was in 1951 a stigma was in 1956 a most valuable asset for Moscow's grand strategy. Gomulka was proclaimed a "Titoist," but—like Tito—was reliable from the Soviet standpoint. If he had—like Tito—disagreed with Moscow on matters of procedure in 1951, the issue was settled between Moscow and Tito, and Moscow could use both "heretics" in 1956. That no actual changes were planned by Moscow was evidenced by the fact that the top "Stalinist henchmen" Josef Cyrankiewicz and Alexander Zawadzki kept their posts and became Gomulka's closest collaborators. As for Marian Spychalski, the new "Titoist" minister of defense, he was built up as a "military Gomulka" as opposed to Marshal Rokossovsky, the Soviet chief of the Polish armed forces. He was first appointed Deputy Minister of Defense and chief of the political administration in the Army. A few weeks later, he was promoted to Minister of Defense. The Polish communist army had obtained a "national" communist to command it. What Western Titoists forgot was that when Ochab, at Stalin's order, accused Gomulka of "nationalist" deviation in 1951, it was "nationalist" Spychalski who was the chief witness, whose testimony was essential for jailing Gomulka.⁹

The Soviets who in 1951 were being tough, were in 1956 playing it safe. The men with whom they surrounded Gomulka were only a super-guarantee. But it is very doubtful whether Gomulka himself was up to any trouble. No sooner was he appointed first secretary of the Polish Communist Party than the party's official organ *Tribuna Ludu* "told President Eisenhower that Poland's 'new freedom' did not give the United States the right to interfere in

the country's internal affairs." It also "warned that it would be 'naive' to think this meant Poland was leaning away from Russia toward the west."¹⁰

On November 5 when the Soviets, after the first "one step back" in Budapest, "took two steps forward" and poured new troops into Hungary, Gomulka did not greet the rebels fighting for Hungarian independence, but urged "iron discipline" to prevent any anti-Soviet incident in Poland.

The final and most conclusive proof about Gomulka's "independent," "anti-Moscow" stand, was provided by his visit to Moscow (November 15-19). The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland had been the favorite theme of Western Titoists. Gomulka was allegedly so dangerous for Moscow that he was reportedly advised to desist from his trip. But brave Gomulka decided to go and the world held its breath! The Poles followed the Moscow talks with "tremendous interest and tension."¹¹ Gomulka's first words in Moscow were that the best basis for friendly Polish-Soviet relations was the "Leninist principle of equality of small and great nations, mutual respect for sovereignty and national independence as well as cooperation based on mutual benefit." Then, instead of speaking of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, he assured the Soviet leaders that there could be no talk of Poland leaving the Warsaw Pact, which legalized the presence of Soviet troops in Poland. The Soviet-Polish military alliance "was Poland's best insurance of the Oder-Neisse frontier with Germany." A few days later the communique issued about the talks stressed that in view of "the existing international situation" Soviet troops were still necessary in Poland. Nonetheless, Poland was—dialectically—even more independent than Tito. The Soviet-Yugoslav pact of June 20, 1956 was signed on "a basis of equality." The Soviet-Polish pact was establishing "complete equality" between the two signatories. In other words, the Soviet leaders by accepting and promoting "national independence," had "completely" yielded to

“Titoism.” But “Titoist” satellite Gomulka recognized, in the name of “national independence,” the satellite status quo established by Stalin.

Western Titoists continued hailing Gomulka as a Polish “national hero” and a champion of anti-Soviet independence in Eastern Europe.

Act two followed. The Soviet-inspired-and-directed Titoist coup was not yet over in Poland when it started in Hungary. Erno Gero, the then secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, and Janos Kadar had just returned from Belgrade where they had “reached an understanding on all questions discussed,”¹² and especially on the need for a close cooperation between the Yugoslav and Hungarian Communist Parties in “building the socialist society on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.”

Hungary was obviously ripe for “Titoism.” Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister, was a “national” communist. Kadar was an inveterate Titoist and the rabid Stalinist Erno Gero had just been converted to Titoism. The prospects seemed favorable indeed. But the Hungarian communist leaders had forgotten the people. They had foolishly ignored the basic, irreconcilable rift between the people and themselves, which exploded in their faces. Nagy, Gero and Kadar wanted another show which would change nothing, but placate the people by convincing it that communist Hungary had become “independent” from Moscow. However, the people wanted no part of Titoism, or Nagyism or Geroism or Kadarism. They wanted freedom.

There is no need to recount here the tragic story of the uprising of the Hungarian people against their communist masters. But the most significant political facts in the Hungarian developments must be fully emphasized.

Imre Nagy, unable to satisfy the people, called the Soviet troops to quell the riots. Erno Gero was ousted as first secretary of the party on October 25 and replaced by Janos Kadar. In the last days of October

things had taken such a bad turn for Nagy and the Soviets that Nagy made attempts to divorce himself from the Soviet Union. But the communist regime was falling apart and Nagy was only a nominal prime minister. To escape the judgment of the people, he took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy.

Then, when the Soviets realized that the West would not act, they returned to Budapest with new (mostly Mongolian) troops and installed Janos Kadar, the “Titoist” veteran, in power.

But since the Soviets pursued a Titoist strategy, their puppet Kadar obediently breathed anti-Soviet defiance (!). He proclaimed in Point 1 of his 15-point program: “unconditional insurance of the national independence and sovereignty of our country.” To help him, his Soviet masters broadcast his proclamation “in full over Moscow’s powerful transmitters numerous times throughout the day.”¹³

Within a few days, Tito, the Red Chinese, the U.S. communists, etc., who had applauded Gomulka because he was allegedly defending Poland’s national sovereignty and independence against Moscow, spoke resolutely in favor of the despicable quisling Kadar. Yugoslav communist officials “put Kadar in the same bracket as Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland.”¹⁴ The Chinese Communist Party organ, *People’s Daily*, thought “that actions taken by the Soviet Union in Hungary are entirely just” because they were “in accordance with the genuine desires of the Hungarian people.” Without the Soviet intervention, “Hungary would have become a Fascist hell, an imperialist outpost for overthrowing other Eastern European people’s democracies.”¹⁵

The American communists took the same stand. The Soviet intervention in Hungary was “anti-Fascist and pro-peace.” Hence it was “regrettably” but “obviously . . . necessary.”¹⁶

The most important and revealing document of all is Tito’s anti-Stalinist speech in Pula of November 15.¹⁷ He assailed the “propaganda and constant repeating of the need for the ‘liberation’ of socialist coun-

tries" which was making the de-Stalinization and democratization of those countries so slow and difficult. He glorified Gomulka as a paragon of the "independent" communist virtues.

As for Hungary, Tito thought that the first intervention of the Soviet troops (October 24) was made necessary through the weakness of Nagy, who failed to "proceed energetically against anarchy and the killing of communists." As for Kadar and the other Soviet-installed quislings, Tito said: "I can tell you, comrades, that I know these men in the new government and that they, in my opinion, represent that which is most honest in Hungary."

Evidently frightened by the massacres of the communists by the "unruly fascist and reactionary mob," Tito justified the second Soviet intervention (November 4): "We have said and we shall always say it, that we are against the intervention and use of foreign military power. Which is, now, the lesser evil? Either chaos, civil war, counter-revolution and a new world war, or the intervention of the Soviet troops? The former is a catastrophe, the latter a mistake. And, of course, if that saves socialism in Hungary, then we shall be able, comrades, to say that, although we are against intervention, the Soviet intervention was necessary."

After asserting that what happened in Hungary could not happen in Yugoslavia, Tito went back to the Hungarian situation: "Assessing the present developments in Hungary from the perspective of either socialism or counter-revolution, we must defend the present government of Kadar, we must support it. We must help it because it finds itself in a very difficult situation. We must fight all those elements who now irresponsibly blame the Russians for everything."

The events in Hungary were, in Tito's version, used to cover the "aggression in Egypt." "I expressed to Nasser my doubts that the imperialists would leave him alone. . . . I told him that he must know that the imperialists are people without moral scruples . . . who consider Egypt . . . the most dangerous for their imperialistic and colonial territories in Africa and Asia." Finally, he advised Nasser "to take credits where he could get them."

Tito's final words were to stress the need for "unity and monolithism" in Yugoslavia. "We must not permit various individuals, various elements to blabber just anything. People from underneath, the masses, must silence them and prevent them from sowing dissension."

This review of pronouncements, events and stands on issues which are at the core of the political problems of our age points to the definite conclusion that there is much less difference between Stalinism and Titoism than meets the eye.

All world communist leaders had declared themselves in favor of "Titoism," i.e. national independence, equality and "various roads to socialism." Khrushchev proclaimed "Titoism" in Belgrade, in Calcutta, in Moscow, in Warsaw, everywhere. Mao Tse-tung encouraged Ochab to be bold in the pursuance of a Polish communist road to socialism, as opposed to the subservience to Moscow. Gomulka headed the "Titoist" revolution of October 1956 in Poland, Imre Nagy wanted to be as independent from Moscow as Gomulka. Erno Gero promised in Yalta (October 1956) before Khrushchev and Tito, and then again in Belgrade, that he would be a good anti-Stalinist boy, a genuine "national" Hungarian communist. Janos Kadar was the symbol of Hungarian "national" communism and was hailed as such by Tito even after the slaughter of Budapest.

But once their change of heart was put to test, they all showed their true and unchanged Stalinist color. Khrushchev ordered the ruthless massacres of Budapest and the deportations to Siberia. Gomulka considered the Soviet troops in Poland not as oppressors of the Poles, but as saviors of his regime. Nagy and Gero invited the Soviets against Hungarian "reactionaries" who wanted freedom from Moscow. Kadar became the most despicable Stalinist quisling.

Mao gave his most categorical and unqualified endorsement to Kadar and the Soviet intervention. Finally, Tito, while assailing some anonymous* Stalinists, gave a clean Titoist bill of health and hailed as deserving saviors of national independence and communism Khrushchev, Gomulka and Kadar.

Theoretically, and for propaganda purposes, they were all "Titoists." But as soon as the only thing that matters to them—communist absolute monopoly of power—was jeopardized, they were all monolithically united in their determination to use the most ruthless Stalinist methods to keep that power. Independence, sovereignty, equality and non-interference were to all of them so many empty words devoid of any meaning in the face of the major communist interest: power.

3. *Stalinist Titoism is a miraculous weapon against the West.* (*The Communists will not re-Stalinize.*) The events of Hungary which disclosed the incredible political and military weakness of the Soviets and of the communist system, raised the question of a possible change of communist strategy. It was suggested that the experiment of "national communism" having failed, the communists had no other course but to revert to Stalinism, to an open and undisguised display of hostility and use of force everywhere.

All pertinent facts point to the contrary.

Moscow will not revert to Stalinism, simply because it "cannot rule in the old fashion." Khrushchev had insisted on the equality and independence of Poland at the very moment when Soviet tanks were crushing the Hungarian revolt and when Gomulka signed that the Soviet troops must stay in Poland. And at the same moment Tito hailed Khrushchev as a champion of equality and independence among socialist nations.

This is for all communists the only logical way to follow. Open and proclaimed Stalinism would provoke more difficulties,

* With the exception of the Albanian communists, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu.

more unrest, more revolts. And that is what they cannot afford. Besides, the communists would lose all the huge gains they have achieved through "coexistence" and "Titoism." The revolt in Hungary was, as clearly evidenced in the comments of all communist leaders, from Kadar to Tito and Mao, a potential spark for a general revolt of all oppressed people against all communist regimes.

If that opportunity was missed by the West, it is only because it was unprepared for any decisive political action, and it was unprepared because it was politically confused by the communist propaganda of co-existence and particularly by the Khrushchev-Tito strategy of "independent," "national" communism. As long as the West continues believing in "different" communism and pursuing a policy based on the notion that the best way of fighting communism is helping it, Khrushchev and Tito and Mao and Gomulka and Kadar are safe. If Tito can hail Khrushchev, after the brutal intervention and massacres of Budapest, as a democratic, anti-Stalinist communist—and be hailed by the West as a courageous adversary of Moscow—the Soviet leaders cannot fail to conclude that the strategy of "different," "independent," "national" communism works miracles. If Mrs. Kethley can participate in the Nagy government, which invited the Soviet troops to shoot Hungarians, and a few days later be hailed in the West as a member of "the last free Hungarian government,"¹⁸ then the Soviets obviously have an iron-clad guarantee that the West will not use their troubles against them. The communists are free to talk "Titoism" and practice Stalinism without the slightest danger to themselves. An open return to Stalinism would probably lead to an armed conflict, and a war today would be the end of communism in the world.

The events of Hungary are the most recent and most convincing proof of the rottenness of communism, the failure of communism to win the youth and of the deep hatred of the people against communism.

But as long as people are left to fight bare-handed against Soviet tanks and guns, while the West confines itself to sending messages of sympathy, the prospects for freedom are dim indeed.

The tensions and conflicts within the communist empire are tremendous. But as long as the West has no will and no courage to destroy communism, all those conflicts, differences and difficulties cannot endanger communism. "The practice is the best judge and it has demonstrated that all existing differences could not and cannot seriously impair the further development of sound, mutually beneficial closest friendly relations of cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe."¹⁹

The Soviet-Yugoslav grand strategy of the "Titoization" of Eastern Europe has—unfortunately—passed the test of Poland and Hungary in October/November 1956 with flying colors. That success recommends it for further and wider application. It has been so successful that the communists will in all probability resort more and more to pre-arranged conflicts. This seems, in the light of the latest experiences, the most effective way to save "the revolution," by mentally confusing and politically paralyzing the free world. Tito's speech in Pula on November 15, and his "indignation" over the Soviet breach of word in the abduction of Imre Nagy, whom he had delivered to the Soviets, point clearly in this direction.

The elementary truth that the outcome of the struggle between communism and freedom depends on the West has been once more demonstrated with overwhelming clarity. The revolt in Hungary which could have been the beginning of the end of communism in the whole world, has become another frustrating instance of Western indecision and wavering.

But if some people have lost courage and hope because of the failure of the free world to help the Hungarian rebels, many more people have been even more strongly impressed by the possibilities for freedom

which the rottenness of communism offers. The thirst for freedom is unquenchable. The blood of the fighters for freedom and of the tyrants alike can only make it more irresistible.

The revolt in Hungary is not the last revolt of the oppressed peoples against communism. And therein lies the mortal danger for communism. Not in the struggle for power among communists, but in the struggle for freedom of all oppressed against all communists.

Hence the responsibility of the free world is growing rapidly and the need for a decision is becoming all the more imperative. In World War II the West not only failed to help the people, but helped communism. Since 1948 it has again helped not the people against communism, but by supporting a communist, Tito, it has helped communism.

That disastrous course cannot be followed much longer. The free world stands today, as it stood in the days of Teheran and Yalta, before the same fateful political dilemma: to support communism (under whatever label) against the people, or to support the people, who want freedom, against communism and all communists. It is not yet too late for a decision and for action, but time is running out.

And on that decision hangs the fate of the world.

1. *New York Times*, January 30, 1956.
2. *New York Times*, April 18, 1956.
3. Text on Dissolution of the Cominform, *New York Times*, April 18, 1956.
4. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1956.
5. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 1956.
6. *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 27, 1956.
7. *New York Times*, June 27, 1956. Italics added.
8. *New York Times*, August 1, 1956.
9. "Peril For Polish Leader," article by Jozef Swiatlo, in *Life*, November 26, 1956, p. 184.
10. *New York Times*, October 22, 1956.
11. *New York Times*, November 16, 1956.
12. *Politika*, October 24, 1956.
13. *New York Times*, November 5, 1956.
14. *New York Times*, November 6, 1956.
15. *New York Times*, November 14, 1956.
16. *New York Times*, November 14, 1956.
17. *Politika*, November 16, 1956.
18. *New York Times*, November 26, 1956. Italics added.
19. *Politika*, October 13, 1956.